JQ£' £ 


The  Struggle 

for 

American    Independence 


By 


Sydney   George   Fisher 

Author  of  "  The  Making  of  Pennsylvania,"  "  Men,  Women,   and    Manners 

in    Colonial   Times,"   M  The   True    Benjamin 

Franklin,"   etc. 


ILLUSTRATED 


Vol.   I, 


r 

UNiVERj 


Philadelphia  £ff  London 

J.    B.    Lippincott     Company 

1908 


immv 


Copyright,  1908 
By  J.  B.  Lippincott  Company 


Published  April,  1908 


Electrotyped  and  Printed  by  J.  B.  Lippincott  Company 
The  Washington  Square  Press,  Philadelphia,   U.  S.  A. 


} 


PREFACE 


The  present  work  is  a  continuation  and  enlargement  of 
"  The  True  History  of  the  American  Revolution,"  published 
some  years  ago  in  one  volume.  That  work,  while  being  a  brief 
general  account  of  the  contest,  dwelt  more  particularly  on  cer- 
tain phases  of  the  struggle  which  had  been  omitted  or  ignored 
by  the  historians.  It  soon  became  obvious  that  it  did  not  go 
far  enough,  that  the  original  plan  should  be  extended  and  car- 
ried out  in  more  detail,  and  that  the  whole  mass  of  original 
evidence  in  libraries  and  historical  societies  should  be  made 
accessible,  and  revealed  to  the  public  in  as  complete  a  manner  as 
possible.  Our  people  have  little  or  no  conception  of  what 
the  Revolution  really  was,  no  conception  of  the  nature  of  the 
original  evidence ;  and  the  unwillingness  of  our  writers  of  gen- 
eral histories  to  cite  that  evidence  keeps  it  a  sealed  book  to  the 
public. 

Our  national  feeling  is  bound  up  in  the  Revolution,  and 
the  extreme  importance  of  such  an  event,  which  was  the 
foundation  of  our  nationality  and  of  the  political  and  social 
principles  by  which  we  are  still  guided,  seems  to  deserve  all  the 
light  that  it  is  possible  to  obtain.  We  naturally  want  to  know 
the  origin  of  our  political  existence  and  exactly  why  and  how 
we  broke  away  from  that  great  empire  which  since  then  has 
never  allowed  another  dependency  to  escape,  which  has  reduced 
republics  to  colonies,  and  brought  into  subjection  innumerable 
peoples  and  races,  and  whose  rule,  we  are  told,  is  an  unmixed 
blessing,  far  preferable  to  independence. 

"Although  our  Revolution  is  said  to  have  changed  the  thought 
of  the  world,  like  the  epochs  of  Socrates,  of  Christ,  of  the 
Reformation,  and  of  the  French  Revolution,  yet  no  complete 
history  of  it  has  ever  been  written  upon  the  plan  of  dealing 
frankly  with  all  the  contemporary  evidence  and  withholding 


4  ^(\nck  ,i 


PREFACE 

nothing  of  importance  that  is  found  in  the  original  records. 
Our  histories  are  able  rhetorical  efforts,  enlarged  Fourth-of- 
July  orations,  or  pleasing  literary  essays  on  selected  phases  of 
the  contest.  There  has  been  no  serious  attempt  to  marshal  all 
the  original  sources  of  information  and  reveal  them  to  the 
reader,  as  has  been  done  for  the  history  of  England,  of  France, 
and  of  other  countries. 

Our  writers  ignore  the  position  of  the  loyalists  and  their 
terrible  conflict  with  the  patriots,  whom  they  almost  equalled 
in  numbers.  They  have  failed  to  describe  the  methods  by 
which  the  loyalists  were  subdued,  which  amounted  to  another 
war  in  addition  to  that  carried  on  by  Washington  against  the 
British  army.  They  ignore  the  controversy  over  General  Howe 's 
methods  of  carrying  out  his  instructions  from  the  British 
Ministry,  the  investigation  of  those  methods  by  a  Parliamentary 
inquiry,  and  Howe's  defense  of  himself.  They  ignore  the 
Clinton-Cornwallis  controversy,  without  a  knowledge  of  which 
it  is  impossible  to  understand  the  strategy  of  the  last  three  years 
of  the  war,  as  it  is  impossible  to  understand  the  first  three  years 
without  a  knowledge  of  the  Howe  controversy. 

There  is  no  general  history  of  the  Revolution  from  which 
one  can  obtain  an  intelligent  understanding  of  the  Navigation 
and  Trade  Laws,  and  the  part  they  played  in  the  contest; 
of  the  smuggling  in  defiance  of  them,  and  the  nature  of  the  con- 
troversy over  the  writs  of  assistance  that  were  issued  to  stop  the 
smuggling.  There  is  no  history  which  tells  us  what  became  of 
the  navigation  and  trade  laws  and  the  writs  of  assistance  after 
our  Revolution,  whether  they  were  continued  in  force  among 
Great  Britain's  remaining  colonies,  or  when  they  were  repealed, 
and  what  were  the  reasons  for  the  repeal. 

Indeed,  the  effect  of  our  Revolution  on  Great  Britain's 
colonial  policy  never  seems  to  have  been  honored  with  any 
serious  investigation.  We  seek  in  vain  to  learn  from  the 
histories  how  England  governed  her  colonies  for  half  a  century 
after  our  separation,  what  lessons  she  learned  from  our  Revolu- 
tion, and  in  what  respects  her  present  policy  differs  from  or 
resembles  the  policy  against  which  we  rebelled. 

vi 


PREFACE 

I  have  never  seen  any  attempt  to  describe,  from  the  original 
records,  England's  exact  position  with  regard  to  ourselves  at 
the  outbreak  of  the  Revolution,  except  the  usual  assumption 
that  the  Tory  statesmen  who  were  in  power  were  either 
ignorantly  stupid,  and  blind  to  their  own  interests,  or  desper- 
ately corrupt  and  wicked,  and  that  the  Whig  minority  were 
angels  of  light  who  would  have  saved  the  colonies  for  the 
British  empire. 

According  to  this  assumption,  the  contest  was  one  of  extreme 
virtue  on  one  side  against  extreme  vice  of  every  sort  on  the 
other;  and  if  the  good  Whigs  had  had  their  way  we  should 
still  be  innocent,  loyal  colonies,  as  Canada  and  Australia  are 
supposed  to  be,  happy  in  their  lack  of  dangerous  and  tumultu- 
ous independence.  Why  this  should  be  regarded  by  our  his- 
torians as  a  desirable  result  of  the  Revolution,  and  why  their 
attempts  to  show  that  we  wanted  to  remain  in  the  British 
empire  should  be  considered  patriotic  I  have  never  been  able 
to  understand. 

There  is  no  general  history  of  the  Revolution  that  gives 
any  adequate  description  of  the  twelve  or  thirteen  acts  of 
Parliament  the  patriot  colonists  wished  repealed;  or  a  full 
explanation  of  why  they  wished  them  repealed.  There  is  no 
account  of  the  full  meaning  of  their  requirement  that  Great 
Britain  should  keep  no  troops  and  build  no  fortification  in  a 
colony,  except  by  the  consent  of  that  colony. 

All  these  subjects  were  very  familiar  ones  to  the  people  of 
those  days;  but,  for  want  of  adequate  description,  they  are  as 
unknown  to  modern  readers  of  history  as  are  the  conciliatory 
measures  Great  Britain  adopted,  her  gentle  and  mild  efforts  to 
persuade  us  to  remain  in  the  empire ;  and  we  must  not  obscure 
or  ignore  these  measures  because  they  do  not  show  the  British 
Government  to  have  been  stupid  and  tyrannical. 

All  these  topics  are  of  such  interest  and  importance,  that  it 
is  strange  that  they  have  always  been  left  to  persons  who  were 
unable  or  unwilling  to  reveal  them.  Our  great  masters  of 
historic  method  and  research,  Prescott,  Motley,  and  Park- 
man,  never  attempted  to  write  the  history  of  the  Revolution. 

vii 


PREFACE 

They  sought  a  field  for  their  genius  in  describing  the  conquest 
and  plunder  of  the  native  races  of  Mexico  and  Peru,  the  success- 
ful resistance  of  Protestant  thrift  and  heroism  in  the  Nether- 
lands, the  romantic  adventures  of  Jesuit  missionaries,  and  the 
French  and  Indian  wars  of  Canada. 

Why  they  considered  the  Revolution  uninteresting,  or 
unworthy  of  their  genius,  we  shall  perhaps  never  know.  It 
may  have  been  that  they  had  the  feeling,  so  common  in  their 
time  among  the  educated  classes,  and  by  no  means  yet  extin- 
guished, that  our  annals  were  essentially  dull  and  commonplace, 
incapable  of  any  high  order  of  literary  use.  They  may  have 
thought  that  the  Revolution  was  too  much  involved  with  the 
rights  of  man  and  levelling  principles  of  plebeian  advancement, 
and  too  little  connected  with  the  splendor  of  monarchs  and 
conquerors.  It  may  have  seemed  to  them  too  full  of  economic 
theories  of  trade,  too  dependent  on  legal  and  constitutional 
principles,  leading  too  surely  to  the  dead  level  of  general 
prosperity,  and  a  colorless  triumph  of  the  masses  over  princes 
and  aristocracies. 

Or,  possibly,  they  may  have  inferred,  from  the  histories 
published  in  their  time,  that  no  account  of  the  Revolution  would 
be  acceptable  that  was  not  written  in  rhetorical  or  partisan 
language ;  that  freedom  of  research  and  candid  discussion  were 
neither  expected  nor  desired ;  and  that  events  must  be  omitted 
or  manipulated  so  as  to  subserve  some  definite  moral  purpose, 
as  in  the  Reverend  Mr.  Weems'  "Life  of  Washington. ' ' 

The  Weems  lives  of  Washington,  Franklin  and  Marion, 
beginning  in  1800  and  passing  through  over  forty  editions; 
Botta's  history,  a  very  complete  partisan  statement,  the  basis 
of  many  modern  histories,  of  great  popularity  from  1809 
to  about  1850  and  passing  through  ten  editions  in  America 
and  twenty  in  Europe,  were  in  their  way  very  valuable  sources 
of  information.  But,  like  Bancroft's  laborious  pages  and  Hil- 
dreth's  colorless  chronicle,  which  succeeded  them,  they  were 
not  calculated  to  lead  any  one  to  suppose  that  the  Revolution 
afforded  an  opportunity  for  the  display  of  the  high  order  of 
talents  which  Prescott,  Motley,  and  Parkman  possessed.  Certain 

viii 


PREFACE 

it  is  that  no  account  of  the  greatest  period  in  our  political  life 
has  been  written  with  the  broad,  thorough  research,  trained 
scholarship,  dignified  but  fascinating  style,  and  full  intelligent 
inquiry  which  we  find  in  ''The  Conquest  of  Mexico, "  "The 
Rise  of  the  Dutch  Republic, "  or  ' '  The  Conspiracy  of  Pontiac. ' ' 

Although  we  are  a  democratic  country,  our  history  of  the 
event  which  largely  created  our  democracy  has  been  written  in 
the  most  undemocratic  method — a  method  which  conceals  the 
real  condition;  a  method  of  paternalism  which  seeks  to  let 
the  people  know  only  such  things  as  the  writer  supposes  will 
be  good  for  them;  a  method  whose  foundation  principle 
appears  to  be  that  the  people  cannot  be  trusted  with  the  original 
evidence. 

We  frequently  hear  the  question,  Who  is  an  authority  on 
the  Revolution?  or  what  is  the  "final  and  authoritative 
account"  of  some  part  of  it.  But  there  is  no  such  authority, 
and  never  will  be.  There  is  no  person  whose  statement  on  any 
point  can  be  absolutely  accepted;  and  any  one  who  supposes 
that  he  can  write  a  "final  and  authoritative  account"  of  any 
historical  event  is  likely  to  find  himself  disappointed.  By 
authority  or  authorities  is  properly  meant  the  original  evidence 
of  the  persons  concerned  in  the  event,  contained  in  letters, 
memoirs,  and  public  documents.  These  must  always  be  referred 
to  when  any  question  is  raised.  They  are  sometimes  contra- 
dictory ;  but,  nevertheless,  they  are  the  only  authority  we  have. 
Any  one  has  the  right  to  draw  his  own  inferences  from  them; 
but  none  of  these  inferences  are  authority.  The  original 
evidence  in  the  records  is  the  only  real  authority. 

For  example,  the  only  authority  for  a  battle  like  Long 
Island  or  Brandywine  consists  of  the  reports  or  letters  of 
Washington,  the  report  and  defence  of  Howe,  and  the  written 
experiences  of  the  officers  and  men  on  both  sides  who  saw  the 
battle.  They  must  be  all  read ;  no  one  of  them  is  of  much  value 
by  itself.  After  that  we  gain  light  by  reading  the  criticisms  on 
the  conduct  of  the  generals  by  contemporary  writers,  some  of 
them  military  experts,  some  mere  heated  partisans,  but  all 
valuable  as  making  up  the  history  or  picture  of  the  times  and 

ix 


PREFACE 

of  what  actually  occurred.  Later  military  criticism  from  the 
modern  point  of  view,  as  well  as  descriptions  by  modern  his- 
torians are  no  authority  at  all,  but  merely  more  or  less  inter- 
esting, or  confusing,  comments  on  the  original  evidence. 

Similarly  in  other  episodes  of  the  Revolution,  whether  bat- 
tles, riots,  arguments,  or  development  and  change  of  opinion, 
the  only  authority  is  the  original  testimony  of  the  people  of  the 
time,  the  participants  and  witnesses,  preserved  for  us  in  polit- 
ical pamphlets,  letters,  memoirs,  and  documents.  In  fact,  it 
would  be  better  in  some  respects  if  we  could  abandon  the  word 
authority  and  use  instead  the  terms  witnesses  and  evidence.  In 
the  case  of  the  Battle  of  Long  Island  and  some  other  events  of 
the  Revolution,  the  original  evidence  has  nearly  all  been 
reprinted  in  accessible  form,  sometimes  collected  in  a  single 
volume,  so  that  any  person  within  reach  of  one  of  our  better 
public  libraries  can  read  it  for  himself,  and  draw  inferences 
just  as  good  as  those  of  any  historian  or  so-called  authority. 

The  historians  of  our  Revolution  made  a  great  mistake  in 
abandoning  the  good  old-fashioned  plan  of  referring  to  the 
original  evidence  by  foot-note  citations.  Botta  and  Hildreth 
gave  no  citations.  Bancroft,  who  is  believed  to  have  made  a 
great  study  of  the  original  evidence,  has  only  a  few  citations 
and  those  rather  unimportant,  and  he  does  not  give  the  source 
of  his  quotations.  Fiske,  whose  books  are  the  most  beautifully 
written  and  entertaining  account  of  the  Revolution  that  has 
ever  appeared,  gives  no  citations  at  all.  The  lesser  lights,  of 
course,  follow  these  distinguished  examples.  Their  readers  are 
left  entirely  in  the  dark  as  to  the  nature  of  the  original  evi- 
dence. Instead  of  aiding  investigation,  so  that  subsequent 
writers  could  begin  where  they  left  off  and  accumulate  evidence 
on  all  important  points,  they  cut  off  this  process  altogether. 
Every  subsequent  investigator  must  begin  over  again  the  labori- 
ous process ;  and  for  the  evidence  on  any  point  he  must  search 
in  widely  scattered  sources,  and  hunt  largely  at  random. 

There  is,  of  course,  the  excuse  that  foot-note  citations  give 
an  air  of  learning  and  heaviness  which  alarm  the  general 
reader,  and  this  is  supposed  to  be  a  serious  consideration  in 

x 


PREFACE 

American  history,  which,  above  all  things,  should  be  popular. 
It  is  perhaps  unfair,  therefore,  to  attach  any  blame  to  our 
historians  for  not  using  or  citing  the  original  evidence,  when 
we  consider  that  they  were  striving  merely  to  popularize  the 
Revolution  and  not  to  write  works  of  research.  But  this  feeling 
against  research  has  been  carried  too  far,  and  allowed  altogether 
too  much  influence ;  and  the  practice  of  not  citing  the  evidence 
leads  one  into  very  careless  habits. 

When  no  historians  refer  in  any  adequate  way  to  the  orig- 
inal evidence,  the  compilers  of  the  popular  histories,  appear- 
ing almost  every  year,  are  tempted  to  become  more  and  more 
perfunctory  and  inferior;  for  they  cannot,  of  course,  afford 
the  time  to  search  for  the  original  evidence  in  its  present  widely 
scattered  state.  But  there  would  be  no  reason  why  they  should 
not  read  it,  and  write  from  it,  if  the  greater  part  of  it  were 
cited  under  numerous  topics  in  some  general  history. 

It  is  not  required,  of  course,  that  authorities  should  be  cited 
for  every  statement,  and  in  reading  the  original  sources  one 
acquires  ideas  and  views  which  cannot  be  recorded  in  foot-note 
citations.  But  each  chapter  should  in  some  way  guide  the 
reader  to  the  more  important  parts  of  the  evidence  on  which  it 
is  based.  The  writer  should  not  only  let  the  public  know  who 
the  witnesses  are,  but  if  there  are  contradictions  among  them, 
controversies  as  to  facts  or  the  motives  of  public  characters,  or 
differences  of  opinion  as  to  measures,  he  should  not  conceal 
these  difficulties  from  the  reader.  He  should  not  undertake  to 
decide  everything  for  him,  and  make  things  appear  smooth 
which  in  reality  are  rough. 

The  disregard  for  the  original  evidence  has  been  so  universal 
that  our  most  intelligent  people  do  not  know  that  there  is 
this  evidence,  contained  in  innumerable  letters,  memoirs, 
and  documents.  In  talking  recently  with  a  college  professor  of 
high  reputation  in  his  special  branch,  familiar  with  libraries, 
and  of  considerable  knowledge  of  the  world,  he  expressed  sur- 
prise that  there  was  any  original  evidence  of  the  Revolution 
that  was  worth  investigating  or  that  would  require  much  time 
to  investigate.    He  supposed  that  there  was  nothing  but  certain 


PREFACE 

battles  and  dates,  and  that  one  could  write  a  history  only  by 
reading  secondary  writers  and  commentators — Bancroft,  Fiske, 
Botta — and  essays  and  articles  by  various  members  of  the 
Adams  family,  and  from  these  preparing  a  re-statement  of 
general  views  and  principles. 

That  is,  in  truth,  the  process  that  has  been  going  on; 
repeated  rehashing  of  secondary  opinions  without  ever  recur- 
ring to  the  original  evidence;  and  every  re-statement,  inspired 
often  by  a  small  money-making  enterprise,  carries  us  farther 
from  the  original  reality. 

Published  lists  and  bibliographies  of  so-called  authorities, 
instead  of  guiding  us  to  the  original  evidence,  contain  for  the 
most  part  mere  secondary  commentaries,  which  are  of  course 
more  accessible  and  more  easily  collected.  The  secondary  com- 
mentaries increase  in  numbers  and  make  a  goodly  show.  The 
original  evidence  is  comparatively  small  in  amount,  but  very 
difficult  to  bring  together. 

For  these  reasons  I  called  the  volume  I  wrote  on  the  subject 
some  years  ago  "The  True  History  of  the  American  Revolu- 
tion"; for  while  I  agree  with  certain  objectors  that  there  is  no 
such  thing  as  ' '  absolute  truth ' '  except  in  the  mind  of  God,  yet 
the  title,  taken  in  the  ordinary  meaning  of  English,  correctly 
describes  my  effort  to  lead  our  historical  writing  back  to  the 
original  documentary  evidence,  which  constitutes  all  the  truth 
we  ever  have  of  a  past  event  when  the  eye-witnesses  are  dead. 
The  rising  generation  of  Americans  should  be  led  to  see  that 
the  dignity  of  history  does  not  consist  of  rhetoric  or  pleasing 
literature,  but  of  broad  and  candid  investigation;  and  they 
should  learn  to  admire  truth  and  historic  reality  rather  than 
mere  popular  or  clever  generalizations. 

The  present  volumes  have  been  given  the  title  of  "The 
Struggle  for  American  Independence, ' '  because  as  supple- 
mentary to  the  original  volume,  which  is  to  be  retained  in  the 
series  for  which  it  was  written,  they  bring  out  more  clearly 
than  ever  that  the  Revolution  was  not  the  work  of  a  war 
or  of  a  decade,  but  of  a  long  evolution  of  thought,  experi- 
ence, and  events;  that  it  was  not  a  contest  between  a  dragon 

xii 


PREFACE 

and  a  fairy  settled  once  and  for  all  in  favor  of  the  fairy ;  that 
it  was  not  a  mere  accidental  mistake  on  the  part  of  England, 
that  she  would  not  repeat,  a  contest  mistakenly  conducted 
through  eleven  years  of  argument  and  diplomacy  and  eight 
years  of  war  by  the  King  alone  against  the  wishes  of  the 
English  people;  but  that  it  was  entered  upon  by  the  English 
nation  as  deliberately  and  intelligently  as  any  other  imperial 
expansion  they  have  undertaken  and  upon  principles  which 
for  them  are  still  unchangeable ;  and  that  it  was  a  long,  uncer- 
tain struggle  between  the  two  opposing  ideas  of  colonial  empire 
and  separate  independence,  both  of  which  are  still  powerful  in 
the  world  and  preparing  for  future  struggles. 

There  is  all  the  more  reason  now  for  a  free  and  open  use  of 
the  original  sources  of  the  evidence  of  this  struggle,  because 
within  the  last  sixty  years  they  have  been  admirably  collected 
and  catalogued  or  reprinted  by  historical  societies,  university 
publication  funds,  and  the  efforts  of  public-spirited  citizens. 
Drake's  "Tea  Leaves,"  reprinting  the  original  letters,  papers, 
and  other  authentic  information  relating  to  the  destruction  of 
the  tea  at  Boston,  is  a  good  example.  J.  R.  Bartlett's  collection 
of  all  the  evidence  relating  to  the  burning  of  the  Gaspee  reveals 
the  true  bearings  of  that  incident  in  a  way  that  cannot  be  found 
in  any  history,  and  at  the  same  time  throws  light  on  other 
aspects  of  the  Revolution.  There  is  nothing  so  refreshing  as  to 
read  original  evidence  of  this  sort  after  being  surfeited  with 
general  statements  and  commentaries,  cautiously  written  so  as 
to  make  the  Revolution  seem  smooth  and  easy. 

Flick's  "Loyalism"  is  another  very  satisfactory  work,  an 
admirable  collection  of  real  evidence ;  and  in  the  same  connec- 
tion should  be  mentioned  Van  Tyne  's  ' '  Loyalists. ' '  Then  there 
is  Judge  Gray's  exhaustive  investigation  of  the  subject  of 
Writs  of  Assistance,  in  which  he  throws  a  flood  of  light  on  the 
whole  subject  of  the  smuggling  trade  and  the  working  of  the 
navigation  laws;  and  in  this  same  line  of  the  navigation  and 
trade  laws  some  valuable  researches  have  been  published  in  the 
third  volume  of  the  Columbia  University  Studies  in  History. 

There  is  Kidder's  collection  of  original  evidence  relating 

xiii 


PREFACE 

to  the  Boston  Massacre,  Striker's  excellent  work  on  the  battles 
of  Trenton  and  Princeton,  Professor  Bassett  's  thorough  investi- 
gation of  the  battle  of  the  Alamance,  and  Haywood's  enlight- 
ening researches  in  the  administration  of  Governor  Tryon. 
The  recent  publication  of  the  diary  and  letters  of  that  very 
devoted  loyalist,  Governor  Hutchinson,  has  opened  for  us  a 
most  important  source  of  information,  and  there  is  also  much 
to  be  learned  from  the  writings  of  the  more  irascible  and  less 
accurate,  but  very  sincere  loyalist,  Judge  Jones. 

These  and  the  various  researches  in  the  French  archives, 
letters,  and  diaries  disclose  how  complicated  the  Revolution  was, 
because  it  consisted  of  three  wars  waged  at  the  same  time,  each 
one  of  which  might  fill  a  volume — our  foreign  war  of  the  patriot 
party  with  England,  our  civil  war  of  the  patriots  with  the 
loyalists,  and  the  European  war  which  France,  Spain  and 
Holland  waged  on  our  behalf. 

I  have  sometimes  cited  the  more  carefully  prepared  biog- 
raphies, which  reprint  original  letters  and  documents;  and  I 
have  treated  the  accounts  of  the  war  by  Harry  Lee,  by  Gordon, 
and  by  Stedman  as  original  evidence,  not  to  be  blindly  followed, 
but  to  be  considered  along  with  the  rest.  Lee  is  a  most  intelli- 
gent eye-witness  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  successful  parti- 
san officer  who  was  also  a  man  of  broad  education  and  talents. 
Stedman  was  an  officer  with  the  British  army  in  America  all 
through  the  war;  and  his  book,  whether  written  solely  by 
himself  or  with  the  assistance  of  Dr.  William  Thomson,  is 
valuable  evidence  from  the  more  moderate  English  point  of 
view.  Gordon,  an  English  Congregationalist  minister,  lived 
in  Massachusetts  during  the  Revolution  and  afterwards 
returned  to  England.  While  in  this  country  he  took  the 
patriot  side,  collected  material  for  his  book,  visited  battle- 
fields, talked  with  generals  and  statesmen,  and  had  access  to 
their  papers.  That  part  of  his  work  is  a  reprint  of  what 
had  been  published  in  the  Annual  Register  is  not,  to  my 
mind,  a  reason  for  excluding  him  as  a  witness,  for  the  Annual 
Register,  an  English  periodical  of  the  time,  written,  it  is  sup- 
posed, by  Burke,  was  generally  admitted  by  both  sides  to  have 

xiv 


PREFACE 

furnished  the  most  reliable  and  impartial  account  of  the  events 
of  the  Revolution.  A  large  part  of  the  letters  and  documents 
which  Gordon  read  in  manuscript  have  since  his  day  been  pub- 
lished in  the  American  Archives,  and  confirm  his  statements, 
notably  in  the  important  year  1775.  But  he  is  only  one  witness 
and  tells  only  a  part.  I  cite  always  from  the  first  edition  of  his 
work  published  in  London  in  1788. * 

It,  of  course,  naturally  follows  from  the  position  I  have 
taken  that  I  can  see  no  good  reason  for  the  usual  custom  of 
rejecting  entirely  the  point  of  view  and  the  writings  of  the 
loyalists;  and  I  accordingly  accept  them  as  relevant  evidence 
to  be  weighed  along  with  the  rest. 

It  is  also  evident  from  this  preface  and  the  whole  course 
of  the  narrative,  that  I  reject,  as  too  narrow  and  partisan, 
the  English  Whig  point  of  view,  on  which  both  Fiske's  and 
Trevelyan's  charmingly  written  histories  of  the  Revolution 
are  based.  The  Whig  point  of  view  that  the  patriots  were 
not  seeking  independence,  that,  if  kindly  treated  and  the 
troops  withdrawn,  they  would  voluntarily  remain  in  the 
Empire,  and  that  if  the  Whigs  had  been  put  in  power 
the  Anglo-Saxon  race  would  never  have  been  divided  and 
America  would  still  constitute  part  of  the  British  empire,  was, 
no  doubt,  a  very  proper  platform  for  the  Whig  party  as  a 
minority  trying  to  regain  office.  It  was  a  source  of  endless 
minority  eloquence  as  Burke,  Pox,  and  Lord  Chatham  dis- 
covered. But  it  is  entirely  too  restricted,  as  it  seems  to  me, 
too  unjust  to  the  real  patriots,  and  too  much  opposed  to  a 
great  mass  of  evidence  to  be  at  all  suitable  for  history. 

Such  modern  English  works  as  the  1894  edition  of  Todd's 
"Parliamentary  Government  in  the  British  Colonies,"  Sir 
Henry  Jenkyns'  "British  Rule  and  Jurisdiction  Beyond  the 
Seas,"  the  edition  of  1891  of  Lewis's  "Government  of  Depen- 
dencies," together  with  histories  of  Canada  and  Australia  like 


1See  a  rather  extreme  attack  upon  Gordon  in  Report  Am.  Hist. 
Assoc.  1899,  vol.  i,  p.  365 ;  contra  Winsor,  "  Handbook  of  the  Amer- 
ican Revolution."   p.  286. 

xv 


PREFACE 

those  of  Bourinot  and  Tregarthen,  and  works  on  India  like 
those  of  Naoroji,  Digby,  Lilly,  and  Dutt,  I  have  made  con- 
siderable use  of  because  they  disclose  the  modern  British  colonial 
system  and  open  a  whole  new  domain  of  thought  by  comparison 
with  the  system  against  which  our  ancestors  rebelled. 

Besides  all  these  sources  of  information,  there  are  numer- 
ous articles  and  notes  of  general  research  in  such  periodicals 
as  the  Pennsylvania  Magazine  of  History,  the  American  His- 
torical Review,  the  Historical  Magazine,  and  in  the  reports  of 
the  American  Historical  Association.  There  are  the  thousands 
of  pages  in  the  huge  volumes  of  Force's  American  Archives, 
besides  various  reprints  of  documents  and  letters  too  numerous 
to  mention,  as  well  as  the  vast  field  of  investigation  which  opens 
before  one  when  the  old  contemporary  pamphlets  are  examined. 

It  is  passing  strange  that  so  much  scholarly  and  excellent 
work  should  have  been  done  in  collecting  this  material  of  the 
Revolution  and  that  so  little  use  of  it  should  be  made  in  writing 
general  histories.  It  is  strange  that  these  isolated  investigators 
should  have  been  so  genuine  and  sincere,  so  thorough-going  and 
candid,  and  the  general  historians  so  much  the  reverse. 

This  excellent  individual  work  is  widely  scattered,  buried, 
and  to  all  intents  forgotten,  in  the  libraries  and  historical  socie- 
ties. To  bring  together  under  proper  topics,  even  in  an  approx- 
imate degree,  all  the  instances  of  the  original  evidence,  when 
it  has  never  been  done  before,  is  a  troublesome  task;  and  to 
state  the  results  briefly  and  without  dulness  is  still  more  diffi- 
cult. It  is  not  likely  that  I  have  been  able  to  do  either  to  the 
satisfaction  of  everybody.  It  will  be  enough  if  the  greater  part 
of  the  evidence  has  been  brought  together  so  that  the  investi- 
gator of  the  future  will  not  have  to  search  for  it  at  random. 


CONTENTS 


VOLUME  I 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.  Early  Conditions  and  Causes 1 

II.  Effect  of  the  Reformation  and  the  Rights  of  Man.  . .     18 

III.  The  Great  Protective  System  of  the  Trade  and  Navi- 

gation Laws 36 

IV.  The  Writs  of  Assistance 49 

V.  More  Stringent  Navigation  Laws,  Admiralty  Courts 

and  Customs  Officials 61 

VI.  The  Stamp  Act 69 

VII.  Arguments  against  The  Stamp  Act 82' 

VIII.  The  Stamp  Act  Cannot  be  Enforced  and  is  Repealed  .    101 

IX.  The  Paint,  Paper  and  Glass  Act 112 

X.  Troops  Sent  to  Boston,  but  the  Paint,  Paper  and 

Glass  Act  is  Repealed 126 

XI.  The  First  Bloodshed  of  the  Revolution  in  New  York 

and  Boston.  .  <. 137 

XII.  Continued  Mildness  of  British  Measures 145 

XIII.  The  Whately  Letters  Increase  the  III  Feeling 157 

XIV.  The  Tea  Episode 164 

XV.  The  Punishment!  of  Boston 182 

XVT.  The  Culmination  of  the  Patriot  Argument 190 

XVII.  The  Passion  for  Independence  Restrained  or  Con- 
cealed   206 

XVIII.  The  Boston  Port  Bill  is  Enforced 214 

XIX.  The  Continental  Congress  is  Elected 221 

XX.  The  Congress  Gives  England  an  Ultimatum 226 

XXI.  The  Rise  and  Numbers  of  the  Loyalists 240 

XXII.  The  Methods  of  Suppressing  the  Loyalists 255 

XXIII.  England  Rejects  the  Ultimatum  of  the  Congress 275 

XXIV.  Preparing  for  the  Break 293 

XXV.  The  Battle  of  Lexington 300 

XXVI.  The  Patriots  Besiege  Boston  and  Take  Ticonderoga  309 

XXVII.  The  Second  Continental  Congress 322 

XXVIII.  Bunker  Hill 333 

XXIX.  Incidents  and  Results  of  Bunker  Hill 343 

xvii 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTEB  PAGE 

XXX.  Washington  is  Appointed  Commander-in-chief 349 

XXXI.  The  Character  and  Condition  of  the  Patriot  Army.  .  356 

XXXII.  British  Sovereignty  Extinguished  in  1775 372 

XXXIII.  The  Destruction  of  Portland  and  Norfolk 382 

XXXIV.  The  American  Navy  and  Privateering 387 

XXXV.  The  Attack  upon  Canada 394 

XXXVI.  Arnold's  March  to  Quebec 400 

XXXVII.  The  Retreat  from  Canada 412 

XXXVIII.  The  Evacuation  of  Boston 425 

XXXIX.  Independence  Openly  Discussed 436 

XL.  A  Comprehensive  Plan  to  Subjugate  the  Southern 

\  Colonies 445 

XLI.  The  Adoption  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence.  . .   457 

XLII.  Military  Conditions  and  General  Strategy 466 

XLIII.  The  Great  Armada  and  its  Proposals  of  Peace 479 

XLIV.  The  Battle  of  Long  Island 490 

XLV.  More  Proposals  of  Peace 501 

XL VI.  The  Motives  of  the  Howes 507 

XL VII.  The  Taking  of  New  York  and  the  Battle  of  Harlem 

Heights 515 

XL VIII.  White  Plains  and  Fort  Washington 522 

XLIX.  The  Retreat  Across  New  Jersey  and  the  Capture  of 

Lee 535 

L.  Arnold  Defeated  on  Lake  Champlain 545 

LI.  Trenton 552 

LII.  Princeton 564 


VOLUME  II 

CHAPTER  *•  PAGE 

LIII.  The  Quiet  Spring  of  1777 1 

LIV.  The  Battle  of  Brandywine 10 

LV.  The  Struggle  for  the  Schuylkill 30 

LVI.  The  Battle  of  Germantown 37 

LVII.  The  Defence  of  Red  Bank  and  Fort  Mifflin 42 

LVIII.  Burgoyne  Sweeps  Down  from  Canada 56 

LIX.  Howe's  Defence  of  His  Abandonment  of  Burgoyne  67 
LX.  Burgoyne's  Defeat  at  Fort  Stanwix  and  at  Ben- 
nington   77 

V/LXI.  The  Two  Battles  of  Saratoga 85 

LXII.  The  Surrender 98 

LXIII.  Burgoyne's  Reception  in  England 106 

LXIV.  The  Alliance  with  France 113 

LXV.  Another  Quiet  Winter  and  Spring 122 

xviii 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGB 

LXVI.  The  Mischianza 139 

LXVII.  Lafayette's  Narrow  Escape  at  Barren  Hill 144 

LXVIII.  General  Howe  Returns  to  England,  and  His  Con- 
duct of  the  War  is  Investigated 149 

LXIX.  The  British  Make  Their  Last  Supreme  Effort  for 

Compromise 158 

LXX.  Clinton    Abandons    Philadelphia    and    Fights    the 

Battle  of  Monmouth 174 

LXXI.  Lee's  Conduct  and  Trial 189 

LXXII.  The   Condition   of   Philadelphia;  the   Massacre   of 

Wyoming  and  the  Taking  of  Kaskaskia 198 

LXXIII.  The  French  Fleet  Fails  at  New  York  and  at  New- 
port    206 

LXXIV.  Clinton  Raids  the  North  and  Strikes  Heavily  in  the 

French  West  Indies 218 

LXXV.  Georgia    Subjugated    and    Proclaimed    a    British 

Colony 228 

LXX VI.  Clinton  Raids  Virginia  and  Connecticut 235 

LXX VII.  The  Alliance  with  Spain,  and  the  Bon  Homme  Rich- 
ard and  Serapis 246 

LXX VIII.  The   British  Establish  a   Post  in  Maine  and  the 

French  Fail  to  Take  Savannah 256 

LXXIX.  The  Fall  of  Charleston 261 

LXXX.  South  Carolina  Conquered  and  Great  Rejoicing  in 

England 270 

LXXXI.  New  Jersey  Invaded,  Gibraltar  Relieved  and  Eng- 
land again  Successful  in  the  West  Indies 279 

LXXXII.  The  French  Fleet  and  Army  Locked  up  in  Narragan- 

sett  Bay i 285 

LXXXIII.  The  Disaster  at  Camden 295 

LXXXIV.  Arnold's  Conspiracy 302 

LXXXV.  Traitors  and  Double  Spies 313 

I  LXXXVI.  Holland  Joins  in  the  War,  the  Subjugation  of  South 

Carolina  and  the  Mediation  of  Russia 328 

LXXXVII.  Cornwallis  Begins  to  Break  Up  Clinton's  Policy  . . .  336 

LXXXVIII.  The  Battle  of  King's  Mountain 349 

LXXXIX.  The  Riflemen  Hang  Nine  of  Their  Prisoners 360 

XC.  The  Retreat  of  Cornwallis  and  Greene's  Daring 

Strategy 367 

XCI.  The  Battle  of  Cowpens 382 

XCII.  The  Dash  Across  North  Carolina 392 

XCIII.  Greene  Stops  the  Rising  of  the  Loyalists 401 

XCIV.  The  Battle  of  Guilford  Court  House 406 

XCV.  Cornwallis  Retreats  to  Wilmington  and  Abandons 

South  Carolina 412 

xix 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

XCVI.  The  Carolinas  in  a  State  of  Anarchy 417 

XCVII.  Greene  Loses  the  Battle  of  Hobkirk  Hill 424 

XCVIII.  The  Fall  of  Augusta  and  Ninety-Six 432 

XCIX.  The  Battle  of  Eutaw  Springs  Confines  the  British 

to  the  Seaports 439 

C.  The  Scene  Shifts  to  Virginia 446 

CI.  Cornwallis  Retires  to  Yorktown 463 

CII.  The  Attack  upon  New  York  Changed  to  an  Attack 

upon  Yorktown 471 

CHI.  The  Siege  of  Yorktown 492 

CIV.  The  Effect  of  the  Fall  of  Yorktown  and  of  the 

LOSS  OF  EUSTATIUS,  MINORCA  AND  St.  CHRISTOPHER  .  .    504 

CV.  British  Naval  Superiority  Restored  by  Rodney's 

Victory  at  Guadaloupe 514 

CVI.  First  Attempts  at  Peace 524 

CVII.  Suspicious  Character  of  the  Overtures  for  Peace.  .  528 

CVIII.  A  Provisional  Treaty  with  England  is  Secured 536 

CIX.  Parliament   Overthrows   the   Shelburne   Ministry 

for  Making  the  Treaty 546 

CX.  The  Effect  of  the  Revolution  on  England's  Co- 
lonial System 552 


LIST   OF   ILLUSTRATIONS 


VOLUME  I 

PAGE 

The  Repeal,  or  Funeral  of  Miss  Amer  Stamp.  An  English  caricature  on 
the  repeal  of  the  Stamp  Act.  See  Pennsylvania  Magazine  of  History, 
vol.  30,  pp.  413,  414 110 

Poster  against  the  loyalists  in  Philadelphia.  From  the  copy  in  the 
Historical  Society  of  Pennsylvania 260 

Dispatch  carried  by  express  riders  giving  the  news  of  the  Battle  of  Lex- 
ington.    From  the  original  in  the  Historical  Society  of  Pennsylvania  310 

Old  Engraving  of  the  Battle  of  Bunker  Hill 340 

Philadelphia  Broadside  giving  the  news  of  the  Battle  of  Bunker  Hill. 
From  the  copy  in  the  Pennsylvania  Historical  Society 344 

Revolutionary  Weapons  and  Ammunition.  The  gun  with  the  long, 
broad  bayonet  is  the  English  Tower  Musket.  The  gun  with  the  short 
bayonet  is  one  of  the  muskets  sent  to  us  from  France  in  the  first 
shipment  in  1777.  The  weapon  in  the  middle  is  the  frontier  rifle. 
On  the  floor  is  a  cartridge  box  with  some  of  the  paper  cartridges. 
Photographed  from  the  collection  of  Mr.  William  Read  of  Boston, 
Massachusetts 362 

Portrait  of  General  Howe.  From  Andrews'  "War  with  America, 
France  and  Spain"  published  in  1785.  Revolutionary  portraits  are 
often  unreliable  as  likenesses.  This  one  of  Howe  may  or  may  not 
be  a  likeness.  But  as  it  is  interesting  and  well  executed,  it  has  been 
admitted  in  order  to  give  the  reader  some  idea  of  the  man  about 
whom  so  much  is  said 482 

Contemporary  French  Engraving  of  the  Burning  of  New  York.  Women 
are  represented  as  the  incendiaries.  From  D'Auberteuil's  "  Revolu- 
tion of  North  America,"  published  in  1782 518 

MAPS 

Map  of  the  Siege  of  Boston  showing  the  importance  of  Breed's  Hill, 

Dorchester  Heights  and  Nooks  Hill 316 

Map  of  the  Battle  of  Bunker  Hill 336 

Map  showing  the  General  Strategy  of  the  War 470 

Map  of  the  Battle  of  Long  Island 494 

Map  showing  movements  to  White  Plains 526 

Map  of  Washington's  Retreat  across  New  Jersey 536 

Map  of  British  outposts  in  New  Jersey 554 

xxi 


LIST   OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 

VOLUME  II 

PAGE 

House  in  which  Baroness  Riedesel  took  refuge.  From  a  picture  in  the 
collection  of  Mr.  Julius  F.  Sachse  of  Philadelphia 98 

Surrender  of  Burgoyne  from  a  sketch  by  a  German  officer.  From  the 
original  in  the  collection  of  Mr.  Julius  F.  Sachse  of  Philadelphia. . .  .    102 

A  call  for  Sailors  for  Paul  Jones.  From  the  copy  in  the  collection  of 
the  Essex  Institute  at  Salem,  Mass * 252 

Old  Engraving  of  Gordon  Riots  in  London 276 

Portrait  of  De  Grasse.  Engraved  by  Geoff roy;  but  whether  it  is  any- 
thing of  a  likeness  is  not  known.  From  the  Bradford  Club's  "Opera- 
tions of  the  French  Fleet  under  the  Count  de  Grasse. " 480 

Old  French  Engraving  of  the  Surrender  of  Cornwallis.  From  the  col- 
lection of  Mr.  J.  E.  Barr,  of  Philadelphia 498 

Old  French  Engraving  of  the  Siege  of  Fort  St.  Phillipe  in  Minorca. 
From  the  collection  of  Mr.  J.  E.  Barr,  of  Philadelphia 508 

Old  French  Engraving  of  the  Siege  of  Brimstone  Hill,  in  St.  Chris- 
topher.    From  the  collection  of  Mr.  J.  E.  Barr,  of  Philadelphia 512 

Old  French  Engraving  of  the  Surrender  of  Admiral  de  Grasse.  From 
the  collection  of  Mr.  J.  E.  Barr,  of  Philadelphia 518 

MAPS 

Map  of  the  Battle  of  Brandywine 23 

Map  of  the  Battle  of  Germantown 37 

Map  of  River  Defences  of  Philadelphia 42 

Map  of  Burgoyne's  Campaign 63 

Map  of  Clinton's  Retreat  across  New  Jersey 178 

Map  of  Admiral  Howe's  Defence  of  New  York 208 

Map  of  the  West  Indies 224 

Map  of  British  Occupation  of  South  Carolina 374 

Map  of  the  Wandering  Campaign  of  Cornwallis 468 


The  Struggle 

for 

American  Independence 
i. 

EARLY  CONDITIONS  AND  CAUSE 

If  we  look  upon  the  Revolution  merely  as  a  war,  or  series  of 
interesting  battles,  from  1775  to  1783,  we  shall  fail  to  grasp  its 
meaning.  It  was  really  a  long  continued  political  and  economic 
movement,  gradually  creating  among  our  people  a  political 
party  which,  against  great  odds  and  by  persistent  endeavor, 
established  on  this  continent  ideas  and  principles  which  are  not 
yet  entirely  accepted  in  Europe. 

To  fix  upon  an  exact  date  for  the  beginning  of  such  a  move- 
ment is,  of  course,  impossible;  but  it  was  long  before  the  year 
1775.  The  eight  years  of  battles  from  1775  to  1783  were  merely 
a  conspicuous  and  violent  outcropping  of  a  range  of  human 
thought,  which  had  been  developing  fqr  many  decades  and 
continued  to  accomplish  practical  remits  Long  after  Washing- 
ton's work  as  a  military  commander  was  finished.  "The  late 
American  war  is  over,"  said  Dr.  Rush  in  1787,  "but  the  Revo- 
lution is  still  going  on. ' '  l 

From  its  earliest  beginning  it  was  in  every  phase  a  process 
of  evolution;  and  must  be  looked  at  in  that  light  to  be  under- 
stood. The  Revolutionary  movement  was  still  conspicuously 
altering  our  social  and  political  conditions  down  to  the  time  of 
the  Civil  War  of  1861,  and  we  have  not  yet  passed  out  of  the 
period  of  history  which  may  be  said  to  belong  to  its  influence. 
We  are  struggling  to-day  to  adapt  its  principles  to  new  and 
unexpected  conditions;  and  its  ideas  are  slowly  working  their 
way  not  only  in  Europe,  but  in  Japan,  China,  and  Russia. 


1  Niles,  "  Principles  and  Acts  of  the  Revolution,"  edition  1876,  p.  234. 

1 


■ '  : \\ : ' / :  j  s    AFRICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

The  great  underlying  conditions  which  brought  about  the 
Revolution  were,  first  of  all,  the  extremely  liberal  charters  and 
governments  which  England  gave  her  colonists  in  order  to 
encourage  the  settlement  of  the  American  wilderness.  The 
privileges  thus  allowed  were  increased  by  the  semi-independence 
and  disregard  of  laws  and  regulations  which  England  could 
not  prevent,  partly  because  the  English  Government  was  not 
strongly  organized,  but  principally  because  the  increasing 
power  of  France  in  Canada  occupied  all  England's  attention 
in  America  up  to  1763.  She  needed  the  help  of  the  colonists 
to  conquer  France,  and  so  long  as  that  help  was  needed  it  was 
not  advisable  to  discuss  a  stricter  regulation  of  colonial  affairs. 

Canada  having  been  conquered  and  the  French  power 
removed  from  the  continent  in  1763,  the  English  Government 
at  once  began  to  regulate  the  American  provinces,  and  re- 
duce them  to  what  she  naturally  considered  a  more  orderly 
and  colonial  condition.  If  that  were  not  done  they  would 
now,  as  the  dread  of  France  was  removed,  press  for  greater 
privileges  and  become  entirely  independent.  This  change  to  a 
severer  regulation  in  1764  was  the  beginning  of  the  modern 
British  empire.  At  that  time  the  present  methods  and  princi- 
ples of  that  empire  were  first  laid  down  and  promulgated.  But 
this  change  was  regarded  by  a  large  part  of  our  people  as  an 
infringement  of  long-established  rights,  and  it  brought  about 
the  outbreak,  which  began  with  ten  years  of  argument,  1764- 
1774,  and  ended  with  eight  years  of  war,  1775-1783.2 

The  liberality  of  some  of  the  early  charters  was  quite 
remarkable.  No  modern  English  colonies,  not  even  Canada 
and  the  Australian  provinces,  have  quite  as  much  freedom  as 
Connecticut  and  Rhode  Island  enjoyed  all  through  our  colonial 
period.  They  elected  their  own  legislatures  and  governors,  and 
did  not  even  have  to  send  their  laws  to  England  for  approval. 
No  modern  British  colony  elects  its  own  governor ;  and  if  it  has 
a  legislature  elected  by  its  people,  the  acts  of  that  legislature 
can  be  vetoed  by  the  home  government.    A  community  electing 

*  American  Archives,  4th  series,  vol.  ii,  p.  1890. 

2 


THE  OLD  CHARTERS 

its  own  governor  and  enacting  whatever  laws  it  pleases  is  not  a 
colony  in  the  modern  English  meaning  of  the  word.  Connecti- 
cut and  Rhode  Island  could  not  make  treaties  with  foreign 
nations,  but  in  other  respects  they  were,  as  we  would  now  say, 
semi-independent  commonwealths  under  the  protectorate  or 
suzerainty  of  England. 

When  the  Ministry  determined  on  reorganizing  the  colonies 
in  1764,  one  of  the  first  subjects  of  discussion  was  how  to 
abolish,  with  the  least  disturbance,  the  old  charters  which  had 
been  originally  granted  as  mere  "temporary  means  for  settling 
the  colonies,"  but  which  now,  as  Governor  Bernard  put  it, 
"amount  to  an  alienation  of  the  dominions  of  Great  Britain, 
and  are,  in  effect,  acts  dismembering  the  British  empire." 
The  charters  of  Connecticut  and  Rhode  Island  were  regarded  as 
particularly  bad  examples,  and  utter  absurdities  in  colonial 
government.  In  the  beginning  of  the  actual  fighting,  in  1776, 
when  it  was  expected  that  the  patriot  colonists  might  com- 
promise, or  agree  to  some  sort  of  peace  or  truce,  Admiral  Howe 
and  General  Howe  were  directed  by  their  secret  instructions  to 
use  every  endeavor  to  obtain  a  surrender  of  the  charters  of 
Rhode  Island  and  Connecticut.3 

Neither  Connecticut  nor  Rhode  Island  changed  its  form  of 
government  during  the  Revolution.  The  Connecticut  charter 
was  found  to  be  liberal  enough  to  serve  as  the  constitution  of  an 
American  State;  and  Connecticut  lived  under  it  until  1818. 
Rhode  Island  lived  under  her  charter  as  a  constitution  until 
1842. 

Our  ancestors  in  colonial  times  encouraged  themselves  to 
regard  the  old  charters  as  so  sacred  that  they  were  of  higher 
authority  than  an  act  of  Parliament.  They  had  been  granted, 
it  was  argued,  not  by  Parliament,  but  by  the  old  English  kings, 
and  were  unalterable  by  Parliament,  unless  the  colonists  con- 


5  Bernard,  "  Select  Letters  on  Government."  See  the  charters  in  the 
collections  of  Poor  or  of  Hazzard ;  also  Palfrey,  "  History  of  New 
England,"  vol.  ii.  pp.  540-566;  copy  of  the  secret  instructions  of  the 
Howes  in  the  Historical  Society  of  Pennsylvania ;  "  Sagittarius's 
Letters,"  Boston,  1775,  p.  20. 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

sented  to  the  alteration.  They  stood  in  the  way  of  all  reorgani- 
zation of  the  colonies  by  England;  and  after  her  experience 
with  them  in  our  Revolution,  England  never  again  granted  such 
charters.  In  fact,  she  gave  up  granting  colonial  charters  alto- 
gether; and  her  present  relations,  even  with  her  most  self- 
governing  colonies,  are  usually  regulated  by  a  mere  act  or 
acts  of  Parliament,  which  no  one  questions  may  be  altered  at 
any  time  by  any  subsequent  Parliament. 

The  first  charter  of  Massachusetts  was  in  effect  as  liberal  as 
those  of  Connecticut  and  Rhode  Island.  It  was  probably  in- 
tended that  the  governing  body  under  this  charter  should 
remain  in  England;  but  the  Puritans  who  had  obtained  it 
moved  the  whole  governing  body  out  to  Massachusetts,  elected 
their  own  legislature  and  governor,  and  did  not  submit  their 
laws  to  England  for  approval.  They  assumed  several  of  the 
attributes  of  sovereignty;  coined  their  own  money,  and  issued 
the  famous  pine-tree  shilling ;  and  established  by  law  a  form  of 
religion,  sometimes  called  Congregationalism,  which  was  not 
recognized  by  the  laws  of  England.  They  ceased  to  issue  writs 
in  the  king 's  name ;  dropped  the  English  oath  of  allegiance,  and 
adopted  a  new  oath  in  which  public  officers  and  the  people 
swore  allegiance,  not  to  England,  but  to  Massachusetts. 

They  debated  what  allegiance  they  owed  to  England,  and 
concluded  that  they  were  independent  in  government,  that  no 
appeals  could  be  taken  to  England,  but  that  they  were  under 
an  English  protectorate.  When  some  captains  of  vessels 
reminded  them  that  no  English  flag  was  displayed  in  the  colony, 
they  debated  whether  the  British  flag  should  be  allowed  to  fly 
on  the  fort  at  Castle  Island,  and  conceded  that  it  might  be 
put  there,  as  that  particular  fort  was  the  king's  property.  But 
they  had  given  so  little  attention  to  allegiance  and  the  symbol 
of  it  that  at  the  close  of  this  debate  no  English  flags  could  be 
found  in  Boston,  and  they  had  to  borrow  one  from  the  captain 
of  a  ship.4 


4Winthrop's  Journal,  published  as  the  "History  of  New  England," 
vol.  i,  pp.  187-188;  vol.  ii,  pp.  279-282;  Palfrey,  "New  England,"  vol.  i, 
pp.  284,  375,  499,  et  passim. 

4 


FREEDOM  IN  VIRGINIA 

Under  this  charter  which  allowed  so  much  freedom  Massa- 
chusetts existed  from  1629  to  1685,  when  her  disregard  of 
British  authority  and  the  killing,  whipping,  and  imprisoning 
of  Quakers  and  Baptists  had  reached  such  a  pass  that  the 
charter  was  annulled,  and  Massachusetts  became  a  colony  under 
a  less  liberal  charter.  She  had  a  governor  appointed  by  the 
king,  and  was  controlled  in  a  way  which,  after  her  previous 
freedom,  was  very  galling. 

These  instances  show  why  New  England  became  so  eager  for 
independence  the  moment  the  French  were  driven  from  Canada. 
Virginia  was  also  ardent,  and  there,  too,  we  find  that  an 
extremely  liberal  government  had  been  allowed  to  grow  up. 
Virginia  had,  alone  and  single-handed,  in  1676,  rebelled  against 
the  whole  authority  of  the  British  Government,  because  she 
thought  her  privileges  were  being  impaired.  Such  an  outbreak 
as  this  and  a  similar  rebellion  in  Massachusetts  in  1690  warned 
England  to  be  as  gentle  as  possible  with  the  colonies,  while 
France  was  becoming  more  and  more  of  a  power  on  the  north 
and  west. 

The  other  colonies  never  had  so  much  freedom.  None  of 
them  elected  their  own  governors ;  they  had  not  had  such  a  taste 
of  independence  as  New  England  and  Virginia,  which  from  the 
English  point  of  view  were  regarded  as  the  leaders  in  rebellion. 
But  they  had  all  had  a  certain  measure  of  their  own  way  of 
doing  things,  and  had  struggled  to  have  more  of  their  own 
way,  and  had  found  that  England  was  compelled  at  times  to 
yield  to  them.  It  is  not  necessary  to  describe  the  details  of  this 
struggle,  in  all  of  its  successes  or  failures.  It  is  of  more 
importance  to  describe  a  method  of  government  which  grew 
up  in  all  the  colonies  that  did  not  elect  their  own  governors,  a 
method  which  they  regarded  as  the  bulwark  of  their  liberties, 
which  in  England  was  regarded  as  scandalous,  but  which  never- 
theless was  allowed  to  go  on  and  had  an  important  influence  on 
the  Revolution. 

This  method  arose  out  of  the  system  by  which  the  people  of 
the  colony  elected  the  legislature,  and  the  crown,  or  a  proprietor 
under  the  crown,  as  in  Pennsylvania  and  Maryland,  appointed 

5 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

the  governor.  Under  this  system  the  legislature  voted  the  gov- 
ernor his  salary  out  of  taxes  which  all  these  colonial  legislatures 
had  the  power  of  levying.  The  governor  had  the  power  of 
absolute  veto  on  all  acts  of  the  legislature,  and,  as  representing 
the  crown,  he  wanted  certain  laws  passed  to  carry  out  the  ideas 
or  reforms  of  the  home  government. 

The  members  of  the  legislature  cared  little  or  nothing  for 
these  reforms.  As  representing  the  people,  they  had  their 
popular  measures  which  they  wished  carried  out.  These  meas- 
ures the  governor  usually  wanted  to  veto,  either  because  he 
deemed  them  hostile  to  the  interests  of  the  crown,  or  because 
he  wished  to  punish  the  legislature  for  failing  to  pass  crown 
measures  on  which  his  reputation  at  home  depended. 

The  governor  and  the  legislature  being  thus  dependent  on 
each  other,  the  question  of  salary  threw  the  balance  of  power 
into  the  hands  of  the  legislature ;  and  they  quickly  learned  the 
trick  of  withholding  the  governor 's  salary  until  he  had  assented 
to  their  measures.  The  system  became  practically  one  of 
bargain  and  sale,  as  Franklin  called  it.  The  people,  through 
their  legislators,  bargained  with  the  governor  for  such  laws 
as  they  needed.  The  petty  squabbles  with  the  governor, 
necessary  to  carry  on  the  system,  were  interminable  in  every 
colony  where  it  prevailed.  They  fill  the  minute-books  and 
records,  making  colonial  history  more  tiresome  than  it  might 
otherwise  be,  except  in  an  instance,  where  Franklin,  who  often 
came  in  contact  with  the  system,  described  it  in  his  inimitable 
manner : 

"  Hence  arose  the  custom  of  presents  twice  a  year  to  the  governors, 
at  the  close  of  each  session  in  which  laws  were  passed,  given  at  the 
time  of  passing;  they  usually  amounted  to  a  thousand  pounds  per 
annum.  But  when  the  governors  and  assemblies  disagreed,  so  that  laws 
were  not  passed,  the  presents  were  withheld.  When  a  disposition  to 
agree  ensued,  there  sometimes  still  remained  some  diffidence.  The 
governors  would  not  pass  the  laws  that  were  wanted  without  being  sure 
of  the  money,  even  all  that  they  called  their  arrears;  nor  the  assemblies 
give  the  money  without  being  sure  of  the  laws.  Thence  the  necessity 
of  some  private  conference,  in  which  mutual  assurances  of  good  faith 
might  be  received  and  given,  that  the  transaction  should  go  hand  in  hand. 


THE  GOVERNOR'S  SALARY 

What  name  the  impartial  reader  will  give  to  this  kind  of  commerce  I 
cannot  say.  .  .  .  Time  established  the  custom  and  made  it  seem  honest; 
so  that  our  governors,  even  those  of  the  most  undoubted  honor,  have 
practised  it.    .    .    . 

"  When  they  came  to  resolve,  on  the  report  of  the  grand  committee, 
to  give  the  money,  they  guarded  their  resolves  very  cautiously,  to  wit: 
'  Resolved  that  on  the  passage  of  such  bills  as  now  lie  before  the  governor 
(the  naturalization  bill  and  such  other  bills  as  may  be  presented  to 
him  during  the  sitting)  there  be  paid  him  the  sum  of  five  hundred 
pounds.'  .    .    . 

"  Do  not,  my  courteous  reader,  take  pet  at  our  proprietary  constitu- 
tion for  these  our  bargain  and  sale  proceedings  in  legislation.  It  is  a 
happy  country  where  justice  and  what  was  your  own  before  can  be  had 
for  ready  money.  It  is  another  addition  to  the  value  of  money,  and,  of 
course,  another  spur  to  industry.  Every  land  is  not  so  blessed." — Works, 
Bigelow  edition,  vol.  iii,  pp.  311-316. 

What  was  thought  and  said  of  this  system  depended  entirely 
on  one's  point  of  view.  Franklin  ridiculed  it  when  it  worked 
against  him.  Afterwards,  in  the  Revolution,  when  he  saw 
that  colonial  self-government  depended  upon  it,  he  became,  like 
Dickinson  and  other  patriot  leaders,  a  stanch  upholder  of  it.6 
In  England  it  was  regarded  as  corruption.  There  was  plenty  of 
corruption  in  England  at  that  time;  but  outside  corruption 
always  seems  the  more  heinous;  and  this  so-called  corruption 
blocked  and  thwarted  nearly  all  the  plans  of  the  mother-country 
to  regulate  her  colonies.  It  was  believed  to  have  seriously 
interfered  with  the  raising  of  supplies  and  aids  for  the  war 
against  the  French  and  Indians.  If  anything  of  the  sort  existed 
in  our  time,  if  a  territory  of  the  United  States,  or  an  island  like 
Porto  Rico,  were  governed  in  that  way,  we  would  denounce  it; 
and  in  all  probability  put  a  stop  to  it  very  quickly.  It  was  very 
natural  that  England,  acting  from  her  point  of  view,  should 
start  to  abolish  it  as  soon  as  France  was  driven  from  the  con- 
tinent, and  this  attempt  was  one  of  the  fundamental  causes  of 
the  Revolution. 


5  Franklin,  Works,  Bigelow  edition,  vol.  iv,  pp.  407-433 ;  vol.  v, 
p.  465.  Dickinson,  "Letters  from  a  Farmer,"  letters  ix,  x ;  Wells,  "  Life 
of  Samuel  Adams,"  vol.  i,  pp.  485-486 ;  Egerton,  "  Origin  and  Growth  of 
English  Colonies,"  ed.  1903,  pp.  152-156;  Report,  American  Historical 
Association,  1894,  p.  148. 

7 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

The  colonists  who  had  become  Americanized,  tinged  with 
the  soil,  differentiated  from  English  influence,  or,  as  English- 
men said,  rebelliously  inclined,  were  all  enthusiastic  supporters 
of  the  system  of  withholding  the  governor's  salary.  They  loved 
it  and  were  ready  to  die  for  it,  and  resisted  any  change  or 
reform  in  it.  They  would  not  hear  of  fixing  regular  salaries 
upon  the  governors,  because  they  knew  that  the  moment  the 
governors  ceased  to  be  dependent  on  the  legislatures  for  their 
salaries,  the  legislatures  would  be  powerless  to  accomplish  the 
popular  will,  and  the  colonies,  except  Connecticut  and  Rhode 
Island,  would  fall  under  complete  control  of  Parliament  and 
the  King.  So  long  as  they  controlled  the  governor  the  peopje 
felt  themselves  freemen;  once  lose  that  control  and  they  were 
mere  colonists,  or,  as  they  expressed  it,  political  slaves.  Each 
legislature  was  called  and  adjourned  by  the  governor;  and  he 
would  hardly  take  the  trouble  to  call  it,  except  to  pass  crown 
measures,  unless  he  was  dependent  on  it  for  his  salary. 

The  system  extended  to  the  judges,  who,  though  appointed 
by  the  crown  or  governor,  were  dependent  for  their  salaries 
on  the  annual  vote  of  the  legislature.  In  New  York  the 
judiciary  was  believed  to  be  notoriously  dependent.  A  chief 
justice,  it  was  said,  gave  a  decision  against  a  member  of  the 
legislature,  who  promptly,  in  retaliation,  had  the  judge 's  salary 
reduced  fifty  pounds.  The  local  magistrates  in  New  York  were 
controlled  by  the  assemblymen.  Some  of  these  magistrates 
could  not  write,  and  had  to  affix  their  marks  to  warrants.6 

The  colonists  insisted  that  they  must  retain  control  of  the 
judges '  salaries,  because,  if  the  crown  both  appointed  the  judges 
and  paid  them  their  salaries,  the  decisions  would  all  be  crown 
decisions.  They  were  willing  to  compromise,  however,  and  fix 
permanent  salaries  on  the  judges  if  the  home  government  would 
agree  that  the  judges  should  be  appointed  for  life  and  good 
behavior  instead  of  holding  office  at  the  pleasure  of  the  crown. 
This   apparently   reasonable   suggestion  the   English   Govern- 


• "  Documents  Relating  to  the  Colonial  History  of  New  York,"  vol. 
vii,  pp.  500,  705,  760,  774,  796-797,  906,  979. 

8 


SALARIES  IN  POPULAR  CONTROL 

ment  would  not  adopt.7  It  seems  to  have  feared  that  the  judges 
holding  office  by  that  tenure  would  gradually  drift  to  the  side 
of  the  colonists,  and  make  regulation  and  administration  more 
difficult  than  ever.  It  was  already  extremely  difficult  to  get  a 
jury  to  decide  in  favor  of  the  crown.  The  control  of  the 
colonies  seemed  to  be  slipping  away,  and  the  Ministry  were 
anxious  to  retain  as  much  of  it  as  was  possible. 

Those  acts  of  Parliament  by  which  the  money  raised  from 
taxes  on  the  colonies  was  not  to  be  cast  generally  into  the 
English  exchequer,  but  to  be  used  for  ' '  defraying  the  expenses 
of  government  and  the  administration  of  justice  in  the  colo- 
nies," and  therefore  would  all  be  spent  in  the  colonies,  read 
innocently  enough.  What  could  be  more  fair  and  honorable 
towards  you,  Englishmen  would  say,  than  an  act  which  takes 
no  money  out  of  your  country?  It  is  the  same  money  which 
you  now  raise  by  taxing  yourselves ;  it  will  be  spent,  in  the  same 
way  as  you  apply  it,  to  pay  governors  and  judges,  and  on  a 
fixed  and  regular  system. 

But  the  ''fixed  and  regular  system"  destroyed  what  the 
Americans  considered  their  fundamental,  constitutional  prin- 
ciple, by  which  executive  salaries  must  be  within  popular 
control.  That  principle  was  vitally  necessary  to  all  the  colonies, 
except  to  Connecticut  and  Rhode  Island.  It  would  become  vital 
to  Connecticut  and  Rhode  Island  if  they  should  lose  the  right 
to  elect  their  own  governors,  as  was  not  improbable  when 
England  began  her  remodelling  after  the  expulsion  of  France 
from  Canada. 

One  effect  of  the  system  of  withholding  the  governor's  salary 
was  to  divide  the  upper  classes  of  the  colonists,  and  indeed  all 
the  people,  into  two  parties — those  who  were  interested  in  the 
governor  and  his  family  and  following,  and  those  who  were 
interested  in  the  legislature.  Around  every  governor  appointed 
from  England  there  grew  up  a  little  aristocracy  of  powerful 
families  and  individuals,  with  their  patronage,  influence,  and 
branches  extending  down  through  all  classes.  The  people  of  this 


Franklin,  Works,  Bigelow  edition,  vol.  v,  pp.  463-464. 

9 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

party  who  had  means  and  education  considered  themselves  social 
superiors,  because  they  were  so  closely  connected  with  Eng- 
land and  the  king,  who  was  the  source  of  all  rank  and  nobility. 
They  considered  themselves  the  only  American  society  that 
deserved  recognition ;  and  nearly  all  of  them  became  loyalists  in 
the  Revolution. 

Among  the  legislative  party,  as  it  may  be  called,  there 
were  individuals  and  families  of  as  much  means  and  as 
good  education  as  any  in  the  governor's  party.  But  they 
formed  a  set  by  themselves,  and  were  sometimes  hardly  on 
speaking  terms  with  the  executive  party.  In  some  of  the 
colonies  the  two  parties  were  on  friendly  terms;  but  in  Penn- 
sylvania, New  York,  and  Massachusetts  the  contests  and  hatred 
between  them  were,  at  times,  extremely  bitter  and  violent. 

Prominent  men  whose  names  have  become  household  words 
among  us — Hancock,  Adams,  and  Warren,  of  Massachusetts; 
Schuyler,  Hamilton,  and  Livingston,  of  New  York;  Reed, 
Morris,  Dickinson,  and  Mifflin,  of  Pennsylvania;  Paca  and 
Chase,  of  Maryland ;  and  Lee,  Washington,  Bland,  and  Harri- 
son, of  Virginia — were  all  of  the  Whig  legislative  set.  They 
were  more  or  less  distinctly  separated  from  the  high  society 
that  basked  in  the  regal  sunlight,  which,  even  when  filtered 
through  a  colonial  governor,  was  supposed  to  redeem  America 
from  vulgarity. 

In  the  party  which  stood  by  the  governors  we  find  another 
set  of  family  names,  the  names  of  the  loyalist  leaders,  who 
believed  that  imperial  restraint  would  be  better  for  us  than 
independence.  If  the  Revolution  had  terminated  differently 
their  names  instead  of  the  others  might  have  become  household 
words  in  America.  The  Hunts,  Galloways,  Aliens,  and  Hamil- 
tons,  of  Pennsylvania ;  DeLancey,  Van  Schaack,  and  Jones,  of 
New  York ;  Leonard,  Hutchinson,  Sewall,  Curwen,  and  Oliver, 
of  Massachusetts,  once  filled  a  large  place  in  the  public  vision, 
but  their  names  are  now  meaningless  to  nearly  every  one. 

The  liberality  of  the  early  charters  and  governments  was  of 
course  due  to  the  desire  of  the  crown  to  encourage  emigration  to 
America  and  get  rid  of  troublesome  people,  rebels  against  either 

10 


AMERICA  SETTLED  BY  DISSENTERS 

the  government  or  the  established  religion,  like  the  Puritans, 
Baptists,  Quakers,  and  Roman  Catholics.  The  charters  were 
not  granted  from  any  particular  love  of  liberty;  for  the  most 
liberal  of  them,  those  to  Connecticut  and  Rhode  Island,  were 
granted  by  Charles  II.  Other  liberal  ones  were  granted  by 
other  Stuart  kings,  with  the  approval  of  their  officials  and 
courtiers,  all  of  whom  showed  by  every  other  act  of  their  lives 
that  they  were  the  determined  enemies  of  free  parliaments  and 
free  representation  of  the  people.8 

For  the  sake  of  getting  rid  of  Roman  Catholics  the  crown 
gave  Lord  Baltimore  a  charter  under  which  he  and  his  colonists 
could  set  up  any  form  of  government  they  pleased  not  contrary 
to  the  laws  of  England;  and  for  the  sake  of  getting  rid  of 
Quakers,  William  Penn  was  allowed  the  same  sort  of  charter  for 
Pennsylvania.  The  Puritans  were  given  great  privileges  in 
New  England  for  the  sake  of  getting  them  out  of  old  England ; 
and  the  royalists  and  churchmen  of  Virginia  left  England 
when  the  Puritans  were  in  power  under  Cromwell. 

It  was  difficult  in  those  days  to  persuade  people  to  go  to 
America.  They  had  to  be  driven  out  by  persecution  or  coaxed 
out  by  offers  of  liberal  government.  There  was  no  crowding 
and  overflow  of  population  in  England.  When  the  first  colony 
was  started,  in  1607,  England's  population  was  only  five 
millions,  and  one  hundred  and  seventy-five  years  afterwards, 
at  the  time  of  the  Revolution,  it  had  increased  to  only  eight 
millions,  and  large  districts  of  country,  especially  in  the  north- 
ern part,  were  as  primitive  and  uncultivated  as  the  American 
wilderness.9 

The  policy  of  the  Government  was  to  have  as  many  people  as 
possible  go  to  America,  where  they  would  encourage  English 
trade  and  shipping  by  furnishing  the  mother-country  with  raw 
material  and  creating  a  demand  for  her  manufactured  goods. 
But  people  would  not  go  for  that  reason ;  and  if  it  had  not 


8  The   "  Grievances  of  the  American   Colonies   Candidly  Examined," 
London,  1776,  p.  10. 

9  See  Macaulay's  famous  Third  Chapter  of  his  History,  and  numerous 
passages  in  Greene's  "  History  of  England." 

11 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

been  for  the  religious  and  political  rebellions  and  persecutions 
of  the  seventeenth  century,  America  would  have  remained  for 
a  long  time  uninhabited  by  white  men.       ^><^^^^c^    £ 

When  persecution  ceased  there  was  no  migration  of  any 
importance  to  the  colonies.  Immigration  to  New  England  ceased 
after  1640;  and  in  all  the  colonies  the  immigration  was  com- 
paratively small.  The  people  increased  in  the  natural  way  by 
births,  and  increased  with  remarkable  rapidity.  The  two  million 
white  colonists  of  1776  were  largely  a  native  stock,  whose 
ancestors  had  been  on  the  soil  for  many  generations ;  and  they 
had  grown  out  of  an  original  stock  of  immigrants  which  had 
not  numbered  one  hundred  thousand.  This  native  and  natural 
growth  is  worth  remembering  when  we  are  seeking  to  explain 
the  desire  for  independence.10 

After  the  reign  of  Queen  Anne,  Walpole  wlien  in  power 
would  not  restrict  the  colonies  in  any  way  or  even  govern  them 
with  any  attention.  He  wished  his  administration  to  have  no 
trouble  from  them,  and  he  thought  it  well  to  encourage  their 
commerce  by  letting  them  alone,  because  the  greater  the  pros- 
perity of  the  colonies,  the  greater  would  be  their  demand  for 
English  goods.11 

"  Walpole  was  content  with  seeing  that  no  trouble  came  from 
America.  He  left  it  to  the  Duke  of  New  Castle,  and  the  Duke  left  it 
so  much  to  itself  that  he  had  a  closet  full  of  dispatches  from  American 
governors  which  had  lain  unopened  for  years.  This  was  what  Burke 
described  as  treating  the  colonies  with  salutary  neglect;  and  what  caused 
it  to  be  said  that  George  Grenville  lost  America  because  he  was  foolish 
enough  to  read  the  American  dispatches." — Morley,  "  Life  of  Walpole," 
p.  169. 

From  other  sources  of  information  we  learn  how  the  colonial 
legislatures  in  this  struggle  with  the  governors  increased  their 


10  F.  B.  Dexter,  "  Estimates  of  Population  in  the  American  Colonies," 
p.  29,  published  by  the  American  Antiquarian  Society  of  Worcester,  Mass. 

11  Annual  Register,  1765,  p.  25.  As  to  departmental  methods  for 
governing  the  colonies  before  the  Revolution,  see  Lewis,  "  Government  of 
Dependencies,"  edition  of  1891,  pp.  149,  160-161;  Pownall,  "Administra- 
tion of  the  Colonies." 

12 


AMERICA  SEMI-INDEPENDENT 

privileges  step  by  step.  They  gradually  secured  for  themselves 
the  appointment  of  all  civil  officers  except  the  governors,  judges, 
and  court  officers.  Governor  Shirley,  writing  in  1748,  describes 
the  steady  encroachments  which  the  colonial  legislatures,  espe- 
cially in  New  York,  had  been  making  upon  the  authority  of  the 
home  government.  Since  1743  the  legislatures,  instead  of 
voting  the  government  supplies  for  five  years,  would  vote  them 
for  only  one  year.  They  had  usurped  the  nomination  of  officers. 
They  wTere  acquiring  more  and  more  control  over  the  militia, 
the  erection  of  fortifications,  and  the  supplies  of  ammunition. 
They  were  gaining  a  stronger  influence  in  regulating  treaties 
and  intercourse  with  the  Indians;  and  in  general  "they  have 
gone  great  lengths  in  getting  the  government,  military  as  well 
as  civil,  in  their  hands. "  12  In  1741  the  governor  of  New  York 
in  rebuking  the  legislature  for  their  aggressiveness  warned  them 
that  for  some  years  the  people  in  England  had  been  well  aware 
of  the  inclination  of  the  colonies  to  throw  off  their  dependence 
on  the  crown.13 

In  short,  as  Sir  George  Cromwell  Lewis  says,  "The  early 
English  colonies  were  in  practice  nearly  independent  of  the 
mother-country  except  as  to  their  external  commercial  rela- 
tions." Instead  of  being  like  modern  English  colonies,  they 
had  become  more  like  Greek  colonies,  which  were  communities 
sent  forth  to  reproduce  the  mother-country,  to  become  self- 
sustaining  and  independent,  and  to  be  assisted  by  the  mother- 
country  only  when  necessary  in  their  wars. 

To  the  Romans  the  word  colony  meant  a  conquered  province, 
garrisoned  and  controlled  by  military  authority,  governed  by 
officials  sent  out  from  Eome,  and  held  as  the  property  of  the 
empire  for  the  benefit  and  profit  of  the  Roman  people,  very 
much  as  crown  colonies  are  held  by  England.  In  England 
the  term  has  usually  meant  an  outlying  community  of  people, 


12  "  Documents  Relating  to  New  York  Colonial  History,"  vol.  vi,  pp. 
432-437;  Smith,  "History  of  New  York,"  edition  1814,  p.  441;  Egerton, 
"  Origin  and  Growth  of  English  Colonies,"  1903,  p.  158. 

"Lewis,  "Government  of  Dependencies,"  edition  1891,  pp.  xxix-xxx 
and  59-60. 

13 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

completely  under  the  authority  of  Parliament,  with  no  self- 
government  at  all,  or  with  a  certain  amount  of  representative  or 
self-government,  according  to  circumstances,  but  with  no  view 
to  ultimate  independence. 

The  old  Greek  colony  of  Corcyreans  said  that  "  they  went 
out  on  the  footing  of  equality  with,  not  of  political  slavery  to, 
those  who  were  left  behind. "  In  a  similar  way  the  colonists  in 
Barbadoes  explained  to  Oliver  Cromwell  that  they  had  the  same 
rights  as  Englishmen  living  in  England,  and  as  Englishmen 
living  in  the  Barbadoes  did  not  interfere  with  Englishmen 
living  in  England,  it  was  no  business  of  the  home-keeping 
Englishmen  to  rule  the  colonists.  They  were  not  a  dependency, 
they  said,  but  a  second  England.14 

A  striking  illustration  of  the  free  condition  of  the  colonies 
was  the  way  in  which  their  legislatures  issued  paper  money, 
which  in  New  England  became  very  seriously  depreciated.  This 
paper  currency  the  colonists  considered  absolutely  necessary  to 
supply  the  place  of  the  gold  and  silver  which  were  so  rapidly 
drained  from  them  into  England  to  pay  for  the  manufactured 
goods  they  bought.  There  seems  to  be  no  doubt  but  that  they 
were  right  in  this,  and  so  long  as  the  issues  of  paper  money 
were  kept  within  safe  bounds,  as  in  Pennsylvania,  no  harm 
resulted.  But  there  were  such  disastrous  results  in  some  colonies 
that  there  was  a  great  outcry  in  England.  To  many  English- 
men this  paper  money  seemed  to  be  a  mere  dishonorable  device 
to  avoid  paying  the  heavy  debts  which  the  colonists  owed  to  the 
British  merchants,  who  sold  to  them  the  axes  with  which  they 
felled  the  forests,  the  plows  with  which  they  tilled  the  lands, 
and  the  utensils  in  which  they  cooked  their  dinners.15 

At  one  time  the  independent  spirit  of  the  colonists  had 
reached  such  a  height  that  some  of  them  attempted  to  pass  stay 
laws  to  prevent  English  merchants  from  collecting  debts  by 
levy  and  sale  of  property  in  the  colonies.     This  was  going 


"Lewis,  "Government  of  Dependencies,"  edition  1891,  pp.  xxix-xxx 
and  59-60. 

w  Phillips,  "  Historical  Sketches  of  Paper  Currency  in  the  American 
Colonies;"  Franklin,  Works,  Bigelow  edition,  vol.  v,  p.  529. 

14 


AMERICA  MUST  BE  REORGANIZED 

too  far  even  for  that  period,  and  an  act  of  Parliament  was 
passed  in  1732  giving  English  merchants  the  same  right  to 
seize  private  property  for  debt  in  the  colonies  that  they  had  in 
England.  That  such  an  act  was  necessary  is  in  itself  a  striking 
commentary  on  the  situation;  and  the  act  became  a  landmark 
in  the  constitutional  relations  between  the  colonies  and  the 
mother-country,  and  was  frequently  cited  during  the  Revolu- 
tion to  show  that  Parliament  had  full  jurisdiction  in  the 
colonies.16 

No  attempt,  however,  was  made  to  restrain  the  paper  money 
issues  until  1751,  when  Parliament  passed  an  act  declaring  the 
paper  money  of  the  New  England  colonies  an  illegal  tender  in* 
payment  of  a  debt.  In  1764,  when  the  French  war  was  over 
and  colonial  reorganization  begun,  Parliament  declared  all 
future  issues  of  paper  money  in  the  colonies  illegal ;  and  this 
was  one  of  the  acts  which  incited  the  outbreak  of  the  Revolution. 

When  we  look  upon  the  situation  candidly,  after  the  lapse 
of  nearly  two  hundred  years,  it  seems  quite  natural  that  Eng- 
land, from  her  imperial  point  of  view  of  a  great  obedient 
empire  should  conclude  that  the  colonies  were  too  independent 
and  must  be  reorganized;  and  it  was  also  natural  that  many 
of  the  colonists  should  look  upon  their  semi-independence  as 
their  long-established  privilege  of  doing  as  they  pleased  and, 
if  they  saw  fit,  governing  themselves  badly. 

France  having  abandoned  Canada  by  the  treaty  of  1763, 
the  following  year,  1764,  was  the  beginning  of  the  attempt  to 
reorganize  the  colonies  and  the  beginning  of  their  resistance 
or  Revolution.  Nothing  but  her  desire  to  conquer  Canada  had 
restrained  England  from  starting  that  reorganization  years 
before ;  and  nothing  but  the  fear  of  the  French  in  Canada  had 
kept  the  colonists  from  being  still  more  independent  in  conduct. 
For  a  number  of  years  the  French  power  in  the  north  had 
been  increasing  and  was  passing  into  the  Ohio  and  Mississippi 
valleys,  to  cut  off  the  colonies  from  westward  expansion. 


16 "  The    Interest    of    the    Merchants    and    Manufacturers    of    Great 
Britain  in  the  Present  Contest  with  the  Colonies,"  p.  38,  London,  1774. 

15 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

Kalm,  the  Swedish  botanist,  who  travelled  in  America  in 
1748,  reported  that  the  presence  of  the  French  in  Canada  was 
all  that  held  the  colonies  in  submission  to  England.  He  met 
both  Americans  and  English  who  foretold  that  the  colonies 
would  be  absolutely  independent  within  thirty  or  fifty  years.17 

In  fact,  the  English-speaking  communities  in  America  were 
not  colonies  in  the  modern  meaning  of  the  term.  England  had 
lost  a  large  part  of  her  sovereignty  over  them;  and  Dean 
Tucker  shrewdly  remarked  that  British  sovereignty  in  the 
colonies  was  entirely  gone  as  soon  as  the  French  were  removed, 
and  that  the  Revolution  was  a  contest  to  recover  it.  Governor 
Bernard,  writing  in  1774,  said  that  at  the  time  of  the  passage  of 
the  Stamp  Act,  ' '  there  was  no  fixed  idea  of  the  relation  between 
Great  Britain  and  America. ' ' 18 

Englishmen  were  so  well  aware  that  as  soon  as  the  French 
power  was  removed  from  Canada  the  irregularities  and  inde- 
pendence of  the  colonies  would  increase,  that  at  the  close  of 
the  French  war  there  was  a  strong  feeling  in  favor  of  returning 
Canada  to  France  to  act  as  a  check  on  the  ambition  of  the  New 
Englanders  and  Virginians.  In  place  of  Canada,  it  was  pro- 
posed to  take  the  rich  sugar  island  of  Guadaloupe,  which,  it 
was  thought,  would  be  fully  as  profitable  as  the  Canadian 
wastes  of  snow. 

Franklin,  who  was  in  London  at  that  time,  vigorously 
opposed  this  feeling  and  policy.    He  wanted  the  French  entirely 


""Travels  into  North  America,"  vol.  i,  p.  265. 

18  "The  True  Interest  of  Great  Britain  Set  Forth,"  p.  12,  London, 
1774;  Cartwright's  "American  Independence  the  Interest  and  Glory  of 
Great  Britain,"  pp.  90-91;  "  The  Constitutional  Right  of  the  Legislature 
of  Great  Britain  to  Tax  the  British  Colonies,"  p.  3,  London,  1768. 
"Letters  of  James  Murray,  Loyalist,"  p.  154;  Bernard,  "{Select  Letters 
on  Trade  and  Government."  Speaking  of  smuggling  in  Rhode  Island  in 
1761  Governor  Bernard,  of  Massachusetts,  said,  "  These  practices  will 
never  be  put  an  end  to  till  Rhode  Island  is  reduced  to  the  subjection  of 
the  British  Empire,  of  which  at  present  it  is  no  more  a  part  than  the 
Bahama  Islands  were  when  they  were  inhabited  by  the  Buccaneers." — 
Quincy's  Reports  of  Massachusetts  Superior  Court,  1761-1772,  pp. 
436-437. 

16 


EFFECT  OF  CANADA 

removed  from  the  continent,  so  that  America  might  be  free. 
But  it  remained  the  general  opinion  in  England  long  after  the 
Revolution  that  "had  not  the  French  been  removed  from 
Canada,  the  revolt  of  America  never  would  have  taken 
place."19 


"Franklin,  Works,  Bigelow  edition,  vol.  iii,  pp.  62,  92,  111,  115; 
Eddis,  "  Letters  from  America,"  p.  54 ;  Stedman,  "  American  War,"  vol.  i, 
p.  31. 

The  change  in  the  situation  by  the  conquest  of  Canada  was  quickly 
seen  by  the  people  of  the  time.  "  No  sooner  were  the  French  kites  and  the 
Indian  vultures  scared  away  than  they  (the  colonists)  began  to  strut  and 
to  claim  an  independent  property  to  the  dunghill.  Their  fear  and  their 
natural  affection  forsook  them  at  one  and  the  same  time." — "  The  Justice 
and  Necessity  of  Taxing  the  American  Colonies,"  p.  7,  London,  1760. 

"  Ever  since  the  reduction  of  Canada,"  wrote  one  of  the  ablest  of 
the  loyalist  pamphleteers,  "  we  have  been  bloated  with  a  vain  opinion  of 
our  own  importance." — "  A  Friendly  Address  to  all  Reasonable  Ameri- 
cans," p.  25,  New  York,  1774.  See,  also,  "  Strictures  upon  the  Declara- 
tion of  the  Congress;"  "Observations  on  the  American  Revolution," 
published  by  order  of  Congress,  1779.  This  document  argues  that  the 
colonies  were  semi-independent  states  under  a  protectorate  from  Great 
Britain  to  save  them  from  France. 


II. 


EFFECT  OF  THE  REFORMATION  AND  THE  RIGHTS 

OF  MAN 

Besides  the  semi-independent  character  of  their  political 
governments,  there  were  other  circumstances  which  tended  to 
inspire  a  large  part  of  the  colonists  with  a  strong  passion  for 
independence,  and  led  them  to  resist  with  unusual  energy  the 
remodelling  plans  which  England  began  in  1764. 

Some  of  these  characteristics  were  eloquently  described  by 
Burke  in  one  of  his  famous  speeches  in  Parliament.  The 
Americans,  he  said,  were  not  only  Protestants,  but  protestants 
against  Protestantism  itself.  They  were  dissenters  from  the 
Church  of  England;  they  were  Puritans,  Congregationalists, 
Presbyterians,  Baptists,  Quakers,  whose  ancestors  had  been 
persecuted  in  England  and  had  fled  to  America  from  that  perse- 
cution. They  hated  the  English  Church  and  the  English  Gov- 
ernment. They  had  lost  all  that  peculiar  English  reverence 
and  deference  for  the  church  and  the  crown.  In  their  religious 
beliefs  and  practices,  they  had  advanced  beyond  all  other 
Protestants  in  the  liberty  of  the  Reformation.  They  had 
rejected  so  many  dogmas  and  sacraments  that  they  were  more 
free  in  their  religion  than  most  of  the  people  of  Europe.  They 
had  trained  and  accustomed  themselves  to  the  freest  and  most 
subtle  debate  of  all  religious  questions,  regardless  of  priests, 
councils,  or  creeds ;  and  they  had  encouraged  this  individualism 
until  even  the  women  thought  for  themselves,  and  it  was  said 
that  every  one 's  hat  was  his  church. 

Such  simple  church  organization  as  they  had  was  demo- 
cratic like  that  of  the  Congregationalists  or  republican  like  that 
of  the  Presbyterians.  The  people  elected  their  own  religious 
leaders,  calling  them  ministers,  pastors,  elders  or  teachers,  and 
dismissed  them  when  their  preaching  ceased  to  please  the  major- 
ity.    This  religious  liberty  naturally  led  to  equally  extreme 

18 


THE  CHURCH  OF  ENGLAND 

political  liberalism.  They  had  accepted  the  right  of  private 
judgment  in  religion  and  they  recognized  the  same  right  in  poli- 
tics. They  were  the  worst  possible  subjects  for  the  formation 
of  a  great  colonial  empire. 

This  characteristic  of  strong  Protestantism  may  be  said  to 
have  applied  more  particularly  to  the  New  Englanders  and  the 
Scotch-Irish  Presbyterians  scattered  along  the  frontiers  of  the 
other  colonies.  But,  nevertheless,  we  find  that  the  churchmen 
of  Virginia  descended  from  English  royalists  were  as  ardent  for 
independence  as  the  Puritans  and  Scotch-Irish.  Washington 
and  all  the  prominent  leaders  in  Virginia  had  been  brought  up 
in  the  Church  of  England.  The  Rutledges,  Laurens,  Pinckney, 
Drayton,  and  Middleton,  of  South  Carolina,  and  other  patriots 
of  the  southern  and  middle  colonies,  were  either  of  the  Church 
of  England  or  of  lighter  forms  of  religious  belief  than  the 
Puritans  and  Presbyterians.  The  English  established  churcli 
had,  in  fact,  been  considerably  transformed  when  transplanted 
to  America.  Many  of  the  Roman  Catholics  of  Maryland  took 
part  in  the  Revolution,  and  one  of  them,  Charles  Carroll,  signed 
the  Declaration  of  Independence.  Dickinson  and  General 
Mifflin,  of  Pennsylvania,  and  General  Greene,  of  Rhode  Island, 
had  been  brought  up  in  the  Quaker  faith. 

The  sturdy  influences  of  Protestantism  and  American  life 
had,  however,  not  so  great  an  effect  on  that  large  body  of  people 
called  loyalists,  whose  numbers  have  been  variously  estimated 
at  from  one-third  to  over  half  the  population.  They  remained 
loyal  to  England,  and  were  so  far  from  being  inspired  with  a 
love  of  independence  that  they  utterly  detested  the  whole 
patriot  cause  and  sacrificed  their  property  and  lives  in  the 
effort  to  stamp  out  its  principles  and  put  in  their  place  the 
British  empire  method  of  alien  control  as  the  best  form  of 
government  for  America. 

Patriot  parties  have  existed  in  other  countries  without  the 
aid  of  the  particular  influences  which  Burke  described.  The 
love  of  national  independence  is,  in  fact,  the  most  difficult 
passion  to  eradicate,  as  the  Irish,  the  Poles,  and  other  broken 
nationalities  bear   witness.     The   desire   for   independence   is 

19 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

natural  to  all  vigorous  communities,  is  generally  regarded  as 
more  manlike  and  honorable  than  dependence,  and  usually 
springs  up  spontaneously  whether  in  Holland,  Switzerland,  or 
America,  in  spite  of  the  commercial  and  conservative  influences 
of  loyalism.  But  nevertheless  the  influences  mentioned  by 
Burke,  and  several  that  he  did  not  mention,  had  no  doubt  con- 
siderable effect  in  creating  the  patriot  party  in  America  and 
inspiring  it  with  enthusiasm  and  energy. 

The  self-confidence  aroused  in  the  colonists  by  their  success 
in  subduing  the  wilderness,  felling  the  vast  forests,  hunting 
the  wild  game  and  still  wilder  red  men,  has  often  been  given  as 
a  cause  of  the  Revolution  and  the  American  love  of  inde- 
pendence. Eloquence  is  easily  tempted  to  enlarge  upon  such 
causes,  and  to  describe  in  romantic  language  the  hunter  and  the 
woodsman,  the  farmer  in  the  fresh  soil  of  primeval  forests,  the 
fishermen  of  the  Grand  Banks,  the  merchants  and  sailors  who 
traded  with  the  whole  world  in  defiance  of  the  British  naviga- 
tion laws,  and  the  crews  of  the  whaling  ships  that  pursued 
their  dangerous  game  from  the  equator  to  the  poles. 

The  American  lawyers,  according  to  Burke,  were  an  impor- 
tant cause  of  the  Revolution.  They  were  very  numerous  in  the 
colonies ;  law  and  theories  of  government  were  much  read  and 
studied,  and  the  people  were  trained  to  discussion  of  political 
rights  as  well  as  of  religious  doctrine.  Burke  described  in 
picturesque  detail  how,  in  the  South,  the  ruling  class  lived 
scattered  and  remote  from  one  another,  maintaining  themselves 
in  self-reliant  authority  on  plantations  with  hundreds  of  slaves ; 
and  slavery,  he  said,  inspired  in  the  white  master  a  fierce  love 
of  independence  for  himself  and  an  undying  dread  of  any  form 
of  the  bondage  which  his  love  of  gain  had  inflicted  on  a  weaker 
race. 

The  geographical  position  of  the  thirteen  contiguous  colo- 
nies, so  situated  that  they  could  easily  unite  and  act  together, 
and  having  a  population  that  was  increasing  so  rapidly  that  it 
seemed  likely  in  a  few  years  to  exceed  the  population  of 
England,  was  possibly  a  more  effective  cause  of  the  Revolution 
than  any  of  those  that  have  been  named.    The  consciousness  of 

20 


DANGER  OF  UNION 

possessing  such  a  vast  fertile  continent,  which  within  a  few  gen- 
erations would  support  more  than  double  the  population  of  lit- 
tle England,  furnished  a  profound  encouragement  for  theories 
of  independence.  People  in  England  were  well  aware  of  this 
feeling  in  the  colonies,  and  Joshua  Gee,  a  popular  writer  on 
political  economy  in  1738,  tried  to  quiet  their  fears.  Some,  he 
said,  were  objecting  that ' '  if  we  encourage  the  Plantations  they 
will  grow  rich  and  set  up  for  themselves  and  cast  off  the  English 
government";  and  he  went  on  to  show  that  this  fear  was 
groundless  because  the  colonists  nearly  all  lived  on  the  navigable 
rivers  and  bays  of  America,  where  the  British  navy  could  easily 
reach  and  subdue  them.  He  also  attempted  to  argue  away  the 
advantage  of  the  contiguous  situation  of  the  colonies  and 
described  them  as  split  up  into  a  dozen  or  more  separate  prov- 
inces, each  with  its  own  governor;  and  it  was  inconceivable,  he 
said,  that  such  diverse  communities  would  be  able  to  unite 
against  England.1 

English  statesmen,  however,  saw  the  danger  of  union  among 
the  colonies  long  before  the  outbreak  of  the  Revolution;  and 
they  shrewdly  rejected  the  plan  of  union  of  the  Albany  con- 
ference of  1754;  and  in  the  Revolution  itself  a  large  part  of 
England's  diplomatic  and  military  efforts  were  directed 
towards  breaking  up  the  easy  communication  among  the 
colonies. 

In  modern  times  England's  colonies  have  been  widely  sepa- 
rated from  one  another.  There  has  been  no  large  and  rapidly 
increasing  white  population  on  contiguous  territory  with  ability 
for  union.  The  dark-skinned  population  of  India  is ;  enormous 
in  numbers,  but  incapable  of  the  united  action  of  the  Americans 
of  1776,  and  India  is  not  considered  a  colony  but  a  territory 
continuously  held  by  overwhelming  military  force.  Instead  of 
a  colonial  population  which  threatened  in  a  short  time  to  out- 
number her  own  people,  England 's  power  and  population  have, 
in  modern  times,  grown  far  beyond  any  power  or  population  in 
her  well-scattered  white  colonies. 


1  Joshua   Gee,   "  Trade  and  Navigation   of  Great   Britain,"   6th  ed. 
71;  Kidder,  "  History  of  the  Boston  Massacre,"  p.  121. 

21 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

The  colonists  at  the  time  of  the  Revolution  have  often  been 
described  as  speaking  of  England  as  home  and  regarding  the 
mother-country  with  no  little  degree  of  affection;  and  while 
there  is  no  doubt  some  truth  in  this,  especially  as  regards 
the  people  who  were  loyalists,  yet  a  very  large  proportion 
of  the  colonists  had  become  totally  differentiated  from  the 
people  of  England.  This  was  the  inevitable  result  of  having 
lived  for  over  a  hundred  years  in  the  American  environment. 
They  were  no  longer  Englishmen.  They  had  become  com- 
pletely Americanized.  Certain  classes  kept  up  their  connection 
with  England,  and  many  of  the  rich  planters  of  the  South  sent 
their  sons  to  England  to  be  educated.  But  a  very  large  part  of 
the  colonists,  especially  in  the  older  settled  provinces,  like 
Massachusetts  and  Virginia,  had  forgotten  England  and  were 
another  people. 

Instead  of  speaking,  as  novelists  often  describe  them,  in  a 
formal,  archaic  way,  using  quaint  phrases  of  old  English  life, 
the  colonists  spoke  with  mannerisms  and  colloquial  slang  which 
were  peculiarly  American.  These  peculiarities  were  ridiculed 
by  Englishmen  of  the  time  and  formed  part  of  Grant 's  famous 
speech  in  Parliament,  the  burden  of  which  appears  to  have  been 
that  the  colonists  had  become  entirely  different  from  English 
people,  and  Grant  is  said  to  have  given  imitations  of  what  he 
considered  their  strange  speech  and  manners.  Mrs.  Knight,  in 
her  "  Journal  of  Travel  from  Boston  to  New  York,"  had,  many 
years  before  the  Revolution,  given  specimens  of  this  difference ; 
and  the  language  of  the  New  Englanders  which  she  describes 
was  certainly  not  like  anything  in  England. 

"  Law  for  me — what  in  the  world  brings  you  here  at  this  time  of 
night?  I  never  see  a  woman  on  the  Rode  so  Dreadful  late  in  all  the 
days  of  my  versall  life.  Who  are  you?  Where  are  you  going?"— Mrs. 
Knight's  Journal,  p.  23. 

In  1775  some  one  wrote  a  set  of  humorous  verses,  said  to 
have  been  the  original  Yankee  Doodle  song,  to  illustrate  the 
colloquial  Americanisms  of  the  time.  "Slapping"  was  used 
for  ' '  large, "  as  in  the  phrase  ' '  a  slapping  stallion. "    ■ '  Nation ' ' 

22 


AMERICAN  QUALITIES 

was  used  for  "a  great  deal,"  as  in  such  a  phrase  as  "only  a 
nation  louder."  "Tarnal"  was  used  for  "very."  "I  see" 
was  used  for  "I  saw,"  "I  come"  for  "I  came,"  and  "I  hooked 
it  off  "  in  place  of  "  I  went  away. ' ' 2 

Not  only  did  the  patriots  feel  themselves  to  be  quite  different 
from  Englishmen,  but  they  had  a  consciousness  of  ability  and 
power,  the  result  of  having  governed  themselves  so  long  in 
their  towns,  counties,  and  provinces,  and  of  having  carried  on 
a  commerce  of  their  own  in  defiance  of  the  English  navigation 
laws.  They  felt  that  they,  not  Englishmen,  had  created  the 
country ;  and  they  had  a  resolute  intention  to  develop  its  future 
greatness  in  their  own  way  without  the  advice  of  aliens  across 
three  thousand  miles  of  ocean. 

This  high  confidence,  which  was  a  conspicuous  motive  in  the 
patriot  party,  was  always  ridiculed  by  the  loyalists  as  mere 
bumptiousness  and  conceit.  It  was  difficult  for  a  loyalist  to 
understand  how  any  one  could  seriously  put  himself  in  opposi- 
tion to  the  British  empire  or  want  any  form  of  government 
except  the  British  constitution.  But  the  patriot  estimate  of 
their  own  ability  was  by  no  means  an  exaggeration.  They 
could  be  overcome,  of  course,  as  the  Boer  republics  and  other 
peoples  have  been  overcome,  by  the  superior  numbers  or  wealth 
of  Great  Britain.  But  the  history  of  the  Revolution  disclosed 
qualities  in  which  the  Americans  notoriously  excelled  Europeans 
as  well  as  the  Anglo-Saxon  stock  in  England  from  which  they 
were  derived.  They  were  of  keener  practical  intelligence,  more 
promptness  in  action,  more  untiring  energy,  more  originality  in 
enterprise,  better  courage  and  endurance,  and  more  natural 
military  skill  among  the  rank  and  file.  These  distinctively 
American  qualities,  as  we  now  call  them,  seem  to  have  been 
much  more  in  evidence  among  the  patriot  party  than  among  the 
loyalists. 

Every  circumstance  of  their  past  and  every  consideration 
of  their  present  convinced  the  patriots  of  the  infinite  pleasure 


2  Preble,  "  Flag  of  the  United  States,"  ed.  1880,  750;    Harper's  Cyclo- 
pedia of  U.  S.  History,  p.  1551. 

23 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

and  value  of  home  rule  and  they  had  codified  their  opinions  into 
a  political  philosophy  which  not  only  justified  their  semi- 
independence  and  disregard  of  acts  of  Parliament,  but  would 
also  justify  them  in  breaking  off  from  England  at  the  first 
opportunity  and  becoming  absolutely  independent.  They  had 
gathered  this  philosophy  from  the  works  of  certain  European 
writers — Grotius,  Puffendorf,  Locke,  Burlamaqui,  Beccaria, 
Montesquieu,  and  others — who  had  applied  to  politics  and 
government  the  doctrines  of  religious  liberty  and  the  right 
of  private  judgment  which  had  been  developed  by  the  Refor- 
mation. Being  such  extreme  Protestants,  and  having  carried 
so  far  the  religious  ideas  of  the  Reformation,  the  colonists 
naturally  accepted  in  their  fullest  meaning  the  political  prin- 
ciples of  the  Reformation.  If  we  are  looking  for  profound 
influences  in  the  Revolution,  it  would  be  difficult  to  find  any 
that  were  stronger  than  two  of  the  writers  just  mentioned, 
Locke  and  Burlamaqui,  whose  books  had  a  vast  effect  in  the 
break-up  of  the  British  empire  which  we  are  about  to  record. 

Beginning  with  Grotius,  who  was  born  in  1583,  and  ending 
with  Montesquieu,  who  died  in  1755,  the  writers  mentioned 
covered  a  period  of  about  two  hundred  years  of  political  inves- 
tigation, thought,  and  experience.  In  fact,  they  covered  the 
period  since  the  Reformation.  They  represented  the  effect  of 
the  Reformation  on  political  thought.  They  represented  also 
all  those  nations  whose  opinions  on  such  subjects  were  worth 
anything.  Grotius  was  a  Dutchman,  Puffendorf  a  German, 
Locke  an  Englishman,  Burlamaqui  an  Italian  Swiss,  and  Mon- 
tesquieu a  Frenchman. 

Hooker,  who  lived  from  1553  to  1600,  and  whom  Locke  cites 
so  freely,  might  be  included  in  the  number,  and  that  would 
make  the  period  quite  two  hundred  years.  Hooker,  in  his 
"Ecclesiastical  Polity/'  declared  very  emphatically  that  gov- 
ernments could  not  be  legitimate  unless  they  rested  on  the 
consent  of  the  governed ;  and  this  principle  forms  the  founda- 
tion of  Locke 's  famous  essays. 

There  were,  of  course,  other  minor  writers ;  and  the  colonists 
relied  upon  them  all;   but  seldom  troubled  themselves  to  read 

24 


BURLAMAQUI  AND  LOCKE 

the  works  of  the  earlier  ones,  or  to  read  Hutchinson,  Clarke,  and 
other  followers  of  that  school,  because  Locke,  Burlamaqui,  and 
Beccaria  had  summarized  them  all  and  brought  them  down  to 
date.  To  this  day  any  one  going  to  the  Philadelphia  Library, 
and  asking  for  No.  77,  can  take  in  his  hands  the  identical,  well- 
worn  volume  by  Burlamaqui  which  delegates  to  the  Congress 
and  many  an  unsettled  Philadelphian  read  with  earnest, 
anxious  minds.  It  was  among  the  first  books  that  the  library 
had  obtained;  and  perhaps  the  most  important  and  effective 
book  it  has  ever  owned.3 

The  rebellious  colonists  also  read  Locke 's  ' '  Two  Treatises  on 
Government"  with  much  profit  and  satisfaction  to  themselves. 
Locke  was  an  extreme  Whig,  an  English  revolutionist  of  the 
school  of  1688.  Before  that  great  event,  he  had  been  unen- 
durable to  the  royalists,  who  were  in  power,  and  had  been 
obliged  to  spend  a  large  part  of  his  time  on  the  continent.  In 
the  preface  to  his  ' '  Two  Treatises, ' '  he  says  that  they  will  show 
how  entirely  legitimate  is  the  title  of  William  III  to  the  throne, 
because  it  is  established  on  the  consent  of  the  people.  That  is 
the  burden  of  his  whole  argument — the  consent  of  the  people 
as  the  only  true  foundation  of  government.  That  principle 
sank  so  deep  into  the  minds  of  the  patriot  colonists  that  it  was 
the  foundation  of  all  their  political  thought,  and  became  an 
essentially  American  idea. 

Beccaria,  who,  like  Burlamaqui,  was  an  Italian,  also  exer- 
cised great  influence  on  the  colonists.  His  famous  book,. 
1 '  Crimes  and  Punishments, ' '  was  also  a  short,  concise,  but  very 
eloquent  volume.  It  caused  a  great  stir  in  the  world.  The 
translation  circulated  in  America  had  added  to  it  a  character- 
istic commentary  by  Voltaire.  Beccaria,  though  not  writing 
directly  on  the  subject  of  liberty,  necessarily  included  that 


3  The  colonists  were  also  fond  of  reading  Montesquieu's  "  Spirit  of 
the  Laws,"  but  more  in  after  years  when  they  were  framing  their  con- 
stitutions. He  dealt  more  with  the  details  of  governmental  administra- 
tion, the  legislative,  executive,  and  judicial  departments.  Burlamaqui 
confined  himself  exclusively  to  the  fundamental  principles  of  political 
liberty  and  independence. 

25 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

subject,  because  he  dealt  with  the  administration  of  the  criminal 
law.  His  plea  for  more  humane  and  just  punishments,  and  for 
punishments  more  in  proportion  to  the  offence,  found  a  ready 
sympathy  among  the  Americans,  who  had  already  revolted  in 
disgust  from  the  brutality  and  extravagant  cruelty  of  the 
English  criminal  code. 

But  Beccaria  also  stated  most  beautifully  and  clearly  the 
essential  principles  of  liberty.  His  foundation  doctrine,  that 
' '  every  act  of  authority  of  one  man  over  another  for  which  there 
is  not  absolute  necessity  is  tyrannical, ' '  made  a  most  profound 
impression  in  America.  He  laid  down  also  the  principle  that 
''in  every  human  society  there  is  an  effort  continually  tending 
to  confer  on  one  part  the  highest  power  and  happiness,  and  to 
reduce  the  other  to  the  extreme  of  weakness  and  misery. ' '  That 
sentence  became  the  life-long  guide  of  many  Americans.  It 
became  a  constituent  part  of  the  minds  of  Jefferson  and  Hamil- 
ton. It  can  be  seen  as  the  foundation,  the  connecting  strand, 
running  all  through  the  essays  of  the  Federalist.  It  was  the 
inspiration  of  the  "checks  and  balances"  in  the  national  Con- 
stitution. It  can  be  traced  in  American  thought  and  legislation 
down  to  the  present  time. 

Burlamaqui's  book,  devoted  exclusively  to  the  subject  of 
liberty  and  independence,  is  still  one  of  the  best  expositions  of 
the  true  doctrines  of  natural  law,  or  the  rights  of  man.  At  the 
time  of  the  Revolution  these  rights  of  man  were  often  spoken 
of  as  our  rights  as  men,  which  is  a  very  descriptive  phrase, 
because  the  essence  of  those  rights  is  political  manhood,  honor- 
able self-reliance  as  opposed  to  degenerate  dependence. 

Burlamaqui  belonged  to  a  Protestant  family  that  had  once 
lived  at  Lucca,  Italy;  but  had  been  compelled,  like  the  family 
of  Turretini,  and  many  others,  to  take  refuge  in  Switzerland. 
He  became  a  professor  at  Geneva,  which  gave  him  the  reputa- 
tion of  a  learned  man.  He  also  became  a  counsellor  of  state 
and  was  noted  for  his  practical  sagacity.  He  had  intended 
to  write  a  great  work  in  many  volumes  on  the  subject  to  which 
he  had  devoted  so  much  of  his  life,  "The  Principles  of  Natural 
Law, "  as  it  was  then  called.    Ill  health  preventing  such  a  huge 


BURLAMAQUFS  BOOK 

task,  he  prepared  a  single  volume,  which  he  said  was  only  for 
beginners  and  students,  because  it  dealt  with  the  bare  elements 
of  the  science  in  the  simplest  and  plainest  language. 

This  little  book  was  translated  into  English  in  1748,  and 
contained  only  three  hundred  pages ;  but  in  that  small  space  of 
large,  clear  type,  Burlamaqui  compressed  everything  that  the 
patriot  colonists  wanted  to  know.  He  was  remarkably  clear 
and  concise,  and  gave  the  Americans  the  qualities  of  the  Italian 
mind  at  its  best.  He  aroused  them  by  his  modern  glowing 
thought  and  his  enthusiasm  for  progress  and  liberty.  His 
handy  little  volume  was  vastly  more  effective  and  far-reaching 
than  would  have  been  the  blunderbuss  he  had  intended  to  load 
to  the  muzzle. 

If  we  examine  the  volumes  of  Burlamaqui 's  predecessors, 
Grotius,  Puffendorf,  and  the  others,  we  find  their  statements 
about  natural  law  and  our  rights  as  men  rather  brief,  vague, 
and  general,  as  is  usual  with  the  old  writers  on  any  science. 
Burlamaqui  brought  them  down  to  date,  developed  their  prin- 
ciples, and  swept  in  the  results  of  all  the  thought  and  criticism 
since  their  day. 

The  term  natural  law,  which  all  these  writers  used,  has  long 
since  gone  out  of  fashion.  They  used  it  because,  inspired  by  the 
Reformation,  they  were  struggling  to  get  away  from  the  arbi- 
trary system,  the  artificial  scholasticism,  the  despotism  of  the 
middle  ages.  They  were  seeking  to  obtain  for  law  and  govern- 
ment a  foundation  which  should  grow  out  of  the  nature  of 
things,  the  common  facts  of  life  that  everybody  understood. 
They  sought  a  system  that,  being  natural,  would  become  estab- 
lished and  eternal  like  nature;  a  system  that  would  displace 
that  thing  of  the  middle  ages  which  they  detested,  and  called 
* '  arbitrary  institution. ' ' 

Let  us,  they  said,  contemplate  for  a  time  man  as  he  is  in 
himself,  the  natural  man,  his  wants  and  requirements. 

"  The  only  way,"  said  Burlamaqui,  "  to  attain  to  the  knowledge  of 
that  natural  law  is  to  consider  attentively  the  nature  and  constitution 
of  man,  the  relations  he  has  to  the  beings  that  surround  him,  and  the 
states  from  thence  resulting.     In  fact,  the  verjr  term  of  natural  law  and 

27 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

the  notion  we  have  given  of  it,  show  that  the  principles  of  this  science 
must  be  taken  from  the  very  nature  and  constitution  of  man." — "Prin- 
ciples of  Natural  Law,"  p.  156. 

Men  naturally,  he  said,  draw  together  to  form  societies  for 
mutual  protection  and  advantage.  Their  natural  state  is  a  state 
of  union  and  society,  and  these  societies  are  merely  for  the 
common  advantage  of  all  of  the  members. 

This  was  certainly  a  very  simple  proposition,  but  it  had 
required  centuries  to  bring  men 's  minds  back  to  it ;  and  it  was 
not  altogether  safe  to  put  forth  because  it  implied  that  each 
community  existed  for  the  benefit  of  itself,  for  the  benefit  of  its 
members,  and  not  for  the  benefit  of  a  prince  or  another  nation, 
or  for  the  church,  or  for  an  empire. 

It  was  a  principle  quickly  seized  upon  by  the  Americans  as 
soon  as  their  difficulties  began  in  1764.  In  their  early  debates 
and  discussions  we  hear  a  great  deal  about  a  ' '  state  of  nature^" 
which  at  first  seems  rather  meaningless  to  us.  But  it  was  merely 
their  attempt  to  apply  to  themselves  the  fundamental  principles 
of  the  Reformation.  Were  the  colonies  by  the  exactions  and 
remodelling  of  the  mother-country  thrown  into  that  "state  of 
nature,"  where  they  could  reorganize  society  afresh,  on  the 
basis  of  their  own  advantage  ?  How  much  severity  or  how  much 
oppression  or  dissatisfaction  would  bring  about  this  state  of 
nature?  Was  there  any  positive  rule  by  which  you  could 
decide  ?  Patrick  Henry,  who  was  always  very  eloquent  on  the 
subject,  declared  that  the  boundary  had  been  passed ;  that  the 
colonies  were  in  a  state  of  nature. 

Any  one  who  is  at  all  familiar  with  the  trend  of  thought  for 
the  last  hundred  years  can  readily  see  how  closely  this  idea  of 
going  back  to  natural  causes  and  first  conceptions  for  the  dis- 
covery of  political  principles  is  allied  to  every  kind  of  modern 
progress ;  to  the  modern  study  of  natural  history,  the  study  of 
the  plants  and  animals  in  their  natural  environment,  instead  of 
by  preconceived  scholastic  theories;  the  study  of  the  human 
body  by  dissection  instead  of  by  supposition ;  the  study  of  heat, 
light,  electricity,  the  soil,  the  rocks,  the  ocean,  the  stars  by  actual 

28 


INDEPENDENCE  AND  EQUALITY 

observation,  without  regard  to  what  the  Scriptures  and  learned 
commentators  had  to  say. 

A  large  part  of  the  American  colonists  were  very  far 
advanced  in  all  the  ideas  of  the  Reformation.  Burlamaqui's 
book,  applying  to  politics  and  government  these  free  and  won- 
derful principles,  came  to  a  large  number  of  them  as  the  most 
soul-stirring  and  mind-arousing  message  they  had  ever  heard. 
It  has  all  become  trite  enough  to  us;  but  to  them  it  was  fresh 
and  marvellous.  Their  imaginations  seized  on  it  with  the 
indomitable  energy  and  passion  which  the  climate  inspired,  and 
some  who  breathed  the  air  of  Virginia  and  Massachusetts  were 
on  fire  with  enthusiasm. 

"  This  state  of  nature,"  argued  Burlamaqui,  "is  not  the 
work  of  man,  but  established  by  divine  institution. ' ' 

"Natural  society  is  a  state  of  equality  and  liberty;  a  state  in  which 
all  men  enjoy  the  same  prerogatives,  and  an  entire  independence  on  any 
other  power  but  God.  For  every  man  is  naturally  master  of  himself, 
and  equal  to  his  fellow-creatures  so  long  as  he  does  not  subject  himself 
to  another  person's  authority  by  a  particular  convention." — "  Principles 
of  Natural  Law,"  p.  38. 

Here  we  find  coupled  with  liberty  that  word  equality  which 
played  such  a  tremendous  part  in  history  for  the  succeeding 
hundred  years.  And  we  must  bear  in  mind  that  what  the 
people  of  that  time  meant  by  it  was  political  equality,  equality 
of  rights,  equality  before  the  law  and  the  government;  and 
not  equality  of  ability,  talents,  fortune,  or  gifts,  as  some  have 
fancied. 

Burlamaqui  not  only  found  liberty,  independence,  and 
equality  growing  out  of  nature  itself;  but  he  argued  that  all 
this  was  part  of  the  divine  plan,  the  great  order  of  nature  and 
the  universe.  Indeed,  that  was  what  he  and  his  Reformation 
predecessors  had  set  out  to  discover,  to  unravel  the  system  of 
humanity,  to  see  if  there  really  was  a  system  that  could  be 
gathered  from  the  actual  plain  facts;  and  to  see  also  if  there 
was  a  unity  and  completeness  in  this  system. 

"The  human  understanding,"  he  says,  "is  naturally  right, 
and  has  within  itself  a  strength  sufficient  to  arrive  at  the  knowl- 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

edge  of  truth,  and  to  distinguish  it  from  error."  That  he 
announces  as  the  fundamental  principle  of  his  book,  "the  hinge 
whereon  the  whole  system  of  humanity  turns,"  and  it  was 
simply  his  way  of  restating  the  great  doctrine  of  the  Reforma- 
tion, the  right  of  private  judgment. 

But  he  goes  on  to  enlarge  on  it  in  a  way  particularly  pleas- 
ing to  the  patriot  colonists,  for  he  says  we  have  this  power  to 
decide  for  ourselves,  "especially  in  things  wherein  our  respec- 
tive duties  are  concerned." 

"Yes,"  said  the  colonists,  "we  have  often  thought  that  we 
were  the  best  judges  of  all  our  own  affairs." 

' '  Those  who  feel, ' '  said  Franklin,  in  his  examination  before 
Parliament,  "can  best  judge." 

The  daring  Burlamaqui  went  on  to  show  that  liberty  instead 
of  being,  as  some  supposed,  a  privilege  to  be  graciously  accorded, 
was  in  reality  a  universal  right,  inherent  in  the  nature  of 
things. 

Then  appears  that  idea  common  to  the  great  leaders  of 
thought  in  that  age,  that  man's  true  purpose  in  the  world  is 
the  pursuit  of  happiness.  To  this  pursuit,  they  said,  every 
human  being  has  a  complete  right.  It  was  part  of  liberty;  a 
necessary  consequence  of  liberty.  This  principle  of  the  right  to 
pursue  happiness,  which  is  merely  another  way  of  stating  the 
right  of  self -development,  has  played  as  great  a  part  in  subse- 
quent history  as  equality. "  It  is  one  of  the  foundation  principles 
of  the  Declaration  of  Independence.  It  is  given  there  as  the 
ground-work  of  the  right  of  revolution,  the  right  of  a  people  to 
throw  off  or  destroy  a  power  which  interferes  with  this  great 
pursuit,  ' '  and  to  institute  a  new  government,  laying  its  founda- 
tion on  such  principles,  and  organizing  its  power  in  such  form 
as  to  them  shall  seem  most  likely  to  effect  their  safety  and 
happiness. ' ' 

It  has  been  interpreted  in  all  sorts  of  ways — as  the  right  to 
improve  your  condition,  to  develop  your  talents,  to  grow  rich,  or 
to  rise  into  the  class  of  society  above  you.  It  is  now  in  its 
broadest  meaning  so  axiomatic  in  this  country  that  Americans 
can  hardly  realize  that  it  was  ever  disputed. 

30 


THE  PURSUIT  OF  HAPPINESS 

But  it  was,  and  still  is,  disputed  in  England  and  on  the 
continent.  Even  so  liberal  an  Englishman  as  Kingsley  resented 
with  indignation  the  charge  that  he  favored  the  aspiration  of  the 
lower  classes  to  change  their  condition.  Once  a  cobbler,  remain 
a  cobbler,  and  be  content  to  be  a  good  cobbler.  In  other  words, 
the  righteousness  which  he  so  loudly  professed  was  intended  to 
exalt  certain  fortunate  individuals,  and  not  to  advance  society. 

This  desire  and  pursuit  of  happiness  being  part  of  nature, 
or  part  of  the  system  of  Providence,  and  as  essential  to  every 
man  and  as  inseparable  from  him  as  his  reason,  it  should  be 
freely  allowed  him,  and  not  repressed.  This,  Burlamaqui 
declares,  is  a  great  principle,  "the  key  of  the  human  system," 
opening  to  vast  consequences  for  the  world. 

The  consequences  have  certainly  been  vaster  than  he 
dreamed  of.  Millions  of  people  now  live  their  daily  life 
in  the  sunshine  of  this  doctrine.  Millions  have  fled  to  us 
from  Europe  to  seek  its  protection.  Not  only  the  whole  Ameri- 
can system  of  laws,  but  whole  philosophies  and  codes  of  conduct 
have  grown  up  under  it.  The  abolitionists  appealed  to  it,  and 
freed  six  millions  of  slaves.  The  transcendental  philosophy  of 
New  England,  that  extreme  and  beautiful  attempt  to  develop 
conscience,  nobility,  and  character  from  within ;  that  call  of  the 
great  writers  like  Lowell  to  every  humble  individual  to  stand 
by  his  own  personality,  fear  it  not,  advance  it  by  its  own  lines ; 
even  our  education,  the  elective  system  of  our  colleges — all  these 
things  have  followed  under  that  ' '  pursuit  of  happiness ' '  which 
the  patriot  colonists  seized  upon  so  gladly  in  1765  and  en- 
shrined in  their  Declaration  of  Independence  in  1776. 

They  found  in  the  principles  of  natural  law  how  govern- 
ment, civil  society,  or  "sovereignty,"  as  those  writers  were  apt 
to  call  it,  was  to  be  built  up  and  regulated.  Civil  government 
did  not  destroy  natural  rights  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness. 
On  the  contrary,  it  was  intended  to  give  these  rights  greater 
security  and  a  fresh  force  and  efficiency.  That  was  the  purpose 
men  had  in  coming  together  to  form  a  civil  society  for  the 
benefit  of  all;  that  was  the  reason,  as  Burlamaqui  put  it,  that 

31 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

"the  sovereign  became  the  depositary,  as  it  were,  of  the  will  and 
strength  of  each  individual. ' ' 

This  seemed  very  satisfactory  to  some  of  the  colonists.  You 
choose  your  sovereign,  your  government,  for  yourself,  and  make 
it  your  mere  depositary  or  agent.  Then  as  to  the  nature  of 
government,  the  right  to  govern,  they  were  very  much  pleased 
to  find  that  the  only  right  there  was  of  this  sort  was  the  right  of 
each  community  to  govern  itself.  Government  by  outside  power 
was  absolutely  indefensible,  because  the  notion  that  there  was  a 
divine  right  in  one  set  of  people  to  rule  over  others  was  exploded 
nonsense,  and  the  assertion  that  mere  might  or  superior  power 
necessarily  gave  such  right  was  equally  indefensible.  There 
remained  only  one  plausible  reason,  and  that  was  that  superior 
excellence,  wisdom,  or  ability  might  possibly  give  such  right. 

As  to  this  "superior  excellence"  theory,  if  you  admitted  it 
you  denied  man's  inherent  right  to  liberty,  equality,  and  the 
pursuit  of  happiness ;  you  denied  his  moral  accountability  and 
responsibility;  you  crippled  his  independent  development,  his 
self -development,  his  individual  action;  in  a  word,  you  de- 
stroyed the  whole  natural  system. 

Because  a  man  is  inferior  to  another  is  no  reason  why  he 
should  surrender  his  liberty,  his  accountability,  his  chance  for 
self-development,  to  the  superior.  We  do  not  surrender  our 
property  to  the  next  man  who  is  richer  or  an  abler  business 
manager.  Our  inferiority  does  not  give  him  a  right  over  us. 
On  the  contrary,  the  inferiority  of  the  inferior  man  is  an  addi- 
tional reason  why  he  should  cling  to  all  those  rights  of  nature 
which  have  been  given  to  him,  that  he  may  have  wherewithal 
to  raise  himself,  and  be  alone  accountable  for  himself.  Or, 
as  Burlamaqui  briefly  summarized  it: 

"  The  knowledge  I  have  of  the  excellency  of  a  superior  does  not 
alone  afford  me  a  motive  sufficient  to  subject  myself  to  him,  and  to  induce 
me  to  abandon  my  own  will  in  order  to  take  his  for  my  rule;  .  .  .  and 
without  any  reproach  of  conscience  I  may  sincerely  judge  that  the 
intelligent  principle  within  me  is  sufficient  to  direct  my  conduct." — 
"  Principles  of  Natural  Law,"  p.  86. 

Only   the   people,    Burlamaqui   explained,    have    inherent 

32 


CONSENT  OF  THE  GOVERNED 

inalienable  rights;  and  they  alone  can  confer  the  privilege  of 
commanding.  It  had  been  supposed  that  the  sovereign  alone 
had  rights,  and  the  people  only  privileges.  But  here  were 
Burlamaqui,  Puffendorf,  Montesquieu,  Locke,  and  fully  half 
the  American  colonists,  undertaking  to  reverse  this  order  and 
announcing  that  the  people  alone  had  rights,  and  the  sovereign 
merely  privileges. 

These  principles  the  Americans  afterwards  translated  in 
their  documents  by  the  phrase,  "a  just  government  exists 
only  by  consent  of  the  governed."  All  men  being  born 
politically  equal,  the  colonies,  as  Dickinson  and  Hamilton 
explained,  are  equally  with  Great  Britain  entitled  to  happiness, 
equally  entitled  to  govern  themselves,  equally  entitled  to  free- 
dom and  independence.4 

It  is  curious  to  see  the  cautious  way  in  which  some  of  the 
colonists  applied  these  doctrines  by  mixing  them  up  with 
loyalty  arguments.  This  is  very  noticeable  in  the  pamphlets 
written  by  Alexander  Hamilton.  He  gives  the  stock  arguments 
for  redress  of  grievances,  freedom  from  internal  taxation,  gov- 
ernment by  the  king  alone,  and  will  not  admit  that  he  is  any- 
thing but  a  loyal  subject.  At  the  same  time  there  runs  through 
all  he  says  an  undercurrent  of  strong  rebellion  which  leads  to 
his  ultimate  object.  "The  power,"  he  says,  "which  one  society 
bestows  upon  any  man  or  body  of  men  can  never  extend  beyond 
its  own  limits."  This  he  lays  down  as  a  universal  truth,  inde- 
pendently of  charters  and  the  wonderful  British  Constitution. 
It  applied  to  the  whole  world.  Parliament  was  elected  by  the 
people  of  England,  therefore  it  had  no  authority  outside  of 
the  British  isle.  That  British  isle  and  America  were  separate 
societies. 

"Nature,"  said  Hamilton,  "has  distributed  an  equality  of 
rights  to  every  man."  How  then,  he  asked,  can  the  English 
people  have  any  rights  over  life,  liberty,  or  property  in  Amer- 
ica? They  can  have  authority  only  among  themselves  in 
England.     We  are  separated  from  Great  Britain,  Hamilton 


'*  Dickinson's  Works,"  vol.  i,  p.  202. 
3  33 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

argued,  not  only  by  the  ocean,  by  geography,  but  because  we 
have  no  part  or  share  in  governing  her.  Therefore,  as  we  have 
no  share  in  governing  her,  she,  by  the  law  of  nature,  can  have 
no  share  in  governing  us ;  she  is  a  separate  society. 

The  British,  he  said,  were  attempting  to  involve  in  the  idea 
of  a  colony  the  idea  of  political  slavery,  and  against  that  a  man 
must  fight  with  his  life.  To  be  controlled  by  the  superior 
wisdom  of  another  nation  was  ridiculous,  unworthy  of  the  con- 
sideration of  manhood ;  and  at  this  point  he  used  that  sentence 
which  has  so  often  been  quoted — "Deplorable  is  the  condition 
of  that  people  who  have  nothing  else  than  the  wisdom  and 
justice  of  another  to  depend  upon."5 

Charters  and  documents,  he  declared,  must  yield  to  natural 
laws  and  our  rights  as  men. 

"  The  sacred  rights  of  man  are  not  to  be  rummaged  for  among  old 
parchments  or  musty  records.  They  are  written  as  with  a  sunbeam  in 
the  whole  volume  of  human  nature  by  the  hand  of  divinity  itself  and 
can  never  be  erased  by  mortal  power." 

The  Declaration  of  Independence  was  an  epitome  of  these 
doctrines  of  natural  law  applied  to  the  colonies.  The  Declara- 
tion of  Independence  originated  in  these  doctrines,  and  not  in 
the  mind  of  Jefferson,  as  so  many  people  have  absurdly  sup- 
posed. In  order  to  see  how  directly  the  Declaration  was  an 
outcome  of  these  teachings  we  have  only  to  read  its  opening 
paragraphs : 

"  When,  in  the  course  of  human  events,  it  becomes  necessary  for 
one  people  to  dissolve  the  political  bands  which  have  connected  them 
with  another,  and  to  assume,  among  the  powers  of  the  earth,  the 
separate  and  equal  station  to  which  the  laws  of  nature  and  of  nature's 
God  entitle  them,  a  decent  respect  to  the  opinions  of  mankind  requires 
that  they  should  declare  the  causes  which  impel  them  to  the  separation. 

"  We  hold  these  truths  to  be  self-evident,  that  all  men  are  created 
equal;  that  they  are  endowed  by  their  Creator  with  certain  inalienable 
rights;  that  among  these  are  life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness. 
That,  to  secure  these  rights,  governments  are  instituted  among  men, 
deriving  their  just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the  governed;  that,  when- 
ever any  form   of  government  becomes   destructive  of  these  ends,  it  is 


5  Works,  Lodge  edition,  vol.  i,  p.  70. 

34 


JEFFERSON  ONLY  THE  DRAFTSMAN 

the  right  of  the  people  to  alter  or  to  abolish  it,  and  to  institute  a  new 
government,  laying  its  foundation  on  such  principles,  and  organizing 
its  powers  in  such  form  as  to  them  shall  seem  most  likely  to  effect  their 
safety  and  happiness.  Prudence,  indeed,  will  dictate  that  governments 
long  established  should  not  be  changed  for  light  and  transient  causes; 
and,  accordingly,  all  experience  hath  shown,  that  mankind  are  more 
disposed  to  suffer,  while  evils  are  sufferable,  than  to  right  themselves  by 
abolishing  the  forms  to  which  they  are  accustomed." 

By  understanding  the  writings  of  Burlamaqui,  Locke,  and 
Beccaria,  which  the  colonists  were  studying  so  intently,  we 
know  the  origin  of  the  Declaration,  and  need  not  flounder  in  the 
dark,  as  so  many  have  done,  wondering  where  it  came  from, 
or  how  it  was  that  Jefferson  could  have  invented  it.  Being 
unwilling  to  take  the  trouble  of  examining  carefully  the 
influences  which  preceded  the  Declaration,  historical  students 
are  sometimes  surprised  to  find  a  document  like  the  Virginia 
Bill  of  Rights  or  the  supposed  Mecklenburg  resolutions,6  issued 
before  the  Declaration  and  yet  containing  the  same  principles. 
They  instantly  jump  to  the  conclusion  that  here  is  the  real 
origin  and  author  of  the  Declaration,  and  from  this  Jefferson 
stole  his  ideas. 

Jefferson  merely  drafted  the  Declaration.  Neither  he, 
Adams,  Franklin,  Sherman,  nor  Livingston,  who  composed  the 
committee  which  was  responsible  for  it,  ever  claimed  any  orig- 
inality for  its  principles.  They  were  merely  stating"  principles 
which  were  already  familiar  to  the  people,  which  had  been 
debated  over  and  over  again  in  Congress;  which  were  so 
familiar,  in  fact,  that  they  stated  them  rather  carelessly  and 
took  too  much  for  granted.  It  would  have  been  better,  instead 
of  saying,  "all  men  are  created  equal,"  to  have  said  that 
all  men  are  created  politically  equal,  which  was  what  they 
meant,  and  what  every  one  at  that  time  understood.  By 
leaving  out  the  word  ' '  politically ' '  they  gave  an  opportunity  to 
a  generation  unfamiliar  with  the  doctrines  of  natural  law  to 
suppose  that  they  meant  that  all  men  are  created,  or  should 
be  made,  equal  in  conditions,  opportunities  or  talents. 

"Magazine  of  American   History,  vol.   xxi,   pp.   31,   221;    Niles,   pp. 

313-390. 

35 


III. 


THE  GREAT  PROTECTIVE   SYSTEM   OF   THE  TRADE 
AND  NAVIGATION  LAWS 

The  most  conspicuous  rejection  of  British  authority  was 
purposely  omitted  from  the  previous  chapters  because  it 
deserves  a  distinct  and  separate  treatment.  It  was  the  first 
irregularity  that  England  attempted  to  remedy  as  soon  as 
France  was  out  of  the  way,  and  it  shows  more  clearly  than 
anything  else  the  untamable  spirit  of  the  patriot  colonists,  and 
those  aggressive  independent  qualities  which  Burke  declared 
would  be  hard  to  subdue. 

There  were  a  number  of  laws  on  the  English  statute-books 
known  as  the  navigation  laws  and  the  laws  of  trade.  They 
constituted  a  great  protective  system  of  penalties,  tariffs,  and 
duties,  designed  to  build  up  the  shipping,  the  trade,  the  com- 
merce, and  the  manufacturing  interests  of  Great  Britain  and 
the  colonies.  They  were  to  protect  the  colonies  from  foreign 
traders  and  foreign  interference,  and  to  unite  them  closely 
with  the  mother-country  in  bonds  of  wealth  and  prosperity 
against  all  the  rest  of  the  world. 

In  the  commercial  competition  in  which  England  was 
involved  with  Holland,  Prance,  and  Spain,  it  was  thought 
important  to  prevent  those  nations  from  trading  with  the 
British  colonies.  For  if  those  nations  were  permitted  to  trade 
with  her  colonies,  England's  reason  for  protecting  and  govern- 
ing them  was  defeated;  it  would  be  hardly  worth  while  to 
have  colonies. 

Each  nation  at  that  time  kept,  or  tried  to  keep,  its  colonial 
trade  exclusively  for  itself.  To  accomplish  this  for  England 
was  one  of  the  objects  of  the  trade^md  navigation  laws. 
Another  guiding  principle  that  ran  th^Mfcthem  was.  that  the 
profits  of  trade  should  be  shared  betwejrtne  colonies  and  the 
mother-country.    The  colonies  must  not  monopolize  any  depart- 

36 


BEGINNING  NAVIGATION  LAWS 

merit  of  trade.  Still  another  principle  was  that  the  colonies 
should  confine  themselves  chiefly  to  the  production  of  raw 
materials  and  buy  their  manufactured  goods  from  England. 

We  find  the  beginning  of  these  laws  in  the  earliest  period  of 
the  English  colonies.  The  first  important  product  from  the 
colonies  was  tobacco  from  Virginia;  and  the  King,  who  could 
at  that  time,  without  the  aid  of  Parliament,  impose  duties  and 
taxes,  put  a  heavy  duty  on  this  tobacco.  The  Virginians 
accordingly  sent  all  their  tobacco  to  Holland. 

This  simple  instance  shows  both  the  cause  and  the  principle 
of  all  the  navigation  laws.  If  Holland,  England's  rival  in 
commerce,  was  to  reap  all  the  advantage  of  Virginia 's  existence, 
of  what  value  to  England  was  Virginia  ?  So  the  King  ordered 
that  no  tobacco  or  other  product  of  the  colonies  should  be 
carried  to  a  foreign  port  until  it  had  been  first  landed  in 
England  and  the  duties  paid. 

This  regulation  was  not  merely  for  the  revenue  from  the 
duties,  but  for  the  advantage  of  English  tobacco  merchants, 
and  to  prevent  Holland  trading  with  Virginia  and  establishing 
a  connection  there.  Soon  afterwards,  in  1651,  Cromwell's 
Parliament  took  the  next  step,  and  an  obvious  one,  by  prohib- 
iting the  ships  of  all  foreign  nations  from  trading  with  the 
colonies.  This  was  part  of  Cromwell's  vigorous  and  successful 
foreign  policy,  one  of  the  methods  he  employed  for  building  up 
the  power  of  England.  It  was  intended  to  keep  for  England 
all  her  colonial  trade  and  encourage  her  ship-builders,  ship- 
owners, merchants,  and  manufacturers  by  the  same  method 
other  nations  pursued. 

Cromwell  was  of  the  same  dissenting  religion  as  a  great 
many  of  the  American  colonists.  He  favored  the  colonists,  and 
was  generally  regarded  by  them  as  a  great  prototype  of 
liberty.  But  his  Parliament  passed  the  first  navigation  law; 
and  the  colonists  were  often  reminded  of  this  when,  during 
the  Revolution,  some  of  them  argued  so  strenuously  against 
those  laws. 

In  1660,  when  the  commonwealth  period  of  Cromwell  closed 

37 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

and  monarchy  was  restored  in  England,  the  famous  navigation 
act  was  passed,  carrying  the  protective  system  still  farther : 

1.  No  goods  were  to  carried  from  the  colonies  except  in  English-  or 
colonial-built  ships  of  which  the  master  and  three-fourths  of  the  sailors 
were  English  subjects. 

2.  Foreigners  could  not  be  merchants  or  factors  in  the  colonies. 

3.  No  goods  of  the  growth,  production,  or  manufacture  of  Africa, 
Asia,  or  America  could  be  carried  to  England  in  any  but  English  or 
colonial  ships.  And  such  goods  must  be  brought  direct  from  the  places 
where  they  were  usually  produced. 

4.  Oil,  whale-fins,  etc.,  usually  produced  or  caught  by  English  sub- 
jects, must,  when  brought  into  England  by  foreigners,  pay  double  alien 
customs. 

5.  The  English  coasting  trade  was  confined  exclusively  to  English 
ships. 

The  colonists  never  objected  to  these  provisions,  because 
most  of  them  favored  the  colonists  as  much  as  they  favored 
England.  Such  regulations  encouraged  colonial  shipping.  The 
provisions  relating  to  the  coasting  trade  we  ourselves  adopted 
as  soon  as  we  became  a  nation ;  and  we  still  confine  our  coasting 
trade  to  our  own  vessels.  We  also,  in  1816  and  afterwards, 
passed  navigation  acts  somewhat  similar  in  their  provisions  to 
these  clauses  of  the  English  act  which  have  been  cited.  There 
is  no  question  that  these  and  similar  protective  regulations 
assisted  in  building  up  the  greatness  and  power  of  England 
and  the  prosperity  of  the  colonies. 

But  there  was  a  clause  in  the  navigation  act  of  1660  which 
did  not  please  the  colonists.  It  provided  that  no  sugar,  tobacco, 
cotton,  indigo,  ginger,  fustic,  or  other  dye-wood  should  be 
carried  to  any  port  on  the  continent  of  Europe.  Such  com- 
modities must  be  carried  only  to  England  or  to  English  colonies. 
The  reason  for  this  regulation  was,  that  if  the  colonists  sold 
these  commodities  on  the  continent  of  Europe  they  would  reap 
all  the  profits  of  the  sale  and  the  mother-country  would  get 
nothing.  It  seemed  fairer  that  these  articles  should  be  taken 
to  England  and  sold  to  English  merchants,  who  might  then 
resell  at  a  profit  to  continental  merchants.    Thus  the  profits  of 

38 


WANTED  ALL  THE  PROFITS 

the  colonial  trade,  instead  of  being  monopolized  by  the  colonies, 
would  be  shared  between  them  and  the  mother-country. 

These  colonial  commodities  which  could  not  be  carried  to 
continental  Europe  became  known  in  history  as  the  enumerated 
articles.1  Judged  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  times,  there 
was  nothing  harsh  or  tyrannical  in  this  provision.  But  the 
colonists,  having  ships  of  their  own,  very  naturally  wanted  to 
trade  directly  with  the  continent  of  Europe.  They  wanted 
all  the  profits  for  themselves.  They  wanted  full  control  of 
all  the  natural  advantages  of  the  separate  country  in  which 
they  lived,  and  in  this  respect  they  were  not  unlike  the  rest 
of  the  world. 

Accordingly  this  regulation  about  trading  with  the  continent 
of  Europe  was  disobeyed,  or,  if  conformed  to  at  all,  it  was  to 
such  a  slight  extent  that  it  was  practically  a  dead  letter.  The 
colonists  repealed  it  as  though  they  had  had  a  parliament  of 
their  own  for  the  purpose ;  and  while  France  held  Canada  they 
could  do  so  with  impunity. 

In  1663  another  act  was  passed,  to  parts  of  which  the 
colonists  had  no  objection.  They  certainly  approved  of  that 
clause  which  prohibited  tobacco-planting  in  England,  and  com- 
plained that  the  weed  was  still  cultivated  there  in  spite  of  a 
previous  act  prohibiting  its  culture.  The  object  of  this  act  was 
to  favor  the  Virginia  and  Maryland  tobacco-planters.  In  con- 
sideration for  sending  all  their  tobacco  to  England  they  were 
to  have  the  exclusive  monopoly  of  tobacco-planting.  The  great 
object  of  the  trade  laws  was  to  bind  together  by  reciprocal 
favors  the  colonies  and  the  mother-country  as  a  unit  against  all 
of  England's  rivals. 

But  one  of  the  clauses  of  the  act  of  1663  forbade  any  com- 
modities of  Europe  to  be  taken  to  the  colonies2  except  in  English- 


1  In  1704  molasses  and  the  rice  of  South  Carolina  were  added  to 
the  enumerated  articles.  In  1730  rice  was  allowed  to  be  carried  to 
European  ports  south  of  Cape  Finisterre. 

2  The  act  allowed  certain  exceptions — salt  for  the  New  England 
fisheries,  wine  from  Madeira  and  the  Azores*  servants  and  horses  from 
Scotland  and  Ireland. 

39 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

built  ships  and  from  English  ports.  This  was  to  compel  the 
colonies  to  buy  their  manufactured  goods  and  articles  of  luxury 
from  England.  Why  should  the  colonists  enrich  the  merchants 
of  France,  Holland,  and  Spain  ?  Why  not  enrich  the  merchants 
of  England? 

This  regulation  naturally  displeased  enterprising  colonists, 
and  they  disobeyed  it.  They  carried  the  enumerated  articles  to 
Europe,  and  on  the  return  voyage  they  brought  back  European 
products  in  their  own  ships  and  without  obtaining  them  at 
English  ports  or  from  English  merchants.  Many  a  cargo  of 
manufactured  articles  from  France  or  Holland,  and  of  wine, 
oil,  and  fruit  from  Portugal,  and  many  a  cargo  of  the  famous 
cheap  Holland  tea,  snugly  packed  in  molasses  hogsheads,  did 
our  vessels  "run,"  as  it  was  called,  to  the  American  coast,  to 
the  great  damage  and  underselling  of  British  merchants,  and  to 
the  great  profit  of  the  natural  enemies  of  Great  Britain  in 
France,  Spain,  and  Holland. 

If  we  could  raise  from  the  mud,  into  which  she  finally  sank, 
any  one  of  the  curiously  rigged  ships  of  our  ancestors,  with  her 
high-turreted  stern,  her  queer  little  mast  out  on  the  bowsprit, 
her  lateen  sail,  and  all  the  contrivances  which  made  her  only  a 
slight  advance  on  the  old  "Mayflower,"  which  brought  such 
vast  cargoes  of  ancestors  and  old  china  to  Massachusetts,  we 
would  be  tolerably  safe  in  calling  her  a  smuggler,  for  most  of 
our  ships  were  engaged  in  that  profitable  business. 

The  desire  to  share  profits  with  England  was  not  very 
ardent.  In  1676  Edward  Randolph  was  sent  out  to  Massa- 
chusetts as  an  agent  to  look  into  its  condition.  He  reported 
the  navigation  laws  unexecuted  and  smuggling  so  universal  that 
commerce  was  free;  and  the  governor  of  Massachusetts  "would 
make  the  world  believe  they  were  a  free  state. ' ' 

In  168Q  he  returned  to  Massachusetts  as  collector  of  customs 
to  enforce  \he  navigation  laws.  The  notice  of  his  appointment 
was  torn  down,  and  the  assembly  created  a  custom-office  of  its 
own,  so  as  to  supersede  him  and  administer  the  navigation  laws 
in  the  Massachusetts  manner.     When  he  attempted  to  seize 

40 


THE  OLD  MOLASSES  ACT 

vessels  he  was  overwhelmed  with  law-suits.     The  people  were 
against  him,  and  he  returned  to  England  disgusted.3 

There  was  an  act  of  1696  requiring  the  trade  between  Eng- 
land and  the  colonies  to  be  carried  in  English-  or  colonial-built 
ships ;  but  to  this  the  colonists  of  course  had  no  objection. 

In  1733  another  trade  act  was  passed,  which  levied  duties  on 
spirits,  sugar,  and  molasses  imported  to  the  colonies  from  any 
of  the  French  or  Spanish  West  Indies.  This,  as  the  preamble 
of  the  act  explained,  was  to  protect  the  English  sugar  islands .. 
from  competition  with  the  French  and  Spanish  sugar  islands, 
as  well  as  to  give  the  mother-country  a  share  in  this  trade.  But 
the  colonists  found  the  trade  so  profitable  that  they  preferred 
to  have  it  for  themselves  without  any  tax  or  duties.  They 
carried  many  of  their  products  to  the  French  and  Spanish 
islands,  making  a  good  exchange  for  spirits  and  sugar,  and 
bringing  back  gold  and  silver  money  which  they  needed  in 
buying  supplies  from  England  and  in  decreasing  the  amount 
of  paper  money  they  were  obliged  to  issue.  The  act  of  1733, 
levying  duties  on  this  trade,  was  a  subject  of  much  discussion 
during  the  early  stages  of  the  Revolution,  and  was  usually 
spoken  of  as  the  "old  molasses  act"  to  distinguish  it  from  a 
sort  of  supplement  to  it  passed  in  1764,  called  the  "sugar  act." 
Our  people  made  a  dead  letter  of  it,  as  they  did  of  all  the  others 
that  interfered  with  their  purposes. 

Modern  writers  have  usually  been  inclined  to  dispose  of  all 
these  trade  laws  with  the  brief  statement  that  they  were  un- 
natural and  absurd  restraints.  But  we  must  look  at  them\ 
from  the  point  of  view  of  their  times,  and  they  were  generally 
regarded  by  Adam  Smith  and  other  political  writers  as  much 
less  restrictive  than  similar  laws  of  other  countries.4  The 
trade  of  all  the  Spanish  colonies  was  confined  by  law  to  Spain ; 
the  trade  of  the  Brazils  to  Portugal ;  the  trade  of  Martinico  and 


8  Palfrey,  "  New  England,"  vol.  iii,  pp.  284,  375  j  Randolph's  Report, 
Hutchinson  Papers,  published  by  Prince  Society,  vol.  ii;  Andros  Tracts, 
vol.  iii;  Lossing,  "  Cyclopaedia  of  United  States  History,"  pp.  957,  1182. 

*  See,  also,  "  The  Interests  of  the  Merchants  and  Manufacturers  of 
Great  Britain  in  the  Present  Contest,"  London,  1774. 

41 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

other  French  colonies  to  France;  the  trade  of  Curacoa  and 
Surinam  to  Holland.  Until  about  the  year  1750  the  trade  of 
the  Spanish  colonies  was  not  only  confined  to  Spain,  but  to  one 
port  of  Spain,  at  first  Seville,  and  afterwards  Cadiz.5 

There  was,  however,  a  famous  exception  to  these  stringent 
regulations  of  colonial  commerce.  The  trade  of  the  island  of  St. 
Eustatius  was  allowed  by  Holland  to  be  free  to  all  the  world. 
England  herself  had  free  ports  in  Jamaica  and  Dominica,  the 
French  one  in  St.  Domingo,  and  the  Danes  one  in  St.  Thomas. 
The  object  of  such  free  ports  was  to  draw  trade  from  a  rival  at 
some  particular  point,  so  as  to  reap  the  advantages  of  both  free 
trade  and  protection  and  take  profits  both  coming  and  going. 
The  English  considered  Eustatius  a  great  injury  to  their  trade. 
A  large  part  of  the  American  smuggling  was  conducted  there. 
It  was  used  during  the  Revolution  to  obtain  arms  and  supplies 
from  France;  its  little  rock-bound  harbor  was  always  crowded 
with  vessels ;  there  was  no  spot  of  earth  more  thoroughly  hated 
for  its  free  trade;  and  towards  the  close  of  our  Revolution 
England  seized  it,  capturing  all  the  ships  in  its  harbor  and 
destroying  its  docks  and  warehouses.6 

Adam  Smith,  while  showing  that  England  dealt  more 
liberally  than  any  other  nation  with  her  colonies  in  these 
matters  of  trade,  was  nevertheless  opposed  on  principle  to  such 
restrictions.  But  the  restrictions  had  as  yet,  he  said,  done  no 
harm  to  the  colonies. 

"  To  prohibit  a  great  people,  however,  from  making  all  that  they 
can  of  every  part  of  their  own  produce,  or  from  employing  their  stock 
and  industry  in  the  way  that  they  judge  most  advantageous  to  them- 
selves,  is   a  manifest  violation  of   the   most  sacred   rights   of   mankind. 


6  Lewis,  "  Government  of  Dependencies,"  edition  of  1891,  p.  216. 
See  the  writings  of  Dr.  Richard  Price  and  Dean  Tucker,  as  well  as  the 
works  of  Josiah  Child,  Joshua  Gee,  and  John  Ashley  on  the  navigation 
and  trade  laws;  chap,  iii  of  Stokes'  "Constitution  of  the  British  Colo- 
nies," and  Stedman,  "  American  War,"  edition  1794,  vol.  i,  pp.  11-18. 

8 "  Observations  on  North  America,"  translated  by  J.  G.  Rosen- 
garten,  Phila.,  1903 ;  Joshua  Gee,  "  Trade  and  Navigation  of  Great 
Britain,"  6th  ed.,  p.  Ill;  "Prior  Documents  of  the  Revolution,"  p.  166; 
American  Archives,  5th  series,  vol.  ii,  p.  165. 

42 


EFFECT  OF  NAVIGATION  ACTS 

Unjust,  however,  as  such  prohibitions  may  be,  they  have  not  hitherto 
been  very  hurtful  to  the  colonies.  ...  In  a  more  advanced  state  they 
might  be  really  oppressive  and  insupportable." — "  Wealth  of  Nations," 
Book  iv,  chap,  vii,  5th  ed.,  p.  261. 

Adam  Smith  was  a  free-trader  and  believed  that  free  trade 
would  have  been  better  for  England  than  the  attempt  to  monop- 
olize the  colonial  trade.  But  it  would  have  been  a  good  deal  to 
expect  England  to  give  up  colonial  monopoly  when  all  other 
nations  were  practising  it  and  watching  their  chance  to  absorb 
the  trade  of  the  English  colonies.  If  they  had  all  been  willing 
to  abandon  restrictions,  and  trust  to  chance  or  the  working  of 
natural  laws  for  their  commercial  advantage,  there  would  have 
been  a  very  pretty  field  in  which  Adam  Smith  and  other  polit- 
ical economists  could  have  watched  developments.  But  such  an 
ideal  condition  of  affairs  was  practically  impossible. 

From  England's  point  of  view  the  restrictive  and  pro- 
tective system  was  of  great  importance.  Even  though  the 
colonies  violated  such  parts  of  the  system  as  they  disliked,  there 
remained  enough  to  add  enormously  to  England's  wealth.  Sir 
Joshua  Gee,  writing  in  1738,  seems  to  have  thought  that  the 
colonies  had  been  the  principal  cause  of  England's  growth  and 
greatness.  For  nearly  two  hundred  years  many  of  the  pro- 
visions of  the  navigation  and  trade  laws  had  been  of  vast  utility 
in  accomplishing  her  purposes  of  trade  and  crippling  her  com- 
mercial rivals,  Holland  and  France.  The  navigation  acts  have 
always  been  regarded  in  England  as  having,  in  effect,  destroyed 
the  Dutch  commercial  supremacy.  English  shipping  and  colo- 
nial shipping  developed  so  rapidly  under  the  first  navigation 
act  that  old  writers  called  it  the  Sea  Magna  Charta  and  the 
Charta  Maratima.  The  trade  and  navigation  laws  are  by  no 
means  to  be  despised  and  ridiculed,  because,  under  changed 
conditions,  their  principle  has  been  abandoned  and  England 
has  seen  greater  advantage  in  free  trade.7 

7  See  Josiah  Child's  "  New  Course  of  Trade,"  published  in  1698,  as 
well  Gee's  "Trade  and  Navigation  of  Great  Britain,"  published  in  1738. 
The  trade  and  navigation  laws  can  be  read  in  any  edition  of  the  British 
Statutes  at  Large.  Eyre  and  Strahan's  edition  is  good,  and  Stamp's 
Index  to  the  Statutes  at  Large  will  be  found  convenient. 

43 


AMERICAN    INDEPENDENCE 

In  the  general  European  opinion  of  that  time  the  restric- 
tive system  of  the  navigation  and  trade  laws  was  believed 
to  be  particularly  fair  and  liberal,  because  it  was  mutual; 
because,  while  the  colonies  were  compelled  to  trade  with  the 
mother-country,  the  mother-country,  besides  protecting  them 
with  her  army  and  fleet,  was  compelled  to  trade  with  the 
colonies.  The  British  merchants  were  as  closely  bound  to  buy 
their  raw  material  only  from  the  colonies  as  the  colonies  were 
bound  to  buy  manufactured  goods  only  from  the  British  mer- 
chants. The  people  of  Great  Britain,  as  we  have  seen,  were 
not  allowed  to  raise  tobacco  or  buy  it  anywhere  except  in  Mary- 
land and  Virginia. 

The  colonists  were  paid  bounties  on  all  the  naval  stores, 
hemp,  flax,  and  lumber,  which  they  produced ;  and  the  large 
sums  thus  paid  to  them  were  regarded  by  Englishmen  as  fully 
offsetting  any  inconveniences  they  might  suffer  from  restric- 
tions on  their  trade.  South  Carolina  had  a  bounty  on  indigo, 
and  could  carry  her  rice  to  all  European  ports  south  of  Cape 
Finisterre.  The  reason  for  this  freedom  south  of  the  cape  was 
that  those  parts  of  Europe  were  not  manufacturing  countries 
and  the  colony  ships  were  not  likely  to  carry  home  from  them 
any  manufactured  articles  that  would  interfere  with  English 
manufacturers.8 

The  laws  which  prohibited  the  colonies  from  importing 
directly  from  Europe  were  mitigated  by  a  system  of  drawbacks 
on  the  duties.  The  great  colonial  staples  of  grain,  lumber,  salt 
provisions,  fish,  sugar,  and  rum  the  colonists  were  allowed  to 
carry  to  any  part  of  the  world,  provided  they  took  them  in  their 
own  or  in  British-built  ships  of  which  the  owners  and  three- 
fourths  of  the  crew  were  British  subjects.  The  British  West 
India  colonies  were  compelled  to  buy  their  provisions  and 
lumber  from  the  American  continental  colonies.  That  colonies 
which  had  cost  such  a  vast  and  long-continued  expenditure  of 
blood  and  treasure  should  be  closely  bound  to  the  mother- 


s  Smith,   "Wealth   of  Nations,"   5th  Edinburgh  edition,   1859,   Book 
iv,  chap,  viii,  p.  200. 

44 


RESTRAINTS  ON  MANUFACTURING 

country  in  trade,  and  should  take  part  in  a  system  which  would 
at  the  same  time  enrich  the  mother-country  and  themselves, 
seemed  to  most  Europeans  natural  and  right. 

Montesquieu,  who  wrote  just  before  the  outbreak  of  our 
Revolution,  and  who  was  one  of  the  liberal  thinkers  of  that 
time,  described  the  colonial  monopoly  system  as  well  recognized 
by  the  law  of  nations,  and  he  defends  the  system  "because  the 
design  of  the  settlement  was  the  extension  of  commerce  and  not 
the  founding  of  a  city  or  a  new  empire. ' '  What  a  colony  loses 
by  the  restraint  is,  he  says,  "visibly  compensated  by  the  pro- 
tection of  the  mother  country,  who  defends  it  by  her  arms  and 
supports  it  by  her  laws. ' ' 9 

Nor  was  colonial  trade  monopoly  without  its  advocates  even 
in  America.  Joseph  Reed,  of  Philadelphia,  who  became  a 
patriot  general  in  the  Revolution  and  an  intimate  friend  of 
Washington,  wrote  an  essay  in  1766  in  which  he  defended  in 
the  most  enthusiastic  manner  the  colonial  monopoly  as  bene- 
ficial alike  to  both  England  and  her  colonies.10 

The  Americans  were  also  restrained  by  acts  of  Parliament 
from  manufacturing  such  articles  as  English  merchants  wished 
to  furnish ;  and  some  of  the  acts  on  this  subject  were  aimed  not 
so  much  at  manufacturing  certain  articles  as  at  exporting  them 
and  injuring  the  foreign  trade  of  the  mother-country.  The 
colonists  could  mine  ore  and  turn  it  into  iron,  but  they  were 
not  allowed  to  manufacture  the  iron  into  steel,  tools,  or  weapons. 
Furs  must  be  brought  to  England  and  not  manufactured  in  the 
colonies.  Hat-making  was  so  successfully  carried  on  that  better 
hats  were  made  in  the  colonies  than  in  Europe,  and  many  of 
them  were  exported  to  Spain,  Portugal,  the  West  Indies,  and 
even  to  England.  The  English  hat-makers  thereupon  petitioned 
Parliament,  and  in  1732  hat-making  was  restrained  by  forbid- 
ding the  manufacture  of  hats  in  the  colonies  by  any  one  who 
had  not  served  an  apprenticeship  of  seven  years  and  allowing 
to  a  hatter  only  two  apprentices.    The  object  of  this  act  was  to 


9"  Spirit  of  the  Laws,"  B.  21,  c.  xvii. 
10  Life  of  Joseph  Reed,  by  W.  B.  Reed,  vol.  i,  p.  409. 

45 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

keep  the  industry  within  bounds,  allowing  the  Americans  to 
make  only  a  few  hats  for  themselves;  and  to  attain  this  more 
effectually,  the  colonists  were  forbidden  to  export  hats  to 
Europe  or  from  one  colony  to  another.  For  the  same  reasons  no 
wool  and  no  article  made  of  wool  could  be  exported  from  the 
colonies ;  for  the  wool  industry  in  England  was  of  vast  impor- 
tance and  must  be  encouraged  by  every  means.11 

The  colonists  seem  to  have  violated  these  laws  with  impunity. 
They  were  not  very  strongly  drawn  to  domestic  manufacturing 
at  that  time,  because  they  saw  greater  fields  of  profit  in  farming 
and  on  the  ocean,  in  ship-building  and  the  carrying  trade,  in 
whaling  and  in  the  fisheries  of  the  Grand  Banks.  But  they 
indulged  themselves  in  a  certain  amount  of  manufacturing, 
both  illicit  and  legitimate.  They  made  steel,  tools,  anchors, 
scythes,  and  weapons  of  all  sorts  in  spite  of  the  prohibition. 
Rifles  appear  to  have  been  made  at  Lancaster  and  Philadelphia 
long  before  the  Revolution.  Blacksmiths  could  forge  muskets 
and  smooth-bore  barrels.  Those  who  know  the  passion  of  the 
American  for  tools  and  machinery  will  smile  at  his  being 
restrained  by  an  act  of  a  Parliament  three  thousand  miles 
away.12 

Such  manufacturing  as  was  carried  on  in  America  was 
confined  almost  exclusively  to  the  northern  colonies.  It  did  not 
become  large,  and  the  products  of  it  were  not  extensively 
exported.  The  colonists  imported  enormous  quantities  of  manu- 
factured goods  from  England.  These  importations  were  rapidly 
increasing  in  volume  and  appeared  to  be  only  slightly  affected 
by  the  surreptitious  colonial  manufacturing.  By  reason  of  the 
enormous  importations  the  profits  of  nearly  every  kind  of  busi- 


11  Acts  8  Geo.  I,  c.  15,  sec.  24;  5  Geo.  II,  c.  22;  23  Geo.  II,  c.  29,  sec.  9; 
10  and  11  Wm.  Ill,  c.  10,  sec.  19;  12  Geo.  II,  c.  21,  sec.  11;  Columbia 
Univ.  Studies  in  History,  &c,  vol.  iii,  No.  2,  p.  66. 

12 "  The  Interests  of  the  Merchants  and  Manufacturers  in  the  Present 
Contest,"  p.  22,  et  scq.,  London,  1774;  Pennsylvania  Magazine  of  History, 
vol.  vii,  p.  197;  Achenwall,  "Observations  on  North  America,"  1767, 
translated  by  J.  G.  Rosengarten,  pp.  13-14;  American  Archives,  4th 
series,  vol.  i,  p.  1002. 

46 


MUST  BUY  FROM  ENGLAND 

ness  in  the  colonies  tended  to  centre  in  England;  specie  was 
drained  from  the  colonists;  and  they  were  forced  to  create  an 
artificial  paper  money.  In  the  matter  of  taking  her  manufac- 
tured goods,  the  colonies  were  certainly  a  source  of  wealth 
to  England.  Pownall  thought  that  the  English  manufacturers 
would  always  be  able  to  undersell  American-made  goods,  and 
the  colonists  would  always  be  dependent  on  England  for  such 
supplies.13 

The  policy  of  preventing  a  colony  from  establishing  manu- 
factures of  its  own  and  thus  compelling  it  to  buy  goods  from 
the  mother-country  was  from  earliest  times  considered  an 
important  and  obviously  necessary  part  of  England's  colonial 
sj'stem.  It  seemed  absurd  to  allow  a  colony  to  develop  an 
industry  which  could  interfere  with  an  industry  of  the  mother- 
country,  and  sell  to  France  or  Spain  products  which  the  mother- 
country  wished  to  sell.  The  Board  of  Trade  and  Plantations 
were,  from  their  first  constitution  in  1696,  instructed  to  watch 
for  and  report  such  dangers.  For  a  hundred  years  before  our 
Revolution  the  principal  reason  for  holding  and  encouraging 
the  colonies  and  sacrificing  money  and  lives  in  their  protection, 
was  that  they  might  afford  a  market,  or  give  a  vent  as  it  was 
called,  for  English  goods.  After  our  Revolution  this  same 
method  was  successfully  followed  in  British  India,  where 
England  has  largely  suppressed  the  native  industries,  and 
reaped  a  vast  .revenue  from  the  control  of  a  population  of 
290,000,000. 

"  India,  in  the  eighteenth  century  was  a  great  manufacturing  as 
well  as  a  great  agricultural  country,  and  the  products  of  Indian  looms 
supplied  the  markets  of  Asia  and  of  Europe.  It  is,  unfortunately,  true 
that  the  East  Indian  Company  and  the  British  Parliament,  following 
the  selfish  commercial  policy  of  a  hundred  years  ago,  discouraged  Indian 
manufactures  in  the  early  years  of  British  rule  in  order  to  encourage  the 
rising  manufactures  of  England.  Their  fixed  policy,  pursued  during  the 
last  decades  of  the  eighteenth  century  and  the  first  decades  of  the  nine- 
teenth, was  to  make  India  subservient  to  the  industries  of  Great  Britain, 
and  to  make  the  Indian  people  grow  raw  produce  only,  in  order  to  supply 


""Administration  of  the  Colonies,"  2d  ed.,  p.  201. 

47 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

material  for  the  looms  and  manufactories  of  Great  Britain.  This  policy 
was  pursued  with  unwavering  resolution  and  with  fatal  success.  .  .  . 
It  is  a  painful  episode  in  the  history  of  British  rule  in  India;  but  it  is  a 
story  which  has  to  be  told  to  explain  the  economic  condition  of  the 
Indian  people,  and  their  present  helpless  dependence  on  agriculture." — 
Dutt,  "  Economic  History  of  India,"  p.  viii.  See  also  Digby,  "  Prosperous 
British  India,"  pp.  36,  85,  91,  145,  258-261. 

Since  1879,  however,  the  opposite  policy  has  been  pursued  in 
the  case  of  Canada  and  Australia,  whose  populations  have 
always  been  comparatively  small  and  whose  ability  and  oppor- 
tunities for  manufacturing  are  so  slight  that  they  never  could 
become  great  and  dangerous  rivals  like  India  or  the  United 
States.  The  restraint  of  manufacturing  in  Canada  and  Aus- 
tralia was  found  to  be  depressing  at  a  time  when  those  colonies 
needed  the  greatest  encouragement.  Even  when  England  was 
practising  and  advocating  free  trade  most  strongly  it  soon 
became  obvious  that  an  exception  must  be  made  in  the  case  of 
Canada,  whose  manufacturing  industries  required  encourage- 
ment ;  and  accordingly  after  the  year  1879  Canada  was  allowed 
to  enact  a  tariff  "which  was  professedly  based  upon  the  prin- 
ciple of  protection  to  native  industries. ' ' 14 


14  Johns  Hopkins  Univ.  Studies  in  History,  &c,  vol.  vii,  "  Federal 
Government  in  Canada,"  p.  41 ;  Achenwall,  "  Observations  on  North 
America,"  1767,  pp.  15,  19;  Todd,  "Parliamentary  Government  in  the 
British  Colonies,"  edition  1894,  pp.  222-227,  231-232,  273. 


IV. 

THE  WRITS  OF  ASSISTANCE 

The  smuggling  we  indulged  in  so  universally  against  the 
navigation  laws  was  not  a  daring  occupation.  A  vessel  would 
enter  her  cargo  as  salt  or  ballast,  or  would  pay  duty  on  part, 
and  "run"  the  rest.  Popular  opinion  was  so  overwhelmingly 
in  favor  of  smuggling  that  it  was  not  regarded  as  a  crime ;  and 
the  customs  officials  wishing  to  live  at  peace  with  their  neigh- 
bors and  being  well  treated  by  captains  and  importers  would 
take  no  notice  of  irregularities  over  which  any  sort  of  veil  was 
drawn. 

The  law  which  required  all  tobacco  to  be  taken  to  England 
was  evaded  by  delivering  the  tobacco  to  the  Dutch  at  sea,  and 
this  was  supposed  to  be  a  loss  of  £10,000  a  year  to  the  English 
revenue.  Great  quantities  of  tobacco,  however,  went  to  England 
in  accordance  with  the  law.  The  southern  colonies,  especially 
South  Carolina,  were  not  so  much  inclined  to  indulge  in  illegal 
trade  as  their  northern  sisters,  because  the  products  of  the 
South  were  more  suited  to  the  English  market,  while  the 
northern  commodities  found  a  more  natural  and  better  exchange 
in  the  forbidden  ports  of  the  West  Indies  or  continental 
Europe. 

On  the  American  coast,  the  creeks  of  the  Delaware  River  and 
the  inlets  and  sounds  of  the  New  Jersey  shore  gave  ample 
opportunity  for  smuggling  in  the  neighborhood  of  Philadelphia. 
Farther  north  we  find  that  Long  Island,  with  its  sound  and 
bays,  became  the  natural  and  secure  home  of  the  smuggler ;  and 
goods  were  often  landed  at  Cape  Ann,  and  carried  thence  to 
Boston  in  wood  boats.  Under  the  pretence  of  trading  in  fish, 
the  wild  island  of  Newfoundland  was  much  used  by  the  smug- 
glers, and  was  described  as  a  "magazine  of  all  sorts  of  goods 
brought  thither  directly  from  France,  Holland,  Scotland,  Ire- 
land, and  other  places."     New  England  vessels  carried  on  a 

4  49 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

large  illicit  trade  with  France,  exchanging  provisions  and 
lumber  for  French  manufactures  and  India  goods.  In  the  West 
Indies  vessels  obtained  false  clearances  for  casks  supposed  to 
contain  sugar  or  molasses,  but  which,  in  fact,  were  empty ;  and 
the  vessel  then  proceeded  to  the  French  Islands  and  loaded 
the  forbidden  articles.1 

The  issuing  of  false  documents  from  the  custom-houses  and 
the  general  corruption  of  the  customs  officials  seem  to  have  been 
universal  and  taken  as  a  matter  of  course.  "If  conniving  at 
foreign  sugar  and  molasses  and  Portugal  wines  and  fruit, ' '  said 
Governor  Bernard,  of  Massachusetts,  in  1764,  "is  to  be  reckoned 
corruption,  there  was  never,  I  believe,  an  uncorrupt  custom 
officer  in  America  till  within  twelve  months."  The  governors 
themselves,  it  was  said,  shared  in  the  profits  of  the  smuggling, 
and  a  vessel  engaged  in  the  illicit  trade  in  Rhode  Island  was 
owned  by  one  of  the  judges  of  the  Superior  Court.2 

Our  people  regarded  the  prohibitions  of  the  navigation  laws 
as  contrary  to  their  natural  interests  and  therefore  as  wicked 
foreign  legislation  which  it  was  no  discredit  to  evade,  and  the 
tricks  of  evasion  appear  to  have  been  openly  discussed.  I  have 
been  shown  the  diary  of  a  member  of  a  respectable  Quaker 
family  in  which  he  describes  one  of  these  devices  as  if  it  were  a 
regular  part  of  business: 

May  22,  1750.  "  Feathers  may  be  shipped  from  Ireland  paying  a 
duty  of  2/  per  ct.  provided  the  vesel  be  entered  out  from  some  forrain 

1  Hutchinson's  letter  to  Richard  Jackson,  September,  1703;  Ryerson's 
"  Loyalists,"  vol.  i,  p.  27C ;  Board  of  Trade  Papers,  Pennsylvania  Histor- 
ical Society,  vol.  ii,  B.  34,  619;  Rhode  Island  Colonial  Records,  vol.  vi, 
428-430 ;  "  Letters  to  the  Ministry  and  Memorials  to  the  Lords  of  the 
Treasury  from  Commissioners  of  Customs,"  pp.  115-120;  Stedman, 
"American  War,"  edition  1794,  vol.  i,  p.  12;  Columbia  Univ.  Studies  in 
History,  etc.,  vol.  iii,  chap.  2,  pp.  39,  130,  etc.;  "Documents  Relating  to 
New  York  Colonial  History,"  vol.  iii,  pp.  44-47;  Quincy's  Reports  of 
Massachusetts  Superior  Court,  1761-1772,  pp.  430,  436  et  passim;  "  Let- 
ters to  the  Ministry  from  Gov.  Bernard,"  &c,  London,  1769,  pp.  55,  115 
et  passim;  "A  Defence  of  the  Letters  from  a  Gentleman  at  Halifax," 
Providence,  1765,  p.  22;  American  Archives,  4th  series,  vol.  i,  p.  1669. 

2  Quincy's  Reports  of  the  Massachusetts  Superior  Court,  1761-1772, 
pp.  423-424,  437. 

50 


SMUGGLING  RESPECTABLE 

port,  such  as  the  Dutch  West  Indies,  Madeira,  Jamaica,  etc.  The  method 
would  be  to  enter  out  for  a  forrain  and  the  port  designed  for,  take  a 
particular  cocket  for  the  prohibited  goods  directed  for  a  forrain  port 
and  when  clear  of  the  Kingdom  destroy  it  and  when  arrived  with  us  run 
the  goods." 

Smuggling  was  on  so  large  a  scale  and  so  popular  that  it 
had  become  respectable.  There  had  been  for  a  hundred  years 
and  more  a  great  deal  of  smuggling  on  the  English  coast,  which 
has  been  vividly  described  by  Macaulay  as  it  existed,  about  the 
year  1700,  when  the  people  used  to  say  that  if  a  gallows  were 
set  up  every  quarter  of  a  mile  along  the  seacoast  the  trade  would 
still  go  on  briskly.  Even  after  our  Revolution,  English  smug- 
gling seemed  to  be  as  bad  as  ever.  It  had  been  reduced,  we 
are  told,  to  regular  system;  forty  thousand  persons  were 
engaged  in  it  by  sea  and  land;  and  gentlemen  of  rank  and 
character  in  London  were  believed  to  furnish  the  capital 
required.3 

The  moral  aspect  of  the  situation  was  not  allowed  to  pass 
unchallenged.  We  find  a  pamphlet 4  written  as  is  supposed  by 
John  Drinker,  of  Philadelphia,  implying  that  all  merchants 
were  habitual  customs  violators  or  corrupted  others  to  break  the 
laws,  and  that  such  a  system  was  ruining  the  morals  of  the 
country.  In  our  time  a  reform  club  would  be  organized  to  deal 
with  the  question.  But  the  colonists  usually  regarded  the  trade 
laws  as  so  contrary  to  their  natural  rights  and  opportunities 
that  it  was  a  sacred  duty  to  break  them. 

In  spite  of  the  long  series  of  trade  and  navigation  laws 
filling  so  many  pages  of  her  statute-books,  the  revenue  collected 
by  England  in  America  was  only  £1000  or  £2000  per  year,  and 
it  cost  £7000  or  £8000  to  collect  it.  John  Adams  said  that  the 
duties  on  molasses  alone,  if  collected,  would  have  amounted  to 
£25,000  per  year.  He  asserted  quite  positively  that  the  acts 
of  trade  "had  never  been  executed  as  revenue  laws,  and  there 
never  had  been  a  time  when  they  would  have  been  or  could 


s  Stanhope,  Life  of  Pitt,  pp.  215-216. 

* "  Observations  on  the  Late  Popular  Measures,"  Philadelphia,  1774. 

51 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

have  been  obeyed  as  such. " 5  He  meant,  of  course,  such  parts 
of  the  trade  and  navigation  laws  as  the  colonists  considered 
injurious  to  their  interests. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Reverend  Cotton  Mather,  of  Massa- 
chusetts, asserted  with  characteristic  unction  that  it  was  a 
shameful  slander  on  the  colonists  to  say  that  they  broke  the 
acts  of  navigation.  "The  whole  body  of  the  people,"  he  said, 
"would  rejoice  in  the  severest  execution  of  those  acts  and  lend 
their  utmost  help  thereunto.  There  are  but  a  few  particular 
persons  that  have  transgressed  in  the  forbidden  trade. ' ' G 

Between  these  two  extreme  statements  many  others  might  be 
collected  affirming  or  denying  the  universality  of  the  smuggling. 
But  the  conclusion  one  draws  is  that  it  was  universal ;  and  was, 
as  Lieutenant  Governor  Colden,  of  New  York,  said,  "publickly 
espoused  by  numbers  and  more  strenuously  advocated  than 
legal  trade."  There  was  no  doubt  occasional  or  partial  con- 
formity, and  those  parts  of  the  trade  and  navigation  laws  which 
gave  an  advantage  to  colonial  ships  were,  of  course,  faithfully 
and  legally  obeyed. 

About  the  year  1755  writs  of  assistance  began  to  be  used  in 
Massachusetts  for  authorizing  custom-house  officers  to  break 
into  vessels,  warehouses,  and  dwellings  to  search  for  contraband 
goods,  and  the  controversy  over  these  writs  must  be  noticed.  A 
writ  of  assistance,  or  assistants  as  it  was  often  called  in  those 
days,  was  a  writ  issued  by  a  court  and  directed  to  sheriffs, 
constables,  naval  and  other  officers,  as  well  as  to  all  subjects  of 
the  realm,  commanding  them  to  permit  and  aid  the  customs 
officers  to  enter  vessels  by  day  or  night,  and  warehouses,  cellars, 
and  dwellings  by  day  only,  and  break  open  chests,  boxes,  and 
packages  of  all  sorts  in  the  search  for  contraband  goods.  The 
writ  was  general  and  did  not  specify  a  particular  house  or 
particular  goods.    It  did  not  have  to  be  issued  on  sworn  infor- 


6  Works,  vol.  x,  pp.  246,  348.  See  also  Colden's  remarks,  American 
Archives,  4th  series,  vol.  i,  p.  1030. 

"Andros,  Tracts  ii,  p.  57;  see  Beer,  "Commercial  Policy  of  England," 
Columbia  Univ.  Studies  in  History,  &c,  vol.  iii,  No.  2,  p.  140;  Quincy, 
Reports  of  Massachusetts  Superior  Court,  1761-1772,  pp.  401-407. 

52 


WRITS  OF  ASSISTANCE 

mation.  It  was  not  limited,  like  most  writs,  to  a  short  period  of 
time,  but  endured  in  full  power  during  the  life  of  the  king  and 
for  six  months  after  his  death.  It  was  in  fact  a  general  author- 
ity to  the  custom-house  officer  of  a  particular  place  to  search 
everywhere  and  violate  the  ancient  maxim  that  a  man's  house 
is  his  castle. 

A  strong  argument  can,  of  course,  be  made  against  such 
writs  as  violating  the  general  principle  that  a  man's  house 
should  not  be  searched  except  by  a  writ  issued  for  only  a  limited 
period  and  based  on  sworn  information  describing  the  par- 
ticular house  and  giving  a  reason  for  the  search.  But  in 
England  writs  of  assistance  had  been  held  to  be  an  exception 
to  this  principle  ever  since  the  time  of  Charles  II.  Every 
custom-house  officer  had  one  of  them.  They  were  used  almost 
daily,  and  were  continued  in  use  in  their  full  force  in  England 
down  to  the  year  1817. 7 

They  were  established  by  an  act  of  Parliament  in  the 
fourteenth  year  of  the  reign  of  Charles  II,  and  another  act  in 
the  eighth  year  of  William  III  extended  their  use  to  the  colonies. 
As  this  latter  act  named  no  particular  courts  in  the  colonies 
which  should  grant  such  writs,  a  doubt  was  raised  as  to  their 
legality  in  America.  But  the  courts  of  Massachusetts  and  of 
New  Hampshire  seem  to  have  had  no  scruples  about  issuing  them, 
because  the  Massachusetts  court  had  been  given  by  the  assembly 
the  same  judicial  powers  as  the  Exchequer  Court,  which  in 
England  issued  the  writs. 

When  George  II  died,  October  25,  1760,  the  writs  of  assist- 
ance that  had  been  issued  in  New  Hampshire  and  Massachusetts 
would  expire  in  six  months.  The  customs  officers  began  to 
apply  to  the  courts  for  new  writs,  and  the  application  of 
Charles  Paxton,  Surveyor  and  Searcher  of  the  Port  of  Boston, 
has  been  much  noticed  in  our  histories,  because  of  the  eloquent 


7  After  that  they  seem  to  have  been  still  issued  by  the  courts,  but 
the  Board  of  Customs  modified  their  use  by  an  order  that  no  officer 
should  act  under  one  unless  he  first  took  oath  before  a  magistrate  of  his 
belief  and  grounds  of  belief  that  contraband  goods  were  lodged  in  a 
certain  house.     Quincy's  Reports  supra,  pp.  390,  452,  535. 

53 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

but  in  some  respects  exaggerated  description  of  it  which  John 
Adams  has  left  us.8 

Writs  of  assistance  were  of  great  importance  to  the  govern- 
ment because,  nearly  the  whole  population  being  interested  in 
smuggling,  it  was  very  easy  to  conceal  goods  in  private  stores 
and  dwellings,  and  they  never  could  be  discovered  unless  the 
government  had  the  largest  liberty  of  search.  Hutchinson,  the 
lieutenant  governor,  a  native  of  Massachusetts,  but  a  strong 
loyalist  and  government  man,  said  that  about  the  only  chance 
the  customs  officers  had  to  detect  contraband  goods  was  after 
they  were  landed,  and  even  then  they  could  not  discover  them 
without  a  writ  of  assistance. 

Hutchinson  was  also  chief  justice  of  the  court  that  in 
February,  1761,  heard  the  argument  on  Paxton's  application 
for  a  new  writ.  Some  patriot  merchants,  or  illicit  traders  as  the 
loyalists  called  them,  had  petitioned  the  court  not  to  grant  the 
writ;  and  they  had  retained  as  their  counsel  Thatcher  and 
James  Otis  to  convince  the  court  that  such  tyrannical  writs 
should  not  be  issued  in  America.  The  government 's  side  of  the 
case  was  argued  by  Gridley.  As  counsel  for  the  petitioners, 
Thatcher  appears  to  have  made  a  lawyer -like  but  unexciting 
speech  against  the  technical  legality  of  such  writs.  But  Otis's 
argument  has  become  famous  from  the  enthusiastic  description 
of  it  by  Adams,  who  was  then  a  young  law  student  and  sat  at 
the  trial  taking  notes. 

The  argument  of  the  case  drew  an  audience  of  all  the  mem- 
bers of  the  bar  and  probably  some  of  the  citizens  of  the  town. 
Adams,  in  his  confident  and  exuberant  style,  describes  the  scene 
in  the  council  chamber  of  the  old  State  House,  which  is  still 
standing  in  Boston: 

"  That  council  chamber  was  as  respectable  an  apartment  as  the 
House  of  Commons  or  the  House  of  Lords  in  Great  Britain,  in  propor- 
tion, or  that  in  the  State  House  in  Philadelphia,  in  which  the  Deelara- 


8  The  whole  subject  has  been  exhaustively  and  admirably  investigated 
by  Judge  Gray,  of  Massachusetts,  afterwards  one  of  the  justices  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States.  See  the  Appendix  to  Quincy's  Re- 
ports of  Massachusetts  Superior  Court,  1761-1772,  already  cited. 

54 


THE  FAMOUS  SPEECH  OF  OTIS 

tion  of  Independence  was  signed  in  1776.  In  this  chamber  round  a  great 
fire  were  seated  five  judges,  with  Lieutenant  Governor  Hutchinson  at 
their  head  as  chief  justice,  all  arrayed  in  their  new,  fresh,  rich  robes  of 
scarlet  English  broadcloth,  in  their  large  cambric  bands  and  immense 
judicial  wigs.  In  this  chamber  were  seated  at  a  long  table  all  the  barris- 
ters at  law  of  Boston,  and  of  the  neighboring  county  of  Middlesex,  in 
gowns,  bands  and  tie  wigs.  They  were  not  seated  on  ivory  chairs,  but 
their  dress  was  more  solemn  and  more  pompous  than  that  of  the  Roman 
Senate  when  the  Gauls  broke  in  upon  them.    .    .    . 

"  Two  portraits  at  more  than  full  length  of  King  Charles  the  Second 
and  of  King  James  the  Second,  in  splendid  golden  frames,  were  hung 
upon  the  most  conspicuous  sides  of  the  apartment.  If  my  young  eyes 
or  old  memory  have  not  deceived  me,  these  were  as  fine  pictures  as  I 
ever  saw;  the  colors  of  the  royal  ermines  and  long  flowing  robes  were 
the  most  glowing,  the  figures  the  most  noble  and  graceful,  the  features 
the  most  distinct  and  characteristic,  far  superior  to  those  of  the  King 
and  Queen  of  France  in  the  senate  chamber  of  Congress — these  were 
worthy  of  the  pencils  of  Rubens  and  Vandyke.  There  was  no  painter 
in  England  capable  of  them  at  that  time." — Works,  vol.  x,  p.  245. 

The  speech  by  Otis,  Adams  said,  was  a  "flame  of  fire." 
Judging  from  his  account  it  was  a  most  violent  denunciation 
of  the  whole  commercial  system  which  was  represented  by  the 
navigation  and  trade  laws.  Feeling  no  doubt  that  there  was 
every  probability  that  writs  legal  in  England  under  acts  of 
Parliament,  and  which  had  been  so  long  used  in  the  colonies, 
would  be  held  legal  by  the  Massachusetts  court,  Otis  struck  at 
the  foundation  and  denied  that  Parliament  had  any  authority 
whatever  over  the  colonies.  The  acts  extending  the  writs  to 
America  as  well  as  the  navigation  and  trade  laws  were,  there- 
fore, so  far  as  the  colonies  were  concerned,  absolutely  null  and 
void,  and  writs  issued  in  support  of  such  acts  ought  to  be  held 
void  and  infamous. 

Loyalists,  and  indeed  some  patriots,  have  ascribed  Otis's 
violent  denunciation  to  a  personal  hostility  he  felt  towards 
Hutchinson,  the  chief  justice  of  the  court,  as  well  as  towards 
the  British  Government.  Otis's  father,  usually  known  as 
Colonel  Otis,  had  been  twice  promised  that  when  a  vacancy 
occurred  he  would  be  made  one  of  the  justices  of  the  court.  The 
promise  had  been  twice  broken,  and  on  the  last  occasion  Hutch- 

55 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

inson  had  obtained  the  place  and  had  been  made  chief  justice. 
Before  this  last  appointment  had  been  made  Otis  had  said,  ' '  If 
Governor  Bernard  does  not  appoint  my  father  judge  of  the 
superior  court  I  will  kindle  such  a  fire  in  the  province  as  shall 
singe  the  governor,  though  I  myself  perish  in  the  flames. ' '  ° 

Up  to  that  time  the  colonists  were  not  in  the  habit  of  deny- 
ing the  whole  authority  of  Parliament.  They  had  not  as  yet 
decided  to  assail  the  authority  of  the  numerous  parliamentary 
statutes  under  which  they  had  been  living,  in  many  cases 
without  the  slightest  complaint,  for  more  than  a  hundred  years. 
Four  years  afterwards  at  the  time  of  the  stamp  act  we  shall 
find  them  formally  admitting  the  full  authority  of  Parliament 
over  them  except  in  the  one  item  of  internal  taxation;  and  it 
was  not  until  some  years  after  that,  that  they  abandoned  this 
distinction  between  internal  and  external  taxation  and  rejected 
the  whole  authority  of  Parliament. 

If,  therefore,  we  can  rely  on  the  description  by  Adams  of 
Otis's  bold  denial  of  all  parliamentary  authority,  that  denial 
was  considerably  in  advance  of  the  time.  Such  denial  of 
authority  had  no  doubt  been  discussed  before  1761  among  some 
of  the  radical  colonists  in  private  conversation ;  but  there  does 
not  seem  to  have  been  anything  in  the  nature  of  a  general 
formal  avowal  of  it. 

Otis,  aroused  to  what  according  to  Adams  was  an  extraordi- 
nary pitch  of  passion  and  eloquence,  ridiculed  and  cast  away 
the  distinction  between  external  and  internal  taxes  and  made  the 
argument,  often  made  publicly  ten  or  fifteen  years  afterwards, 
that  the  colonies  must  necessarily  be  out  of  the  jurisdiction 
of  Parliament  because  they  had  been  originally  chartered  by 
the  Stuart  kings  without  the  assistance  of  an  act  of  Parlia- 
ment. Those  kings  hated  parliaments  and  would  not  permit 
Parliament  to  share  such  a  right  with  them.  The  whole  system 
of  English  colonization  was,  Otis  said,  outside  the  realm,  outside 
of  parliamentary  authority,  and  in  the  hands  only  of  the  King. 

Not  content  with  ridiculing  the  language  and  the  provisions 


9  Gordon,  "  American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  i,  p.  141. 

56 


TRADE  SYSTEM  ATTACKED 

of  the  acts  of  trade,  Otis  attacked  those  writers — political  econ- 
omists we  would  now  call  them — who  had  supported  the  pro- 
priety of  controlling  colonial  trade.  He  began  with  Sir  Josiah 
Child,  who  wrote  before  the  year  1700  and  who  was  always 
regarded  as  a  great  authority  because  of  his  practical  experi- 
ence. He  was  the  ablest  merchant  of  his  time  and  controlled 
almost  the  whole  trade  of  England  with  the  East.  From  him 
Otis  passed  on  to  Sir  Joshua  Gee,  and  Ashley,  and  Davenant, 
which  brought  the  list  down  to  his  own  time. 

He  had  the  books  of  these  men  in  court  and  read  quotations 
from  them.  They  upheld  the  necessity  in  those  days  of  con- 
fining the  trade  of  a  colony  to  its  mother-country,  because  other 
nations  did  the  same,  and  if  the  trade  of  a  colony  were  not  so 
confined  it  would  be  absorbed  by  the  Dutch  and  the  colony 
would  become  not  only  useless  to  its  mother,  but  perhaps  a 
dangerous  rival.  They  upheld  the  general  principle  that  to 
allow  a  colony  unrestricted  trade  would  necessarily  be  an 
injury  to  the  trade  of  the  mother-country;  and  New  England 
would  be  a  damage  to  old  England,  unless  its  trade  were  con- 
fined to  England.  Against  these  doctrines  Otis  poured  forth 
the  whole  venom  and  bitterness  of  New  England  hatred  and 
detestation.  If  the  King  of  Great  Britain  in  person,  he 
declared,  were  encamped  on  Boston  Common  at  the  head  of 
twenty  thousand  men,  with  all  his  navy  on  our  coast,  he  would 
not  be  able  to  execute  those  laws  of  navigation  and  trade. 

His  appeal  was  no  doubt  addressed  to  the  audience  which 
filled  the  room  as  much  as  to  the  court;  and  to  arouse  hatred 
for  the  whole  British  system,  he  read  passages  from  the 
writers  mentioned  in  which  they  had  sneered  at  the  Ameri- 
can colonists  as  outcasts  and  convicts  who  had  left  England  for 
England's  good;  ''loose,  vagrant  people,  vicious  and  destitute 
of  means,"  like  the  Virginians,  who  "could  never  have  lived  at 
home,  but  must  have  come  to  be  hanged  or  died  untimely ;  "  or 
malcontents  like  the  New  Englanders,  who  ' '  feared  the  re-estab- 
lishment  of  the  ecclesiastical  laws,"  and  "some  of  those  people 
called  Quakers  banished  for  meeting  on  pretence  of  religious 

worship." 

57 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

Otis  also  went  over  the  whole  ground  of  the  laws  regulating 
colonial  manufacturing  and  Adams  says  "alternately  laughed 
and  raged  against  them  all."  A  member  of  Parliament,  it  was 
said,  had  announced  that  not  even  a  hobnail  ought  to  be  manu- 
factured in  America.  Why  then,  said  Otis,  should  not  Parlia- 
ment enact  that  the  Americans  must  send  their  horses  to 
England  to  be  shod? 

This  defiant  speech,  in  which  British  judges  and  governors 
were  told  to  their  faces  that  all  England's  laws  were  invalid  in 
the  colonies,  and  that  those  which  were  disliked  never  had 
been  and  never  could  be  executed,  produced,  according  to 
Adams,  a  tremendous  impression. 

It  was  not  printed  or  published  in  any  way  except  that  the 
lawyers  and  others  in  the  audience  may  have  carried  a  very 
complete  account  of  it  out  of  doors.  Adams  in  the  excess  of  his 
admiration  lifty-six  years  afterwards,  describes  it  as  the  begin- 
ning of  the  Revolution;  but  that  is  of  course  an  exaggeration. 
Allowing,  however,  for  Adams's  determination  to  have  every- 
thing begin  in  Boston,  we  can  understand  that  it  was  one  of 
the  events  which  encouraged  the  opponents  of  British  rule  in 
Massachusetts,  encouraged  the  mercantile  classes  to  evade  the 
trade  laws,  and  gratified  the  leaders  of  the  little  infant  patriot 
party  by  bringing  to  their  side  a  distinguished  and  able  orator 
like  Otis. 

He  was  soon  afterwards  elected  to  the  Massachusetts  Assem- 
bly, and  for  the  next  ten  years  was  accepted  by  the  patriots  as 
one  of  their  leaders  and  advisers.  We  soon  find  him,  however, 
stating  milder  views  than  he  had  urged  upon  the  court.  Indeed, 
he  reversed  his  opinion  and  held  that  Parliament  had  complete 
and  absolute  power  over  the  colonies  in  every  particular,  and 
that  it  was  impossible  to  conceive  of  the  colonial  relation  with- 
out that  absolute  power  of  Parliament.  As  a  lawyer  and  a 
student  of  the  British  Constitution,  he  must  have  been  well 
aware  that  such  would  be  the  final  decision  in  England  and 
that  there  was  nothing  for  the  Americans  to  do  but  accept  that 
decision  or  break  away  from  the  mother-country  by  force. 

He  seems  to  have  been  a  man  of  violent  impulses,  much 

58 


THE  COURT  ALLOWS  THE  WRIT 

given  to  invective  and  abuse,  full  of  egotism,  absorbing  every 
conversation  and  talking  down  opposition.  His  wife  was  a 
loyalist,  and  her  curtain  lectures,  of  which  he  bitterly  and 
openly  complained,  seem  to  have  aggravated  his  impulsive 
tendencies.  He  was  disliked  for  his  manners,  but  valued  for  his 
patriotic  services,  which  were  terminated  in  1769  by  an  assault 
in  the  coffee-house  by  one  of  the  customs  commissioners,  and 
his  subsequent  insanity.10 

The  court  before  which  he  made  his  famous  speech  reserved 
its  decision  as  to  issuing  the  writ  of  assistance  until  the  judges 
could  communicate  with  England  and  obtain  further  informa- 
tion. When  that  information  was  obtained  the  writ  was  issued, 
followed  afterwards  by  the  issuance  of  others  in  both  Massachu- 
setts and  New  Hampshire. 

This  decision  seems  to  have  been  legally  correct.  Such 
general  writs  are  contrary  to  American  principles  and  would, 
with  us,  be  now  held  unconstitutional.  But  Massachusetts  was 
at  that  time  an  English  colony  under  the  jurisdiction  of  Parlia- 
ment, which,  by  the  act  of  the  reign  of  William  III,  had 
expressly  extended  the  English  writs  to  the  colonies;  and  the 
Massachusetts  Assembly  had  given  the  superior  court  of  the 
province  the  same  powers  as  the  Court  of  Exchequer  in 
England,  which  issued  such  writs.  The  writs  issued  in  Massa- 
chusetts and  New  Hampshire  under  that  decision  seem  to  have 
been  of  immediate  service  to  the  government  in  making  seizures 
of  illicit  cargoes  on  the  New  England  coast;  and  in  1764  the 
Ministry  instituted  repressive  measures  of  a  wider  scope.11 


10  John  Adams,  Works,  vol.  ii,  pp.  163,  219-220,  226-227. 
"- ■ — -iijSee  Quincy's  Reports,  supra,  p.  540. 

James  Cockle,  the  surveyor  of  customs  for  Salem,  was  also  given  a 
new   writ,    and   under    the    custom-house    advertisements    of    the    Boston 
Gazette  of  May  20,  1762,  an  extreme  patriot  newspaper,  is  the  following: 
"  Port  of  C—K—C— Borough 

"  Now  riding  at  anchor  and  ready  for  sailing,  the  Idiot  of  full 
Freight  with  Ignorance,  no  commission,  few  Guns;  any  necessitious 
Person  that  wants  daily  sustenance  may  meet  with  suitable  Encourage- 
ment   by   applying    to   J-s    C-K-C   the    commander,    at   Kings    Arms    in 

S ." — Quincy's  Reports,  supra,  pp.  422-423. 

59 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

It  was  rather  late,  however,  to  begin  to  repress  the  American 
merchants  and  sailors,  who  had  done  pretty  much  as  they 
pleased  for  over  a  hundred  years.  Their  ships  had  sailed  into 
every  sea;  the  merchants  were  as  daring  in  commercial  enter- 
prise as  the  crews  were  bold  and  skilful  in  navigation;  and 
they  laughed  at  the  Parliament  whose  laws  they  had  violated 
for  generations.  They  were  men  who  had  won  careers  from 
rugged  nature,  and  therefore  believed  in  themselves ;  who  were 
inventive,  aggressive,  self-confident,  and  unpleasant  in  English 
eyes;  but  the  same  men  whom  the  eloquent  Irishman,  Burke, 
delighted  to  describe  as  pursuing  the  whales  among  the 
tumbling  mountains  of  Arctic  ice,  or  following  the  same 
dangerous  game  beneath  the  frozen  serpent  of  the  South. 

What  else  had  the  colonists  but  their  ships  and  their  farms  ? 
Those  were  their  two  principal  occupations.  They  ploughed 
either  the  sea  or  the  land ;  and  the  farmers  and  the  small  traders 
were  strongly  inclined  to  wish  success  to  the  great  merchants 
and  the  sailors  because  the  shipping  interest  added  value  to  the 
farms  and  the  small  trade. 

When,  therefore,  the  British  Government,  after  the  French 
war  was  over,  resolved  on  more  regular  and  systematic  control, 
when  revenue-cutters  became  more  numerous,  when  the  customs 
officials  were  stiffened  for  their  duty  and  struck  at  what  the 
colonists  called  "free  trade,"  and  what  in  England  was  called 
the  infamous  crime  of  smuggling,  it  seemed  to  many  of  the 
colonists  a  terrible  thing,  an  interference  with  time-honored 
privilege,  a  suppression  of  their  natural  energies,  and  is  not 
improperly  described  as  an  important  cause  of  the  Revolution.12 


Prior  Documents  of  the  Revolution,"  p.  3. 


V. 

MORE  STRINGENT  NAVIGATION  LAWS,  ADMIRALTY 
COURTS  AND  CUSTOMS  OFFICIALS 

The  reform  that  irritated  the  colonial  merchants  and  ship- 
owners most  of  all  was  aimed  at  their  trade  with  the  French 
and  Spanish  West  Indies,  the  trade  which,  as  we  have  seen,  had 
been  prohibited  by  the  "old  molasses  act"  of  1734.  They  had 
evaded  that  act  for  thirty  years.  But  now,  in  this  famous  year 
1764,  with  France  driven  from  Canada,  and  the  reorganization 
of  the  colonies  resolved  upon,  the  Ministry  ordered  men-of-war 
and  revenue-cutters  to  enforce  the  law,  and  a  supplementary  act 
was  passed,  known  among  the  colonists  as  the  ' '  Sugar  Act. ' ' 

This  act  reduced  by  one-half  the  duties  which  had  been 
imposed  on  sugar  and  molasses  by  the  "old  molasses  act"  of 
1734.  This  reduction,  like  so  many  other  parts  of  the  system, 
was  intended  as  a  favor  to  the  colonists  and  a  compensation  for 
restrictions  in  other  matters.  But  as  the  colonists,  by  wholesale 
smuggling,  had  been  bringing  in  sugar  and  molasses  free,  they 
did  not  appreciate  this  favor  of  half-duties  which  were  to  be 
actually  enforced. 

The  act  also  imposed  duties  on  coffee,  pimento,  French  and 
East  India  goods,  and  wines  from  Madeira  and  the  Azores, 
which  hitherto  had  been  free.  It  also  added  iron  and  lumber  to 
the  "enumerated  articles"  which  could  be  exported  only  to 
England ;  and  it  reinforced  the  powers  of  the  admiralty  courts, 
which  could  try  the  smuggling  and  law-breaking  colonists 
without  a  jury. 

But  the  worst  part  of  the  act  was  that  it  required  the  duties 
to  be  paid  in  specie  into  the  treasury  in  London;  and  of  this 
the  colonial  merchants  bitterly  complained,  because  it  would 
drain  the  colonies  of  specie;  and  as  Parliament  was  passing 
another  act  prohibiting  future  issues  of  paper  money  there 
would  be  nothing  to  supply  the  place  of  the  specie. 

61 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

From  the  English  point  of  view  the  "old  molasses  act"  and 
the  Sugar  Act  were  necessary  to  protect  the  English  sugar 
islands  from  French  and  Spanish  competition;  were,  in  fact, 
part  of  the  system  of  protection  for  all  parts  of  the  empire ;  the 
system  of  give  and  take,  by  which  inconveniences  suffered  by 
one  locality  for  the  sake  of  another  were  compensated  by 
bounties  or  special  privileges  in  some  other  department  of 
trade.1 

This  attempt  to  enforce  the  Sugar  Act  and  the  old  trade 
laws  aroused  great  opposition  and  indignation  in  America,  and 
met  with  no  real  success.  The  loyalists  afterwards  said  that 
the  indignation  was  confined  to  the  smuggling  merchants  and  a 
few  radical  and  restless  people;  but  the  indignant  ones  were 
able  to  make  themselves  very  conspicuous,  for  they  combined  to 
protect  and  conceal  smuggling,  and  at  times  they  broke  out  into 
mob  violence  and  outrage  which  made  Englishmen  stare.  When 
the  officials  occasionally  succeeded  in  seizing  a  smuggled  cargo  it 
was  apt  to  be  rescued  by  violence  which  was  actual  warfare,  but 
into  which  the  perpetrators  entered  not  only  without  hesitation 
but  with  zeal,  energy,  and  righteous  indignation,  as  though 
they  felt  that  the  country  was  already  their  own  and  the 
Englishman  a  foreigner  and  invader. 

After  the  new  writs  of  assistance  were  issued,  in  1761,  there 
was  possibly  some  little  success  in  repressing  smuggling  until 
1766,  at  which  time  the  violence  of  the  mobs  in  support  of  the 
illicit  trading  was  so  great  in  Massachusetts  that  the  writs  could 
not  be  used,  and  all  attempts  to  seize  cargoes  or  enforce  the 
laws  were  abandoned  as  impracticable.  In  fact,  at  this  time  all 
authority  in  New  England  was  in  the  hands  of  the  populace. 

This  sudden  defeat,  in  1766,  of  all  the  Government's  efforts 
against  smuggling  seems  to  have  been  the  result  of  the  repeal  of 


1  The  court  of  Madrid  was  opposed  to  the  trade  with  the  American 
colonies  and  the  Sugar  Act  was  regarded  as  in  compliance  with  Spanish 
wishes  and  the  treaties  subsisting  between  Spain  and  England. — "  Prior 
Documents  of  the  Revolution,"  p.  4.  See  also  pp.  163-167  for  an  inter- 
esting petition  against  the  Sugar  Act  sent  to  the  House  of  Commons  by 
the  merchants  of  New  York.    Annual  Register,  1765,  chap.  vi. 

62 


RESTRICTIONS  INCREASED 

the  Stamp  Act  in  that  year,  which  inspired  the  patriot  party 
with  such  confidence  in  themselves  that  they  decided  to  abolish 
the  trade  and  navigation  laws  altogether.  Otis  made  a  speech 
at  this  time  in  which  he  told  the  people  that  as  Parliament  had 
given  up  the  Stamp  Act  it  had  given  up  the  navigation  laws, 
and  that  the  merchants  were  great  fools  if  they  submitted  any 
longer  to  laws  restraining  their  trade,  which  ought  to  be  free.2 

In  the  hope  of  remedying  this  state  of  affairs,  an  act  of 
Parliament  was  passed  in  1767  creating  a  new  Board  of  Com- 
missioners of  Customs,  who  were  to  reside  in  America  instead 
of  in  England.  There  were  five  of  these  commissioners,  and  it 
was  one  of  them,  John  Robinson,  who  quarrelled  with  and 
assaulted  James  Otis  in  the  coffee-house. 

The  enumerated  articles  which  the  colonists  were  forbidden 
to  carry  to  any  country  of  Europe  except  Great  Britain  had 
now  greatly  increased  in  number.  By  the  original  navigation 
act  of  1660  there  had  been  only  about  seven  of  them — sugar, 
tobacco,  cotton,  indigo,  ginger,  fustic  or  other  dyewood.  But 
now  there  had  been  added  molasses,  hemp,  copper  ore,  skins  and 
furs,  pitch,  tar,  turpentine,  masts,  yards,  bowsprits,  rice,  coffee, 
pigment,  cocoanuts,  whale-fins,  raw  silk,  pot  and  pearlashes. 
This  tended  to  pass  more  trade  through  the  hands  of  English 
people  and  make  England  the  great  market  for  the  commerce 
of  the  world. 

In  1766  Parliament  also  enacted  that  all  non-enumerated 
articles  should  be  subject  to  very  much  the  same  regulation 
as  the  enumerated  articles,  and  not  sent  to  any  European 
country  north  of  Cape  Finisterre,  except  Great  Britain  and 
Ireland.  These  non-enumerated  articles  included  for  the 
most  part  grain  of  all  sorts,  salt  provisions  and  fish.  The 
colonies  produced  these  in  large  quantities,  and  had  here- 
tofore been  free  to  carry  them  to  all  the  markets  of  the  world. 
Their  sale  of  them  had  not  previously  been  confined  to  England, 
because  it  had  been  thought  that  forcing  the  whole  colonial 


2Quincy's  Reports  of  Massachusetts  Superior  Court,  17G1-1772,  pp. 
434,  445,  446. 

G3 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

supply  of  such  products  into  England  would  interfere  too  much 
with  English  people  who  produced  the  same  commodities.'5 

The  British  fleet  on  the  American  coast  was  instructed  at 
this  time  to  give  every  assistance  to  the  customs  officials.  Each 
captain  had  to  take  the  custom-house  oaths,  and  be  commis- 
sioned as  a  custom-house  officer  to  assist  in  the  good  work. 
Admiral  Colville,  who  commanded  from  the  St.  Lawrence  to 
Florida,  became  in  effect  the  head  of  a  corps  of  revenue  officers ; 
and,  to  stimulate  the  zeal  of  his  officers,  they  were  to  receive 
large  rewards  from  all  forfeited  property.  Some  of  the  cap- 
tains even  went  so  far  as  to  buy  on  their  own  account  small 
vessels,  which  they  sent,  disguised  as  coasters,  into  the  bays  and 
shoal  waters  to  collect  evidence  and  make  seizures;  and  one  of 
the  captains  appears  to  have  been  given  a  writ  of  assistance.4 

But  to  bring  the  colonists  under  the  discipline  of  a  more 
methodical  government  was  an  extremely  difficult  and  slow 
process.  The  new  commissioners  of  customs  sent  out  more  than 
twenty  cutters  and  armed  vessels  to  cruise  for  smugglers.  But 
they  rarely  made  a  seizure;  and  the  colonists  laughed  at  the 
enormous  exertion  with  small  result,  and  said  that  it  was  like 
burning  a  barn  to  roast  an  egg.5 

As  a  further  check  to  smuggling,  and  in  the  hope  of  gaining 
more  control  of  the  colonies,  the  admiralty  courts,  which  tried 
cases  without  juries,  were  made  more  numerous,  and  all  the 
revenue  cases  brought  within  their  jurisdiction.  Such  courts 
had  been  established  in  the  colonies  ever  since  1696;  but  they 
were  few,  widely  separated,  and  their  jurisdiction  it  seems  was 


3  Smith,  "  Wealth  of  Nations,"  supra,  pp.  259-2G0.  See  also  the 
printed  instructions  from  the  new  commissioners  of  customs  at  Boston 
to  their  under-officials,  giving  full  details  of  their  duties,  enumeration 
of  articles  and  of  the  various  acts  of  Parliament  to  be  enforced.  A  copy 
of  this  very  instructive  and  valuable  document  is  preserved  in  the  Carter- 
Brown  collection  at  Providence,  Rhode  Island. 

4 "  Observations  on  the  Several  Acts  of  Parliament,"  etc.,  p.  17, 
Boston,  1769;  Quincy's  Reports  of  the  Massachusetts  Superior  Court, 
pp.  429-430;  Annual  Register,  1765,  chap.  v. 

5Jared  Ingersoll,  "Letters  Relating  to  the  Stamp  Act,"  New 
Haven,  1766. 


64 


ADMIRALTY  COURTS 

limited.  In  1765  the  Stamp  Act  provided  that  not  only  the  suits 
for  penalties  under  that  act,  but  all  suits  under  the  revenue 
laws,  could  be  brought  in  admiralty.  This  act  was  repealed  in 
1766  and  in  1768  another  act  was  passed  providing  that  revenue 
cases  might  be  tried  in  any  court  of  vice  admiralty  appointed 
or  to  be  appointed.  The  intention  of  this  act  was  to  make  the 
admiralty  courts  more  numerous  and  convenient;  and  such 
courts  were  established  at  Halifax,  Boston,  Philadelphia,  and 
Charleston. 

This  extension  of  admiralty  seemed  necessary  to  the  British 
Government  because  it  was  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  find  a 
jury  in  America  that  would  convict  a  smuggler  or  any  one 
violating  the  Stamp  Act  of  Parliament.  The  enforcement  of 
such  acts  of  Parliament  in  admiralty  courts  without  juries 
seemed  entirely  justifiable  to  the  Ministry  because  penalties 
under  the  revenue  laws  had  long  been  recoverable  in  admiralty, 
and  in  England  stamp  duties  were  recoverable  before  two 
justices  of  the  peace  without  a  jury.6 

But  to  many  of  the  colonists  it  seemed  as  if  these  courts 
without  juries  would  soon  extend  their  power  from  their  proper 
sphere  of  the  seaports  into  the  "body  of  the  country,"  as  it 
was  called.  They  raised  the  alarm  that  Britain  was  depriving 
her  colonies  of  the  right  of  trial  by  jury ;  that  she  intended  to 
cut  off  trial  by  jury  more  and  more ;  and  in  the  Declaration  of 
Independence  this  is  enumerated  as  one  of  the  reasons  for 
breaking  up  the  empire. 

It  is  interesting  to  remember  in  this  connection  that  by  act 
of  Parliament  the  British  Government  can  at  any  time  with- 


8 Tucker,  "True  Interest  of  Great  Britain  Set  Forth,"  London,  1774; 
"  Correct  Copies  of  Two  Protests  Against  the  Bill  to  Repeal  the  Ameri- 
can Stamp  Act,"  p.  17,  London,  1766;  "The  Conduct  of  the  Late  Admin- 
istration," etc.,  pp.  12-13,  London,  1767;  Columbia  Univ.  Studies  in 
History,  &c,  vol.  iii,  No.  2,  p.  129 ;  "  Strictures  upon  the  Declaration  of 
the  Congress  at  Philadelphia,"  London,  1776,  p.  24;  "An  Answer  to 
the  Declaration  of  the  Congress,"  London,  1776,  p.  71;  Quincy,  Massa- 
chusetts Reports,  1761-1772,  p.  553  et  seq.;  "The  Rights  of  the  Colonies 
Examined,"  Providence,  1765,  pp.  14-15. 
5  65 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

draw  trial  by  jury  from  Ireland,  and  in  the  year  1902  withdrew 
it  by  proclamation  in  nine  Irish  counties.  Great  Britain  began 
the  conquest  and  pacification  of  Ireland  seven  hundred  years 
ago,  but  the  Irish  are  not  yet  submissive  and  British  sovereignty 
is  not  yet  established.  To  Englishmen  who  reflected  on  the 
smuggling  and  illicit  manufacturing,  the  thousands  of  convicts 
transported  to  the  colonies,  the  thousands  of  fierce  red  Indians 
by  whom  the  colonists  were  supposed  to  be  influenced,  and  the 
million  black  slaves  driven  with  whips — the  withholding  from 
such  people  of  the  right  of  trial  by  jury,  as  it  still  may  be  with- 
held from  Ireland,  or  even  of  the  right  of  self-government, 
seemed  no  doubt  a  small  matter.  It  was  the  fashion  among 
most  Englishmen  to  despise  the  Americans,  as  it  is  indeed  the 
fashion  everywhere  to  despise  a  people  who  are  in  a  dependent 
or  colonial  position. 

The  patriot  colonists,  however,  rapidly  learned  to  resent 
English  contempt  and  revenge  themselves.  One  of  the  first 
war-vessels  which  attempted  to  carry  out  the  new  policy  of 
repressing  smuggling  was  the  schooner  ' '  St.  John, ' '  which  was 
stationed  at  Newport;  and  the  colonists  actually  fitted  out  an 
armed  sloop  to  destroy  her,  and  when  prevented  by  the  presence 
of  the  man-of-war  ''Squirrel,"  they  landed  on  Goat  Island, 
seized  the  battery,  and  discharged  its  guns  at  the  ' '  Squirrel. ' ' 7 

During  that  same  year  the  press-gangs  of  British  war- 
vessels  at  Newport  caused  much  irritation  by  taking  sailors 
from  colonial  ships.  In  one  instance  the  ''Maidstone"  pressed 
the  whole  crew  of  an  American  brig  just  arrived  from  Africa, 
and  that  night  the  Newport  mob,  finding  one  of  the  "Maid- 
stone's" boats  at  the  wharf,  dragged  it  up  to  the  common  and 
burnt  it  amid  shouts  of  applause  from  the  people. 

At  the  close  of  the  year  1764,  the  first  year  of  the  attempt  at 
reorganization  and  reform,  the  Ministry  and  Parliament  had 
been  inclined  to  congratulate  themselves  on  having  done  a 
good  deal  towards  remedying  the  disorders  in  America.  At  the 
opening  of  the  next  session  of  Parliament,  in  1765,  the  King 


7  J.  K.  Bartlett,  "  Destruction  of  the  Gaspee,"  p.  6. 

66 


SMUGGLING  N#T  REPRESSED 

reminded  the  Lords  and  Commons  that  the  colonial  question 
was  simply  "obedience  to  the  laws  and  respect  for  the  legisla- 
tive authority  of  the  kingdom,"  and  Parliament,  in  reply, 
declared  that  they  intended  to  proceed  "with  that  temper  and 
firmness  which  will  best  conciliate  and  insure  due  submission 
to  the  laws  and  reverence  for  the  legislative  authority  of  Great 
Britain." 

But  in  the  next  two  or  three  years  they  met  with  little  or 
no  success,  and  we  find  the  pamphleteers  in  England  recom- 
mending stronger  measures,  and  a  greater  number  of  customs 
officers  and  war-vessels.  The  new  Board  of  Commissioners  of 
Customs  had  made  its  headquarters  in  Boston,  a  significant 
event,  followed  by  a  long  train  of  the  most  important  historical 
circumstances.  Boston,  Englishmen  thought,  was  the  worst 
place  in  America.  It  had  always  been  so.  It  needed  curbing. 
Massachusetts  was,  they  said,  the  only  colony  which  had  persist- 
ently, from  her  foundation,  shown  a  disloyal  spirit  to  the 
English  Government  and  the  English  Church. 

The  proceedings  to  stop  smuggling  were  carried  on  for  some 
years  after  1764,  and  were  contemporaneous  with  more  con- 
spicuous events,  the  Stamp  Act  and  other  taxing  laws.  It  is 
somewhat  difficult  to  tell  how  far  the  repression  of  smuggling 
was  successful,  because  the  colonists  laughed  at  the  revenue- 
cutters  and  men-of-war  as  failures,  and  at  the  same  time  com- 
plained that  they  were  being  ruined  by  the  stoppage  of  their 
old  "free  trade."  It  seems  to  be  true  that  the  naval  and 
customs  officers  made  comparatively  few  seizures,  and  those 
they  made  were  often  rescued ;  but  at  the  same  time  the  fear  of 
seizure  and  the  presence  of  the  men-of-war  may  at  first  have 
stopped  a  great  deal  of  the  smuggling.  The  island  of  Jamaica 
complained  of  much  loss.  Exactly  what  were  the  losses  among 
ourselves  cannot  now  be  known. 

The  complete  cessation,  in  1766,  of  the  Government's 
efforts  against  illicit  trade  in  Massachusetts  was  apparently 
partially  remedied  by  the  creation  of  the  new  board  of  com- 
missioners in  the  following  year.  But  it  seems  probable  that 
the  efforts  to  check  contraband  trade  for  the  next  six  or  seven 

67 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

years  met  with  very  small  success.  When  the  year  1774  was 
reached,  the  mobs  and  tar-and-feather  parties  had  driven  so 
many  British  officials  from  office  that  all  attempts  to  check 
smuggling  and  enforce  the  trade  laws  were  necessarily  aban- 
doned until  the  army  could  restore  authority. 

Those  old  trade  laws  can  still  be  read  in  their  places  in  the 
English  Statutes  at  Large.  Some  of  their  provisions  undoubt- 
edly built  up  and  encouraged  colonial  prosperity,  especially  the 
shipping  interests  of  New  England  and  the  middle  colonies; 
but  other  provisions  which  the  colonists  disliked  were  from 
the  beginning  almost  as  dead  as  they  are  now.  Those  laws 
and  the  principles  embodied  in  them  were  not,  as  many  of  us 
suppose,  overthrown  or  abandoned  as  the  result  of  our  Revolu- 
tion. England  continued  them  in  full  force  and  the  colonies 
that  remained  to  her  after  our  separation  were  ruled  by  those 
laws  down  to  the  year  1849,  when  changing  conditions  and  the 
increasing  power  of  the  English  liberal  party  had  established 
free  trade. 


VI. 

THE  STAMP  ACT 

After  a  great  political  movement  or  experiment  has  failed, 
it  is  easy  enough  to  say  that  it  should  never  have  been  under- 
taken, and  to  characterize  it  as  an  absurdity.  After  an  event 
has  happened  we  can  all  see  its  mistakes.  The  important  and 
the  difficult  thing  is  to  foresee  what  will  happen ;  and  in  order 
to  understand  a  historical  episode  we  must  take  the  point  of 
view,  not  of  the  final  critic,  but  of  the  men  who  undertook  the 
enterprise  and  were  obliged  to  use  their  foresight  in  an  untried 
field. 

There  is  no  use  in  saying  that  the  English  Government  and 
people  should  not  have  attempted  to  reorganize  the  colonies. 
They  had  to  do  it  or  abandon  England's  foundation  principle 
of  empire.  It  had  never  been  her  intention  to  create  inde- 
pendent communities,  or  establish  republics.  It  had  never  been 
her  intention  to  recognize  the  doctrine  that  naturally  separated 
peoples  had  a  natural  right  to  independence.  But  she  would 
be  recognizing  that  principle  and  would  be  encouraging  her 
colonies  to  turn  themselves  into  republics  if  she  allowed  the 
condition  of  affairs  in  America  to  continue. 

The  American  colonists  were  multiplying  so  rapidly  that 
they  would  soon  equal  in  numbers  the  population  of  England. 
The  colonial  population  doubled  about  every  thirty  years;  but 
the  population  of  England  had  not  doubled  in  a  hundred  and 
fifty  years.  England  now  had  8,000,000  and  the  American 
colonies  had  2,000,000  whites  and  about  1,000,000  slaves.  If  the 
respective  rates  of  increase  were  maintained,  the  Americans 
would  in  1810  be  as  numerous  as  Englishmen,  and  the  colonial 
relation  between  them  would  cease ;  for  that  relation  is  hardly 

69 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

possible  between  equals,  and  impossible  when  the  colony  is  the 
superior.1 

Having  resolved  that  a  complete  reorganization  of  the 
colonies  was  necessary,  the  British  Government  did  not  go 
about  it  in  an  ignorant  or  careless  fashion,  as  has  usually  been 
taken  for  granted  in  our  histories.  As  soon  as  the  conquest 
of  Canada  was  assured  and  before  the  treaty  of  peace  was 
signed  in  1763,  the  British  Ministry,  under  the  leadership  of 
the  Earl  of  Bute,  took  great  pains  to  inform  themselves  of 
the  exact  state  of  affairs  in  the  colonies,  and  learn  what  new 
regulations  would  be  most  suitable  for  "the  grand  plan  of 
reforming  the  American  governments."  Agents  were  sent  out 
to  travel  about  and  report,  conciliate  prominent  persons  and 
win  them  to  the  side  of  the  ministerial  measures. 

There  was  no  secrecy  in  the  matter.  The  agents  were  intro- 
duced in  their  true  character  and  the  purpose  of  their  coming 
explained.  In  fact,  the  British  military  officers  in  America 
and  all  British  officials  began  to  talk  openly  of  the  necessity  of 
regulating  and  reforming  the  colonial  governments,  reducing 
the  membership  of  the  legislative  assemblies,  forming  New 
Hampshire,  Rhode  Island,  and  Massachusetts  into  one  colony, 
together  with  other  changes  that  would  give  Great  Britain 
better  control.2 

Besides  the  agents  who  were  sent  out,  the  home  government 
had  abundant  sources  of  information  in  the  colonial  governors 
appointed  by  the  Crown,  so  that  it  cannot  be  said  that  Great 
Britain  went  into  this  attempt  to  have  what  she  considered 


1  Kidder,  "History  of  the  Boston  Massacre,"  p.  121.  In  the  year 
1775  it  was  estimated  that  the  American  population  would  be  6,000,000 
in  the  year  1800.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  was  only  5,500,000  in  that 
year  and  England's  population  was  8,800,000.  England's  rate  of  increase 
unexpectedly  improved  after  1776,  owing  it  is  supposed  to  the  great 
wealth  drawn  from  India,  so  that  the  population  of  England  and  the 
United  States  were  not  equal  until  about  1837,  and  our  population  did 
not  equal  that  of  the  United  Kingdom  until  1847. — American  Archives, 
4th  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  9,  1557;  Mulhall,  "Dictionary  of  Statistics," 
review  of  1898. 

3  Gordon,  "  American  Revolution,"  edition  of  1788,  vol.  i,  pp.  142-147.. 

70 


BERNARD  AND  POWNALL 

real  colonies  and  consolidate  her  empire,  without  thorough 
investigation  and  discussion.  Among  the  speeches,  books,  and 
pamphlets  which  enlarged  upon  the  subject,  Sir  Francis  Ber- 
nard's "Select  Letters"  and  Thomas  Pownall 's  ''Administra- 
tion of  the  Colonies ' '  are  of  more  than  ordinary  interest.  Both 
of  these  men  had  had  much  experience  in  colonial  affairs. 
Bernard's  letters  were  written  while  he  was  a  colonial  governor 
to  officials  of  the  home  government  and  afterwards  published. 
He  had  been  governor  of  New  Jersey  and  of  Massachusetts ;  and 
Pownall  had  been  governor  of  Massachusetts,  of  New  Jersey, 
and  of  South  Carolina. 

The  policy  and  principles  which  Bernard  recommended  were 
the  absolute  sovereignty  of  Parliament  over  all  British  colonies, 
the  right  of  Parliament  at  any  time  to  change  colonial  govern- 
ments and  constitutions,  the  principle  that  colonial  self-govern- 
ment is  not  a  right  but  merely  a  privilege  granted  by  Parlia- 
ment and  to  be  exercised  in  subordination  to  Parliament,  the 
principle  that  salaries  of  governors  must  be  fixed  and  perma- 
nent and  not  dependent  on  the  annual  vote  of  a  colonial 
legislature.  These  ideas  were  all  carried  out  in  practice  by 
Great  Britain  after  our  Revolution,  as  time  and  necessity 
showed  that  in  no  other  way  could  colonies  be  retained  and 
governed. 

Pownall  denned  that  ideal  British  empire  which  British 
statesmen  have  ever  since  been  struggling  to  achieve.  There  is 
no  substantial  difference  between  his  description  and  that  which 
we  read  to-day  in  English  newspapers  and  in  the  speeches  of 
English  statesmen. 

England,  he  said,  must  not  be  a  mere  island,  content  with 
herself;  nor  must  she  be  an  island  influencing  in  a  vague  way 
isolated  colonies  or  provinces,  disconnected  fragments  without 
a  vital  unity.  The  time  had  come  for  her  to  consolidate  her 
colonies  in  a  commercial  empire.  The  conquest  of  Canada  had 
given  the  opportunity,  the  "lead"  as  he  calls  it;  and  she  must 
now  make  those  "nascent  powers"  in  America  a  part  of 
herself.  Their  interest,  he  admits,  may  be  "different  and  even 
distinct  from  the  peculiar  interests  of  the  mother  country;" 

71 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

but  they  cannot  become  independent.     They  "will  fall  under 
the  dominion  of  some  of  the  potentates  of  Europe/ ' 

"It  is  therefore  the  duty  of  those  who  govern  us  to  carry  forward 
this  state  of  things  to  the  weaving  of  this  land  into  our  system,  that 
Great  Britain  may  be  no  more  considered  as  the  kingdom  of  this  Isle 
only,  with  many  appendages  of  provinces,  colonies,  settlements,  and  other 
extraneous  parts,  but  as  a  grand  marine  dominion  consisting  of  our 
possessions  in  the  Atlantic  and  in  America  united  into  one  empire,  into 
one  centre  where  the  seat  of  government  is." — "  Administration  of  the 
Colonies,"  p.  9. 

Pownall  and  Bernard  urged  their  countrymen  to  immediate 
action.  The  old  charters  should  be  annulled,  the  forms  of 
government  should  be  all  alike,  and  the  colonies  should  be 
reduced  in  number  and  be  given  natural  instead  of  artificial 
boundaries.  Bernard  pointed  out  that  America  would  grow 
more  and  more  difficult  to  subdue  and  reform.  It  would  be  well, 
Pownall  said,  to  inquire  whether  the  colonies  were  not  already 
arrived  "at  an  independency  of  the  government  of  the  mother 
country ; ' '  to  learn  also  the  measure  of  independency  that  they 
had  built  up  ' '  when  the  government  of  the  mother  country  was 
so  weak  or  distracted  at  home,  or  so  deeply  engaged  abroad  in 
Europe  as  not  to  be  able  to  attend  to  or  assert  its  right  in 
America."  3 

Bernard  did  not  agree  with  the  Whig  minority  and  their 
leaders,  Burke  and  Chatham,  that  the  colonies,  if  let  alone, 
would  come  to  themselves,  see  the  advantage  of  membership  in 
a  great  empire  over  an  attempt  at  isolated  independence,  and 
become  willing  subjects  of  Britain's  rule.  From  his  long 
experience  in  the  colonies  Bernard  was  convinced  that  there 
was  a  powerful  party  which  intended  to  break  away  from 
England  if  it  could. 

Everything  in  the  relations  between  the  colonies  and  the 
mother-country  had,  it  was  said,  been  left  uncertain.  It  was 
not  even  determined  whether  the  King  or  Parliament  was  the 
proper  authority  to  govern  the  colonies  and  bring  them  into 


*  Pownall,  "  Administration  of  the  Colonies,"  2d  edition,  p.  29. 

72 


AMERICA  MUST  BE  CONQUERED 

subjection.  It  was  not  settled  whether  the  commander  of  mili- 
tary forces  sent  out  from  England  could  supersede  the  military 
authority  of  the  colonial  governors.  It  was  disputed  whether 
the  Crown  or  the  colonial  legislatures  could  create  courts  of 
law.  In  England  the  colonies  were  regarded  as  mere  corpora- 
tions capable  only  of  making  by-laws,  while  in  America  the 
patriot  party  regarded  them  as  independent  states  under  a 
mere  protectorate  from  the  British  crown. 

These  arguments  of  two  of  the  most  experienced  of  American 
governors  show  how  the  majority  of  Englishmen  of  that  time 
looked  upon  the  necessity  of  reorganizing  the  colonies.  The 
trade  of  the  colonies  with  England,  in  spite  of  all  the  smug- 
gling, was  now  as  large  as  England's  trade  with  the  whole 
world  had  been  sixty  years  before;  and  must  all  this  be  lost? 
Must  the  colonists  take  it  for  themselves,  divert  it  to  Holland, 
France,  and  Spain,  or  dissipate  it  in  attempting  to  control  it 
exclusively  for  their  own  interests  ? 

The  recent  long  war  had  been  fought  to  settle  whether 
England  or  France  should  dominate  on  the  North  American 
continent,  and  England  had  won.  But  of  what  use  would  her 
victory  be  unless  she  could  also  conquer  the  Americans  them- 
selves and  make  them  part  of  a  united  empire  which  would 
increase  her  own  power  and  wealth? 

So  at  the  same  time  that  the  British  Government  started  to 
suppress  smuggling  in  1764  it  also  prepared  to  enlarge  the 
system  of  taxing  the  colonies  and  make  it  subserve  the  new 
plans  for  their  better  government  and  control.  It  is  a  great 
mistake  to  suppose  that  the  stamp  act  which  was  now  projected 
was  the  first  instance  of  taxation  of  the  colonies.  They  had 
been  taxed  in  various  ways  ever  since  the  reign  of  Charles  II, 
and  there  were  a  number  of  old  trade  acts  of  Parliament  levying 
duties  on  colonial  exports  and  imports,  as  well  as  other  acts 
regulating  their  domestic  concerns  and  pursuits.  These  taxes 
on  exports  and  imports  were  what  the  colonists  called  external 
taxes  levied  on  their  commerce  for  the  purpose  of  regulating  it 
and  differed,  they  said,  from  the  proposed  stamp  act,  which 
they  called  an  internal  tax. 

73 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

The  proceeds  of  these  old  taxes  had  never  equalled  the  cost 
of  collecting  them ;  so  that  although  the  people  of  England 
were  enriched  by  colonial  trade,  the  government  itself  was 
unable  to  meet  its  ordinary  expenses  in  protecting  and  govern- 
ing the  colonies  which  produced  this  beneficial  trade. 

The  colonies  had  also  been  taxed  in  another  way.  When 
England  was  engaged  in  a  war  for  their  benefit,  as  in  the  recent 
war  with  France,  there  was  a  regular  system  b}r  which  the 
British  Secretary  of  State  made  a  requisition  on  the  colonies 
through  the  colonial  governors,  stating  the  quota  of  money  or 
supplies  required  from  each.  Each  colonial  assembly  thereupon 
began  a  long  wrangle  with  its  governor,  and  usually  ended  by 
voting  the  supply,  or  part  of  it,  which  was  collected  from  the 
people  by  taxation. 

This  was  a  voluntary  system,  for  sometimes  a  colony  would 
grant  no  supply  at  all.  It  was,  in  short,  the  old  feudal  aid 
system,  the  system  in  which  all  taxation  in  England  had  orig- 
inated. Taxation  was  originally  not  a  self-acting  system  of 
compulsion.  Taxes  were  gifts,  grants,  or  aids,  which  the 
people,  or  their  feudal  lords,  or  Parliament  as  representing  the 
people,  granted  to  the  King  at  irregular  intervals  to  assist  him 
in  wars  or  other  undertakings;  or,  as  Mr.  Stubbs  puts  it,  "the 
people  made  a  voluntary  offering  to  relieve  the  wants  of  the 
ruler."4 

This  voluntary  system  had  long  since  ceased  in  England, 
and  the  modern,  annual,  self-acting  system  prevailed  both  there 
and  also  in  the  local  taxation  of  the  colonies.  The  taxation 
proposed  in  1764  was  intended  to  be  an  extension  of  the  modern 
system,  to  be  applied  in  a  regular  and  systematic  way  to  the 
colonies  in  time  of  peace,  so  that  they  would  pay  all  expenses  of 
governing  and  securing  them.  This  sort  of  taxation  of  a 
dependency  is  still  enforced  by  England  in  her  most  important 
possession,  India.  It  had  often  been  discussed  as  applicable  to 
the  colonies  in  America.  It  had  been  suggested  in  1713,  when 
Harley  was  at  the  head  of  the  treasury,  and  again  at  the  opening 


4  Stubbs,  "  Constitutional  History  of  England,"  edition  of  1875,vol.  i, 
p.  577.     See  Stedman,  "  American  War,"  vol.  i,  p.  44. 

74 


INSTANCES  OF  TAXATION 

of  the  Seven  Years'  War.  It  had  also  been  advocated  in  the 
early  part  of  the  century  by  Governor  Keith,  of  Pennsylvania, 
who  was  also  one  of  those  who  foresaw  the  leaning  of  some  of 
the  colonists  towards  independence,  and  thought  that  such  a 
spirit  should  be  nipped  in  the  bud.  Other  governors  had  recom- 
mended it,  and  Governor  Shirley,  of  Massachusetts,  had 
recommended  a  stamp  tax.  Spain,  Holland,  and  France  taxed 
their  colonies  to  defray  the  expense  of  governing  them.  The 
taxation  of  America  had  for  a  long  time  been  an  obvious 
measure,  and  might  have  been  tried  much  sooner  if  Canada  had 
not  belonged  to  France. 

If  the  British  Government  could  have  foreseen  what  would 
happen,  they  would  probably  not  have  made  the  attempt.  But 
there  was  no  experience  except  the  previous  taxation  of  America 
and  the  taxation  of  their  colonies  by  other  nations,  none  of 
which  had  ever  been  seriously  resisted.  If  it  is  allowable  to 
have  colonies  and  subject  peoples,  the  mere  legal  right  of  the 
dominant  country  to  tax  them  or  do  anything  else  with  them  is 
perfectly  clear.  But  England  has  learned  that  certain  colonies 
capable  of  making  trouble  must  be  left  to  their  own  methods  of 
taxation.  We  ourselves  discriminate  against  the  Philippine 
Islands  in  our  regulations  of  the  protective  tariff  in  a  way  that 
is  in  effect  taxation.  England  no  longer  levies  taxes  on  such 
dependencies  as  Canada  and  Australia,  but  on  India,  whose 
people  constitute  by  far  the  most  numerous  and  most  profitable 
part  of  her  empire,  she  levies  taxes  of  the  heaviest  kind  for  the 
avowed  purpose  of  defraying  the  expense  of  governing  them. 
Indirect  taxes  are  also  levied  by  England  on  her  crown  colonies, 
and  occasionally  a  direct  tax,  as  in  the  case  of  colonial  light- 
houses. The  taxation  of  dependencies  seems  to  be  a  question 
of  power  and  policy  or  color  of  skin  rather  than  of  right  or 
equal  justice.5 


5  Digby,  "  Prosperous  British  India ;  "  Dutt,  "  Economic  History  of 
India;  "  Naoroji,  "  Poverty  and  Un-British  Pule  in  India,"  pp.  49,  56,  58, 
61,  248,  267,  279,  288,  298,  651,  558,  220.  Jenkyns,  "British  Rule  and 
Jurisdiction  Beyond  the  Seas,"  pp.  10-11;  Lewis,  "Government  of 
Dependencies,"  Lucas  edition,  1891,  pp.  xlix,  lvi;  Lilly,  "India  and  its 
Problems,"  p.  184. 

75 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

In  1764  England  was  believed  to  be  bankrupt,  groaning 
under  the  vast  debt  of  over  £148,000,000  which  had  been 
incurred  by  the  war  she  had  just  waged  to  save  the  colonies 
from  the  clutches  of  France.  During  that  war  she  had  granted 
to  the  colonists  at  different  periods  over  £1,000,000  to  encourage 
their  exertions.  Her  present  debt  of  £148,000,000  was  a  heavy 
one  for  a  country  of  barely  eight  million  people.  The  colonies 
had  no  taxes,  except  the  very  light  ones  which  they  levied  on 
themselves  by  their  own  legislative  assemblies.  But  the  people 
in  England  suffered  under  very  heavy  and  burdensome  taxes  on 
all  sorts  of  articles,  including  the  wheels  on  their  wagons,  the 
panes  of  glass  in  their  houses,  and  other  things  which  involved 
prying  and  irritating  investigations.  All  this  was  to  help  pay 
for  that  great  war,  and  why,  asked  Englishmen,  should  not  the 
colonies  be  called  upon  to  pay  the  expense  of  keeping  them  in 
the  empire  in  time  of  peace  f  While  the  war  was  being  carried 
on  they  had  been  taxed  in  the  old  voluntary  way,  and,  on 
requisition  from  the  home  government,  had  voted  in  their  legis- 
lative assemblies  supplies  of  money,  men,  and  provisions.  Now 
that  peace  was  declared,  why  should  they  not  be  taxed  in  a 
regular  and  orderly  way  to  pay  for  their  own  government  and 
military  protection  and  relieve  England  of  that  expense  f 

This  was  the  very  plausible  position  taken  by  England. 
But  the  Americans  argued  that  the  advantage  which  Great 
Britain  received  from  control  of  the  colonial  trade  far  exceeded 
any  supposed  colonial  proportion  of  the  expense  for  imperial 
defense.  To  this  England  answered  that  the  colonists  were 
such  violators  of  the  trade  and  navigation  laws  that  England 
could  not  get  her  full  share  of  the  trade;  and  the  colonists 
again  replied  that,  nevertheless,  she  ought  not  to  try  to  tax  them 
and  at  the  same  time  try  to  monopolize  their  trade.  Let  her 
abandon  one  or  the  other  and  not  attempt  to  commit  double 
extortion. 

This  had  been  one  of  the  early  phases  of  the  dispute.  There 
was  no  intention  on  the  part  of  England  that  the  proceeds  of 
colonial  taxation  were  to  go  into  the  English  exchequer  to 
enrich  England  or  pay  her  debt  at  the  expense  of  the  colonies. 

76 


OBJECT  OF  THE  STAMP  ACT 

The  plan  of  taxation  that  was  actually  formulated  and  intended 
to  be  enforced  was  to  tax  the  colonies  only  for  their  own 
benefit;  that  is  to  say,  the  proceeds  of  the  taxation  were  to  be 
used  to  pay  the  expenses  of  colonial  administration  and  govern- 
ment, the  expenses  of  troops  placed  in  the  colonies  for  securing 
and  protecting  them,  the  salaries  of  governors,  judges,  and 
other  officials,  and  what  may  be  called  the  general  administra- 
tion expenses,  to  the  end  that  the  money  raised  in  taxes  should 
be  all  spent  in  the  colonies  and  that  the  colonies  should  be 
more  regularly  and  better  governed. 

The  intention  in  the  British  mind  was  not  merely  to  get 
money  or  revenue  from  the  colonies,  and  above  all  not  to  get  if 
in  such  a  crude  way  that  England  could  at  once  be  charged 
with  extortion  and  mere  money-making.  The_  intention  was 
far  deeper  and  more  comprehensive,  and  had  in  view  a  general 
policy  of  bringing  the  colonies  under  better  control  by  means  of 
regular  taxation  which  would  take  away  from  their  popular 
assemblies  the  control  of  the  salaries  of  the  governors  and  other 
executive  officials. 

This  sort  of  taxation,  although  not  attempted  in  such  colonies 
as  Canada  and  Australia,  has  been  carried  out  in  the  most  com- 
plete manner  in  India,  where  England  levies  taxes  to  pay  the 
salaries  of  the  numerous  English  officials  and  other  expenses  of 
the  vast  system  of  the  Indian  civil  and  military  administration. 
The  results  of  the  system  in  India  seem  to  have  been  very  much 
the  same  that  our  ancestors  feared  and  predicted  for  America. 
They  argued  that  if  England  were  allowed  to  take  an  inch  she 
would  take  an  ell ;  the  amount  of  the  increased  taxation  would 
at  first  be  of  no  importance,  but  the  principle  would  be  of  the 
greatest  importance.  Once  admit  that  Parliament  had  the  right 
to  increase  taxation  in  the  colonies  or  levy  internal  taxes,  and 
taxation  would  be  increased  every  year.  Parliament  would  not 
stop  at  three  pence  per  pound  on  tea.  All  the  taxes  on  land, 
wagons,  and  window-panes  which  were  endured  in  England 
would  be  transferred  to  America,  and  the  English  people  would 
force  this  measure  on  the  Lords  and  Commons  or  pull  the  par- 
liament-house down  about  their  ears. 

77 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

"  How  would  you  like  to  pay  four  shillings  a  year,  out  of  every 
pound  your  farms  are  worth,  to  be  squandered  (at  least  a  great  part 
of  it)  upon  ministerial  tools  and  court  sycophants?  What  would  you 
think  of  giving  a  tenth  part  of  the  yearly  products  of  your  lands  to  the 
clergy?  Would  you  not  think  it  very  hard  to  pay  ten  shillings  sterling, 
per  annum,  for  every  wheel  of  your  wagons  and  other  carriages;  a 
shilling  or  two  for  every  pane  of  glass  in  your  houses;  and  two  or  three 
shillings  for  every  one  of  your  hearths?  I  might  mention  taxes  upon 
your  mares,  cows,  and  many  other  things;  but  those  I  have  already  men- 
tioned are  sufficient.  .  .  .  Perhaps,  before  long,  your  tables,  and  chairs, 
and  platters,  and  dishes,  and  knives,  and  forks,  and  everything  else, 
would  be  taxed.  Nay,  I  don't  know  but  they  would  find  means  to  tax 
you  for  every  child  you  got,  and  for  every  kiss  your  daughters  received 
from  their  sweethearts;  and,  God  knows,  that  would  soon  ruin  you." — 
Hamilton's  Works,  Lodge  edition,  vol.  i,  p.  35. 

Hamilton  and  other  patriots  believed  that  the  taxation  of 
America  would  be  used  to  create  a  vast  patronage,  an  American 
civil  service  of  salaried  positions  for  younger  sons  and  political 
dependents  who  would  rule  the  colonies.  Officialdom  and  taxes 
would  mutually  increase  each  other ;  and  this,  if  we  can  believe 
the  books  by  Digby,  Dutt,  Naoroji  and  others,  has  been  the  sad 
fate  of  British  India. 

It  was  commonly  believed  in  America  that  the  disposition  to 
increase  the  taxation  of  the  colonists  had  been  strengthened  by 
the  reports  of  their  gaiety  and  luxury  which  reached  England 
through  the  officers  and  soldiers  returning  after  the  close  of  the 
French  War.  They  described  planters  living  like  princes  and 
all  the  people  rich  and  even  overgrown  in  fortune ;  in  short,  a 
sort  of  India  to  be  despoiled  for  British  profit.  The  colonists 
complained  that  these  reports  were  very  misleading,  that  they 
were  based  on  observations  made  during  the  period  of  inflation 
at  the  time  of  the  war  with  France,  when  large  sums  were 
spent  for  army  supplies.  The  people  were  lavish  in  entertain- 
ing the  officers  who  had  helped  them  to  conquer  Canada ;  and  it 
was  somewhat  contemptible,  they  said,  when  the  officers  return- 
ing to  England  denounced  to  the  Ministry,  as  fit  subjects  for 
plunder,  the  Americans  whose  hospitality  they  had  enjoyed.6 


"Gordon,  "American  Revolution,  edition  1788,  vol.  i,  pp.  136-157. 

78 


THE  VOLUNTARY  SYSTEM 

The  colonists  had  no  objection  to  continuing  the  old  volun- 
tary system,  by  which  their  legislatures  sometimes  voted  sup- 
plies to  the  home  government;  for  whenever  a  governor 
announced  that  he  had  been  instructed  to  obtain  a  certain 
quota,  the  legislature  had  a  chance  to  strike  a  bargain  for  his 
consent  to  some  of  their  favorite  measures.  But  the  delays 
caused  by  these  contests  were  very  exasperating  to  generals  in 
the  field  during  the  French  War,  and  also  to  the  home 
government. 

The  colonists,  however,  were  fond  of  saying  that  the  volun- 
tary system  must  have  been  profitable  enough  to  England.  Did 
you  not  yourselves,  they  would  say,  think  that  in  the  last  war  we 
had  been  too  complying  and  too  generous  in  our  devotion  to  the 
King,  and  did  you  not  hand  us  back  £133,333  6s.  8d.,  which  you 
said  we  had  paid  over  and  above  our  share  of  the  expense  ?  Let 
the  King 'frankly  tell  us  his  necessities,  and  we  will  in  the 
future,  as  in  the  past,  of  our  own  volition,  assist  him. 

But  public  men  in  England  thought  that  the  refunding  of 
the  £133,000  was  an  argument  against  the  old  method,  because 
the  greater  part  of  that  sum  had  been  returned  only  to  Massa- 
chusetts and  one  or  two  other  provinces,  which  had  voted 
supplies  in  great  excess  over  all  the  others.  It  was  ridiculous, 
they  said,  for  a  great  nation  to  have  to  conduct  its  finances  by 
this  sort  of  refunding.  It  would  be  better  to  have  a  simple 
self-acting  method,  like  the  stamp  tax,  that  would  bear  equally 
on  all. 

Accordingly,  on  the  10th  day  of  March,  1764,  that  famous 
year  of  colonial  reorganization,  and  the  same  day  on  which  the 
Sugar  Act  and  the  law  for  the  further  restraint  of  paper  money 
in  the  colonies  were  passed,  Mr.  Grenville,  Chancellor  of  the 
Exchequer,  announced  in  Parliament  the  plan  of  a  stamp  tax 
for  the  colonies.  He  introduced  and  secured  the  passage  of 
some  resolutions  on  the  right,  equity,  and  policy  of  colonial 
taxation,  which  were  intended  to  raise  the  whole  question 
and  have  it  discussed  for  a  year  before  any  particular  measure 
was  offered. 

The  Ministry  went  about  this  measure  with  that  display  of 

79 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

considerate  care  and  tenderness  which  England  has  so  often 
shown  to  dependencies,  a  tenderness  very  much  admired  by 
some  but  very  exasperating  to  a  people  who  are  fond  of  freedom. 
Mr.  Grenville  not  only  wanted  the  subject  discussed  for  a  year 
in  England  before  final  action  was  taken,  but  he  wanted  the 
colonists  to  discuss  it  and  offer  suggestions,  or  propose  some 
better  plan  of  taxation,  or  one  that  would  be  more  agreeable  to 
them.  He  was  lavishly  candid  in  saying  that  the  Sugar  Act 
just  passed  levied  an  external  tax,  the  validity  of  which  the 
colonists  admitted;  but  the  stamp  tax  might  be  an  internal 
tax,  the  validity  of  which  might  be  denied  in  America ;  and  he 
wished  that  question  fully  discussed.  He  was  also  excessively 
liberal  in  hinting  to  the  colonial  agents  in  London  that  now  was 
the  opportunity  for  the  colonies,  by  voluntarily  agreeing  to  the 
Stamp  Tax,  or  an  equivalent,  to  establish  a  precedent  for  being 
consulted  before  any  tax  was  imposed  upon  them  by  Parlia- 
ment. He  afterwards  made  a  great  point  of  selecting  as  stamp 
officials  in  America  only  such  persons  as  were  natives  of  the 
country. 

But  the  patriot  party  in  America  was  far  too  shrewd  to 
accept  the  Stamp  Act  or  offer  an  equivalent.  They  sent  back 
some  petitions  and  remonstrances  against  it,  but  for  the  most 
part  were  silent.  A  year  went  by.  The  proposed  tax  was 
drafted  into  the  form  of  a  law  and  debated  in  the  House  of 
Commons  during  the  early  spring  of  1765.  A  few  of  the  Whigs 
— Conway,  Barre,  and  Alderman  Beckford — made  rather 
impressive  speeches  against  it.  But  the  debate  was  neither  a 
long  nor  a  great  one,  and  the  majority  in  favor  of  the  act  was 
overwhelming. 

The  expression  "sons  of  liberty"  which  Barre  used  in  the 
debate  was  taken  up  in  America,  and  societies  of  these  "sons" 
were  organized  in  almost  every  colony.  They  were  the  first  of 
the  revolutionary  committees  and  were  composed  of  the  most 
extreme  patriots.  They  took  the  advanced  position  that  Parlia- 
ment not  only  had  no  right  to  tax  the  colonies,  but  no  right  to 
exercise  authority  over  them  in  any  case  whatsoever.  The 
colonies,  they  said,  were  under  the  King  alone ;  and  for  the  King 

80 


STAMP  ACT  TO  BE  SELF-ACTING 

the  "Sons  of  Liberty "  expressed  the  most  extravagant  loyalty. 
At  the  same  time  they  stood  ready  to  resist  the  Stamp  Act  with 
their  lives,  and  those  in  New  York  and  Connecticut  bound  them- 
selves to  "march  with  their  whole  force,  if  required,  to  the 
relief  of  those  that  may  be  in  danger  from  the  Stamp  Act  or 
its  promoters. ' ' 7 

The  Stamp  Act  provided  for  a  stamp  on  newspapers  and 
on  most  of  the  legal,  official,  and  business  documents  used  in  the 
colonies.  It  was  the  sort  of  tax  which  we  levied  on  ourselves 
during  the  Civil  War  and  again  at  the  time  of  the  war  with 
Spain.  It  is  unquestionably  the  fairest,  most  equally  distrib- 
uted, and  easiest  to  collect  of  all  forms  of  taxes.  Scarcely  any 
one  in  England  seems  to  have  had  any  doubt  as  to  the  right  of 
Parliament  to  levy  such  a  tax,  an  internal  one,  so-called,  on 
the  colonies. 

The  penalties  for  infringement  of  the  Stamp  Act  varied 
from  £10  to  £20  and  could  be  collected  in  the  admiralty  courts, 
where  there  was  no  trial  by  jury ;  and  to  the  great  disgust  and 
indignation  of  many  of  the  colonists  the  act  further  provided 
that  hereafter  penalties  and  forfeitures  under  all  of  the  revenue 
laws  relating  to  the  colonies  could  be  collected  through  these 
same  jury  less  courts  of  admiralty. 

As  it  was  a  tax  on  documents  used  in  the  everyday  affairs  of 
life,  the  Stamp  Act  was  expected  to  be  self-acting;  it  could 
not  be  evaded  by  smuggling  or  by  any  of  the  other  methods 
used  against  the  molasses  act  and  the  navigation  and  trade  laws. 
The  colonists  would  enforce  it  themselves  in  carrying  on  their 
business;  and  this  expectation  would  no  doubt  have  been 
fulfilled  in  any  country  where  governmental  authority  was  in 
full  force. 


7  Gordon,  "American  Revolution,'-  edition  1788,  vol.  i,  pp.  195,  197. 


VII. 

ARGUMENTS  AGAINST  THE  STAMP  ACT 

Most  people  in  England  and  many  in  America  appear  to 
have  thought  that  the  colonists  after  a  few  protests  would  accept 
the  Stamp  Act  and  settle  down  to  obedience.  But  this  proved 
to  be  a  mistake.  All  that  was  needed  was  for  some  one  to  start 
the  opposition. 

News  of  the  passage  of  the  act  reached  America  in  May, 
and  soon  afterwards,  on  May  29th,  Patrick  Henry,  who  had  just 
been  elected  to  the  Virginia  Assembly,  introduced  a  set  of  reso- 
lutions which  he  appears  to  have  drafted  after  consultation 
with  two  other  members,  George  Johnston  and  John  Fleming. 
The  resolutions  recited  that  the  Virginians  could  be  lawfully 
taxed  only  by  their  own  assembly,  that  taxation  by  Parliament 
was  illegal,  unconstitutional,  and  unjust;  that  the  Virginians 
were  not  bound  to  obey  such  laws,  and  that  any  person  who 
spoke  in  favor  of  them  should  be  deemed  an  enemy  of  Virginia. 

Such  resolutions,  affecting  to  absolve  colonists  from  obedi- 
ence to  acts  of  Parliament  and  denouncing  as  enemies  all  who 
inculcated  such  obedience,  were  regarded  as  criminal  by  many 
members  of  the  Virginia  assembly;  and  as  Henry  spoke, — 
"Caesar  had  his  Brutus,  Charles  I  his  Cromwell,  and  George 
III  " — cries  of  "  Treason!  "  "  Treason!  "  were  heard  from 
every  quarter, — "  may  profit  by  their  example,"  cried  Henry. 
"  If  this  be  treason  make  the  most  of  it." 

The  resolutions  were,  nevertheless,  adopted  by  the  assembly 
sitting  as  committee  of  the  whole;  but  when  the  committee 
reported  them  the  next  day,  the  assembly  amended  them  by 
striking  out  the  parts  which  were  deemed  treasonable,  so  that 
the  resolutions  were  changed  to  a  mere  argumentative  protest 
against  the  right  of  Parliament  to  tax  America,  and  in  this 
changed  form  could  cause  no  more  excitement  than  previous 
protests  before  the  Stamp  Act  passed. 

82 


EFFECT  OF  HENRY  RESOLUTIONS 

But  copies  of  the  original  unamended  resolutions  were  sent 
in  manuscript  to  Philadelphia  and  New  York,  where  it  is  said 
they  were  handed  about  in  secret  among  the  ' '  Sons  of  Liberty ' ' 
and  regarded  as  so  extreme  that  no  one  would  print  them.  Some 
one,  however,  took  them  to  New  England,  and  by  the  end  of 
June  they  began  to  appear  in  their  original  form  in  the  New 
England  newspapers.  It  was  the  spark  that  was  needed,  and 
the  universal  testimony  of  the  time  was  that  these  unamended 
resolutions  started  all  the  violent  opposition  and  rioting  which 
followed  during  the  summer.  Governor  Bernard,  of  Massa- 
chusetts, said  that  he  had  thought  that  the  Stamp  Act  would 
be  accepted  until  those  resolutions  were  published  and  acted 
like  an  ' '  alarm  bell  to  all  the  disaffected. ' '  General  Gage,  writ- 
ing from  New  York,  described  them  as  "the  signal  for  a  general 
outcry  over  the  continent. ' ' * 

The  assemblies  of  other  colonies  quickly  followed  with 
various  forms  of  resolutions;  and  the  argument  contained  in 
them  was  that  Parliament  had  never  before  taxed  the  colonies 
in  internal  matters,  and  that  internal  taxation  was,  therefore, 
the  exclusive  province  of  the  colonial  legislatures.  They  admit 
that  Parliament  can  tax  them  externally,  or,  as  they  put  it, 
regulate  their  commerce  by  levying  duties  on  it,  and  regulate 
them,  as  in  fact  it  always  had  done,  in  all  internal  matters 
except  this  one  of  internal  taxes. 

This  position  was  very  weak,  because  it  admitted  the  right 
to  regulate  all  their  internal  affairs  except  one;  and  the  dis- 
tinction it  raised  between  external  and  internal  taxes  was 
altogether  absurd.  There  was  no  real  or  substantial  difference 
between  the  supposed  two  kinds  of  taxes ;  between  taxes  levied 
at  a  seaport  and  taxes  levied  throughout  the  country.  The 
colonists  afterwards  saw  this  weakness  and  changed  their 
ground.  But  this  supposed  distinction  between  external  and 
internal  taxes  was  good  enough  to  begin  with;  and  the  Revolu- 


1  Stedman,  "  American  War,"  vol.  i,  p.  33 ;  Gordon,  "  American 
Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  i,  pp.  167-171-175-200;  Tyler,  "Life  of 
Patrick  Henry,"  pp.  60-68-72-76.  The  unamended  resolutions  appeared 
in  the  Newport  Mercury,  June  27,  and  in  the  Boston  Gazette,  July  4. 

83 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

tion,  during  the  seventeen  years  of  its  active  progress,  was 
largely  a  question  of  the  evolution  of  opinion. 

During  that  summer  of  1765,  while  the  assemblies  of  the 
different  colonies  were  passing  resolutions  of  protest,- the  mobs 
of  the  patriot  party,  under  the  influence  of  Henry 's  unamended 
resolutions,  were  protesting  in  another  way.  It  certainly  amazed 
Englishmen  to  read  that  the  mob  in  Boston,  not  content  with 
hanging  in  effigy  the  proposed  stamp  distributors,  levelled  the 
office  of  one  of  them  to  the  ground  and  smashed  the  windows 
and  furniture  of  his  private  house;  that  they  destroyed  the 
papers  and  records  of  the  court  of  admiralty,  sacked  the  house 
of  the  comptroller  of  customs,  and  drank  themselves  drunk 
with  his  wines;  and,  finally,  proceeded  to  the  house  of  Lieu- 
tenant-Governor Hutchinson,  who  was  compelled  to  flee  to  save 
his  life.  They  completely  gutted  his  house,  stamped  upon  the 
chairs  and  mahogany  tables  until  they  were  wrecked,  smashed 
the  large,  gilt-framed  pictures,  tore  up  all  the  fruit-trees  in  his 
garden,  and  piled  the  wreckage  with  his  clothes  and  linen  in 
the  street.  Hutchinson  was  a  native  of  the  province,  and  with 
his  library  perished  many  invaluable  historical  manuscripts, 
which  he  had  been  thirty  years  collecting.2 

That  this  outrage  was  said  to  have  been  incited  the  day 
before  by  the  preaching  of  the  Rev.  Dr.  Mayhew,  a  Puritan 
divine,  did  not  lessen  its  atrocity  in  the  eyes  of  Englishmen. 
He  had  preached  on  the  text,  "I  would  they  were  even  cut  off 
which  trouble  you;"  and  the  mob  came  very  near  a  complete 
compliance. 

A  great  many  respectable  citizens  were  shocked,  or  appeared 
to  be  shocked,  at  this  violence  and  excess.  They  held  town 
meetings  of  abhorrence ;  Dr.  Mayhew  wrote  a  letter  of  regret  to 
Hutchinson,  disclaiming  any  intention  of  causing  what  had 
happened  to  him ;  a  guard  was  organized  to  prevent  such  out- 


2  New  England  Historical  and  Genealogical  Register,  vol.  xxxii,  p. 
268;  Hutchinson,  "Massachusetts,"  vol.  iii,  pp.  122-127;  Massachusetts 
Archives,  vol.  xxvi,  p.  143;  Boston  Gazette,  August  19,  September  2, 
1765;  Hutchinson's  "Correspondence,"  vol.  ii,  p.  143;  "Letters  of  James 
Murray,  Loyalist,"  p.  258. 

84 


THE  STAMP  ACT  CONGRESS 

rages  in  the  future,  and  rewards  were  offered  for  rioters.  But 
it  is  quite  significant  that,  although  the  rioters  were  well  known, 
as  the  historians  assure  us,  no  one  was  punished.  Two  or  three 
were  arrested,  but  were  rescued  by  their  friends,  and  it  was 
found  impossible  to  proceed  against  them.3 

In  October  a  respectable  body  of  colonists  met  in  New 
York  to  deal  with  the  Stamp  Act  question.  This  meeting,  which 
has  ever  since  been  known  as  the  Stamp  Act  Congress,  orig- 
inated at  a  consultation  James  Otis  appears  to  have  had  with 
his  father,  Colonel  Otis,  and  Dr.  James  Warren.  They  sub- 
mitted their  plan  to  the  Massachusetts  Assembly,  which  took 
measures  to  have  the  meeting  called.  Neither  Virginia,  North 
Carolina,  New  Hampshire,  nor  Georgia  was  represented  in  it. 
The  assembly  of  New  Hampshire  is  said  to  have  favored  the 
Congress,  but  was  unwilling  to  send  delegates.  The  other  three 
received  the  call  when  their  assemblies  were  not  in  session,  and 
the  assemblies  were  prevented  from  meeting  until  it  was  too 
late.4 

The  Stamp  Act  Congress  passed  resolutions  of  protest  and 
sent  a  petition  to  the  King  and  another  to  Parliament.  The 
arguments  in  these  documents  are  very  much  the  same  as  those 
used  in  the  previous  remonstrances.  They,  of  course,  took  the 
precaution  of  expressing  great  loyalty  to  Great  Britain  and 
admiration  for  the  mighty  British  empire,  to  which,  they  said, 
it  was  a  happiness  to  belong.  They  protested  against  the  exten- 
sion of  the  power  of  admiralty  courts,  and  declared  that  they 
had  the  same  rights  as  Englishmen  born  within  the  realm.  But 
the  groundwork  of  their  position  was  that  Parliament  could  not 


8  Elliott,  "New  England,"  vol.  ii,  pp.  254-255;  Hildreth,  vol.  ii,  chap, 
xxviii,  p.  528;  "Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.  ii,  p.  228. 
Dr.  Mayhew,  who  preached  the  inciting  sermon,  is  said  to  have  been  the 
first  of  the  Massachusetts  ministers  who  became  an  outspoken  advocate 
of  the  Unitarian  movement  which  some  years  afterwards  gained  ground 
so  rapidly  in  Massachusetts. — Cooke,  "  Unitarianism  in  America,"  p.  63. 

4 "  Authentic  Account  of  the  Proceedings  of  the  Congress  held  at 
New  York,  A.  D.  1765;  "  Niles,  "  Principles  and  Acts  of  the  Revolution," 
edition  1876,  pp.  155-168;  Stedman,  "American  War,"  vol.  i,  pp.  39,  40. 

85 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

tax  them  internally  unless  they  were  represented  in  that  body ; 
from  the  nature  of  things,  they  could  never  be  represented,  and 
therefore  Parliament  could  never  tax  them. 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  they  did  not  ask  for  representation 
in  Parliament.  They  declared  it  to  be  impossible,  and  English- 
men were  quick  to  notice  and  comment  on  this.  Grenville,  in 
his  speech  against  the  repeal  of  the  Stamp  Act,  called  forcible 
attention  to  it,  and  reminded  his  hearers  of  its  significance. 

It  was  the  beginning  of  the  rejection  of  all  authority  of 
Parliament.  The  colonists  never  changed  their  ground  on  this 
point.  They  always  insisted  that  representation  was  impossible. 
The  distance  across  the  ocean,  however,  could  hardly  be  said 
to  render  representation  physically  impossible.  Each  colony 
maintained  one  or  more  agents  in  London  to  look  after  its 
affairs  and  represent  it  at  the  executive  departments  of  the 
government;  and  these  agents  sometimes  appeared  before  Par- 
liament as  witnesses.  Each  colony  could  in  a  similar  way  have 
maintained  representatives  in  Parliament.  But  representation 
was  a  political  impossibility,  because,  as  the  colonists  well 
knew,  such  representation  would  be  a  farce.  The  representa- 
tives would  always  be  outvoted.  England  would  never  allow 
them  to  become  numerous;  she  would  never  give  a  fair  repre- 
sentation; never  give  representation  in  proportion  to  popula- 
tion, because,  in  a"  few  generations,  with  the  natural  growth 
of  America,  the  American  members  of  Parliament  would  be 
more  numerous  than  the  English. 

Governor  Bernard,  of  Massachusetts,  tells  us,  in  his  ' '  Select 
Letters,"  that  at  first  the  colonists  were  willing  to  be  repre- 
sented in  Parliament,  and  made  their  argument  in  the  alterna- 
tive that  if  they  were  to  be  taxed  internally  they  must  be  repre- 
sented ;  but  fearing  that  representation  might  be  allowed  them, 
and  that  thus  they  would  be  irretrievably  bound  by  any  measure 
passed  by  Parliament,  they  quickly  shifted  to  the  position  that 
representation  was  impossible,  and  therefore  internal  taxation 
was  constitutionally  impossible. 

Hutchinson  also  said  that  the  colonists  saw  the  futility  of 

86 


TWO  KINDS  OF  TAXATION 

representation  and  changed  their  ground.5  Bernard  would 
have  had  Parliament  voluntarily  offer  them  representation  for 
a  time,  until  through  their  representatives  they  had  assented  to 
a  settlement  of  the  exact  relations  between  America  and  Eng- 
land, and  having  been  entrapped  in  that  "refined  stroke  of 
policy"  they  would  be  helpless  for  the  future. 

This  shrewd  unwillingness  to  be  represented  was  naturally 
regarded  by  many  as  a  sure  sign  of  the  determination  of  the 
patriot  party  to  break  from  England  in  the  end.  Raynal,  the 
French  writer,  in  his  "Philosophical  and  Political  History  of 
the  European  Settlements  in  America,"  advised  them  never 
to  yield  on  this  impossibility  of  representation,  for  if  once  they 
were  represented  the  rest  of  Parliament  could  easily  outvote 
them,  their  liberties  would  be  gone,  and  their  fetters  perma- 
nently forged  upon  them.0 

The  Stamp  Act  Congress  also  made  the  rather  unfortunate 
admission  that  the  colonies  owed  "all  due  subordination  to  that 
august  body  the  Parliament  of  Great  Britain."  Parliament, 
therefore,  had  full  authority  over  them,  could  tax  their  com- 
merce by  duties  at  the  seaports,  and  levy  this  duty  on  exports 
as  well  as  on  imports — do  everything,  in  short,  except  tax  them 
internally. 

But  if  the  principle  "no  taxation  without  representation" 
was  sound  English  constitutional  law,  why  did  the  colonists 
admit  that  they  could  be  taxed  at  their  seaports  without  repre- 
sentation? A  tax  levied  by  Parliament  on  sugar,  molasses,  or 
other  articles  coming  into  the  colonial  seaports  was  paid  by  all 
the  people  of  the  province  in  the  enhanced  price  of  the  goods. 
The  duties  on  French  and  Spanish  products,  which  had  to  be 
paid  in  specie,  and  drained  specie  out  of  the  country,  were  a 
so-called  external  tax;  but  they  drained  specie  out  of  the 
interior  of  the  country  as  well  as  from  the  seaports.    It  was,  as 


6  See  his  "  Strictures  upon  the  Declaration  of  the  Congress  at  Phila- 
delphia," London,  1776.  See  also  Niles,  "  Principles  and  Acts  of  the 
Revolution,"  edition  1876,  p.  156;  "  Prior  Documents  of  the  Revolution," 
p.  192. 

6  Extracts  from  RaynaPs  book  were  widely  circulated  in  a  pamphlet 

87 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

Lord  Mansfield  said,  like  a  pebble  thrown  into  a  pond — the 
circles  from  the  splash  would  extend  over  the  whole  pond. 

In  fact,  in  the  very  nature  of  things  there  could  be  no  tax 
that  could  properly  be  called  an  external  one.  Every  tax  was 
an  internal  tax,  because  any  tax  that  could  be  conceived  of  had 
to  be  levied  on  people  or  property  within  the  boundaries  of  the 
country.  When  once  the  tax-gatherer  had  entered  the  boundary, 
or  taken  private  property  for  taxes  just  inside  the  boundary,  at 
a  seaport,  it  was  as  much  internal  taxation  as  though  he  were  in 
the  central  town  of  the  community. 

"What  a  pother,"  said  an  Irish  member  of  Parliament, 
"whether  money  is  to  be  taken  out  of  their  coat-pocket  or  out  of 
their  waistcoat-pocket ! ' ' 

The  colonists  tried  to  keep  up  the  distinction  by  saying  that 
the  duties  on  imports  and  exports  were  external  and  allowable 
because  they  were  to  regulate  the  commerce  of  the  empire ;  the 
regulation  of  the  commerce  was  the  main  object,  and  the  duties 
were  merely  incidental ;  but  before  long  they  gave  up  the  whole 
distinction  and  took  the  ground  that  without  representation 
Parliament  had  no  right  to  tax  them  in  any  form  or  indeed  to 
govern  them  in  any  form. 

The  principle  of  "no  taxation  without  representation"  had 
always  been  familiar  to  the  colonists.  It  had  been  appealed  to 
on  several  occasions  in  the  past  hundred  and  fifty  years,  notably 
in  Virginia,  and  Massachusetts,  against  acts  of  the  British 
Government.  Its  fairness  was  obvious  to  all  who  believed  in 
representative  government  and  republicanism,  but  not  at  all 
obvious  to  those  who  rejected  such  forms  of  government.  It 
was  part  of  the  doctrine  of  government  by  consent  which  had 
been  advocated  by  Locke  and  other  political  philosophers.  The 
"consent  of  the  governed"  doctrine  was  often  expressed  by  the 
phrase,  "No  laws  can  be  made  or  abrogated  without  the  consent 


called  "  The  Sentiments  of  a  Foreigner  on  the  Disputes  of  Great  Britain 
with  America."  See,  also,  Cartwright's  "  American  Independence,  the 
Interest  and  Glory  of  Great  Britain,"  p.  50.  For  a  loyalist  protest 
against  the  Stamp  Act  Congress,  see  Boston  Gazette,  May  5  and  May 
12,  1766. 

88 


TAXI.NG  AND  REPRESENTATION 

of  the  people  or  their  representatives. ' '  Therefore,  taxing  laws, 
like  all  other  laws,  must  be  by  consent. 

"No  taxation  without  representation"  was  never  a  part  of 
the  British  Constitution,  and  is  not  a  part  of  it  even  now.  It 
could  not  be  adopted  without  at  the  same  time  accepting  the 
doctrine  of  government  by  consent,  and  that  doctrine  no  nation 
with  colonies  should  adopt,  because  it  is  a  flat  denial  of  the 
lawfulness  of  the  colonial  relation.  England  governs  millions 
of  white  colonists  and  over  two  hundred  millions  of  East 
Indians  without  their  consent,  and  will  continue  to  do  so  as 
long  as  her  present  type  of  empire  endures.7 

' '  No  taxation  without  representation ' '  had  often  been  advo- 
cated in  England  by  liberals  of  different  sorts,  Puritans,  Round- 
heads, and  Whigs,  who  felt  that  they  stood  in  need  of  it.  The 
colonists  thought  that  they  had  found  two  or  three  instances  in 
wThich  Parliament  had  partially  recognized  this  doctrine.  There 
were  several  old  divisions  of  England,  the  counties  Palatine  of 
Chester,  Durman,  and  Lancaster,  and  the  marshes  of  Wales, 
which  in  feudal  times  had  been  semi-independent.  They  were 
for  a  long  time  not  taxed  by  Parliament,  and  when  at  last 
Parliament  determined  to  tax  them  they  were,  the  colonists  said, 
given  representation.  The  colonists  clung  to  these  instances 
and  kept  repeating  them  in  all  their  pamphlets;  but  the 
instances  were  certainly  without  avail  in  convincing  Parliament 
and  the  vast  majority  of  Englishmen.8 

Englishmen  easily  replied  that  these  two  or  three  instances, 
even  supposing  them  to  be  as  the  colonists  stated,  were  acci- 
dental and  amounted  to  nothing  in  the  face  of  the  long-con- 
tinued practice  and  custom  to  the  contrary.    In  the  year  1765 


'"The  Conduct  of  the  Late  Administration  Considered,"  p.  61, 
London,  1767;  "The  Constitutional  Right  of  the  Legislature  of  Great 
Britain  to  Tax  the  British  Colonies,"  p.  51,  London,  1768. 

8  See  on  this  subject  of  taxation,  "  The  Rights  of  Great  Britain 
Asserted,"  p.  6.  London,  1776;  "Remarks  on  the  Review  of  the  Contro- 
versy between  Great  Britain  and  Her  Colonies,"  p.  85  j  "  The  Controversy 
between  Great  Britain  and  Her  Colonies  Reviewed,"  London,  1769,  p.  86; 
"  An  Enquiry  Whether  the  Guilt  of  the  Present  Civil  War  Ought  to  be 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

scarcely  any  of  the  great  towns  in  England  had  representatives 
in  Parliament  and  yet  they  were  taxed.  London,  Birmingham, 
Manchester,  Liverpool,  Leeds,  and  Halifax  paid  their  taxes  every 
year,  and  sent  not  a  single  member  to  Parliament.  In  fact,  out 
of  the  eight  million  people  in  England  there  were  not  three 
hundred  thousand  represented. 

In  the  early  days  of  George  III,  160,000  people  elected  all 
the  members  of  parliament.  At  the  close  of  his  reign  in  1820, 
440,000  out  of  a  population  of  22,000,000  elected  all  the  mem- 
bers of  Parliament.  Up  to  the  year  1780  the  members  from  the 
county  of  York,  the  largest  and  most  influential  of  the  counties, 
were  elected  in  Lord  Rockingham's  dining-room.  Parliament 
was  made  up  largely  from  rotten  boroughs  or  pocket-boroughs 
in  the  control  of  individuals  or  families.  The  Duke  of  Norfolk 
was  represented  by  eleven  members,  who  sat  for  places  forming 
part  of  his  estate.  Lord  Lonsdale  was  represented  by  nine, 
and  Lord  Darlington  by  seven.  Old  Sarum  had  not  a  single 
inhabitant,  and  yet  sent  two  members  to  Parliament.  Repre- 
sentative government  as  the  colonists  understood  and  practised 
it  in  their  local  assemblies,  or  as  we  now  understand  it,  had  at 
that  time  no  existence  in  England.9 

The  American  principle  of  equal  representation,  which 
requires  that  the  representative  must  be  a  resident  of  the  district 
he  represents,  in  full  sympathy  with  its  people  and  a  sharer  in 
the  benefit  or  evil  of  laws  applicable  to  them,  has  never  been 
accepted  in  England.  We  like  our  system  and  say  that  the 
English  system  has  always  been  wrong  and  unequal.  But  how- 
ever wrong  we  may  consider  it,  and  however  wrong  our  ances- 


Tmputed  to  Great  Britain  or  to  America,"  London,  177G,  p.  19,  etc.; 
"  A  Letter  to  the  Noble  Gentlemen  Who  Have  Addressed  His  Majesty," 
p.  5 ;  Gibbes,  "  Documentary  History  of  the  American  Revolution," 
1764-1776,  pp.  19-20;  Todd,  "Parliamentary  Government  in  the  British 
Colonies,"  edition  1894,  p.  210;  articles  in  Boston  Evening  Post  for 
January,  17G9,  answered  by  Samuel  Adams  in  the  Boston  Gazette.  See 
also  Annual  Register,  1766,  p.  40. 

•"The  Right  of  the  British  Legislature  to  Tax  the  American 
Colonies,"  London,  1774;  "An  Englishman's  Answer  to  the  Address 
from  the  Delegates  to  the  People  of  Great  Britain,"  etc.,  p.  8,  New  York, 

90 


CAMDEN  AND  MANSFIELD 

tors  may  have  considered  it,  there  is  no  doubt  that  this  unequal 
system  was  well  established  as  part  of  the  British  Constitution 
at  the  time  of  our  Revolution. 

The  representation  in  Parliament  had  slowly  grown  into 
that  state  from  the  old  feudal  customs ;  and  that  growth  or  that 
condition  was  the  British  Constitution  of  that  day.  There  were 
a  few,  a  very  few,  men  in  England  who  apparently  wanted  it 
changed  and  the  principle  of  no  taxation  without  representation 
adopted.  Lord  Camden  argued  to  this  effect  during  the  Stamp 
Act  debates  in  a  most  interesting  speech  in  the  House  of  Lords. 
William  Pitt,  in  the  Commons,  also  argued  for  no  taxation 
without  representation,  and  based  his  reasoning  on  natural  law 
and  natural  right  rather  than  on  the  British  Constitution  as  it 
then  existed.  In  short,  he  argued  that  the  constitution  should 
be  changed.  Lord  Mansfield,  the  greatest  lawyer  of  that  time, 
argued  on  the  other  side;  and  the  speeches  of  these  powerful 
debaters,  especially  those  of  Camden  and  Mansfield,  are  well 
worth  reading  by  any  one  who  is  interested  in  the  details  of  the 
discussion. 

Lord  Mansfield's  side  was  of  course  successful  because  he 
was  arguing  in  favor  of  what  had  long  been  the  established 
rule  and  practice  of  the  British  Constitution.  It  was  not  until 
nearly  a  hundred  years  after  that  time  that  any  important 
enlargement  was  made  in  the  parliamentary  representation; 
and  surely  it  could  hardly  be  expected  that  Parliament  would 
suddenly,  in  the  year  1766,  alter  their  whole  system  of  repre- 
sentation and  adopt  government  by  consent  at  the  suggestion 
of  a  patriotic  party  in  the  colonies.  When  the  British  Parlia- 
ment announced  by  the  Declaratory  Act  of  the  year  1766  that 
they  had  the  constitutional  right  to  govern  and  tax  the  colonies 
as  they  pleased,  with  or  without  representation,  externally  or 
internally,  or  in  any  other  way,  they  were  undoubtedly  acting  in 


1775;  Heaton,  "The  Three  Reforms  of  Parliament,"  ch.  1-2;  Paul, 
"  History  of  Reform,"  ch.  1-6 ;  Bright's  "  Essays  on  Parliamentary 
Reform,"  essay  ii;  Cox,  "Ancient  Parliamentary  Elections;"  Walpole, 
"The  Electorate  and  the  Legislature,"  ch.  4;  Freeman,  "Decayed 
Boroughs ;  "  "  Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.  i,  p.  249. 

91 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

accordance  with  the  long-settled  constitutional  custom,  and  that 
decision  has  never  been  reversed.10 

The  sum  of  the  matter  in  regard  to  no  taxation  without  rep- 
resentation is,  that  America,  having  been  settled  by  the  liberal, 
radical,  and  in  most  instances  minority  element  of  English 
politics,  adopted  this  much-discussed  doctrine,  and  England, 
being  usually  under  the  influence  of  the  Tory  element,  rejected 
it.  Our  patriot  arguments  were  in  effect  an  American  inter- 
pretation of  the  British  Constitution,  an  interpretation  which 
Great  Britain  has  rejected.  We  went  our  separate  ways. 
Although  we  were  of  the  same  race  as  the  people  of  England,  the 
differences  between  us  were  far-reaching  and  radical,  and  the 
gulf  was  being  steadily  widened. 

The  rending  and  separation  was  a  long  process.  Patriot 
and  loyalist,  Britisher  and  colonist,  argued  and  struggled,  each 
trying  to  force  his  theory  on  the  other.  The  Englishman  would 
sometimes  leave  his  firm  ground  of  pure  constitutional  right, 
and  say  to  the  colonists,  You  are  already  represented  in  Parlia- 
ment, more  amply  and  fully  represented  than  you  could  be  in 
one  of  3'our  own,  and  better  protected  than  if  you  sent  your  own 
people  to  the  Parliament  that  sits  in  London.  There  are  always 
members  there  who  take  a  special  interest  in  you  and  protect  all 
the  rights  to  which  you  are  entitled.  William  Pitt  and  Lord 
Camden,  as  well  as  Fox,  Barre,  Conway,  Pownall,  Dowdeswill, 
and  Edmund  Burke,  fight  your  battles  for  you  with  an  elo- 
quence far  beyond  any  your  ablest  men  possess ;  and  it  was  by 
their  defence  of  you  that  the  Stamp  Act  and  the  paint,  paper, 
and  glass  act  were  repealed. 

There  was  a  certain  amount  of  plausibility  in  this  argument, 
especially  to  a  mind  that  was  inclined  to  loyalism.     But  the 


10  Younge,  "  Constitutional  History  of  England,"  p.  72.  The  British 
Parliament  has  to-day  the  right  to  tax  any  of  its  colonies  without  repre- 
sentation. Parliament  is  omnipotent  in  this  as  in  every  other  respect. 
"  American  Historical  Review,"  vol.  i,  p.  37 ;  Proceedings  of  the  Ameri- 
can Antiquarian  Society,  vol.  vii,  p.  181 ;  Jenkyns,  "  British  Rule  and 
Jurisdiction  Beyond  the  Sea,"  p.  10;  Todd,  "Parliamentary  Government 
in  the  British  Colonies,"  edition  1894,  pp.  241-245. 

92 


VIRTUAL  REPRESENTATION 

patriotic  party  replied  that  they  wanted  the  protection  of  ascer- 
tained and  fixed  rights,  so  that  they  would  not  need  the 
condescending  protection  of  these  so-called  great  men  in  Parlia- 
ment, who  would  not  live  forever  or  who  might  change  their 
opinions. 

The  Englishmen  would  then  argue  that  the  colonists  were 
virtually  represented  in  Parliament  just  as  the  vast  majority  of 
people  in  England  were  virtually  represented.  All  the  members 
of  Parliament,  although  elected  by  an  insignificant  fraction  of 
the  people,  were  charged  with  the  duty  of  legislating  for  those 
unrepresented,  and  of  caring  for  their  interests,  and  had  always 
done  so.  The  seven  million  people  who  had  no  direct  repre- 
sentation were  nevertheless  virtually  represented  by  all  the 
members  of  Parliament,  and  in  the  same  way  the  colonists  were 
virtually  represented.11 

This  was  the  only  sort  of  representation  which  the  majority 
of  Englishmen  recognized  or  understood,  and  they  have  main- 
tained it  down  into  our  own  time.  The  House  of  Lords  repre- 
sented all  the  nobility,  the  House  of  Commons  represented  all 
the  commoners,  and  the  colonists  as  commoners  were  therefore 
fully  represented. 

To  this  virtual  representation  the  colonists  replied  that  the 
unrepresented  people  in  England  were  more  or  less  intimately 
associated  with  the  represented  people,  and  the  laws  had  to  be 
the  same  for  all.  Those  members  of  Parliament  who  laid  taxes 
on  unrepresented  Leeds  and  Manchester  taxed  themselves  and 
their  constituents  at  the  same  time.  But  when  they  taxed 
America  they  could  and  did  lay  a  tax  entirely  different  from 
those  they  put  on  themselves  and  their  constituents.12 


11 "  Cursory  Remarks  on  Dr.  Price's  Observations  on  the  Nature  of 
Civil  Liberty,"  London,  1776,  pp.  11-12.  See  also  Eastwick's  Letter  to 
Tucker,  p.  74. 

"  "  Considerations  on  the  Propriety  of  Imposing  Taxes  in  the  British 
Colonies,"  London,  1766.  See,  also,  "  Considerations  on  the  Nature  and 
Extent  of  the  Legislative  Authority  of  the  British  Parliament,"  Phila- 
delphia ;  Niles,  "  Principles  and  Acts  of  the  Revolution,"  edition  1876, 
p.  410. 

93 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

Yes,  the  Englishman  would  reply,  and  the  difference  has 
been  that  they  put  far  lighter  taxes  on  you  than  they  place  on 
themselves.  England  is  overwhelmed  with  taxes  on  wagons, 
furniture,  and  every  article  a  man  can  have,  even  to  the  panes 
of  glass  in  his  house.  The  people  of  England  pay  twenty-five 
shillings  per  head  in  taxes.  They  ask  from  you  only  sixpence 
per  head,  although  they  have  spent  in  support  of  your  govern- 
ment and  protection  since  1690,  without  counting  the  cost  of  the 
war  with  France,  £43,697,142,  of  which  over  £1,500,000  was 
paid  in  bounties  on  your  products.13 

Again  the  Americans  replied  that  if  taxation  were  once 
allowed  England  would  make  it  what  she  pleased  and  rule 
America  as  she  pleased;  and  so  the  interminable  argument 
went  on. 

The  loyalists  were  of  course  anxious  to  see  the  matter  settled 
by  allowing  the  colonies  to  send  representatives  to  Parliament. 
This,  they  thought,  would  prevent  rebellion  and  create  an  ideal 
British  empire  of  overwhelming  power,  with  the  advantage  in 
the  end  greatly  in  favor  of  America.  They  argued  that  the  only 
fair  and  proper  way  by  which  the  colonies  could  be  represented 
would  be  by  giving  them  representatives  in  proportion  to  their 
population,  revenue,  and  growing  power.  As  these  were  increas- 
ing every  year,  the  representation  would  continually  have  to  be 
enlarged ;  and,  as  America  was  greater  in  its  size  and  resources 
than  England,  the  colonies  would  before  long  have  more  repre- 
sentatives in  Parliament  than  the  British  Isles;  and  the  seat 
of  power  of  the  British  empire  would  of  necessity  be  removed 
to  America.14 


13 "  The  Rights  of  Great  Britain  Asserted  Against  the  Claims  of 
America,"  p.  80,  London,  177G.  Cobbett,  "Parliamentary  History," 
vol.  xviii,  p.  222. 

"The  forecasts  of  the  increase  of  population  which  those  who  used 
this  argument  made  have  been  very  nearly  fulfilled.  They  estimated 
one  hundred  and  twenty  millions  for  the  year  1924.  We  may  not  reach 
that  number  at  the  present  rate  of  increase,  but  we  shall  not  be  very  far 
behind  it.  Other  estimates  which  they  gave  were  twenty-four  millions 
in  sixty  years  from  1774  and  ninety-six  millions  in  one  hundred  years. 
They  based  their  estimates  on  the  rate  of  increase  in  their  own  time, 

94 


ENGLAND  ABSORBED  BY  AMERICA 

The  solution  of  the  dispute  lay,  they  said,  in  closer  union 
with  the  mother-country  instead  of  drawing  away  from  her. 
Many  tried  to  win  over  the  patriots  by  showing  that  equal 
rights  with  England  and  such  a  close  union  as  would  make  the 
two  countries  identical  would  be  for  the  greater  glory  of  Amer- 
ica. It  was  certainly  a  fond  delusion  to  suppose  that  England 
would  consent  to  a  union  that  would  absorb  her,  or  that  she  had 
any  idea  of  ever  allowing  any  of  her  dependencies  a  political 
equality  or  commercial  rivalry  with  herself.  But  it  was  charac- 
teristic of  the  loyalists  to  dream  that  London  society,  the  aris- 
tocracy, the  church,  and  all  the  other  ornaments  of  English  life, 
might  be  brought  over  to  New  York  and  Philadelphia. 

"  When  the  numbers,  power,  and  revenues  of  America  exceed  those 
of  Britain  a  revolution  of  the  seat  of  empire  will  surely  take  place.  .  .  . 
{Should  the  Georges  in  regular  succession  wear  the  British  diadem  to  a 
number  ranking  with  the  Louises  of  France,  many  a  goodly  prince  of 
that  royal  line  will  have  mingled  his  ashes  with  American  dust,  and  not 
many  generations  may  pass  away  before  one  of  the  first  monarchs  of  the 
world  on  ascending  his  throne  shall  declare,  with  exulting  joy,  '  Born 
and  educated  amongst  you,  I  glory  in  the  name  of  American.'  " — "  A  Few 
Political  Reflections  Submitted  to  the  Consideration  of  the  British  Colo- 
nies," p.  49,  Philadelphia,  1774. 

The  farther  the  discussion  extended  the  more  clearly  it 
appeared  that  if  Parliament  had  any  power  at  all  over  the 
colonies  it  had  the  power  to  tax  them.  When  one  reflected  that 
Parliament  could  enact  the  death  penalty  in  the  colonies,  and 
take  away  a  colonist's  life  by  a  law  to  which  he  had  not  con- 
sented, it  seemed  strange  that  it  could  not  take  from  a  colonist 
without  his  consent  a  shilling  a  year  in  taxes.  Englishmen 
began  collecting  and  publishing  the  numerous  instances  in 
which  Parliament  had  long  regulated  colonial  internal  affairs, 
so  as  to  show  that  it  was  hardly  possible  that  there  could  be  an 
exception  in  the  one  item  of  taxation  inside  of  the  seaports. 

A  notable  instance  of  internal  regulation  was  the  colonial 
post-office  system,  which  was  begun  by  an  act  of  Parliament  in 


when  the  population  doubled  within  thirty  years:  but  this  rate  was  not 
kept  up.  ("A  Few  Political  Reflections  Submitted  to  the  Considera- 
tion of  the  British  Colonies,"  pp.  69-70.) 

95 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

1692,  and  enlarged  and  extended  by  another  act  in  1710;  and 
this  same  act  fixed  and  regulated  the  rates  of  postage  in  all  the 
colonies  and  exempted  letter-carriers  from  paying  ferriage  over 
rivers.  It  was  unquestionably  an  internal  regulation,  and 
seemed  very  much  like  a  tax  on  the  colonists  for  carrying  their 
letters.  It  was  an  internal  tax  and  a  very  heavy  one,  because 
the  postage  rates  were  high.  In  1765,  the  same  year  as  the 
Stamp  Act,  the  postage  rates  in  the  colonies  were  again  regu- 
lated by  Parliament.  But  although  the  colonists  complained  of 
the  Stamp  Act  they  never  complained  of  the  postage  regulations. 

Loyalists  could  be  very  annoying  on  this  point,  for  it  was 
difficult  to  deny  that  there  was  a  strong  resemblance  between 
demanding  postage  on  letters  and  exacting  a  stamp  duty  on  the 
legal  or  business  document  inside  the  wrapper.  The  real 
difference  was  that  by  paying  the  postage  the  colonists  received 
in  return  an  immediate  and  undeniable  benefit  in  having  their 
letters  carried  at  the  mother-country's  expense  by  a  general 
system  which  was  uniform  throughout  the  colonies,  while  in  the 
case  of  the  stamp  tax,  England  seemed  to  be  getting  all  the 
benefit.  The  general  benefit  of  the  post-office  had  been  so  great 
and  obvious  that  in  1692,  1710,  and  1765,  when  parliamentary 
post-office  acts  were  passed,  it  had  not  occurred  to  the  colonists 
to  think  of  them  as  dangerous  precedents  of  internal  regu- 
lation.15 

If  the  Stamp  Act  is  unconstitutional,  Englishmen  would 
say,  so  also  is  the  post-office  act ;  but  your  arch  patriot  Franklin 
still  remains  postmaster  of  the  colonies,  enjoys  the  salary,  and 
has  done  his  utmost  to  increase  the  postal  revenue,  which  is  an 
internal  tax. 

If  you  want  other  instances,  said  the  loyalists,  of  Parlia- 
ment regulating  the  internal  affairs  of  the  colonies  for  the  last 
century  and  more,  they  are  innumerable.  As  far  back  as  1650, 
under  the  protectorate  of  Oliver  Cromwell,  that  huge  son  of 
liberty,  Parliament  passed  an  act  blocking  up  the  ports  of 

15  See  "  Considerations  on  the  Propriety  of  Imposing  Taxes  in 
the  British  Colonies,"  etc.,  pp.  55-5G,  London,  1766;  American  Archives, 
4th  series,  vol.  i,  p.  500. 

96 


INTERNAL  REGULATION 

Barbadoes,  Virginia,  Bermuda,  and  Antigua,  and  in  that  old 
act  of  Cromwell's  time  it  is  expressly  declared  that  the  colonies 
are  subject  to  Parliament. 

Going  farther  back  than  1650,  they  found  another  instance 
in  1643,  when  Parliament  passed  an  ordinance  putting  the 
whole  government  of  the  colonies  in  the  hands  of  a  governor- 
general  and  seventeen  commissioners,  with  unlimited  powers  to 
"provide  for,  order,  and  dispose  of  all  things  which  they  shall 
think  most  fit  and  advantageous  for  the  well-governing,  secur- 
ing, strengthening,  and  preserving  of  the  said  plantations/' 
Was  not  Parliament  then  exercising  power,  and  omnipotent 
power,  in  the  colonies?  And  Oliver  Cromwell  himself  was  one 
of  the  commissioners. 

Then,  also,  they  said,  there  was  the  act  in  the  second  year  of 
George  II,  levying  duties  out  of  the  wages  of  all  American  sea- 
men for  the  purpose  of  building  up  Greenwich  Hospital.  By  the 
Parliament  also  were  passed  from  time  to  time  those  acts 
restraining  the  colonies  from  manufacturing  certain  articles, 
notably  hats,  articles  of  iron  and  of  steel;  slitting  mills  were 
prohibited,  and  also  the  cutting  of  pine-trees;  lands  were  made 
liable  to  the  payment  of  debts ;  the  statute  of  wills  extended  to 
the  colonies;  paper  currency  was  restrained;  indentured  ser- 
vants were  empowered  to  enlist,  troops  raised  in  the  colonies 
made  subject  to  the  articles  of  war,  and  so  on.  In  fact,  Par- 
liament had  over  and  over  again  walked  about  in  the  colonial 
internal  organs,  without  arousing  much,  if  any  complaint,  and 
without  doing  any  harm.16 


18 "  The  Rights  of  Great  Britain  Asserted,"  pp.  27-39,  London,  1776. 
"  The  Supremacy  of  the  British  Legislature  Over  the  Colonies  Candidly 
Discussed,"  London,  1775;  "An  Englishman's  Answer  to  the  Address 
from  the  Delegates  to  the  People  of  Great  Britain,"  p.  10,  New  York, 
1775;  "An  Answer  to  the  Declaration  of  the  American  Congress," 
London,  1776,  pp.  65-70;  Massachusettensis  Letter  VII;  "The  Contro- 
versy Between  Great  Britain  and  Her  Colonies  Reviewed,"  London,  1769, 
pp.  137-207 ;  "  The  Rights  of  Great  Britain  Asserted  Against  the  Claims 
of  America ;  "  "  An  Enquiry  Whether  the  Guilt  of  the  Present  Civil 
War  Ought  to  be  Imputed  to  Great  Britain  or  America,"  London,  1776; 
Todd,  "  Parliamentary  Government  in  the  British  Colonies,"  ed.  1894, 
7  97 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

Sometimes,  it  is  true,  said  the  loyalists,  you  have  protested 
against  some  particular  part  of  this  regulation  by  Parliament 
when  you  happened  not  to  like  it.  When  Cromwell  was 
handling  Virginia  rather  roughly  her  people  announced  the 
doctrine  that  there  must  be  no  taxation  without  representation. 
But  you  never  protested  on  principle  against  any  internal  regu- 
lation that  was  a  convenience  or  a  benefit  to  you.  And  what 
do  the  few  isolated  protests  you  may  have  made  amount  to 
against  the  fact  of  long-continued  action  by  Parliament  for  over 
a  hundred  years? 

As  Parliament  had  done  so  much  in  colonial  internal  affairs 
without  consent  and  without  representation,  and  could  impose  a 
tax  at  the  seaports,  it  seemed  to  loyalists  and  Englishmen  very 
extraordinary  that  it  could  not  tax  generally  or  internally, 
when  we  consider  that  the  power  of  general  taxation  is  the 
most  important  part,  and,  indeed,  the  foundation,  of  legislative 
power,  if  legislative  power  is  to  exist  at  all.17 

It  was  first  claimed  by  the  colonists  that  Parliament,  in 
spite  of  all  its  internal  regulating,  had  never  actually  assumed 
control  of  private  property  by  a  tax  law  to  which  the  colonists 
had  not  consented;  or,  as  the  Stamp  Act  Congress  put  it, 
"Parliament  could  not  grant  to  his  Majesty  the  property  of 
the  colonists."  But  Parliament  had  taken  away  private  prop- 
erty by  so-called  external  taxes  at  the  seaports,  which  the 
colonists  admitted  to  be  constitutional,  and  an  act  of  Parliament 
was  very  soon  found  by  which  private  property  had  been  con- 
trolled by  Parliament  all  over  the  colonies. 

This  was  the  famous  Act  of  1732,  which  made  all  lands, 


p.  210;  "Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.  i,  pp.  4-7. 
See  also  Dulaney,  "  Considerations  on  the  Propriety  of  Imposing  Taxes  in 
the  British  Colonies;  Objections  to  the  Taxation  of  Our  American  Colo- 
nies," London,  1775;  "Right  of  the  British  Legislature  to  Tax  the 
Colonies  Vindicated,"  London,  1774;  "Argument  of  the  Exclusive  Right 
of  the  Colonies  to  Tax  Themselves,"  London,  1774. 

17 "  Those  who  can  tax  will  rule  and  those  who  can  rule  will  tax." — 
American  Archives,  4th  series,  vol.  ii,  p.  909. 

98 


FAMOUS  INSTANCE  IN  1732 

slaves,  and  personal  property  in  the  colonies  liable  for  the  debts 
of  British  merchants.  The  English  merchants  had  petitioned 
to  have  this  act  passed  as  a  protection.  They  were  obliged  to 
give  the  colonists  in  America  long  credit  for  the  goods  they 
sold  them.  As  this  debtor  class  increased  the  English  merchants 
feared  that  the  colonial  legislatures  would  be  persuaded  to  pass 
stay  laws  to  prevent  the  seizure  of  colonial  property  in  payment 
of  such  debts.  Jamaica  had  already  passed  a  stay  law  of  this 
sort.  Accordingly,  the  act  of  Parliament  of  1732  provided  that 
all  lands,  goods,  and  negro  slaves  in  America  should  at  all  times 
be  liable  to  seizure  and  sale  for  debt  just  as  if  they  were  in 
England.18 

An  enormous  trade  and  commerce  sprang  up,  it  was  said, 
under  the  protection  of  this  act.  Without  the  act  the  English 
merchants  would  have  refused  to  give  the  colonists  long  credit ; 
and  the  colonists,  having  no  specie  and  little  money  of  any  kind 
in  circulation  except  depreciated  paper,  would  have  been  unable 
to  pay  cash  or  pay  on  short  time;  would,  in  short,  have  been 
unable  to  trade.  But  under  the  protection  of  the  act  they 
reaped  a  greater  harvest  than  the  English  merchants.  Their 
wonderful  prosperity  in  recent  years,  said  the  English,  flowed 
from  that  act  of  Parliament;  and  accordingly  they  never  pro- 
tested or  objected  to  it  as  exercising  jurisdiction  over  private 
property.  They  never  asked  that  they  should  first  be  repre- 
sented in  Parliament,  and  never  complained  of  want  of 
representation. 

If,  therefore,  said  the  Englishman,  Parliament  can,  without 
your  consent,  enact  a  law  taking  away  your  life  by  capital 
punishment,  and  can  without  your  consent  take  away  your 
private  property  by  means  of  taxes  levied  on  goods  coming  into 
your  seaports;  and  can  enact  a  law  taking  away  your  private 
property  for  debt,  what  do  you  mean  by  saying  that  Parlia- 
ment cannot  take  away  your  private  property  by  means  of  taxes 


18 "  The    Interest    of    the    Merchants    and    Manufacturers    of    Great 
Britain  in  the  Present  Contest  with  the  Colonies,"  p.  38,  London,  1774. 

99 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

levied  in  all  your  towns?    Where  is  there  any  authority  for 
such  a  distinction  as  that  ? 

There  was  no  authority ;  and  the  patriot  party  soon  admitted 
that  there  was  none  by  changing  their  ground  and  denying  all 
the  authority  of  Parliament,  not  only  in  taxes,  but  in  every 
other  matter.  The  truth  was  that  Parliament  had  the  right  to 
rule,  and  had  long  ruled,  the  colonies  without  their  consent. 
If  a  community  is  a  colony  in  the  English  sense,  it  necessarily 
is  ruled  without  its  consent. 


VIII. 

THE  STAMP  ACT  CANNOT  BE  ENFORCED 
AND  IS  REPEALED 

The  American  patriot  argument  meant  in  reality  the  extin- 
guishment of  the  colonial  relation;  and  the  colonists  now 
proceeded  to  extinguish  that  relation  so  far  as  the  Stamp  Act 
was  concerned.  Parliament  no  doubt  had  a  clear  legal  right 
under  the  British  Constitution  to  pass  the  Stamp  Act,  but  it  was 
very  soon  evident  that  fifty  thousand  troops  should  have  been 
sent  to  America  before  any  attempt  was  made  to  enforce  it. 
Our  people  cared  nothing  about  the  legal  right  under  a  constitu- 
tion on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic.  They  wanted  to  govern 
themselves  by  their  own  constitutions.  They  wanted  to  remain 
in  the  old  semi-independent  condition  which  they  had  enjoyed 
before  the  close  of  the  French  War  in  1763.  They  did  not  want 
to  be  reorganized,  remodelled,  or  reformed  except  by  themselves. 

Their  opposition  was  very  nearly  unanimous.  Thousands 
who  afterwards  became  loyalists  acted  on  this  occasion  as 
patriots,  and  the  independent  feeling  of  the  people  wras  as 
clearly  displayed  as  in  the  opposition  to  the  navigation  and 
trade  laws. 

November  1,  1765,  had  been  fixed  upon  as  the  day  when  the 
enforcement  of  the  Stamp  Act  should  begin;  and  the  "Royal 
Charlotte"  bringing  the  stamps  and  the  stamped  paper  for 
Philadelphia  arrived  in  the  Delaware  just  below  the  city  on  the 
5th  of  October.  Flags  were  immediately  displayed  at  half  mast 
and  the  church  bells  were  muffled  and  tolled  for  the  rest  of  the 
day.  The  shops  were  closed  and  drums  muffled  in  crape  were 
beaten  in  the  streets  by  very  sable  negroes.  Several  thousand 
citizens  met  at  the  State  House,  and  it  was  decided  to  compel 
the  stamp  distributer,  John  Hughes,  to  resign.  Robert  Morris 
headed  a  committee  which  visited  Hughes  for  this  purpose,  and 

101 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

after  warning  him  that  the  rioters  were  ready  to  tear  down  his 
house  they  secured  his  resignation.1 

In  Connecticut  the  stamp  distributer,  Jared  Ingersoll,  had 
been  compelled  to  resign  during  the  summer,  long  before  the 
stamps  arrived.  Oliver,  the  Boston  distributer,  had  been  also 
compelled  to  resign ;  and  the  mob  placarded  the  doors  of  public 
offices  with  the  notice : 

"  Let  him  that  shall  first  distribute  or  employ  stamped  paper  look 
well  to  his  house,  his  person,  and  his  furniture. — Vox  Populi." 

The  stamped  paper  that  arrived  in  Boston  was  protected  in 
the  fort  and  the  same  precaution  had  to  be  taken  in  New  York ; 
but  the  New  York  mob  forced  the  governor's  stables,  paraded 
his  coach  and  his  horses  in  the  streets,  hung  him  in  effigy,  and 
then  burnt  his  carriage  before  his  eyes  on  the  Bowling  Green. 
Proceeding  to  the  house  of  Major  James,  who  was  reported  to 
have  said,  "I  will  cram  the  stamps  down  the  throats  of  the 
people  with  the  point  of  my  sword,"  they  wrecked  his  house 
and  rich  furniture,  destroying  his  fine  library,  pictures,  and 
garden,  as  they  had  done  with  Hutchinson's  house  in  Massa- 
chusetts. Emboldened  by  their  success,  they  sent  a  deputation 
to  the  lieutenant-governor,  and  with  threats  of  bloodshed  and 
riot  demanded  the  stamped  paper.  It  was  surrendered,  anct 
deposited  in  the  City  Hall.  Another  cargo  of  it,  which  after- 
wards arrived,  was  seized  by  the  mob  and  burnt.2 

In  North  Carolina  the  stamp-master  was  forced  to  resign, 
and  when  the  stamped  paper  arrived  at  Brunswick  in  the 
twenty-gun  sloop-of-war  "Diligence,"  her  captain  was  sur- 
prised to  find  his  ship  confronted  by  the  militia,  who  forbade 
him  to  land  the  paper.3 

1  Oberholtzer,  "Life  of  Robert  Morris,"  p.  10;  "Prior  Documents  of 
the  Revolution,"  pp.  43-55;  Boston  Gazette,  October  21,  1765;  September 
22,  1766;  "The  True  Benjamin  Franklin,"  p.  232. 

2  Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  i,  pp.  175-190, 
195;  Botta,  "American  Revolution,"  9th  ed.,  1839,  vol.  i,  pp.  65-75; 
Annual  Register,  1765,  p.  49 ;  "  Prior  Documents  of  the  Revolution," 
pp.  7-37,  110;  Boston  Gazette,  September  16  and  November  18,  1765; 
Lamb,  "American  War,"  p.  11. 

3  Haywood,  "  Governor  Tryon  and  His  Administration,"  pp.  33,  37, 
39, 44.  102 


NO  STAMPS  IN  THE  COUNTRY 

Less  violent  but  equally  effective  measures  were  taken 
throughout  the  country  and  even  in  some  of  the  "West  India 
islands;  but  Barbadoes  and  the  Canadian  provinces  submitted 
to  the  act,  and  there  appear  to  have  been  no  disturbances  in 
East  Florida.  In  the  other  colonies,  which  afterwards  formed 
the  United  States,  the  stamp-masters,  with  the  examples  in 
Pennsylvania,  New  York,  and  New  England  before  their  eyes, 
usually  resigned  voluntarily  or  retired  to  another  locality.  Such 
successful,  widespread  and  thorough  rioting  has  not  often  been 
known. 

So  general  was  the  destruction  of  the  stamped  paper  and 
the  threats  which  prevented  its  use,  that  within  a  few  weeks 
after  the  first  of  November,  1765,  there  was  a  condition  of 
affairs  which  for  a  time  puzzled  the  lawyers  and  judges.  How 
could  vessels  legally  proceed  to  sea  without  stamped  papers? 
How  could  the  people  probate  wills,  execute  deeds,  leases, 
insurance  policies,  contracts,  bills  of  lading,  warrants  for 
surveys,  or  any  other  legal  document?  The  courts  in  many  of 
the  colonies  refused  to  sit,  because  every  paper  used  in  their 
complicated  proceedings  and  processes  and  every  business  docu- 
ment offered  in  evidence  had  to  be  stamped;  and  the  stamps 
could  not  be  obtained,  or,  if  obtained,  the  attempt  to  use  them 
would  immediately  bring  on  the  mob. 

John  Adams  relates  how  he  was  called  upon  on  the  18th  of 
December  to  join  Gridley  and  Otis  in  an  argument  before 
Governor  Bernard  and  his  council  to  persuade  them  to  open 
the  courts.  There  seemed  to  these  patriot  lawyers  two  reasons 
why  the  courts  should  be  opened — first,  the  invalidity  of  the 
Stamp  Act ;  and  second,  the  necessity  of  the  case.  Parliament 
had  no  authority  to  enforce  internal  taxes,  and  therefore  the 
Stamp  Act  ought  to  be  waived  by  the  judges  as  against  natural 
equity  and  the  constitution.  This  argument  would  have  pleased 
a  patriot  mass-meeting,  but  could  not  be  accepted  by  officials  or 
judges  who  were  sworn  to  execute  the  laws  of  England  and  had 
no  power  to  declare  them  void.4 


*  Adams,  Works,  vol.  ii,  pp.  157-163,  181;  Boston  Gazette,  February 
24,  1766. 

103 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

The  other  reason,  based  upon  the  necessity  of  the  situation, 
the  impossibility  of  obtaining  stamps  or  using  them,  and  the 
importance  of  allowing  the  ordinary  business  of  life  to  go  on, 
finally  prevailed  all  over  the  country.  The  governor  and  council 
of  Massachusetts  would  do  nothing ;  they  would  not  take  upon 
themselves  to  order  the  judges  to  open  court;  but  the  Massa- 
chusetts courts,  custom-houses,  and  all  public  offices  soon 
followed  the  example  in  other  colonies  and  conducted  business 
as  if  the  Stamp  Act  had  never  been  passed. 

In  Georgia  a  few  vessels  left  the  Savannah  River  with 
stamped  clearance-papers ;  and  there  was  an  attempt  to  enforce 
the  stamp  law  on  vessels  leaving  North  Carolina,  but  further 
compliance  was  soon  prevented  by  the  people  of  the  province. 
The  first  ship  that  went  to  sea  from  Boston  without  stamped 
papers  is  said  to  have  belonged  to  that  daring  patriot  merchant 
John  Hancock.  The  governor  of  South  Carolina,  compelled  by 
the  necessity  of  the  case,  opened  the  port  of  Charleston;  and 
necessity  accomplished  the  same  result  in  New  York  and  every 
port  on  the  coast.5 

The  quiet  determination  of  a  very  large  proportion  of  the 
people,  including  apparently  most  of  those  who  afterwards 
became  loyalists,  seems  to  have  been  irresistible  and  over- 
whelming. The  Stamp  Act  never  went  into  effect  except  in 
Canada  and  Barbadoes.  The  colonists,  by  a  most  remarkable 
unanimity  of  action,  killed  it  more  effectually  than  they  had 
killed  the  clauses  of  the  navigation  and  trade  laws  which  did 
not  suit  them.  The  people  were  surprised  at  their  own  unanim- 
ity. John  Adams  said  that  there  had  never  before  been  such 
an  instance  of  unanimity,  not  even  in  the  wars  against  the 
French  and  Indians ;  and  it  can  hardly  be  said  that  there  was 
such  an  instance  of  it  again  during  the  Revolution,  for  very 
soon  the  loyalists  began  to  separate  themselves  into  a  distinct 
party.6 

The  business  of  the  colonies  went  on  as  usual.    Every  one 


•  Haywood,  "  Governor  Tryon  and  His  Administration,"  pp.  41-43,  45. 
0  John  Adams,  Works,  vol.  ii,  p.  173. 

104 


NO  ATTEMPT  TO  USE  TROOPS 

by  common  consent  paid  no  attention  to  the  stamp  law  in  any 
of  their  dealings.  The  newspapers  were  published  without  a 
stamp  or  with  a  death 's  head  where  the  stamp  should  have  been ; 
and  no  one  would  receive  the  Canadian  newspapers  which  were 
printed  on  stamped  paper. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  find  in  all  history  another  instance  of 
such  complete  and  thorough  disobedience  to  a  law  which  one  of 
the  most  powerful  nations  of  the  world  had  debated  and  enacted 
with  the  most  careful  consideration,  and  which  was  intended  fo 
be  put  in  operation  in  the  kindliest  and  gentlest  manner.  There 
had  been  no  attempt  to  enforce  the  act  with  troops,  or  to  send 
troops  out  beforehand  and  station  them  at  important  points  in 
the  modern  manner.  Grenville,  fearing  disorders  and  resist- 
ance, had  brought  in  a  bill  to  allow  military  officers  in  the 
colonies  to  quarter  their  troops  in  private  houses ;  but  there  was 
so  much  opposition  in  Parliament  to  this  method  that  it  was 
dropped. 

England  had  at  that  time  some  twelve  regiments  on  the 
American  continent ;  but  most  of  them  were  holding  the  newly- 
acquired  possessions  of  Florida  and  Canada,  and  guarding  the 
Indian  frontiers  on  the  Ohio  and  the  great  lakes.  General 
Gage,  who  was  commander  of  the  British  forces  in  America,  had 
some  troops,  possibly  five  hundred,  at  New  York  and  Albany, 
which  were  the  headquarters  and  strategic  positions  for  the 
British.  There  was  also  part  of  a  Scotch  regiment  in  Philadel- 
phia in  the  old  barracks  near  Third  and  Green  Streets.  But 
most  of  the  rebellious  colonies  were  entirely  without  British 
troops.  No  attempt  was  made  to  use  those  in  New  York  and 
Albany.  In  fact,  the  rioting,  the  burning  of  the  governor's 
coach,  the  surrender  of  the  stamped  paper,  and  the  burning  of  a 
cargo  of  the  paper,  took  place  directly  under  the  eyes  of  the 
soldiers  without  the  slightest  attempt  on  their  part  to  prevent  it. 

General  Gage,  while  instructed  to  repel  acts  of  outrage  and 
violence,  was  also  enjoined  to  act  with  great  caution  and  deli- 
cacy. He  also  appears  to  have  been  under  orders  to  reduce 
expenses  in  all  the  American  military  establishments;  so  that 
England  was  at  this  time  attempting  to  establish  her  sovereignty 

105 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

in  the  colonies  altogether  by  the  conciliatory  and  persuasive 
plan  and  without  the  slightest  use  or  even  the  threat  of  force.7 

After  the  Ministry  had  heard  of  the  rioting,  the  destruction 
of  stamps,  and  forced  resignations  of  stamp-masters,  they  wrote 
letters  on  the  24th  of  October  to  Gage  and  the  governors, 
expressing  great  astonishment  at  what  had  happened.  Gage 
was  gently  reprimanded  for  not  having  protected  the  stamps 
and  stamp-master  of  New  York;  but  at  the  same  time  the 
Ministry  admitted  that  being  on  the  ground  he  probably  knew 
best  what  should  have  been  done.  Governor  Bernard,  of  Massa- 
chusetts, was  told  that  they  had  heard  with  the  greatest  surprise 
of  the  refusal  of  his  council  to  call  for  military  aid  to  help  them 
support  the  law.  All  the  governors  were  told  that  if  there  were 
any  more  disturbances  they  must  call  upon  General  Gage  and 
Admiral  Colvil  for  aid,  and  that  troops  could  be  obtained  from 
Nova  Scotia.8 

It  is  of  course  now  easy  to  see  that  before  passing  such  a 
sweeping  measure  as  the  Stamp  Act,  England  should  have 
conquered  the  colonies  into  complete  submission.  It  was  almost 
like  attempting  to  tax  an  independent  nation.  England  collects 
stamp  duties  of  three  or  four  million  pounds,  as  well  as  excise, 
salt  tax  and  land  taxes,  in  India;  but  she  has  thoroughly 
conquered  the  country  and  has  there  a  very  large  standing 
army.9 

The  colonists  were  not  content  with  disregarding  the  Stamp 
Act.  They  were  determined  to  have  it  repealed,  and  to  force 
the  repeal  by  punishing  England  with  what  we  would  now  call 
boycotting.  They  had  already  largely  abstained  from  buying 
English  goods  because  of  the  Sugar  Act  and  the  attempt  to 
prevent  smuggling.  Their  efforts  and  plans  now  became  more 
elaborate  and  determined.  Wholesale  and  retail  merchants  in 
New  York  and  Philadelphia  formed  themselves  into  associa- 
tions agreeing  to  cancel  all  their  English  orders.    In  Philadel- 


7 "  Prior  Documents  of  the  Revolution,"  pp.  39,  124,  142. 

8  "  Prior  Documents  of  the  Revolution,"  pp.  39-44. 

9  Lilly,  "  India  and  Her  Problems,"  p.  187. 

10G 


STOPPAGE  OF  TRADE 

phia  they  even  prohibited  any  lawyer  from  bringing  suit  to 
recover  a  debt  due  an  inhabitant  of  England.  These  methods 
were  followed  in  Boston  and  other  towns,  and  societies  were 
formed  for  encouraging  domestic  manufacturing. 

Resolutions  were  passed  to  repress  extravagance  at  funerals, 
and  to  abstain  from  eating  lambs  so  that  the  supply  of  domestic 
wool  for  clothes  might  be  increased.  Butchers  who  offered  lamb 
for  sale  were  to  be  boycotted  and  driven  from  business ;  and  so 
thoroughly  were  all  these  plans  carried  out  that  between  Novem- 
ber and  January  trade  with  England  almost  ceased. 

Thousands  of  working  people,  manufacturers,  laborers,  and 
seamen  in  England  were  said  to  be  thrown  out  of  employment, 
and  believed  themselves  threatened  with  starvation.  Petitions 
began  to  pour  into  Parliament  from  London,  Bristol,  Lancaster, 
Liverpool,  Hull,  Glasgow,  and,  indeed,  as  the  Annual  Register 
of  that  date  informs  us,  from  most  of  the  trading  and  maiTu- 
facturing  towns  and  boroughs  of  the  kingdom.  The  trade  with 
the  colonies  was  between  £2,000,000  and  £3,000,000  per  year. 
It  was  no  light  matter  to  cut  down  such  an  enormous  sum. 
Worse  still,  the  colonists  were  indebted  to  British  merchants  in 
some  £2,000,000  or  £3,000,000  on  past  sales,  and  when  pressed 
for  payment  expressed  great  willingness,  but  declared  that  the 
recent  acts  of  Parliament  had  so  interrupted  and  disturbed 
their  commerce,  and  thrown  them  into  such  confusion,  that ' '  the 
means  of  remittances  and  payments  were  utterly  lost  and  taken 
from  them."10 

John  Bull  was  apparently  struck  in  his  pocket,  the  most 
tender  spot  on  his  person.  Meantime,  during  the  previous 
summer  the  Grenville  Ministry,  which  had  secured  the  passage 
of  the  Stamp  Act,  quarrelled  with  the  King  and  went  out  of 
power.  A  new  Ministry  was  formed  by  Lord  Rockingham 
out  of  a  faction  of  the  Whig  party.  This  Ministry  was  very 
short-lived,  and  has  usually  been  described  as  weak.  But  it 
secured  some  legislation  which  has  been  admired.     It  had  to 


10  Annual  Register,  1766,  vol.  ix,  chap,  vii,  pp.  35,  36;  Adam  Smith, 
"  Wealth  of  Nations,"  oth  ed.,  book  4,  chap.  7,  p.  272. 

107 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

settle  first  of  all  the  great  question  raised  by  the  starving 
workmen,  and  the  merchants  and  manufacturers  with  their 
petitions  crowding  the  lobbies  of  Parliament.  They  asked  to 
have  the  Stamp  Act  repealed.  But  general  public'  opinion, 
both  in  Parliament  and  throughout  the  country,  was  exas- 
perated at  the  resistance  in  America  and  was  in  favor  of 
further  coercive  measures.  n 

The  government  was  assailed  for  not  having  immediately 
employed  troops  and  ships-of-war  to  enforce  the  Stamp  Act 
"in  such  a  manner  as  the  outrageousness  of  the  resistance 
required."  Even  the  Whigs  admitted  that  the  situation  was 
critical,  and  that  there  was  an  immediate  necessity  of  enforcing 
the  act  by  fire  and  sword  or  else  of  moving  its  immediate  repeal. 
There  was  no  doubt,  the  Whigs  said,  of  the  ability  of  England  to 
crush  or  even  extirpate  the  colonies,  but  in  such  action  England 
would  be  using  one  of  her  arms  to  cut  off  the  other. 

The  whole  question  of  the  taxation  of  the  colonies  was 
raised  again;  witnesses,  experts  on  trade,  all  sorts  of  persons 
familiar  with  the  colonies,  including  Franklin,  were  called  to 
the  bar  of  the  House,  examined,  and  cross-examined.  The 
agents  of  the  different  colonies  were  constantly  in  attendance 
in  the  lobbies.  No  source  of  information  was  left  unexplored. 
The  ablest  men  of  the  country  were  pitted  against  each  other 
in  continual  debates,  and  colonial  taxation  was  the  leading  topic 
of  conversation  among  all  classes.  It  was  investigated  and 
discussed  far  more  thoroughly  and  with  more  complete  infor- 
mation and  larger  experience  than  at  the  time  of  the  passage 
of  the  Stamp  Act. 

Aside  from  all  eloquence  and  passionate  feeling  there  were 
two  great  questions  before  Parliament.  Was  the  Stamp  Act 
constitutional?  and  if  constitutional,  was  it  expedient?  Eng- 
land had  the  constitutional  right  to  tax  Ireland,  but  refrained. 
Should  she  also  refrain  in  this  instance  from  taxing  America? 

It  was  the  innings  of  the  radical  section  of  the  Whigs  led 


11  Lecky,  "  England  in  the  Eighteenth  Century,"  vol.  iii,  p.  100.     See 
also  Annual  Register,  1766,  pp.  31-48. 

108 


REPEAL  OF  THE  STAMP  ACT 

by  Lord  Rockingham.  They  were  favorable  to  liberalism  and 
the  colonies;  and  there  were  enough  Tories  alarmed  by  the 
petitions  of  traders  and  merchants  to  give  a  majority  which 
decided  that  the  Stamp  Act  was  not  expedient.  They  accord- 
ingly repealed  it  within  a  year  after  its  passage,  with  a  minority 
of  stanch  Tories  strenuously  protesting  and  predicting  the  com- 
plete overthrow  of  British  sovereignty  in  America. 

The  majority  which  repealed  the  Stamp  Act  because  of  its 
inexpediency  felt  quite  sure,  however,  as  did  also  the  vast 
majority  of  Englishmen,  that  Parliament  had  a  constitutional 
right  to  tax  the  colonies  as  it  pleased,  and  so  they  passed  a 
bill  declaring  null  and  void  all  acts  of  colonial  legislatures 
which  had  denied  the  complete  power  of  Parliament  and  they 
also  passed  what  is  known  in  history  as  the  Declaratory  Act, 
asserting  the  constitutional  right  of  Parliament  to  bind  the 
colonies  "in  all  cases  whatsoever ;' '  and  this  is  still  the  law 
of  England. 

The  rejoicing  over  the  repeal  of  the  Stamp  Act  was  dis- 
played, we  are  told,  in  a  most  extraordinary  manner,  even  in 
England.  The  ships  in  the  Thames  hoisted  their  colors  and 
houses  were  illuminated.  The  colonists  had  apparently  been 
able  to  hit  a  hard  blow  by  the  stoppage  of  trade.  The  rejoicing, 
however,  as  subsequent  events  showed,  was  not  universal.  It 
was  the  rejoicing  of  Whigs,  or  of  the  particular  ship-owners, 
merchants,  and  workingmen  who  expected  relief  from  the 
restoration  of  the  American  trade.  It  was  noisy  and  conspicu- 
ous. There  must  have  been  some  exaggeration  in  the  account  of 
the  sufferings  from  loss  of  trade.  It  is  not  improbable  that 
Parliament  had  been  stampeded  by  a  worked-up  excitement  in 
its  lobbies;  for  very  soon  it  appeared  that  the  great  mass  of 
Englishmen  were  unchanged  in  their  opinion  of  what  should 
be  England's  colonial  policy;  and,  as  was  discovered  in  later 
years,  the  stoppage  of  the  American  trade  did  not  seriously 
injure  the  business  or  commercial  interests  of  England.12 

But  in  America  the  rejoicing  was,  of  course,  universal. 


Letters  of  James  Murray,  Loyalist,"  p.  258. 
109 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

There  were  letters  and  addresses,  thanksgivings  in  churches,  the 
boycotting  associations  were  instantly  dissolved,  trade  resumed, 
homespun  given  to  the  poor,  and  the  people  felt  proud  of 
themselves  and  more  independent  than  ever  because  they  could 
compel  England  to  repeal  laws. 

The  colonists  were  certainly  lucky  in  having  chanced  upon  a 
Whig  administration  for  their  great  appeal  against  taxation. 
It  has  sometimes  been  said  that  both  the  Declaratory  Act  and 
the  repeal  of  the  Stamp  Act  were  a  combination  of  sound  con- 
stitutional law  and  sound  policy,  and  that  if  this  same  Whig 
line  of  conduct  had  been  afterwards  consistently  followed, 
England  Avould  not  have  lost  her  American  colonies.  No  doubt 
if  such  a  Whig  policy  had  been  continued  the  colonies  would 
have  been  retained  in  nominal  dependence  a  few  years  longer. 
But  such  a  policy  would  have  left  the  colonies  in  their  semi- 
independent  condition  without  further  remodelling,  with  Brit- 
ish sovereignty  unestablished  in  them,  with  a  powerful  party  of 
the  colonists  elated  by  their  victory  over  England,  and  they 
would  have  gone  on  demanding  more  independence  until  they 
snapped  the  last  string. 

In  fact,  the  Whig  repeal  of  the  Stamp  Act  advanced  the 
colonies  on  their  road  to  independence.  It  gave  the  patriot 
party  such  confidence  in  themselves,  that  they  at  once  put  a 
stop  by  mob  violence  to  all  England's  efforts  to  check  smuggling. 
James  Otis  told  the  people  that  the  government's  abandonment 
of  the  Stamp  Act  could  be  construed  into  an  abandonment  of 
the  navigation  and  trade  laws.  From  the  time  of  the  repeal  of 
the  Stamp  Act  it  does  not  appear  that  England  ever  succeeded 
in  enforcing  any  laws  which  the  patriot  party  did  not  like.13 

Sir  Francis  Bernard,  who  was  governor  of  Massachusetts  at 
this  time,  said  that  the  prestige  of  England  was  gone  as  soon 
as  the  colonists  had  successfully  resisted  the  Stamp  Act.  'The 
repeal  of  the  Stamp  Act  was  a  declaration  of  independence. 
The  nation  that  dared  not  or  would  not  protect  her  chosen 


13  Quincy's    Reports    of    Massachusetts    Superior    Court,    1761-1772. 
pp.  445,  446;  Gordon,  "  American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  i,  p.  234. 

110 


CONDEMNATION  OF  THE  REPEAL 

officials  in  the  colonies,  allowed  them  to  be  mobbed  out  of  office, 
their  private  property  destroyed  and  their  lives  endangered; 
the  nation  that  would  not  even  punish  such  rioting  and  resist- 
ance, but  instead  repealed  a  law  at  the  demand  of  the  rioters, 
was,  he  thought,  trying  the  conciliatory  policy  to  the  verge  of 
imbecility.  The  Tories  condemned  the  repeal  on  this  account, 
and  in  the  course  of  the  next  ten  or  fifteen  years  ascribed  to  it 
the  increasing  coil  of  colonial  entanglement.14 


14  The  arguments  against  repealing  the  Stamp  Act  are  well  and 
briefly  summarized  in  "  Correct  Copies  of  the  Two  Protests  Against  the 
Bill  to  Repeal  the  American  Stamp  Act,"  London,  1766.  See,  also, 
"  The  Constitutional  Right  of  the  Legislature  of  Great  Britain  to  Tax 
the  British  Colonies,"  p.  25,  London,  1768.  "  Prior  Documents  of  the 
Revolution,"  pp.  81-89;  Bernard,  "  Select  Letters  on  Trade,"  &c,  p.  54. 

"  If  Great  Britain  can  or  will  suffer  such  conduct  to  pass  unpun- 
ished," said  John  Hughes,  referring  to  the  violence  which  had  compelled 
his  resignation  as  stamp  distributor,  "  a  man  need  not  be  a  prophet  or 
the  son  of  a  prophet  to  see  that  her  empire  in  North  America  is  at  an 
end." — "  Prior  Documents,"  p.  49. 


IX. 

THE  PAINT,  PAPER  AND  GLASS  ACT 

During  the  year  after  the  repeal  of  the  Stamp  Act  politics 
were  comparatively  quiet  in  the  colonies.  The  Assembly  of 
Virginia  voted  a  statue  to  the  King  and  an  obelisk  to  Pitt,  and 
New  York  voted  statues  to  both  the  King  and  Pitt.  Maryland 
and  Massachusetts  passed  acts  indemnifying  those  who  had 
suffered  in  the  Stamp  Act  riots.1 

There  was,  however,  one  cloud  in  the  sky.  A  clause  of  the 
Mutiny  Act,  passed  at  the  same  time  as  the  Stamp  Act,  required 
the  colonial  legislatures  to  provide  the  British  soldiers  quartered 
in  America  with  barracks,  fires,  beds,  candles,  and  other  necessa- 
ries; and  this  provision  was  now  enforced  as  part  of  the 
remodelling  of  the  colonies.  The  officers  in  command  at  New 
York  made  a  demand  for  these  supplies,  and  the  New  York 
Assembly  voted  part  of  them,  but  failed  to  furnish  vinegar,  salt, 
and  beer. 

This  disobedience  on  the  part  of  a  dependency  was  extremely 
irritating  even  to  a  "Whig  Ministry ;  and  an  act  of  Parliament 
was  passed,  and  approved  by  the  King  on  the  2nd  of  July,  1767, 
prohibiting  the  New  York  Assembly  from  enacting  any  law  or 
performing  any  of  its  functions  until  it  complied  in  every 
particular  with  the  requisition  for  the  soldiers.  The  assembly, 
however,  had  fully  complied  with  the  requisition  on  May  '26, 
so  that  the  act  of  Parliament  was  not  really  necessary ;  but'  it 
was  nevertheless  a  startling  revelation  to  the  colonists  of  the 
power  that  could  be  exercised  over  them  by  Parliament.  This 
was  internal  regulation  with  a  vengeance,  that  Parliament  and 
a  Whig  Ministry  should  actually  suspend  the  power  of  a  colo- 


IU  Prior  Documents  of  the  Revolution,"  pp.  103,  113,  116,  117,  123, 
124,  134,  142.  Gordon,  "  American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  i, 
pp.  210-212. 

112 


CONCILIATION  IMPOSSIBLE 

Dial  legislature.  Yet  the  act  seemed  to  be  entirely  constitu- 
tional, because  the  colonists  themselves  had  admitted  that 
Parliament  had  full  control  over  them,  except  in  the  matter  of 
internal  taxation.2 

The  patriot  leaders  now  began  to  realize  that  their  distinc- 
tion between  internal  and  external  taxation  was  impractical  and 
would  not  stop  the  reorganizing  plans  of  Parliament.  They 
must  go  a  great  deal  farther  than  that,  and  deny  all  the  author- 
ity of  Parliament.  But  at  present  nothing  could  be  done 
because  the  New  York  Assembly  had  unfortunately  yielded,  and 
other  opportunities  must  be  awaited. 

It  has  been  sometimes  argued  that  having  escaped  out  of 
the  Stamp  Act  difficulty,  England's  true  course  was  to  let  the 
colonies  alone,  and  not  to  raise  another  direct  issue  with  them ; 
and  that  if  she  had  followed  that  course  there  would  have  been 
no  war  and  everything  would  have  been  peaceable  and  happy 
down  to  our  own  time.  If  the  advocates  of  this  theory  mean 
that  the  colonies  would  have  gradually  and  peaceably  become 
an  independent  nation  we  can  readily  agree  with  them.  But 
apparently  they  mean  that  England  would  not  have  lost  her 
colonies;  and  that  there  would  have  been  some  pleasant  and 
ideal  union  between  England  and  America  which  they  do  not 
definitely  describe. 

Such  a  union,  indeed,  cannot  be  definitely  described  except 
as  part  of  political  dreamland.  The  question  at  issue  was  one  of 
colonies  or  no  colonies,  dependence  or  independence.  If  the 
colonies  would  not  obey  Parliament,  or  were  not  subject  to  its 
authority,  then  they  were  practically  independent  countries, 
and  any  so-called  union  with  England  would  be  the  mere 
friendliness  which  sometimes  exists  between  independent 
nations.  A  colony  that  can  refuse  obedience  to  the  laws  of  the 
mother-country  may  be  a  colony  in  the  old  Greek  sense  of  an 
independent   community   originally   founded  by   the   mother- 


2  "Prior  Documents,"  pp.  92,  94,  95,  98,  99,  120,  125,  162;  "Memorial 
History  of  the  City  of  New  York,"  vol.  ii,  388;    Lossing,  "History  of 
New  York,"  chap,  iii ;  Lamb,  "  History  of  New  York,"  pp.  744-747. 
8  113 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

country ;  but  it  is  not  a  colony  in  the  imperial  sense,  or  in  the 
English  sense,  and  it  is  certainly  not  part  of  a  consolidated 
empire  which  then  as  now  was  the  object  of  England's  ambition. 

She  accordingly  not  only  punished  and  suspended  the  legis- 
lature of  New  York  for  its  disobedience,  and  created  the  already 
described  new  Board  of  Commissioners  of  Customs  to  reside  in 
America,  but  she  devised  a  new  taxing  act  which  would  it  was 
hoped  raise  sufficient  revenue  to  defray  the  cost  of  the  military 
protection  of  the  colonies,  and  at  the  same  time  fix  permanent 
salaries  on  the  governors,  so  that  they  would  be  no  longer  at  the 
mercy  of  the  legislatures. 

A  few  months  after  the  repeal  of  the  Stamp  Act  the  King 
and  the  Eockingham  Ministry  disagreed,  and  on  the  7th  of 
July,  1766,  that  Ministry  went  out  of  office.  William  Pitt 
formed  a  new  one,  made  up  of  politicians  from  the  various 
cliques  and  factions  of  the  Whigs — a  most  impossible  and 
impractical  Ministry,  and  as  short-lived  as  its  predecessor. 

Pitt  was  no  longer  the  powerful  statesman  who  had  carried 
England  through  the  great  war  with  France  and  secured  for 
her  Canada  and  what  seemed  to  be  a  world-wide  empire.  His 
ideas  were  no  longer  acceptable  to  the  majority  of  Englishmen ; 
for  instead  of  appealing  to  their  passion  for  conquest  and 
empire,  as  he  had  done  during  the  French  War,  he  seemed  to 
be  asking  them  to  allow  the  American  empire,  that  they  had 
saved  from  France,  to  slip  away  from  them  and  become 
independent. 

His  health  was  broken  and  his  nervous  system  shattered. 
He  was  afflicted  with  paroxysms  of  anger,  could  not  bear  the 
slightest  noise,  or  even  the  presence  of  his  children  in  the  same 
house  with  him.  He  spent  enormous  sums  of  money  in  planting 
his  country  seat, ' '  Hayes, ' '  and  secluding  himself  within  it.  He 
sold  the  country-seat,  but  was  so  unhappy  at  parting  with  it 
that  his  wife  bought  it  back  for  him.  He  required  a  constant 
succession  of  chickens  to  be  kept  cooking  in  his  kitchens  all  day 
to  satisfy  his  uncertain,  but  at  times  ravenous,  appetite.  Yet 
when  he  could  summon  sufficient  health  and  strength  to  appear 
in  Parliament  and  rise  in  his  place  to  speak,  the  clearness  and 

114 


LORD  CHATHAM'S  MINISTRY 

vigor  of  his  intellect  and  the  grandeur  of  his  eloquence  was 
still  the  admiration  of  his  hearers.3 

In  forming  the  new  Ministry  he  compelled  the  King  to  give 
him  a  title,  and  henceforth  he  is  known  as  Lord  Chatham. 
Within  a  few  weeks  after  forming  the  Ministry  his  health 
failed  so  rapidly  that  he  had  to  be  taken  to  the  continent.  He 
never  afterwards  exercised  any  control  in  the  Ministry  of  which 
he  was  supposed  to  be  the  head,  and  within  little  more  than  a 
year  he  retired  from  it  altogether.  But  up  to  his  death,  in 
1778,  he  would  occasionally  appear  in  the  House  of  Lords  to 
make  those  eloquent  and  pathetic  appeals  from  which  our 
school-boys  used  to  recite  passages,  denouncing  the  government 
because  it  would  not  withdraw  all  the  troops  from  America,  and 
by  peaceful  discussion  persuade  the  colonies  to  stay  within  the 
empire. 

As  for  the  Ministry  he  had  formed,  it  was  not  his  in  any 
sense.  On  every  question  it  pursued  a  course  opposed  to  his 
policy ;  and  after  extraordinary  confusion  and  divisions  it  soon 
ceased  to  bear  even  the  semblance  of  a  Whig  Ministry,  for  by 
successive  resignations  Tories  were  admitted  until  it  became  all 
Tory.  Lord  Hillsborough  and  Lord  North  were  admitted  to  it ; 
and  finally  that  extreme  and  thorough-going  Tory,  Lord  George 
Germain.  The  Whigs  went  entirely  out  of  power,  and  for  the 
remainder  of  the  Revolution  we  have  a  Tory  government 
dealing  with  the  colonies.4 

The  constant  changing  of  ministries  at  this  time  had  not  a 
little  to  do  with  the  development  of  the  revolutionary  spirit  in 
America.  A  ministry  had  seldom  lasted  over  a  year.  While 
there  were  the  two  great  parties,  Whig  and  Tory,  they  were 
strangely  confused  and  split  up  into  factions.  Party  lines 
were  not  distinctly  drawn.5  There  could  be  no  consistent  and 
steady  colonial  policy.    Whig  ministries  used  Tory  methods  and 


•Lecky,    "England    in    the   Eighteenth    Century,"    edition    of    1882, 
vol.  iii,  p.  121. 

4  Ibid.,  pp.  123  et  seq. 

6  Lecky,    "  England    in    the   Eighteenth    Century,"    edition   of    1882, 
vol.  iii,  pp.  110-114. 

115 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

Tory  ministries  used  Whig  methods.  The  uncertain,  the 
shifting  back  and  forth  from  severity  to  liberality,  passing 
taxing  acts  and  repealing  them,  experimenting  to  see  how  the 
colonies  could  be  consolidated,  feeling  their  way  towards  the 
modern  British  empire,  was  a  vast  encouragement  to  the  colo- 
nial patriots.  As  our  Revolution  advanced  we  find  party  lines 
and  policies  in  England  becoming  clearer,  until  towards  the 
end  they  are  quite  distinct ;  and  after  1778  the  ministry  carried 
out  a  distinctly  Tory  policy. 

As  one  reads  in  this  period  of  English  history  how  bankrupt 
and  disturbed  business  had  become ;  how  violent  the  excitement 
and  rioting  over  Wilkes;  how  incapable  the  government  was  to 
keep  ordinary  civil  order  even  in  London;  how  hostile  to 
England  were  all  the  European  nations,  one  cannot  but  see  that 
it  was  a  golden  opportunity  for  the  patriots.  There  was  no 
period  for  nearly  a  hundred  years  when  we  could  have  broken 
away  so  easily.  Good  fortune  and  opportunity  were  an  impor- 
tant factor  in  the  Revolution,  and  attended  us  from  the  begin- 
ning to  the  end. 

In  the  autumn  of  1766  Parliament  went  to  the  country,  and, 
as  was  naturally  to  be  expected,  the  new  election  returned  a 
body  more  determined  than  ever  to  remodel  the  colonies.  It  is 
difficult  for  any  nation  to  endure  a  dependency  where  its 
sovereignty  is  not  recognized.  The  colonists  were  still  setting 
the  trade  laws  at  defiance.  They  had  compelled  England  to 
repeal  the  Stamp  Act,  and  had  brought  about  this  repeal  b}r 
violence,  by  withholding  trade,  by  starving  English  merchants 
and  workingmen.  Could  this  be  endured  ?  Could  it  be  possible 
1hat  a  set  of  traders  and  farmers  in  a  dependency  had  such 
power  as  that? 

Observing  the  temper  the  House  was  in,  Charles  Townsend, 
Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  a  Whig,  and  a  most  brilliant  but 
uncertain  member  of  the  patch-work  Chatham  Ministry, 
announced,  on  the  26th  of  January,  1767,  that  the  administra- 
tion was  prepared  to  solve  the  American  problem.  This  solution 
would  render  the  colonies  self-sustaining,  and  relieve  Great 
Britain  of  the  expense  of  governing,  defending,  and  protecting 

116 


TOWNSEND'S  PLAN 

them.  He  knew,  he  said,  a  mode  by  which  revenue  eould  be 
drawn  from  America  for  this  purpose  without  causing  the  heat 
and  turmoil  of  the  Stamp  Act ;  and  for  this  hopeful  announce- 
ment he  was  vigorously  applauded  on  all  sides. 

His  plan  was  nothing  more  than  taking  the  colonists  at  their 
word  on  the  distinction  between  external  and  internal  taxes. 
They  had  said  that  they  were  willing  to  pay  external  taxes,  and 
accordingly  a  bill  was  introduced  laying  a  duty  on  paint,  paper, 
glass,  and  tea  imported  into  the  colonies;  the  duty  to  be  paid 
at  their  seaports  in  the  exact  manner  which  they  had  said  was 
lawful  and  constitutional.0 

This  measure  was  adopted  by  a  "Whig  Ministry,  which, 
besides  Lord  Chatham,  contained  Lord  Camden,  who  two  years 
before  had  made  a  brilliant  argument  to  show  that  the  colonies 
could  not  be  taxed  unless  they  were  represented  in  Parliament. 
There  were  also  in  the  same  ministry  Lord  Shelburne  and 
General  Conway,  both  of  them  supposed  to  be  warm  friends  and 
defenders  of  the  colonies.  But  they  all  seem  to  have  felt  as 
strongly  as  the  Tories  the  necessity  for  remodelling  and  con- 
solidating the  empire  and  preventing  the  colonies  from  escaping 
from  control. 

The  Paint,  Paper,  and  Glass  Act  was  a  great  landmark  in 
the  Revolution,  and  wrought  a  great  change  of  opinion.  The 
colonists  were  fairly  caught  in  their  own  argument.  These  new 
taxes  were  external,  and,  therefore,  constitutional.  At  the  same 
time  they  were  laid  on  articles  of  such  universal  use,  imported 
in  such  large  quantities  from  England,  that  they  would  be  paid 
in  the  enhanced  price  of  the  articles  by  all  the  people  all  over 
the  country,  and  so  were  as  much  internal  taxation  as  the 
stamp  tax. 

Besides  being  as  internal  in  their  effect  as  the  stamp  tax,  it 
might  very  well  happen  that  these  new  taxes  could  not  be 
resisted  as  easily  as  the  stamp  tax  had  been  resisted.    The  new 


•This  plan  of  taxation  did  not  originate  with  Townsend.  It  had 
been  discussed  nearly  a  year  before  in  the  Boston  Gazette  of  May  5,  176G, 
and  was  also  a  very  obvious  method. 

117 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

taxes  were  to  be  collected  at  the  seaports  by  the  authority  and 
force  of  the  British  army  and  navy  and  a  host  of  new  revenue 
officers  who  had  recently  been  appointed.  Paint,  paper,  and 
glass  were  imported  in  such  quantities  that  it  might  be  very 
difficult  to  evade  the  duties  by  any  of  the  methods  heretofore 
used.  England  seemed  to  be  reaching  out  to  secure  control  of 
the  colonies  in  a  most  effective  manner. 

Petitions,  resolves,  and  remonstrances  were  again  sent 
across  the  water,  and  the  associations  for  suspending  importa- 
tions were  renewed;  but  it  is  noticeable  that  there  was  no 
rioting.  In  fact,  the  colonists  seemed  to  be  acting  in  a  rather 
subdued  manner.  The  patriot  party  had  possibly  become  more 
conscious  of  its  power,  and  relied  on  renewing  the  non-importa- 
tion plan.  But  in  any  event  the  next  step  was  a  serious  one. 
They  must  adopt  new  political  principles.  Their  leaders  were 
holding  them  in  check.  A  town  meeting  was  held  in  Boston  to 
discountenance  rioting,  and  Otis  urged  caution  and  advised  that 
no  opposition  should  be  made  to  the  new  duties.  On  the  20th 
of  November,  1767,  when  the  taxes  went  into  effect,  the  people 
were  remarkably  quiet,  although  two  years  before  they  had 
broken  out  with  the  utmost  violence  against  the  Stamp  Act.7 

Their  petitions,  letters,  and  public  documents  are  full  of 
the  most  elaborate  expressions  of  loyalty  and  devotion.  The 
petition  which  Massachusetts  sent  to  the  King  in  January,  1768, 
is  apparently  the  perfection  of  unquestioning  loyalty.  With 
an  intense  love  of  independence  in  their  hearts  they,  never- 
theless, are  compelled  to  use  words  of  humble  submissiveness. 
There  is  no  bold  arguing  against  the  right  to  tax;  no  threats 
or  denunciation  which  could  be  called  treason  like  the  resolu- 
tions and  speech  of  Patrick  Henry  two  years  before.  They 
merely  beg  and  beseech  to  be  relieved  from  these  new  taxes. 
If  they  cannot  be  relieved  from  them,  they  can  only  "regret 
their  unhappy  fate."  They  repeat  the  old  unfortunate 
admission  of  the  Stamp  Act  Congress  that  Parliament  has 
superintending  authority  over  them,  but  instead  of  adding  the 


T  Barry,  "  History  of  Massachusetts,"  vol.  ii,  pp.  340,  341. 

118 


THE  CIRCULAR  LETTER 

exception  of  internal  taxation,  they  have  a  new  exception, 
which  they  state  by  saying  that  this  supreme  authority  extends 
to  "all  cases  that  can  consist  with  the  fundamental  rights  of 
nature  and  the  constitution."  Those  words,  "fundamental 
rights  of  nature, ' '  were  a  new  way  of  limiting  the  authority  of 
Parliament  and  significant  of  a  change  to  complete  reliance  on 
the  doctrines  of  the  rights  of  man. 

Glancing  at  the  documents  sent  out  by  the  other  colonies,  we 
find  another  idea  obtruding  itself.  They  ask  for  a  return  of 
the  conditions  and  privileges  they  had  enjoyed  before  the 
French  War  closed  in  1763 ;  the  old  days  when  the  French  in 
Canada  prevented  any  remodelling  or  reorganization  by  Eng- 
land. This  request  for  a  return  to  that  happy  golden  age 
became  for  some  years  a  watchword  in  the  patriot  party,  until 
the  evolution  of  events  brought  them  to  declare  absolute  inde- 
pendence in  1776.  After  that  the  golden  age  seemed  to  be 
before  them,  and  when  England  in  1778  offered  in  effect  a 
return  to  the  conditions  before  1763  they  rejected  the  offer 
with  contempt.8 

In  February,  1768,  the  Massachusetts  Assembly  sent  to  all 
the  other  colonial  assemblies  a  circular  letter,  very  cautiously 
worded,  and  arguing  the  subject  in  a  quiet  way.  There  is 
nothing  about  external  and  internal  taxes ;  but  the  recent  duties 
on  paint,  paper,  and  glass  are  said  to  be  infringements  of 
their  natural  and  constitutional  rights,  because  such  duties 
take  away  their  property  without  their  consent;  which  is 
simply  a  roundabout  way  of  saying  that  no  taxation  without 
representation,  and  the  doctrine  of  consent,  must  now  be 
applied  to  external  as  well  as  internal  taxes. 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  they  say  that  the  new  taxes  are 
infringements  of  their  natural  and  constitutional  rights.     A 
year  or  two  before  it  was  only  their  constitutional  rights ;  no 
it  is  also  their  natural  rights.     Filled  with  a  desperate  deter- 
mination to  secure  the  freedom  of  national  existence  they  are 


8 "  To  talk  of  replacing  us  in  the  situation  of  1763  as  we  first  asked," 
said  George  Mason  in  1778,  "  is  to  the  last  degree  absurd  and  impossible." 
— Niles,  "  Principles  and  Acts  of  the  Revolution,"  edition  1876,  p.  304. 

119 


A 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

broadening  their  arguments  to  meet  England's  broader  and 
more  determined  efforts  to  control  them.  They  are  ceasing  to 
rely  upon  their  charters  and  the  British  constitution,  and  are 
uilding  their  hopes  upon  their  rights  as  men  and  the  right  of 
naturally  separated  communities  to  national  and  independent 
existence. 

The  Massachusetts  patriots  said  in  the  circular  letter  that 
the  doctrine  of  government  by  consent  of  the  governed  was  an 
''unalterable  right  in  nature  ingrafted  into  the  British  Con- 
stitution." This  was  altogether  a  new  way  of  looking  at  the 
British  Constitution,  to  "ingraft"  upon  it  one  of  the  rights-of- 
man  doctrines.  This  sort  of  ingrafting  would  no  doubt  have 
improved  the  British  constitution,  but  the  English  people  would 
not  accept  the  change,  would  not  be  Americanized  to  that 
extent. 

The  Massachusetts  circular  letter,  of  course,  insists  strongly 
that  it  is  impossible  that  the  colonies  should  ever  be  represented 
in  Parliament.  They  evidently  wish  to  keep  Parliament  at 
arm's  length  and  have  no  connection  with  it  whatever.  The 
letter  recites  the  petitions  and  arguments  that  had  been  sent 
to  the  Ministry,  asks  the  various  assemblies  for  their  advice  as 
to  what  else  should  be  done,  and  declares  in  all  seriousness  that 
the  colonists  are  not  seeking  "to  make  themselves  independent 
of  the  mother-country."  They  meant  that  they  were  merely 
making  themselves  independent  of  Parliament,  and  still  re- 
tained their  allegiance  to  the  King. 

The  British  Government,  however,  regarded  this  letter  as 
"of  a  most  dangerous  and  factious  tendency,  calculated  to 
inflame  the  minds  of  good  subjects  in  the  colonies. ' '  The  chief 
object  of  the  letter  was  obviously  to  promote  union  among  the 
colonies,  unite  them  in  opposition,  and  encourage  a  reciprocal 
expression  of  feeling.  The  government  quickly  saw  this,  and 
directed  the  governor  of  Massachusetts  to  have  the  assembly 
rescind  this  letter ;  and  at  the  same  time  a  letter  was  sent  to  all 
the  colonial  assemblies  requesting  them  to  take  no  notice  of  the 
Massachusetts  letter,  "which  will  be  treating  it  with  the 
contempt  it  deserves." 

120 


THE  NUMBERS  45  AND  92 

This  caused  a  great  controversy  and  discussion,  and  became 
the  subject  of  innumerable  speeches,  toasts,  and  humorous 
sallies  both  in  England  and  America.  The  patriots  bitterly 
complained  that  England  was  attempting  to  deny  to  the 
colonists  the  right  to  consult  among  themselves  and  even  the 
right  to  petition.  The  Massachusetts  legislature  by  a  vote  of 
92  to  17  refused  to  rescind  the  letter  and  most  of  the  colonial 
legislatures  rejected  the  instructions  of  the  Ministry  and 
answered  the  Massachusetts  letter  with  words  of  warm 
approval.9 

There  was  great  rejoicing  in  America  over  the  Massachusetts 
refusal  to  rescind,  and  many  Whigs  in  England  celebrated  the 
event  as  a  famous  occurrence  in  the  cause  of  liberty.  Paul 
Revere,  a  silversmith  and  engraver  of  Boston,  celebrated  the 
refusal  by  making  a*  handsome  silver  punch-bowl  inscribed : 
"To  the  Memory  of  the  Glorious  Ninety-two  Members  of  the 
Honorable  House  of  Representatives  of  Massachusetts  Bay, 
who  on  the  30th  of  June,  1768,  voted  not  to  rescind."  The 
number  92,  and  also  45,  the  number  of  Wilkes'  famous 
pamphlet,  were  constantly  used  at  that  time  for  indirect 
allusion  to  liberal  or  American  ideas.  The  Whig  society  of 
Boston  sent  to  a  similar  body  in  London  two  green  turtles, 
one  of  which  they  said  weighed  45  and  the  other  92  pounds. 
Colonel  Barre  presided  at  the  dinner  at  which  the  turtles  were 
served  and  other  English  Whigs  were  present.  They  drank  a 
toast  with  three  times  three  cheers  to  "The  ninety-two  patriots 
of  Massachusetts  Bay."  10 

The  disobedience  of  the  Massachusetts  Assembly  and  of 
nearly  all  of  the  other  colonial  assemblies  was  another  blow  to 
British  authority.  It  is  easy  now  to  see  that  the  orders  to  one 
assembly  to  rescind  and  to  the  others  to  treat  with  contempt 


9  Most  of  the  letters  and  documents  in  this  controversy  are  printed 
in  full  in  "  Prior  Documents  of  the  Revolution,"  pp.  175-193,  202-222, 
243.  See  also  Ryerson's  "Loyalists,"  vol.  i,  chap,  xiv;  Stedman,  "  Ameri- 
can War,"  vol.  i,  pp.  53-63. 

10Niles,  "Principles  and  Acts  of  the  Revolution,"  edition  1876, 
pp.  115,  116. 

121 


/ 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

the  circular  letter  were  worse  than  useless,  unless  followed  by 
sufficient  military  force  to  compel  obedience  or  punish  disobedi- 
ence. It  is  easy  to  see  that  the  Ministry  should  not  have  made 
the  attempt  unless  prepared  to  enforce  obedience.  To  allow  the 
colonies  to  turn  the  tables  so  easily  and  treat  the  home  govern- 
ment with  contempt  was  turning  British  sovereignty  into  a 
laughing  stock.  England  did  not  make  such  mistakes  in  her 
colonial  system  in  later  times.  But  in  the  year  1768  she  was 
totally  unaccustomed  to  enforcing  her  sovereignty  in  her 
colonies.  No  troops  were  sent  out  to  compel  obedience  and  she 
was  again  relying  on  mere  letter-writing  and  paper  proclama- 
tions for  retaining  control  of  America. 

The  Massachusetts  circular  letter  was  considered  by  the 
patriots  as  a  petition  and  the  government's  attack  upon  it  as 
an  attempt  to  deny  the  sacred  right  of  petition.  Eloquent 
speeches  on  this  subject  fed  the  flame  of  patriotism,  and  as 
Franklin  said,  "warmed  moderation  into  zeal  and  inflamed 
zeal  into  rage."  The  more  the  patriots  examined  the  Paint, 
Paper,  and  Glass  Act,  the  more  their  opposition  was  aroused. 
It  expressly  authorized  writs  of  assistance  to  be  issued  in  every 
colony.  The  colonists  had  objected  to  the  Stamp  Act  because 
it  was  intended  to  ' '  defray  the  expense  of  protecting,  defending, 
and  securing"  them ;  which,  they  said,  meant  to  keep  a  standing 
army  among  them.  But  the  Paint,  Paper,  and  Glass  Act  was 
not  only  to  furnish  revenue  for  the  same  purpose,  but  also  for 
' '  defraying  the  charge  of  the  administration  of  justice,  and  the 
support  of  civil  government  in  such  provinces  where  it  shall 
be  found  necessary." 

Further  plans  for  the  reorganization  of  the  colonies  were 
now  disclosed.  There  was  to  be  a  colonial  civil  list,  as  it  was 
called,  and  hereafter  all  governors,  judges,  and  other  colonial 
executive  officials  were  to  receive  fixed  salaries  paid  by  the 
Crown  out  of  the  revenue  raised  by  the  duties  on  paint,  paper, 
glass,  and  tea.  The  old  system  of  the  assemblies  securing  the 
passage  of  their  favorite  laws  by  withholding  the  governor's 
salary,  and  of  controlling  the  judges  in  the  same  way,  was  to 
cease.     There  was  to  be  no  more  withholding  of  a  governor's 

122 


DICKINSON'S  ARGUMENT 

salary  until  he  consented  to  popular  legislation,  but  in  place  of 
it  orderly,  methodical  government,  such  as  seemed  proper  for 
dependencies,  and  such  as  England  had  wanted  to  establish  in 
the  colonies  ever  since  the  reign  of  Charles  II. 

This  struck  at  the  root  of  what  the  colonists  considered  their 
system  of  freedom.  If  they  could  no  longer  control  governors  • 
and  executive  officials  through  their  salaries,  they  could  no 
longer  have  their  favorite  laws.  They  would  become  mere 
colonies,  compelled  to  take  what  was  given  to  them,  and  to  do 
as  they  were  told. 

The  colonists  had  now  three  phases  of  British  reorganiza- 
tion to  resist — the  new  commissioners  of  customs,  the  suspension 
of  the  New  York  legislature,  and  the  Paint,  Paper,  and  Glass 
Act.  In  order  to  meet  the  last  two  they  must  invent  a  new 
argument  and  restrict  still  farther  the  authority  of  Parliament. 
They  could  no  longer  admit  that  Parliament  had  full  authority 
over  them  except  in  internal  taxation.  Thus  the  Paint,  Paper,  / 
and  Glass  Act  brought  them  up  to  the  inevitable  position  of/ 
denying  all  parliamentary  authority ;  and  the  first  man  to  take 
the  important  step  of  stating  the  new  argument  was  John 
Dickinson,  a  Quaker  lawyer  of  Philadelphia.  He  was  about 
thirty-five  years  old,  conspicuous  in  his  profession  and  in 
Pennsylvania  politics,  and  had  been  a  member  of  the  Stamp  Act 
Congress,  for  which  he  had  drafted  several  documents. 

He  stated  the  new  argument  in  twelve  "Letters  from  a 
Farmer,"  which  were  published  in  the  Pennsylvania  Chronicle 
between  December  2,  1767,  and  February  15,  1768.  They  were 
quickly  copied  in  most  of  the  other  colonial  newspapers, 
reprinted  in  pamphlet  form  in  numerous  editions  in  America 
and  England,  and  translated  in  France.  They  caused  the 
greatest  excitement  in  America.  Town  meetings,  societies,  and 
grand  juries  sent  votes  of  thanks  to  the  author.  They  toasted 
him  at  public  dinners,  and  wrote  poems  and  eulogies  in  his 
honor.  At  the  same  time  these  letters  were  also  attacked  as 
going  entirely  too  far  and  "calculated  to  excite  the  passions  of 
the  unthinking."  X1 


Life  and  Writings  of  Dickinson,"  vol.  ii,  p.  280. 
123 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

They  enlarged  in  detail  on  the  danger  of  losing  control  of 
the  salaries  of  the  governors.  They  showed  the  fnll  meaning  of 
Parliament's  suspension  of  the  legislative  power  of  New  York. 
They  showed  that  if  Parliament  could  suspend  the  functions 
of  a  colonial  legislature,  it  was  omnipotent  in  its  control  of  the 
colonies  and  could  not  be  confined  to  mere  external  taxation. 
They  were  far  more  learned  and  comprehensive  than  any  writ- 
ings on  the  patriot  side  that  had  yet  appeared,  and  were 
fortified  by  historical  instances,  clever  anecdotes,  and  all  the 
resources  of  a  trained  legal  mind.  Dickinson  was  bold  enough 
to  answer  the  argument  that  England  was  too  powerful  to  be 
resisted.  It  is  also  significant  that  he  describes  as  a  warning 
to  the  colonists  how  Ireland  had  lost  her  liberties. 

The  old  argument  had  admitted  the  full  power  of  Parlia- 
ment except  in  the  one  item  of  internal  taxation.  Dickinson 
denied  that  Parliament  had  any  power  or  authority  in  the 
colonies  at  all;  denied  even  its  right  of  external  taxation  or 
taxation  in  any  form;  but  conceded  that  Parliament  could 
regulate  the  external  or  ocean  commerce  of  the  colonies  by 
duties,  which,  however,  must  be  solely  for  regulation  and  not 
for  revenue,  because  if  they  were  for  revenue  that  would  be  a 
form  of  external  taxation. 

The  argument,  it  will  be  observed,  went  just  far  enough  to 
cut  out  the  Paint,  Paper,  and  Glass  Act  from  allowable  legisla- 
tion. But  the  final  admission  that  Parliament  could  regulate 
our  commerce  by  duties,  provided  the  duties  did  not  rise  to 
the  dignity  of  taxes,  was  a  very  flimsy  idea  and  seems  to  have 
rested  on  the  old  notion  that  England  as  head  of  the  empire 
and  mistress  of  the  seas  ought  to  be  allowed  in  some  way  to 
regulate  the  general  ocean  commerce  of  the  members  of  the 
empire.  Dickinson  worked  out  the  theory  with  wonderful  astute- 
ness and  ingenuity ;  but  of  course  could  not  show  how  a  duty  on 
commerce  could  be  kept  from  becoming  a  tax. 

Indeed  part  of  his  own  argument  showed  that  almost  any 
governmental  command  was  in  the  end  a  tax.  "An  Act  of 
Parliament,"  he  said,  "commanding  us  to  do  a  certain  thing,  if 
it  has  any  validity,  is  a  tax  upon  us  for  the  expense  that  accrues 
in  complying  with  it."    He  also  argued  against  the  right  of 

124 


NEW  ARGUMENT  CONSERVATIVE 

Parliament  to  call  on  the  legislature  of  New  York  for  supplies 
for  the  troops,  because  it  was  in  effect  a  tax.  He  had  said  that 
if  Parliament  could  demand  fire  and  candles,  or  vinegar,  salt, 
and  pepper  for  the  troops,  it  could  also  demand  that  any 
colonial  legislature  supply  the  troops  with  arms  and  ammuni- 
tion, or  anything  else  they  wanted,  and  was  not  that  taxing? 
And  if  the  legislature  refused  to  comply  and  Parliament  pun- 
ished them  by  suspending  their  powers,  was  not  that  forcing 
them  to  pay  a  tax  ? 

Any  exercise  of  sovereignty,  such  as  quartering  troops  in 
public  houses,  impressing  wagons  or  boats  for  transporting 
them,  their  passage  over  ferries  and  toll-bridges,  may  be  con- 
sidered as  taxes.  Any  exercise  of  governmental  authority  is 
so  intimately  connected  with  taxation,  that  one  cannot  subsist 
without  the  other.  Dickinson's  argument,  although  he  would 
not  openly  avow  it,  was  really  a  denial  of  all  the  authority  of 
Parliament.  His  reasoning  all  led  irresistibly  to  that  end.  He 
was  pushing  Parliament  completely  out  of  all  relations  with 
the  colonies.12 

But  his  cautious  theories,  his  refusal  to  admit  that  he  was 
denying  the  whole  authority  of  Parliament,  served  no  doubt  a 
very  useful  purpose  in  checking  too  sudden  an  advance  of  the 
American  argument.  He  led  on  the  moderate  patriots  step  b}r 
step,  so  that  they  could  in  the  end  see  for  themselves,  from  all 
the  discussion,  that  if  they  admitted  any  authority  at  all  in 
Parliament  they  would  have  to  admit  its  authority  in 
everything. 

There  were  many  radicals  who  had  for  some  time  been 
ready  to  reject  all  authority  of  Parliament,  even  its  regulation 
of  commerce;  but  it  was  too  soon  to  come  out  with  sucli  a 
rejection  in  a  formal  and  public  manner.  The  moderate  patriots 
were  not  ready  for  it,  and  it  shocked  and  annoyed  loyalists  who 
might  be  persuaded  to  become  patriots. 


11  Snow,  "  Administration  of  Dependencies,"  pp.  29-40 ;  Critical 
Review,"  xxvi;  "Life  and  Writings  of  Dickinson,"  vol.  ii,  pp.  281,  282. 
See  also  Snow,  "  Administration  of  Dependencies,"  p.  239,  for  an  interest- 
ing account  of  the  change  wrought  in  Revolutionary  thought  by  Dickin- 
son's arguments. 

125 


TROOPS  SENT  TO  BOSTON,  BUT  THE  PAINT,  PAPER 
AND  GLASS  ACT  IS  REPEALED 

Meantime  the  new  commissioners  of  customs  at  Boston  were 
calling  upon  the  home  government  to  send  out  troops  to  protect 
them  in  the  performance  of  their  duties.  The  governor  and 
lieutenant-governor  had  made  the  same  request ;  and  it  was  said 
in  a  pamphlet  of  the  time  that  even  some  citizens  of  Boston, 
presumably  loyalists,  had  asked  for  troops.1 

General  Gage,  at  British  army  headquarters  in  New  York, 
was  accordingly  instructed  to  send  a  regiment  to  Boston,  and 
the  admiral  of  the  coast  was  directed  to  send  a  frigate,  two 
sloops  and  two  cutters.  The  fort,  or  castle  as  it  was  called,  on 
an  island  in  Boston  harbor,  was  repaired  and  every  arrange- 
ment made  for  a  military  and  naval  occupation. 

The  fifty-gun  ship  "Romney"  arrived  at  Boston  in  May, 
and  on  the  passage  from  Halifax  had  impressed  several  seamen 
from  New  England  vessels.  The  press-gang  was  a  recognized 
Institution  of  that  time,  defended  by  arguments  which  some- 
what resembled  the  arguments  which  defended  slavery.  It  was 
regulated  by  acts  of  Parliament,  and  while  its  cruelties  were 
shocking  and  its  violation  of  the  most  sacred  rights  of  human 
liberty  infamous,  it  was  nevertheless  upheld  by  good  people, 
because  it  was  believed  that  in  no  other  way  could  the  British 
navy  be  sustained.  England  had  always  had  great  difficulty  in 
recruiting  her  army  and  navy,  and  in  all  her  wars  had  been 
obliged  to  hire  troops  from  European  princes.  General  Gage 
was  at  this  time  receiving  recruits  from  Germany  for  one  of 
his  regiments. 

In  the  state  of  feeling  in  which  the  colonists  were,  the  work 


1 "  The   Conduct   of   the   Late   Administration   Examined,1'   p.    53    et 
passim. 

126 


THE  SLOOP  LIBERTY 

of  the  press-gang  was  almost  as  irritating  as  an  act  of  invasion 
by  a  foreign  army.  When  the  "Romney"  reached  Boston,  the 
Massachusetts  legislature  asked  her  captain  to  allow  no  more 
impressment  and  to  release  those  already  taken.  Possibly  some 
terms  might  have  been  made  with  him,  if  one  of  the  men  whom 
he  had  taken  had  not  been  forcibly  rescued  by  the  people.  He 
would  release  none,  and  stormed  in  true  sea-dog  fashion :  "No 
man  shall  go  out  of  this  vessel.  The  town  is  a  blackguard  town, 
ruled  by  mobs.  They  have  begun  with  me  by  rescuing  a  man 
whom  I  pressed  this  morning;  and,  by  the  eternal  God,  I  will 
make  their  hearts  ache  before  I  leave  it. "  2 

Soon  afterwards,  on  the  10th  of  June,  the  customs  officers 
seized  the  sloop  "Liberty,"  with  a  cargo  of  wine  from  Madeira, 
for  violating  the  trade  laws,  and  she  was  immediately  rescued 
by  the  Boston  mob.  The  cargo  belonged  to  John  Hancock,  a 
patriot  leader,  and  suits  for  penalties  amounting  to  over  £9000 
were  entered  against  him  by  the  government. 

The  mob  which  rescued  the  cargo  of  the  ' '  Liberty ' '  attacked 
the  customs  officers  with  bricks  and  stones,  beat  them  with 
sticks,  dragged  the  son  of  one  of  them  by  the  hair,  and  broke 
the  windows  of  their  houses,  until  they  were  obliged  to  seek 
safety  on  board  the  war-ship  "Romney."  From  there  they 
were  taken  to  Castle  William,  the  government  fort  in  the 
harbor,  whence  they  wrote  to  General  Gage  and  the  admiral  to 
hurry  troops  and  war- vessels  to  Boston ;  and  they  remained  at 
the  castle  until  Boston  was  occupied  by  troops.3 

This  affair  of  the  "Liberty"  was  an  important  event  and 
brought  the  inevitable  crisis  a  step  nearer.    The  troops  arrived 


'"Prior  Documents  of  the  Revolution,"  p.  132;  Wells,  "Life  of 
Samuel  Adams,"  vol.  i,  p.  185.  The  press-gang  acts  of  Parliament  did 
not  by  their  own  wording,  it  is  said,  extend  to  America.  Works  of  John 
Adams,  vol  ii,  p.  163;  vol.  x,  p.  204.) 

'Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  i,  pp.  231,  237, 
240;  Kidder,  "History  of  the  Boston  Massacre,"  p.  115.  Works  of 
John  Adams,  vol.  ii,  p.  215.  Adams  said  that  the  suits  were  pressed  until 
ended  by  the  battle  of  Lexington.  Gordon  says  that  they  were  dropped 
March  26,  1769. 

127 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

from  Halifax  in  September;  and  there  were  rumors  that  the 
patriots,  who  had  already  held  a  mass-meeting  of  protest,  would 
not  allow  them  to  land.  On  the  landing  day,  October  1,  1768, 
fourteen  war-vessels  lay  with  springs  on  their  cables  to  haul 
their  broadsides  to  the  town.  Under  this  protection  Colonel 
Dalrymple  landed  his  two  Halifax  regiments,  the  Fourteenth 
and  Twenty-ninth,  numbering,  with  the  artillery,  about  700 
men,  and  with  muskets  loaded  and  fixed  bayonets,  marched 
them  to  Boston  Common. 

The  army  barracks  were  on  Castle  Island,  in  the  harbor,  but 
if  the  troops  went  there  they  could  not  overawe  the  patriots  in 
Boston.  The  assembly  and  people  would  of  course  do  nothfng 
to  provide  quarters  in  Boston,  and  there  was  no  law  allowing 
troops  to  take  possession  of  private  houses.  The  governor  and 
Colonel  Dalrymple  had  no  little  difficulty  in  settling  the  ques- 
tion, but  finally  one  regiment  encamped  on  the  common  in 
tents,  and  the  other,  after  spending  the  night  in  Faneuil  Hall, 
was  quartered  in  the  State  House.  As  cold  weather  came  on 
both  regiments  were  quartered  in  hired  houses;  but  the  main 
guard  remained  posted  directly  opposite  the  State  House,  with 
two  field-pieces  pointed  at  it.  The  commissioners  of  customs, 
who  had  fled  to  Castle  Island  in  the  harbor,  now  returned  and 
resumed  their  duties.4 

This  was  the  first  attempt  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain  to 
enforce  obedience  in  one  of  the  colonies  by  military  force. 
Some  months  before,  troops  had  been  spread  out  in  New 
Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  Connecticut,  and  Georgia,  as  if  the  gov- 
ernment was  beginning  to  learn  from  the  Stamp  Act  experi- 
ences that  military  force  was  becoming  absolutely  necessary. 

Modern  British  colonists  do  not  object  to  the  presence  of 
red-coats;  but  the  Bostonians  were  not  accustomed  to  them 
except  as  allies  against  the  French;  and  the  patriots  among 
them  were  soon  boiling  with  indignation  against  this  alien 

4 Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  i,  p.  248; 
Boston  Gazette,  November  3,  1768;  Kidder,  "History  of  the  Boston 
Massacre,"  p.  115;  "Prior  Documents  of  the  Revolution,"  pp.  129-132; 
Stedman,  "  American  War,"  vol.  i,  p.  67. 

128 


RIGHT  TO  REJECT  TROOPS 

occupation  of  their  town,  this  overawing  of  the  legislature,  and 
this  filling  of  the  private  houses  of  freemen  with  troops  which 
had  come  to  enforce  a  complete  change  in  colonial  government. 

Nothing  happened  during  the  winter,  but  in  the  following 
June,  when  the  Massachusetts  Assembly  met,  they  declined 
doing  any  business  while  surrounded  by  an  armed  force.  They 
appear  to  have  thought  that  by  refusing  to  transact  business 
they  might  compel  the  governor  to  remove  the  troops  from  the 
town.  But  the  governor  took  the  course  of  adjourning  the 
assembly  to  meet  in  Cambridge,  four  miles  away.5  When 
assembled  there,  they  passed  resolutions  protesting  against 
the  right  of  the  governor  to  remove  them  and  protesting 
against  the  establishment  of  a  standing  army  in  a  colony  in 
time  of  peace.  These  resolutions  followed  by  similar  resolves 
in  other  colonial  assemblies,  and  a  series  of  articles  by  Samuel 
Adams  under  the  name  "Vindex"  in  the  Boston  Gazette,  seem 
to  have  started  the  opinion  which  afterwards  grew  into  a  formal 
doctrine  and  demand  upon  Great  Britain,  that  in  time  of  peace 
no  regular  troops  should  be  kept  in  a  colony  and  no  fortification 
built  there  except  by  the  consent  of  the  colony. 

As  this  right  of  a  colony  to  receive  or  reject  the  troops  of  the 
mother-country  has  never  been  recognized  by  England,  and  as 
it  in  effect  destroys  the  colonial  relation  as  usually  understood, 
it  is  of  some  interest  to  observe  how  Samuel  Adams  worked  out 
the  argument.  A  standing  army  was  not  allowed,  he  said,  on. 
the  island  of  England  without  the  consent  of  the  people 
expressed  through  their  representatives  in  Parliament.  As  the 
Americans  were  not  and  could  not  be  represented  in  Parlia- 
ment, a  standing  army  could  not  be  placed  among  them  without 
the  consent  of  the  only  legislative  bodies  in  which  they  were 
represented,  namely,  their  own  assemblies.  The  argument 
was,  of  course,  in  effect,  a  declaration  of  independence;  for 
when  England  had  no  longer  the  right  to  place  an  army  in  a 
colony  to  control  it,  the  colony  had  become  an  independent 
state. 


"  Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.  i,  p.  526. 
9  129 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

When  asked  by  the  governor  at  this  time  to  provide  supplies 
for  the  troops,  the  Massachusetts  Assembly  positively  refused 
to  supply  them  with  anything ;  and  the  South  Carolina  Assem- 
bly also  refused  to  furnish  anything  for  the  troops  quartered  in 
their  colony;  so  that  if  Parliament  followed  the  course  which 
had  been  pursued  in  the  case  of  New  York,  the  functions  of 
two  more  colonial  assemblies  would  be  suspended. 

The  year  1769  opened  with  Parliament  declaring,  in  both 
speeches  and  resolutions  that  the  colonies  were  in  a  state  of 
disobedience  to  law  and  government,  adopting  measures  sub- 
versive of  the  constitution,  and  disclosing  an  inclination  to 
throw  off  all  obedience  to  the  mother-country.  This  was 
unquestionably  a  true  description  of  the  situation ;  and  no  good 
purpose  is  served  by  obscuring  or  denying  it  by  means  of  those 
passages  in  the  documents  of  the  colonists  in  which  they  declare 
their  ' '  heartfelt  loyalty ' '  to  the  King,  and  disclaim  all  intention 
of  independence.  Those  fulsome  expressions  deceived  no  one 
at  that  time,  and  why  should  they  be  used  to  deceive  the  guile- 
less modern  reader.  They  merely  meant  that  the  colonists  were 
loyal  as  they  understood  loyalty,  that  they  were  willing  to 
remain  in  the  empire  if  they  could  remain  in  their  own  way, 
independent  of  Parliament  and  under  a  mere  nominal  headship 
of  the  English  King. 

There  was,  of  course,  a  movement  among  the  Whigs  in 
Parliament  to  have  the  Paint,  Paper,  and  Glass  Act  repealed, 
because  the  colonists  had  revived  their  non-importation  societies, 
were  refraining  from  buying  English  goods,  and  the  Act  seemed 
to  be  an  inexpedient  and  imprudent  measure  like  the  Stamp 
Act.  But  Lord  North,  who  had  succeeded  Townsend  in  the 
Ministry,  decisively  replied  that  "however  prudence  or  policy 
may  hereafter  induce  us  to  repeal  the  late  paper  and  glass  act, 
I  hope  we  shall  never  think  of  it  till  we  see  America  prostrate  at 
our  feet" 

We  find  Parliament  in  this  year  directing  that  the  governor 
of  Massachusetts  obtain  "the  fullest  information  touching  all 
treason  or  misprision  of  treason  within  his  government  since 
the  30th  day  of  December,  1767,"  in  order,  as  the  instructions 

130 


THE  OLD  ACT  OF  HENRY  VIII 

went  on  to  say,  that  his  Majesty  might  have  such  offences  tried 
within  the  realm  of  England,  according  to  the  statute  passed  in 
the  thirty-fifth  year  of  the  reign  of  Henry  VIII. 

The  meaning  of  this,  in  plain  English,  was  that  a  colonist- 
suspected  or  accused  of  treason  must  not  be  tried  in  the  colo- 
nies, where  any  jury  that  could  be  called  would  probably  acquit 
him  as  a  matter  of  course.  It  seemed  better  to  take  him  to 
England,  where  juries  would  not  be  so  hostile  to  the  home 
government.  This  measure  filled  the  patriotic  party  in  the 
colonies  with  the  most  violent  indignation.  They  denounced  it 
in  every  form  of  language ;  and  although  no  one  was  ever  taken 
to  England  to  be  tried,  it  was  enumerated  in  the  Declaration 
of  Independence  as  one  of  the  causes  of  separation. 

It  was  natural  that  our  people,  who  had  enjoyed  so  much 
liberty  that  they  scarcely  understood  what  a  colony  was,  should 
be  indignant  at  this  suggestion  of  transporting  them  for  trial. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Ministry  wished  to  establish  British 
authority  in  the  so-called  colonies;  the  law  of  Henry  VIII 
was  on  the  statute-book;  it  had  been  used  several  times;  the 
Scotch  rebels  had  been  tried  out  of  the  country  in  which  their 
crimes  were  committed;  so  also,  the  Sussex  smugglers  and  the 
murderers  of  Mr.  Park,  the  governor  of  the  Windward  Islands.0 

The  year  1769  wore  away  with  various  minor  events  which 
increased  the  irritation.  The  non-importation  associations  were 
renewed  and  force  and  intimidation  used  to  compel  merchants 
to  join  them.  The  people  of  Newport  seized  a  revenue  sloop, 
threw  her  armament  overboard,  cut  away  her  mast,  and  burned 
her.  James  Otis,  who  had  been  assailing  the  government  and 
the  customs  commissioners,  was  assaulted  by  one  of  the  com- 
missioners and  badly  wounded.7    A  British  naval  lieutenant  at 


8  "  An  Answer  to  the  Declaration  of  the  American  Congress,"  1776, 
pp.  74-77;  Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  i,  p.  262: 
Stedman,  "  American  War,"  vol.  i,  p.  70. 

T  J.  B.  Bartlett,  "  Destruction  of  the  Gaspee."  p.  7 ;  Works  of  John 
Adams,  vol.  ii,  p.  163;  vol.  x,  p.  204;  "Prior  Documents  of  the  Revolu- 
tion," p.  132;  Wells,  "Life  of  Samuel  Adams,"  vol.  i,  pp.  185,  275,  276; 
Tudor,  "  Life  of  Otis." 

131 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

the  head  of  a  press-gang  was  killed  by  four  sailors  whom  he 
attempted  to  drag  from  the  forepeak  of  a  Massachusetts  mer- 
chant vessel.  The  sailors  were  not  tried  for  murder  because 
the  government  knew,  it  is  said,  that  the  press-gang  acts  of 
Parliament  did  not  extend  to  America. 

But  in  November  the  extraordinary  and  unexpected  news 
was  received  that  the  Ministry,  which  had  become  largely  Tory, 
had  of  their  ovra  accord  decided  to  repeal  the  duties  on  paint, 
paper,  and  glass,  and  leave  only  the  duty  on  tea.  In  the  spring, 
they  had  been  denouncing  the  colonial  rebellion,  preparing  to 
punish  traitors,  and  "bring  America  prostrate  to  their  feet." 
In  the  autumn,  they  had  eaten  their  own  words,  and  in  effect 
complied  with  the  request  of  the  patriots.  The  small  duty  on  tea 
was  left  standing  merely  to  show  that  the  right  to  tax  remained, 
just  as  the  Declaratory  Act  had  been  passed  when  the  Stamp 
Act  was  repealed.  This  duty  on  tea  would  also,  it  was  believed, 
be  a  test  of  the  real  intentions  of  the  colonists,  and  show 
whether  or  not  they  were  bent  on  independence.8 

During  the  following  winter  this  promise  of  repeal  was 
promptly  fulfilled.  An  act  repealing  the  duties  on  paint,  paper, 
and  glass  was  passed,  and  received  the  royal  assent  April  12, 
1770 ;  and  the  Ministry  went  still  farther  in  conciliation,  for  no 
attempt  was  made  to  punish  Massachusetts  and  South  Carolina 
for  refusing  to  furnish  supplies  to  the  regular  troops  stationed 
among  them.  The  maintenance  of  such  troops  by  the  colonists 
was  in  effect  abandoned  unless  the  colonial  legislatures  volun- 
tarily chose  to  maintain  them.  The  patriot  party  was  there- 
fore more  than  ever  encouraged  to  announce  their  new  right 
that  no  troops  should  be  stationed  and  no  fortification  erected 
in  a  colony  in  time  of  peace  except  by  the  colony 's  consent. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  imagine  a  colonial  policy  more  con- 
ciliatory than  the  policy  displayed  by  England  at  this  time ;  and 
it  is  difficult  to  agree  with  those  who  hold  that  it  was  want  of 


8  Ramsay,   "American   Revolution,"   Trenton  edition,    1811,   p.    119 
Ryerson,  "  American  Loyalists,"  vol.  i,  p.  361. 

132 


REASONS  FOR  REPEAL  OF  ACT 

conciliation  that  lost  Great  Britain  her  American  colonies.  She 
lost  her  colonies  simply  because  she  wanted  colonies  and  the 
colonies  wanted  independence.  No  amount  of  graciousness, 
friendliness,  or  kindness  could  make  the  colonial  condition 
acceptable  to  the  patriots  of  1770. 

We  must  remember  that  on  this  occasion  Lord  Hillsborough 
officially  informed  all  the  colonial  governors  that  the  Ministry 
"entertained  no  design  to  propose  or  consent  to  the  laying  of 
any  further  taxes  on  America  for  the  purpose  of  raising  a 
revenue."  This  was  in  strict  compliance  with  the  last  Ameri- 
can argument  and  with  Dickinson's  "Letters  from  a  Farmer," 
that  what  America  objected  to  was  "taxation  for  the  purpose  of 
raising  a  revenue."  The  Ministry  had  abandoned  the  revenue 
and  abandoned  the  compulsory  maintenance  of  the  army.  They 
could  hardly  have  done  more,  unless  they  had  declared  England 
the  colony  and  America  the  mother-country.  The  colonies  were 
put  back  very  nearly  into  the  old  condition  that  prevailed 
before  1763. 

Lord  Hillsborough's  promise  that  no  more  taxes  should  be 
laid  on  the  colonies  was  faithfully  kept.  The  British  Parlia- 
ment never  passed  another  taxing  act  for  America,  and  when, 
five  lears  later,  actual  warfare  began,  no  one  could  say  that  the 
promise  had  been  broken,  for  there  had  not  been  even  an 
attempt  to  pass  such  an  act.9 

The  reason  for  this  sudden  change  on  the  part  of  the  Tory 
Ministry  was  simply  that  they  had  found  that  the  Paint,  Paper, 
and  Glass  Act  was  a  failure.  The  colonists  were  too  strong  for 
the  mother-country.  Their  non-importation  associations  were 
successful  and  England's  trade  with  her  colonies  was  steadiljr 
decreasing.    She  could  enforce  neither  the  old  trade  and  naviga- 


•  When  the  East  India  tea-ships  were  sent  to  Boston  and  other  ports 
five  years  afterwards,  it  was  said  by  many  to  be  a  violation  of  Lord 
Hillsborough's  promise  that  no  more  taxes  should  be  laid  on  the  colonies. 
But  the  tea  tax  was  in  existence  when  he  made  his  promise,  which  was 
that  the  Ministry  would  not  ask  Parliament  to  lay  any  further  taxes  on 
America. 

133 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

tion  laws  nor  the  Paint,  Paper,  and  Glass  Act.  The  colonists 
were  now  buying  their  paint,  paper,  and  glass  in  continental 
Europe,  and  the  trade  of  England's  colonies  was  being  trans- 
ferred to  foreign  nations.  English  merchants  were  complain- 
ing and  had  petitioned  Parliament  to  repeal  the  Paint,  Paper, 
and  Glass  Act,  which,  they  said,  brought  no  revenue  to  the 
government  and  was  ruining  English  business  in  America.10 

The  Ministry  therefore,  after  much  hesitation  and  debate, 
decided  to  try  again  the  conciliation  plan.  They  may  have  been 
influenced  in  this  by  the  fear  of  Prance  assisting  the  American 
patriots,  who  had  already  threatened  to  appeal  to  her,  and 
the  Boston  Gazette  of  the  20th  of  September,  1768,  had  openly 
urged  such  an  appeal.11 

Uneasiness  as  to  what  France  would  do  was  no  doubt  an 
underlying  influence  of  all  debates  in  Parliament  and  consulta- 
tions of  ministers  at  this  period.  England  must  avoid  if  possi- 
ble the  forcing  of  the  dispute  to  that  extremity.  But  whatever 
may  have  been  the  reasons  and  motives  of  the  Ministry,  the 
important  fact  remains  that  in  this  year  1770  Great  Britain 
Avithdrew  the  two  great  colonial  grievances — taxation  for 
revenue,  and  compulsory  support  of  a  standing  army ;  and  this 
event  should  not  be  obscured  or  placed  in  the  background  of 
historical  narratives  merely  because  it  does  not  show  sufficient 
tyranny  or  oppression  on  the  part  of  England. 

One  of  the  most  serious  results  of  this  withdrawal  and  repeal 
was  that  among  the  patriot  party  England's  prestige  was  gone 
forever.  Keen  observers  had  believed  that  her  sovereignty  was 
irretrievably  lost  when  she  repealed  the  Stamp  Act  at  the  dicta- 
tion of  that  party ;  and  now  she  had  surely  given  the  finishing 
stroke  to  her  dominion.12 

England,  of  course,  lost  very  little  prestige  among  the  sub- 
missive people  called  loyalists,  people  un- Americanized,  inclin- 


10  Stedman,  "  American  War,"  vol.  i,  pp.  72,  73. 

11  Holmes,  "  Annals,"  vol.  ii,  pp.  177,  178. 

""Letters  of  James  Murray,  Loyalist,"  p.  170;  Stedman,  "American 
War,"  vol.  i,  pp.  77-79. 

134 


EFFECT  OF  THE  REPEAL 

ing  strongly  towards  England  by  taste  and  associations,  and  not 
inspired  with  the  passion  for  ownership  of  the  country  in  which 
they  lived.  These  people  accepted  the  repealing  act  in  the  spirit 
in  which  it  was  offered,  as  redressing  grievances  and  tending  to 
keep  the  colonies  within  the  empire. 

So  very  conciliatory  was  the  repealing  act  and  the  promise 
of  the  Ministry,  that  it  had  a  quieting  effect  on  all  parties  and 
put  an  end  to  excitement  and  turmoil  for  three  or  four  years. 
The  moderates  in  the  patriot  party  were  willing  to  let  well 
enough  alone,  and  they  were  not  disturbed  by  the  small  duty  on 
the  one  item  of  tea  any  more  than  by  the  Declaratory  Act.  In 
truth,  the  extreme  radicals  of  the  Samuel  Adams  type  had 
nothing  with  which  to  arouse  the  moderates. 

In  New  York,  in  the  autumn  of  1769,  the  assembly  under  the 
leadership  of  James  DeLancey  seems  to  have  gone  completely 
into  the  control  of  the  loyalists,  and  they  promptly  passed  an 
act  supplying  the  British  troops  with  all  that  they  required. 
The  extreme  patriots  under  the  leadership  of  Isaac  Sears,  John 
Lamb,  Alexander  McDougall,  and  John  Morin  Scott,  denounced 
this  grant  of  supplies  as  a  contemptible  betrayal  of  the  common 
cause  of  liberty.  The  New  York  Assembly,  they  said,  should 
have  stood  by  the  assemblies  of  South  Carolina  and  Massachu- 
setts, which  refused  to  grant  the  supplies.13 

An  inflammatory  printed  hand-bill  assailing  the  New  York 
Assembly  was  soon  circulated.  The  assembly  voted  it  libellous, 
and,  having  discovered  through  the  printer  that  Alexander 
McDougall  was  the  author  of  it,  they  had  him  arrested,  and  he 
was  imprisoned  for  six  months.  He  afterwards  became  a 
prominent  patriot  leader  and  officer  in  the  Revolution,  to  the 
great  disgust  of  many  respectable  loyalists  who  remembered 
him  as  a  little  boy  helping  his  father  to  carry  milk  about  the 
streets  of  New  York.  His  imprisonment  began  his  career  of 
popularity  among  the  patriots.  He  held  receptions  in  prison 
every  afternoon,  and  was  overrun  with  visitors;  all  the  Sons 


13 "  Memorial  History  of  New  York,"  vol.  ii,  p.  401. 

135 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

of  Liberty  and  their  wives  and  daughters  vying  with  each  other 
in  showing  him  attentions.  As  a  martyr  to  the  cause  of  liberty 
he  was  compared  to  Wilkes  in  London,  and  the  number  forty- 
five  was  applied  to  him  on  every  possible  occasion.14  • 

"  Yesterday  the  forty-fifth  day  of  the  year,  forty-five  gentlemen, 
real  enemies  to  internal  taxation,  by,  or  in  obedience  to,  external  author- 
ity, and  cordial  friends  to  Captain  McDougall  and  the  glorious  cause  of 
American  liberty,  went  in  decent  procession  to  the  New  Gaol;  and 
dined  with  him  on  forty-five  pounds  of  beefsteaks,  cut  from  a  bullock 
forty-five  months  old." — Hudson,  "  Journalism  in  America,"  p.  112. 


14 "  Memorial  History,"  supra;  Gordon,  "  American  Revolution," 
edition  1788,  vol.  i,  p.  303 ;  Jones,  "  New  York  in  the  Revolution,"  vol.  i, 
pp.  24-29,  431 ;  McDougall's  hand-bill  was  pasted  on  walls  and  fences  by  a 
device  which  is  said  to  have  been  used  in  England  in  the  time  of  the 
Pretender.  A  little  boy  was  concealed  in  a  box  carried  by  a  man  who 
would  place  the  box  against  a  wall  and  sit  down  on  it  to  rest.  The  boy 
would  then  draw  back  a  slide,  paste  the  hand-bill  on  the  wall,  shut 
himself  in  again,  and  the  man  would  carry  the  box  to  another  resting- 
place.     (Jones,  supra,  pp.  426-436.) 


UNIVER 

OF 


XI. 

THE  FIRST  BLOODSHED  OF  THE  REVOLUTION 
IN  NEW  YORK  AND  BOSTON 

At  this  time  there  were  British  troops  in  New  York,  where 
in  fact  they  had  always  been,  for  it  had  been  the  English  mili- 
tary headquarters  in  America,  and  there  were  also  in  Boston 
the  two  regiments  recently  placed  there,  with  probably  a  few 
small  scattered  commands  in  other  parts  of  the  country. 
Towards  all  these  troops  the  patriot  part  of  the  population  now 
displayed  the  greatest  unfriendliness.  Conflicts  and  quarrels 
were  frequent ;  and  nothing  showed  more  clearly  that  the  con- 
ciliatory policy  of  the  Ministry  would  have  no  real  effect.  The 
patriot  party  was  not  satisfied  with  mere  repeals  of  obnoxious 
statutes,  and  would  never  cease  its  endeavors  until  the  last 
vestige  and  symbol  of  British  authority  was  driven  from  the 
continent. 

In  New  York  the  troops  had  cut  down  the  liberty-pole  every 
time  the  patriots  replaced  it,  and  at  last  in  January,  1770,  they 
not  only  cut  it  down  but  sawed  it  up  and  piled  the  pieces  in 
front  of  the  headquarters  of  the  Sons  of  Liberty.  An  indignation 
meeting  held  by  the  patriots  and  insulting  replies  to  the  soldiers 
precipitated  a  riot  and  fight  at  Gordon  Hill  on  Johns  Street, 
the  patriots  using  clubs  and  staves  against  the  soldiers '  cutlasses 
and  bayonets.  The  officers  succeeded  in  getting  the  soldiers 
back  to  their  quarters ;  but  several  citizens  were  badly  wounded 
and  one  killed  with  a  bayonet.  Michael  Smith,  a  young  appren- 
tice, fighting  with  a  chair-leg,  compelled  the  surrender  of  a 
grenadier,  and  took  from  him  his  musket,  which  Smith  after- 
wards carried  on  the  patriot  side  throughout  the  war,  the  first 
trophy,  it  is  said,  of  the  Revolution.1 


1 "  Memorial  History  of  New  York,"  vol.  ii,  p.  403 ;   the  Historical 
Magazine,  1860,  vol.  iv,  p.  233. 

137 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

New  York  historians  have  inclined  to  the  opinion  that  this 
conflict  should  be  regarded  as  the  first  battle  of  the  Revolution ; 
but  two  months  afterwards  there  was  a  riot  with  the  troops  in 
Boston  which  attracted  such  widespread  attention  tliat  it  cast 
the  New  York  disturbance  entirely  into  the  shade. 

The  Ministry  had  withdrawn  a  great  deal  of  their  reorgani- 
zation plans;  but  they  were  still  going  through  the  form  of 
trying  to  enforce  the  navigation  laws,  and  troops  were  neces- 
sary in  Boston  to  protect  the  customs  officers.  But  to  Boston 
patriots  the  presence  of  troops  to  enforce  laws  which  Bostonians 
had  disobeyed  for  a  hundred  years,  and  grown  rich  through 
disobedience,  was  unbearable.  They  regarded  the  troops  as  a 
foreign  soldiery,  and,  inspired  no  doubt  by  what  they  had  heard 
of  the  disturbances  in  New  York,  they  were  gradually  working 
themselves  into  a  mood  for  a  pitched  battle.  Men  and  boys  would 
call  the  soldiers  ''bloody  backs,"  or  "scoundrels  in  red;"  and 
they  would  shout  at  them  ' '  Lobsters  for  sale. ' '  The  soldiers  in 
their  turn  had  their  insults  for  the  Yankees,  mohairs,  or  boogers, 
as  they  called  the  colonists,  and  every  little  circumstance  of 
dispute  was  magnified. 

On  Friday,  the  second  of  March,  1770,  a  soldier  going  to 
John  Gray 's  rope-walk  was  asked  by  one  of  the  hands, ' '  Soldier, 
will  you  work?"  On  his  replying  "Yes,"  he  was  told  to  go 
and  employ  himself  at  a  very  disgusting  occupation.  Angered 
at  this  jest,  he  continued  talking  at  the  windows  of  the  rope- 
walk  until  a  workman  came  out  and  knocked  him  down.  The 
soldier  then  summoned  his  companions,  who  were  driven  off; 
and  a  larger  number,  coming  to  fight  with  clubs  and  cutlasses, 
were  also  driven  off. 

During  the  next  two  days,  Saturday  and  Sunday,  there  was 
talk  all  over  the  town  by  both  sides  that  blood  would  flow  for 
the  rope- walk  affair,  and  on  the  night  of  Monday,  the  5th  of 
March,  there  was  much  disturbance  in  the  streets;  the  soldiers 
and  the  people  replying  to  each  other  in  language  extremely 
abusive;  and  many  of  the  people  had  armed  themselves  with 
clubs.  Several  parties  of  soldiers  appear  to  have  sallied  out 
from  their  barracks  and  passed  through  the  streets  cursing  and 

138 


THE  BOSTON  MASSACRE 

threatening  the  people,  striking  at  them  with  clubs,  cutlasses, 
and  bayonets  and  knocking  down  and  injuring  one  or  two 
citizens.  At  a  few  minutes  after  nine  o'clock  the  church  bells 
were  rung  as  if  for  fire;  but  there  was  no  fire;  and  the  bells 
may  have  been  rung  to  bring  people  out  into  the  streets  or  as  a 
signal  for  attacking  the  soldiers. 

The  sentinel  before  the  custom-house  knocked  down  a  boy 
for  upbraiding  an  officer  for  not  paying  his  barber 's  bill ;  and 
soon  afterwards  a  small  crowd  of  boys  and  young  men  pressed 
upon  the  sentinel,  snow-balling  him,  cursing  him,  and  calling 
him  a  ' '  lobster ' '  and  a  ' '  rascal. ' '  He  retreated  up  the  custom- 
house steps,  loaded  his  gun,  and  called  for  the  main  guard  to 
come  and  assist  him. 

Within  a  few  moments  Captain  Preston,  with  eight  men, 
arrived  and  formed  a  small  semicircle  with  loaded  guns  and 
fixed  bayonets  at  the  sentry-box.  Some  of  the  crowd  now 
appear  to  have  moved  off,  leaving  not  more  than  seventy-five 
or  a  hundred  pressing  up  close  to  the  soldiers,  who  kept  moving 
their  extended  guns  from  side  to  side  and  ordering  the  people 
to  stand  back.  Some  witnesses  testified  that  the  crowd  did 
nothing  to  the  soldiers  but  shout  at  them  and  dare  them  to  fire : 
"Fire,  fire,  damn  you;  fire,  you  lobsters;  you  dare  not  fire!" 
Others  swore  that  snowballs  and  ice  were  thrown ;  others  that 
the  guns  of  the  soldiers  were  struck  with  sticks ;  others  that  one 
of  the  soldiers  named  Montgomery  was  struck  with  a  stick  or 
piece  of  ice,  and  immediately  shot  one  of  the  crowd,  Crispus 
Attucks,  who  was  half  Indian,  half  negro.  Two  witnesses  testi- 
fied that  the  blow  which  struck  Montgomery  knocked  him  down 
and  knocked  his  gun  out  of  his  hand,  and  that  he  had  to  recover 
his  gun  before  he  shot  Attucks.  All  the  witnesses,  however, 
agreed  that  immediately  after  the  first  shot  the  other  soldiers 
began  firing,  killing  two  more  citizens  and  wounding  eight,  of 
whom  two  afterwards  died  of  their  wounds.2 


2 "  The  trial  of  the  British  Soldiers  of  the  Twenty-ninth  Regiment 
of  Foot  for  Murder,"  etc.,  Boston,  1807;  "A  Short  Narrative  of  the 
Horrid  Massacre  in  Boston,"  Boston,  1770;  "Additional  Observations  to 
a  Short  Narrative,"  etc.,  Boston,  1770;  Kidder's  "History  of  the  Boston 

139 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

There  was  at  once  great  excitement  in  the  town.  The  bells 
rang  again,  the  drums  beat,  the  troops  were  all  ordered  under 
arms,  and  several  companies  of  them  were  formed  round  the 
town-house  in  the  half -kneeling  position  for  street  firing. 

The  cry  was  spread,  "The  soldiers  are  rising!''  and  the 
people  began  to  arm  themselves  and  pour  into  the  streets. 
Many  ran  to  the  house  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,  who  had  lately 
become  governor  in  place  of  Bernard,  and  besought  him  to  come 
to  King  Street  or  the  town  would  be  all  in  blood.  He  immedi- 
ately started,  forcing  his  way  through  masses  of  furious  people, 
clamoring  for  firearms,  and  he  bore  himself  with  a  dignity  and 
self-possession  which  belie  the  charges  of  cowardice  and  general 
malignity  of  character  that  have  been  thought  necessary  in 
order  to  uphold  the  patriot  side. 

The  patriot  cause  needs  no  such  unworthy  assistance,  and 
can  easily  stand  on  its  own  merits.  Hutchinson  quieted  the 
people;  he  assured  them  that  the  law  should  have  its  course; 
he  persuaded  the  officers  to  order  the  troops  back  to  the  bar- 
racks ;  he  held  a  court  of  inquiry  on  the  spot ;  and  within  three 
hours  Captain  Preston  and  the  guard  which  had  fired  were 
arrested  and  turned  over  to  the  civil  authorities  to  be  tried  for 
murder. 

The  next  day  a  town  meeting  was  called.  A  committee,  of 
which  Samuel  Adams  was  chairman,  urged  Governor  Hutchin- 
son to  remove  all  the  soldiers  from  the  town  to  preserve  the 
peace  and  prevent  an  attack  by  the  people,  who  would  soon  be 
swarming  in  from  the  country.  After  some  hesitation  Hutchin- 
son agreed  that  the  soldiers  should  be  sent  down  the  harbor  to 
the  castle.  This  was,  from  one  point  of  view,  a  wise  and 
creditable  expedient  to  prevent  violence.  But  we  must  also 
remember  that  the  troops  had  been  placed  in  Boston  to  protect 


Massacre,"  contains  a  reprint  of  the  foregoing.  See  also  Niles,  "  Prin- 
ciples, and  Acts  of  the  Revolution,"  edition  1876,  p.  15;  Boston  Gazette, 
March,  1770;  Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  i,  pp. 
282,  298 ;  John  Adams,  Works,  vol.  ii,  p.  229 ;  Ramsay,  "  Colonial  His- 
tory," vol.  i,  pp.  364,  365;  Holmes,  "Annals,"  vol  ii,  pp.  166,  167; 
Forteecue,  "  History  of  the  British  Army,"  vol.  iii,  pp.  35-45. 

140 


EFFECT  OF  THE  MASSACRE 

the  commissioners  of  customs  and  other  British  officials  from 
mob  violence,  and  that  the  people  had  been  demanding  the 
removal  of  the  troops  and  boasting  that  they  would  find  means 
to  force  them  out.  Their  removal  was,  therefore,  an  abandon- 
ment of  the  commissioners  and  a  yielding  to  the  demands  of 
the  patriots  with  the  redoubtable  Samuel  Adams  at  their  head. 

As  soon  as  the  troops  were  removed  the  commissioners  of 
customs,  considering  themselves  no  longer  safe,  abandoned  their 
official  duties.  All  of  them  but  one  left  the  town,  seeking 
safety  in  different  parts  of  the  country,  and  the  navigation 
and  trade  laws  were  more  of  a  dead  letter  than  ever.  Before 
long  one  of  them  returned  to  England,  apparently  to  inform 
the  home  government  of  the  state  of  affairs  and  protest  against 
the  removal  of  the  troops.  The  patriots  believed  that  affidavits 
and  depositions  describing  the  street  fight  from  the  loyalist 
point  of  view  had  been  taken  in  secret  and  sent  with  this  com- 
missioner, who  would  tell  the  home  government  that  the  custom- 
house had  been  attacked  with  intent  to  seize  the  revenue  chest, 
and  that  the  province  was  in  a  state  of  rebellion. 

The  patriots  in  a  town  meeting  held  on  the  12th  of  March 
had  appointed  a  committee  to  prepare  their  own  account  of  the 
event.  This  committee  reported  on  the  19th,  and  their  report, 
entitled  "A  Short  Narrative  of  the  Horrid  Massacre  in  Bos- 
ton," was  adopted  and  ordered  to  be  sent  to  important  persons 
in  England.  Annexed  to  this  narrative  were  the  depositions  of 
nearly  a  hundred  witnesses,  and  if  their  statements  could  be 
believed  the  soldiers  had  had  no  provocation  to  fire. 

To  the  "Short  Narrative"  were  afterwards  added  '"Addi- 
tional Observations,"  complaining  that  the  commissioners  had 
been  in  no  danger,  that  they  need  not  have  abandoned  their 
posts,  and  that  they  had  done  so  for  the  express  purpose  of 
making  it  appear  that  the  province  was  riotous  and  rebellious, 
so  that  the  home  government  would  send  out  more  troops.  The 
soldiers,  it  was  argued,  had  behaved  in  "so  outrageous  a 
manner"  that  they  had  "ceased  to  be  the  king's  troops,"  they 
had  ' '  become  traitors ' '  and  might  ' '  be  resisted  and  expelled. ' ' 

Captain  Preston  and  his  soldiers  were  tried  in  the  following 

141 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

November  and  ably  defended  by  two  of  the  patriot  leaders, 
John  Adams  and  Josiah  Quincy.  The  greatest  pains  were  taken 
by  all  the  patriots  to  give  these  soldiers  a  fair  trial.  A  town 
meeting  voted  that  in  order  not  to  bias  the  minds  of  the  jury 
the  printed  copies  of  the  ' '  Short  Narrative ' '  and  accompanying 
depositions  should  be  sent  only  to  England  and  not  allowed  to 
circulate  in  Boston. 

The  evidence  taken  at  the  trial  differed  considerably  from 
the  evidence  annexed  to  the  "Short  Narrative"  and  showed 
that  the  soldiers  had  received  not  a  little  provocation  before 
they  fired.  Whether  Captain  Preston  had  given  the  order  to 
fire  was  difficult  to  determine,  because  the  crowd  had  been  all 
the  time  shouting,  "Fire,  fire,  if  you  dare!"  and  witnesses 
differed  as  to  whether  the  order  came  from  Preston.  He  was, 
however,  acquitted  of  all  guilt  in  this  respect,  and  to  the  end  of 
his  life  insisted  that  he  had  not  given  the  order.  Two  of  his 
men — Montgomery,  who  was  seen  to  kill  Attucks,  and  Killroy, 
who  was  seen  to  shoot  a  citizen  named  Gray — were  brought  in 
guilty  of  manslaughter,  burnt  on  the  hand  in  open  court,  and 
discharged.  The  remaining  soldiers  had  fired  and  people  had 
been  killed  and  wounded ;  but  as  no  witnesses  could  name  any 
individual  who  had  been  killed  by  a  particular  soldier,  the 
remaining  soldiers  were  given  the  benefit  of  the  doubt  and  all 
six  of  them  acquitted. 

The  general  opinion  among  leading  patriots,  and  among  the 
early  commentators  on  the  Revolution,  seems  to  have  been  that 
the  soldiers  had  received  a  great  deal  of  provocation  and  were 
not  seriously  to  blame  for  firing ;  and  apparently  the  court  and 
jury  were  somewhat  inclined  to  this  view.3  But  the  masses  of 
the  patriot  party  would  not  accept  this  calm  judicial  conclusion. 
Filled  with  hatred  for  the  British  design  of  changing  the  con- 
dition of  the  colonies,  they  assigned  the  worst  motives  for  the 


'Among  modern  historians  Bancroft,  in  the  last  edition  of  his 
"  History  of  the  United  States,"  describes  the  firing  as  an  unprovoked 
and  murderous  assault  on  peaceful  citizens  by  a  debased  soldiery. 
Readers  who  are  curious  about  the  question  are  recommended  to  read 
all  the  evidence  taken  at  the  trial  and  judge  for  themselves. 

142 


FIFTH  OF  MARCH  CELEBRATION 

conduct  of  the  soldiers,  and  insisted  on  regarding  them  as  the 
cruel  and  bloody  agents  of  the  Parliament  and  Ministry  who 
wished  to  restrict  the  liberty  of  Americans. 

The  patriots  of  Massachusetts  never  wearied  of  using  the 
events  of  the  5th  of  March  to  arouse  the  most  passionate  feel- 
ings. They  would  not  make  the  mistake  of  the  New  York 
patriots  and  suffer  their  conflict  to  pass  into  oblivion.  They 
called  it  the  "Boston  Massacre,"  and  it  has  passed  into  history 
under  that  name.  Paul  Revere  prepared  a  colored  engraving  of 
the  scene,  calling  it  the  "Bloody  Massacre."  They  exaggerated 
it  into  a  ferocious  and  unprovoked  assault  by  brutal  soldiers 
upon  a  defenceless  people,  and  the  eagerness  with  which  this 
exaggeration  was  encouraged  showed  whither  events  were 
tending. 

The  next  year,  1771,  the  5th  of  March  was  kept  as  the  anni- 
versary of  the  massacre,  the  church  bells  were  tolled,  and  Paul 
Revere  took  an  important  part. 

"  In  the  Evening  there  was  a  very  striking  Exhibition  at  the 
Dwelling-House  of  Mr.  Paul  Revere,  fronting  the  Old  North  Square. — At 
one  of  the  Chamber-Windows  was  the  appearance  of  the  Ghost  of  the 
unfortunate  young  Seider,  with  one  of  his  Fingers  in  the  Wound, 
endeavoring  to  stop  the  Blood  issuing  therefrom;  near  him  his  Friends 
were  weeping:  And  at  a  small  distance,  a  monumental  Obelisk,  with 
his  Bust  in  Front: — On  the  Front  of  the  Pedestal,  were  the  Names  of 
those  killed  on  the  Fifth  of  March:    Underneath  the  following  Lines, 

"  Seider's  pale  Ghost  fresh  bleeding  stands, 
And  Vengeance  for  his  Death  demands. 

"In  the  next  Window  were  represented  the  Soldiers  drawn  up, 
firing  at  the  People  assembled  before  them — the  Dead  on  the  Ground — 
and  the  Wounded  falling,  with  the  Blood  running  in  Streams  from  their 
Wounds;  Over  which  was  wrote  FOUL  PLAY.  In  the  third  Window 
was  the  Figure  of  a  Woman,  representing  AMERICA,  sitting  on  the 
Stump  of  a  Tree,  with  a  Staff  in  her  Hand,  and  the  Cap  of  Liberty  on 
the  Top  thereof, — one  Foot  on  the  Head  of  a  Grenadier  lying  prostrate 
grasping  a  Serpent — Her  Finger  pointing  to  the  Tragedy. 

"  The  whole  was  so  well  executed,  that  the  Spectators  which 
amounted  to  many  Thousands,  were  struck  with  solemn  Silence,  and 
their  Countenances  covered  with  a  melancholy  Gloom.     At  nine  o'clock 

143 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

the  Bells  tolled  a  doleful  Peal,  until  Ten;  when  the  Exhibition  was 
withdrawn,  and  the  People  retired  to  their  respective  Habitations." — 
Boston  Gazette,  March,  1771,  and  Hudson's  "  Journalism  in  America," 
p.  106.     „ 

Every  year  during  the  Revolution  the  anniversary  of  the 
5th  of  March  was  solemnly  kept  in  Boston  as  a  day  sacred  to 
the  cause  of  liberty,  and  an  oration  was  delivered  by  some 
prominent  citizen.  These  orations,  printed  and  preserved  with 
great  veneration  by  the  people  of  Boston,  assailed  standing 
armies  by  every  argument  that  could  be  drawn  from  the  whole 
history  of  the  world,  and  repeated  all  the  patriot  arguments 
against  alien  control  until  they  were  worn  threadbare.4 

Governor  Hutchinson  and  Colonel  Dalrymple  had  certainly 
carried  out  the  conciliatory  policy  of  the  Ministry  in  surrender- 
ing the  guard  to  be  tried  by  a  jury  of  colonists  and  in  removing 
the  troops  from  Boston,  so  that  the  "massacre"  could  not  at 
that  time  be  worked  up  into  rebellion.  The  removal  of  the 
troops,  and  the  retirement  of  the  commissioners  of  customs  from 
their  duties,  quieted  and  satisfied  the  Bostonians.  They  had 
accomplished  their  purpose ;  the  hateful  commissioners  and  the 
hateful  troops  had  been  removed ;  and  some  months  afterwards 
the  assembly  ceased  to  hold  its  sessions  in  Cambridge  and 
returned  to  Boston,  which  for  the  next  three  years  was  a  very 
peaceful  town,  because  British  sovereignty  was  practically 
extinct  in  Massachusetts. 

No  one  could  say  that  Great  Britain  had  acted  harshly.  On 
the  contrary,  there  had  been  so  much  yielding  that  the  two 
regiments  that  had  been  sent  out  of  Boston  were  ridiculed  in 
England  as  the  ' '  Sam  Adams  regiments. ' ' 


4  After  1783  the  ceremonies  and  oration  of  the  5th  of  March  were 
transferred  to  the  Fourth  of  July.  John  Adams,  writing  in  his  old  age 
in  1816,  said  that  he  had  heard  or  read  forty-five  of  these  5th  of  March 
and  Fourth  of  July  orations,  and  was  tired  of  having  "  young  gentlemen 
of  genius  describing  scenes  they  never  saw  and  descanting  on  feelings 
they  never  felt  and  which  great  pains  had  been  taken  that  they  should 
not  feel."  Niles,  "  Principles  and  Acts  of  the  Revolution,"  edition 
1876,  pp.  17,  490;  John  Adams,  Works,  vol.  v,  p.  203. 

144 


XII. 

CONTINUED  MILDNESS  OF  BRITISH  MEASURES 

With  the  Stamp  Act  and  the  Paint,  Paper,  and  Glass  Act 
repealed,  the  British  troops  removed  from  Boston  to  harmless 
seclusion  down  the  harbor,  and  the  navigation  and  trade  laws  a 
dead  letter,  the  colonies  were  in  about  the  same  semi-independ- 
ent condition  they  had  formerly  enjoyed.  The  reorganization 
plans  of  the  mother-country  had  completely  failed ;  and  for  the 
next  four  years  this  condition  continued,  without  any  very 
serious  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  Ministry  to  change  it.  They 
seemed  to  be  at  a  loss  what  to  do ;  and  they  allowed  everything 
to  drift  as  it  was,  while  several  minor  events  showed  more 
clearly  than  ever  the  tendency  of  the  times. 

In  1771  there  was  a  serious  disturbance  in  North  Carolina 
and  an  armed  conflict  known  as  the  Battle  of  the  Alamance, 
which  has  been  sometimes  incorrectly  called  the  first  battle  of 
the  Revolution ;  and  people  have  wondered  why  it  has  not  been 
given  the  importance  and  had  not  the  effect  of  Lexington  or 
Bunker  Hill.  But  it  was  not  a  battle  of  the  Revolution  at  all, 
and  was  only  indirectly  connected  with  the  Revolutionary 
movement.  It  was  a  mere  local  outbreak  or  insurrection  among 
the  settlers  of  that  part'  of  North  Carolina  lying  immediately 
west  of  Raleigh.  These  people  were  Baptists,  Quakers,  and 
Scotch-Irish  Presbyterians,  with  a  sprinkling  of  Germans  and 
others.  Many  of  them  had  come  down  from  the  frontiers  of 
Pennsylvania;  they  were  out  of  sympathy  with  the  eastern 
part  of  North  Carolina ;  they  bought  most  of  their  supplies  in 
Philadelphia,  to  which  regular  trading  expeditions  were  made ; 
and  they  felt  that  they  were  neglected  and  misunderstood  by 
the  eastern  Carolinians. 

Their  chief  grievance  was  the  collection  of  illegal  fees  for 
recording  deeds  and  land  surveys.  The  clerks  of  court  and  the 
lawyers,  they  said,  charged  excessively,  and  the  sheriffs  col- 
10  145 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

lected  excessive  taxes.  The  officers  who  committed  these  extor- 
tions were  usually  appointed  by  the  governor,  who  lived  at  New 
Berne,  in  the  extreme  eastern  part  of  the  colony,  where  there 
does  not  appear  to  have  been  much,  if  any,  trouble  from  illegal 
fees.  The  governor  admitted  that  "the  sheriffs  had  embezzled 
more  than  one-half  the  public  money  ordered  to  be  collected  by 
them;"  and  in  1770  an  official  report  showed  that  sheriffs  of 
the  province  were  £49,000  in  arrears.  The  governor  had 
attempted  to  check  extortion  by  issuing  proclamations  directing 
all  officials  to  charge  no  more  than  the  fees  allowed  by  law ;  but 
this,  apparently,  had  no  effect.  The  county  governments  were 
in  the  hands  of  official  oligarchies,  "full  fledged  office-holding 
birds  of  prey,"  and  so  firmly  rooted  was  this  system  that  a 
popular  upheaval  and  revolution  seemed  necessary  to  bring  any 
sort  of  redress  to  the  western  settlers.1 

They  undertook  to  have  such  a  revolution ;  holding  indigna- 
tion meetings,  stating  their  grievances,  suggesting  remedies; 
and  they  became  known  as  the  Regulators.  The  rough  element 
among  them  resorted  to  riot  and  violence,  rescued  property 
seized  by  sheriffs,  tied  sheriffs  to  trees  and  beat  them,  and  pre- 
vented the  holding  of  an  election.  Soon  they  proceeded  to  worse 
measures,  and  in  September,  1770,  broke  up  the  court  at  Hills- 
borough and  beat  the  attorneys.  No  court  could  be  held  that 
year  or  the  following  spring;  and  they  indulged  in  the  same 
rough  proceedings  in  Rowan  County.  They  dragged  Edmund 
Fanning  out  in  the  street,  beat  him,  and  destroyed  his  house 
and  furniture.  They  took  possession  of  the  court-room,  held  a 
mock  trial,  scribbled  profane  and  abusive  comments  in  the 
docket,  and  burnt  the  house  and  barn  of  the  judge. 

The  governor  of  the  colony  at  that  time  was  William  Tryon, 
afterwards  famous  in  the  Revolution  as  the  last  colonial  gov- 
ernor of  New  York.  He  was  a  very  capable  man,  and  at  the 
eastern  end  of  North  Carolina  he  had  succeeded  in  surrounding 
himself  with  that  official  magnificence  and  dignity  which  was 


1  Report,  American  Historical  Association,   1894,  pp.   150,   159,   171; 
178,  et  seq. 

146 


SUPPRESSION  OF  REGULATORS 

not  uncommon  in  the  colonies  and  seems  now  in  such  strange 
contrast  with  their  undeveloped  and  half -wilderness  character. 
He  had  sufficient  address  to  persuade  the  assembly  to  vote 
£15,000  for  the  erection  at  New  Berne  of  a  palace,  which  became 
the  governor 's  residence,  and  contained  the  executive  offices  and 
a  hall  for  the  meetings  of  the  assembly.  There  was  a  curious 
implication  of  ownership,  as  well  as  magnificence,  in  having  the 
assembly  conduct  their  business  under  his  eye  in  his  own  house. 
Skilled  artisans  were  brought  from  Philadelphia  to  construct 
the  palace,  which  contained  handsome  chimney-pieces,  Ionic 
statuary,  columns  of  sienna,  and  richly  ornamented  marble 
tablets  with  medallions  of  the  King  and  Queen.  Balls  and 
social  functions  could  be  given  in  this  building  with  great 
effect ;  the  governor  insisted  that  Mrs.  Tryon  should  always  be 
called  her  excellency;  and  all  these  things  were  not  without 
results  in  winning  certain  classes  of  people  to  the  side  of  the 
imperial  government. 

But  all  this  imperial  dignity  did  not  prevent  Tryon 's 
prompt  advance  upon  the  Regulators  and  his  signal  defeat  of 
them  on  a  small  stream  known  as  the  Alamance.  Six  of  the 
ring-leaders  were  hung,  and  a  month  was  spent  in  marching 
through  the  rebellious  counties,  exhibiting  prisoners  in  chains, 
devastating  the  homes  of  rioters,  and  exacting  oaths  of  alle- 
giance to  the  British  crown.  In  all  this  Tryon  was  supported 
and  assisted  by  the  volunteer  militia  of  the  colony,  the  same  men 
who,  a  few  years  before,  had  resisted  the  Stamp  Act  and  pre- 
vented its  enforcement  in  North  Carolina.  They  afterwards 
fought  on  the  patriot  side  against  the  British;  but  in  suppress- 
ing the  Regulators  they  seem  to  have  regarded  themselves  as 
putting  down  mere  rioters. 

It  was  not  in  any  sense  a  contest  between  the  British  and 
the  patriots,  although  some  Revolutionary  histories  describe  it 
as  such,  and  the  monument  erected  on  the  Alamance  recites  that 
the  battle  had  been  fought  "between  the  British  and  the  Regu- 
lators." As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Regulators  were  so  far  from 
being  patriots  that  nearly  all  of  them  became  loyalists.  Their 
grievances,  the  excessive  fees  and  taxes,  as  well  as  their  defeat 

147 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

at  the  Alamance,  they  regarded  as  inflicted  upon  them  by  the 
patriot  party  in  the  province.  Tryon  had  administered  the 
British  oath  of  allegiance  to  6409  of  them.  They  had  sworn 
"  never  to  bear  arms  against  the  king,  but  to  take  up  arms  for 
him  if  called  upon."  This  became  a  great  stumbling-block  to 
many  of  them  when  the  war  began ;  and  no  ingenuity  or  argu- 
ment, even  by  their  own  Presbyterian  ministers,  could  relieve 
their  consciences  from  that  oath.  Loyalists  and  neutrals  were 
in  consequence  very  numerous  in  North  Carolina;  and  the 
patriot  cause  lost  some  able  fighters  when  Tryon  administered 
his  oath  to  over  6000  Regulators. 

It  was  natural,  perhaps,  that  our  histories  should  regard 
the  contest  as  a  struggle  between  patriot  and  British  until 
modern  researches  in  North  Carolina  brought  the  truth  to  light ; 
for  at  the  time  of  the  Battle  of  the  Alamance  an  attempt  was 
made  in  Massachusetts  to  arouse  patriot  feeling  by  describing 
Tryon 's  hanging  of  his  six  prisoners  as  an  act  of  British 
tyranny,  accompanied  by  circumstances  of  deliberate  cruelty 
and  brutality,  and  articles  to  this  effect  appeared  in  the  Massa- 
chusetts Spy.  But  the  colonists  of  eastern  North  Carolina  came 
to  the  rescue  of  their  governor 's  reputation,  and,  in  an  indigna- 
tion meeting,  denounced  the  articles  as  calumnies  and  ordered 
the  offending  number  of  the  Spy  to  be  burned  by  the  hangman.2 

In  June,  1772,  an  event  occurred  in  New  England  which 
revealed  both  sides  of  the  situation,  the  willingness  of  the 
Ministry  to  be  extremely  conciliatory  and  the  willingness  or 
rather  determination  of  the  patriots  to  take  the  government 


2  The  publication  in  recent  years  of  the  Colonial  Records  of  North 
Carolina  has  put  the  Battle  of  the  Alamance  in  a  new  light.  See  Pro- 
fessor Bassett's  article  in  Report  of  American  Historical  Association, 
1894,  pp.  141-212,  and  Haywood's  "  Governor  Tryon  and  His  Adminis- 
tration." Other  sources  of  information  are  described  in  Foote,  "  Sketches 
of  North  Carolina ;  "  Carruthers,  "  Life  of  Dr.  Caldwell ;  "  Husband, 
"  Affairs  of  North  Carolina ;  "  Jones,  "  Defence  of  the  Revolutionary 
History  of  North  Carolina;  "  Martin's  "History  of  North  Carolina;" 
Revolutionary  History  of  North  Carolina  in  Three  Lectures,  by  Hawks, 
Swan  and  Graham. 

148 


AFFAIR  OF  THE  GASPEE 

of  the  country  entirely  into  their  own  hands  and  defy  British 
authority. 

An  eight-gun  British  schooner,  called  the  ' '  Gaspee, ' '  under 
command  of  Lieutenant  Dudingston,  had  for  some  time  been 
very  diligent  in  attempting  to  suppress  smuggling,  which  for 
so  long  a  time  had  been  conducted  with  notorious  success  at 
Newport  and  at  Providence,  in  Rhode  Island.  Dudingston 
was  very  much  in  earnest,  searched  all  vessels  systematically, 
and  examined  even  the  small  market-boats.  These  thorough- 
going methods  were  extremely  exasperating  to  people  who,  for 
a  hundred  years,  had  conducted  their  trade  pretty  much  as  they 
pleased,  without  any  interference  and  were  totally  unaccus- 
tomed to  the  exercise  of  rigorous  British  authority  within  their 
boundaries.  The  Rhode  Island  colonists  elected  their  governor, 
and  the  governor,  though  expressing  the  usual  formal  loyalty 
to  the  crown,  could  not  be  relied  upon  to  assist  either  naval 
officers  or  customs  officers  in  changing  a  condition  of  affairs 
which  had  given  wealth  and  liberty  to  his  people. 

By  the  advice  of  the  chief  justice  of  the  colony,  the  governor 
undertook  to  show  that  Dudingston  was  little  less  than  a  pirate, 
because  he  was  acting  ' '  without  applying  to  the  governor,  show- 
ing his  warrant  and  being  sworn  to  a  due  exercise  of  his  office. ' ' 
The  governor  conducted  an  acrimonious  correspondence  not 
only  with  Dudingston,  but  with  the  admiral  of  the  coast,  under 
whom  Dudingston  acted,  and  admiral  and  governor  mutually 
accused  each  other  of  insolence.  The  governor,  the  admiral 
said,  must  not  interfere  with  naval  officers,  and  must  not 
attempt  to  send  his  sheriffs  on  board  British  war- vessels,  and 
had  no  authority  to  demand  a  sight  of  an  admiral 's  instructions 
to  his  officers.  To  which  the  governor  replied,  that  he  would 
send  his  sheriffs  wherever  he  pleased  within  the  limits  of  Rhode 
Island,  and  that  he  was  not  in  the  habit  of  receiving  "instruc- 
tions for  the  administration  of  his  government  from  the  king's 
admiral  stationed  in  America." 

Rhode  Island  was  evidently  a  colony  only  in  name.  Her 
people  denounced  Dudingston  and  his  crew  as  pirates  and  sons 
of  Belial.     The  best  citizens,   merchants,   vessel-owners,   and 

149 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

captains  appear  to  have  regarded  the  lieutenant  and  his 
schooner  as  no  more  than  the  troublesome  representatives  of 
some  foreign  nation;  and  they  proceeded  to  dispose  of  them 
by  the  violence  that  was  suited  to  such  intruders. 

On  the  9th  of  June,  1772,  their  opportunity  occurred. 
Dudingston  had  sailed  that  day  up  Narragansett  Bay  to  meet 
some  sailors  who  were  to  come  overland  from  Boston  to  Provi- 
dence ;  but  according  to  the  patriot  account,  he  was  pursuing  a 
suspected  vessel.  When  within  seven  miles  of  Providence  his 
schooner  grounded  on  Namquit  Point,  and  when  the  news  of 
this  accident  reached  Providence,  Mr.  John  Brown,  one  of  the 
most  prominent  merchants  of  the  town,  instructed  one  of  his 
captains  to  have  eight  long-boats  with  muffled  oars  collected  at 
Turner 's  wharf. 

Soon  after  sunset  a  man  went  openly  through  the  streets 
beating  a  drum  and  informing  the  people  that  the  "Gaspee" 
was  aground  on  Namquit  Point,  would  not  float  until  three 
o'clock  the  next  morning,  and  those  who  wished  to  destroy  her 
should  meet  at  Mr.  John  Sabin's  tavern.  A  considerable  num- 
ber of  the  most  respectable  citizens,  merchants,  and  captains 
assembled  at  Sabin's,  where  they  moulded  bullets  in  the  kitchen, 
loaded  their  guns,  and  about  midnight,  taking  a  surgeon  with 
them,  rowed  down  upon  the  ' '  Gaspee, ' '  approaching  her  on  the 
bows  so  that  she  could  not  use  her  guns. 

It  is  probable  that  they  intended  to  seize  and  burn  her  with- 
out shedding  blood ;  but  when  Dudingston  hailed  them,  fired  his 
pistols  and  ordered  his  men  to  resist,  he  was  shot  down  with  a 
severe  wound  in  the  groin  and  his  crew  overpowered  and  sent 
ashore.  Dudingston 's  wound  was  dressed  by  the  surgeon;  but 
otherwise  he  was  treated  with  considerable  severity.  All  his 
papers  were  taken,  and  his  clothes  and  private  property  thrown 
overboard.  He  was  put  ashore  on  an  island  almost  naked  and 
left  in  charge  of  some  of  his  men,  who  carried  him  in  a  blanket. 
The  ' '  Gaspee ' '  was  set  on  fire  and  burned  to  the  water 's  edge. 

The  Governor  was,  of  course,  obliged  to  issue  a  proclamation 
offering  a  reward  of  £100  for  the  discovery  of  any  of  the 
persons  concerned  in  this  "atrocious  crime,"  as  he  called  it. 

150 


THE  COMMISSION  OF  INQUIRY 

The  assembly,  when  it  met,  approved  of  all  that  he  had  done 
"to  discover  the  perpetrators  of  that  atrocious  piece  of 
villainy;"  and  the  governor  reported  to  Lord  Hillsborough 
that  "the  conduct  of  those  who  committed  this  outrage  was 
universally  condemned"  by  the  people  of  Rhode  Island.  But, 
although  the  "perpetrators"  were  among  the  most  prominent 
merchants  and  captains  of  Providence,  had  been  openly  sum- 
moned by  beat  of  drum,  had  assembled  at  a  tavern,  had  started 
from  a  public  wharf,  and  the  next  day  one  of  them  had  paraded 
himself  with  Lieutenant  Dudingston's  gold-laced  hat  and 
described  how  he  had  obtained  it,  yet  it  was  impossible  to  obtain 
any  proof  of  their  identity  and  guilt.3 

The  crime  could  be  construed  as  either  piracy  or  high 
treason,  and  might  have  been  treason  even  under  the  modern 
American  definition  of  that  offense.  But  the  Ministry  and  King 
took  no  measures  of  severity  against  this  notorious  defiance  of 
British  authority,  this  deliberately  planned  destruction  of  a 
British  war-vessel.  It  is  true  they  went  through  the  form  of 
appointing  a  commission,  consisting  of  the  governor  of  Rhode 
Island,  the  chief  justices  of  New  York,  New  Jersey,  and  Massa- 
chusetts, together  with  the  judge  of  the  vice  admiralty  court  at 
Boston,  to  inquire  into  the  affair  and  report  to  the  Crown  all 
the  circumstances.  Large  rewards  were  offered  for  the  dis- 
covery of  the  guilty.  The  commissioners  were  to  call  on 
General  Gage  at  New  York  for  any  troops  they  might  need  to 
suppress  riots.  Any  persons  whom  they  should  discover  to  have 
been  concerned  in  burning  the  ' '  Gaspee ' '  were  to  be  arrested  by 
the  civil  magistrates  of  Rhode  Island,  and  delivered  to  the 
admiral  of  the  coast,  to  be  by  him  sent  to  England  for  trial, 
together  with  the  witnesses  against  them  and  also  any  witnesses 
they  might  need  for  their  defence. 

The  commission  might  have  been  made  up  of  persons  sent 
out  from  England ;  but  being  made  up  of  the  governor  of  Rhode 
Island,  elected  by  the  people,  and  of  the  chief  justices  of  neigh- 
boring colonies,  it  was  in  this  respect  fairly  constituted  and  in 


J.  R.  Bartlett,  "  Destruction  of  the  '  Gaspee,'  "  p.  139. 

151 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

line  with  the  conciliatory  policy  which  had  been  adopted.  The 
provision  for  taking  to  England  for  trial  those  who  should  be 
arrested  was,  of  course,  bitterly  assailed  by  the  patriot  news- 
papers, and  the  commission  was  denounced  as  a  star-chamber 
proceeding  and  "a  court  of  inquisition  more  horrid  than  that 
of  $pain." 

The  commissioners  sat  at  Newport  at  various  times  during 
the  following  winter  and  the  spring  of  1773.  It  seems  to  have 
been  intended  that  their  coming  and  purpose  should  remain  a 
secret ;  but  the  governor  of  Rhode  Island,  to  whom  all  the  docu- 
ments were  sent,  felt  bound  to  follow  his  usual  rule  of  disclosing 
to  the  assembly  all  official  papers  from  the  home  government. 
The  purpose  of  the  commission,  therefore,  became  well  known 
in  Rhode  Island  and  all  the  colonies.  The  commissioners  heard 
a  number  of  witnesses,  but  no  evidence  identifying  any  one 
who  had  assisted  in  destroying  the  * '  Gaspee ' '  could  be  obtained 
from  any  inhabitant  of  the  colony,  except  from  a  negro  servant, 
who  said  he  was  with  the  attacking  party  and  vaguely  named 
persons  whom  he  called  Brown  and  Weeks,  without  giving  their 
Christian  names.  He  had  sought  refuge  on  the  British  war-vessel 
''Beaver;"  and  there  was  some  evidence  tending  to  show  that 
any  Rhode  Islander  who  had  had  the  hardihood  to  offer  to 
identify  the  persons  who  burnt  the  "Gaspee"  would  probably 
have  lost  his  life  before  he  reached  the  presence  of  the 
commissioners. 

When  the  commissioners  submitted  all  the  testimony  they 
had  taken  to  the  superior  court  of  Rhode  Island,  the  judges  of 
that  court  reported  that  there  was  no  evidence  on  which  any 
one  could  be  arrested,  and  that  ended  the  investigation.  The 
home  government  took  no  further  steps ;  and  the  Revolutionary 
movement  was  greatly  encouraged,  because  the  patriot  party 
saw  that  they  could  not  only  defy  the  authority  of  the  British 
Government,  but  commit  acts  of  war  and  violence  with 
impunity.4 


4  J.  R.  Bartlett,  "Destruction  of  the  'Gaspee/"  pp.  81,  83;  Gordon, 
"American  Revolution,"  edition  1768,  vol.  i,  p.  312.  In  consequence  of 
the  "  Gaspee  "  affair  Parliament  passed  an  act  making  it  a  capital  offence 

152 


THE  QUESTION  OF  SALARIES 

In  one  respect  all  this  extraordinary  mildness  on  the  part 
of  the  Ministry  may  have  seemed  to  be  accomplishing  the  result 
which  they  expected.  To  a  certain  extent  it  took  the  wind  out 
of  the  patriot  sails.  John  Adams  retired  from  politics  and 
devoted  himself  to  the  practice  of  his  profession.  The  Massa- 
chusetts legislature  had  a  loyalist  majority  in  1771  and  1772, 
and,  to  the  great  disgust  of  Samuel  Adams  and  other  extreme 
patriots,  acknowledged  that  the  governor  or  crown  had  a  right 
to  remove  the  legislature  from  its  usual  place  of  holding 
sessions.  Otis  spoke  in  favor  of  this  right  of  the  governor; 
and  John  Hancock 's  exertions  on  the  patriot  side  were  so  much 
reduced  that  the  loyalists  believed  that  they  had  captured  him.5 

The  Ministry  appear  to  have  thought  it  a  favorable  time  to 
try  to  bring  the  colonies  under  control  by  a  mild  but  clever 
stroke  of  executive  management,  which  would  emancipate  the 
governors  and  judges  from  the  control  of  the  colonial  assemblies 
in  the  matter  of  their  salaries.  The  attempt  to  accomplish  this 
by  parliamentary  legislation  had  failed;  but  the  end  might 
perhaps  be  attained  by  a  mere  executive  order  of  the  Crown; 
and  the  experiment  was  now  tried  on  Massachusetts  in  the  form 
of  a  simple  order  from  the  King  directing  the  salaries  of  the 
governor  and  judges  to  be  paid  by  warrants  drawn  upon  the 
revenue  collected  by  the  commissioners  of  customs. 

It  was,  in  one  sense,  a  confession  of  weakness  on  the  part  of 
the  home  government ;  a  confession  that  they  could  not  govern 
the  colonies  by  parliamentary  legislation;  and  yet,  under  all 
the  circumstances,  it  was  a  hopeful  experiment  and  in  line  with 
more  modern  British  methods,  which  since  our  Revolution  have 
relied  less  on  parliamentary  legislation  in  colonial  matters,  and 
more  on  executive  management.  It  was  certainly  taking  advan- 
tage, in  a  shrewd,  soft  way,  of  the  quiet  and  peace  which  the 
conciliatory  policy  had  produced.    It  seemed  well  calculated  to 


to  destroy  any  of  his  majesty's  docks,  magazines,  ships,  ammunition,  or 
stores,  and  providing  that  any  one  arrested  for  committing  this  crime  in 
the  colonies  could  be  brought  to  England  for  trial. 

5  Wells,  "  Life  of  Samuel  Adams,"  vol.  i,  pp.  393,  397,  437,  358,  472, 
473,  477,  478. 

153 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

avoid  all  the  difficulties  and  failures  that  had  attended  parlia- 
mentary legislation;  it  was  taking  the  colonists  at  their  word 
that  they  were  at  least  loyal  to  the  King  and  preferred  his 
government  to  the  government  of  Parliament. 

But  the  patriots  of  Massachusetts  saw  the  full  meaning  of 
this  new  device  and  offered  a  most  vigorous  resistance.  They 
denounced  it  as  a  sudden  and  outrageous  usurpation  on  the 
part  of  the  Crown,  because  the  salaries  of  the  governor  and 
judges  of  Massachusetts  had  been  paid  by  the  assembly,  under 
the  successive  charters  of  the  colony,  for  nearly  a  hundred  and 
fifty  years,  and  for  the  Crown  to  pay  judicial  salaries  would  be 
a  continual  bribe  and  expose  the  judges  to  a  violation  of  their 
oaths. 

Thomas  Hutchinson,  however,  the  governor  of  Massachu- 
setts, accepted  the  crown  salary  and  refused  to  take  any  salary 
from  the  assembly.  The  Crown  had  increased  the  salaries  of 
the  judges;  and  the  assembly  thereupon  voted  to  all  of  them 
but  the  chief  justice  higher  salaries  for  one  year  than  the  Crown 
offered,  and  demanded,  with  considerable  peremptoriness,  that 
they  receive  these  salaries  and  reject  the  crown  salaries.  They 
yielded  and  accepted  the  assembly 's  salaries. 

The  increase  of  salary  which  the  assembly  voted  to  the  chief 
justice  did  not,  it  appears,  equal  the  increase  the  Crown  offered, 
and  he  rejected  the  assembly's  salary.  He  had  served  seventeen 
years,  he  said,  with  an  inadequate  salary  and  sunk  £2000  in 
the  service.  If  the  assembly  would  reimburse  him  half  his  loss 
he  would  accept  their  salary  and  reject  that  of  the  Crown — if 
the  King  would  allow  him  to  do  so.  A  storm  of  indignation 
was  immediately  raised  against  him  among  the  patriots,  and 
threats  were  made  to  drag  him  from  the  bench  if  he  undertook 
to  hold  court.  His  friends  warned  him  that  his  life  was  in 
danger,  and  the  assembly  sent  him  an  order  forbidding  him 
to  hold  court.  They  drew  up  an  impeachment  of  him  as  an 
enemy  of  his  country,  and  made  the  King  a  defendant  in  the 
impeachment,  for  having  offered  the  judge  a  bribe.  This  im- 
peachment came  up  for  decision  during  the  winter  of  1773-1774, 

154 


CORRESPONDENCE  COMMITTEES 

and  Governor  Hutchinson  disposed  of  it  by  adjourning  the 
assembly.6 

The  plan  of  the  home  government  was  thus  only  partially 
successful  in  Massachusetts,  and  it  also  appears  to  have  met 
with  only  partial  success  in  New  York.  The  Boston  patriots 
worked  hard  against  it;  and  it  was  made  the  occasion  for 
organizing  all  the  patriots  of  Massachusetts  by  means  of  com- 
mittees of  correspondence  established  in  every  town,  with  a 
central  committee  at  Boston. 

This  system  of  committees  was  afterwards  gradually  adopted 
in  all  the  other  rebellious  colonies,  and  by  such  committees  the 
practical  work  of  the  Revolution — promulgation  of  arguments, 
encouragement  of  revolutionary  ideas,  party  discipline,  sup- 
pression or  exile  of  loyalists — and  a  great  deal  of  actual  govern- 
ment of  the  country,  were  carried  on.  There  seems  to  have  been 
an  immediate  encouragement  of  revolutionary  ideas  in  Massa- 
chusetts. We  find  the  Boston  Gazette  of  November  2,  1772, 
threatening  that  "  unless  their  liberties  are  immediately 
restored"  they  will  form  "an  independent  commonwealth." 
The  town  committees  busied  themselves  in  drawing  up  lists  of 
the  acts  of  Parliament  which  England  must  repeal  and  the 
positions  from  which  she  must  recede.  She  must  withdraw 
even  the  right  to  tax;  and  they  went  on  enumerating  every 
objection,  great  and  small,  until  their  lists  were,  in  effect,  a 
complete  denial  of  British  sovereignty.  They  were  ordering  the 
British  Government  off  the  continent. 

As  this  system  of  revolutionary  committees  spread  to  other 
colonies  they  were  called  by  various  names — committees  of 
safety,  committees  of  one  hundred,  or  district  committees — but 
their  purpose  and  methods  were  always  the  same.  They  con- 
stituted an  organization  like  that  of  an  army,  starting  with  a 


8 "  Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.  i,  pp.  138,  140, 
142,  212;  Wells,  "Life  of  Samuel  Adams,"  vol.  i,  pp.  479-493;  J.  R. 
Bartlett,  "Destruction  of  the  '  Gaspee,' "  p.  163;  Gordon,  "American 
Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  i,  pp.  322,  345,  346;  Stedman,  "American 
War,"  vol.  i,  p.  81. 

155 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

few  men  of  character  and  brains,  and  spreading  out,  among 
innumerable  subordinates,  down  to  the  privates  in  the  ranks. 
It  was  a  very  compact  and  perfect  party  organization  or 
"political  engine/'  as  John  Adams  called  it.7 

The  Ministry's  quiet  little  plan  about  the  salaries,  to  be 
drawn  in  such  a  simple  and  natural  way  from  the  revenue 
collected  in  the  custom-houses,  not  only  failed  of  its  purpose, 
but  made  matters  a  great  deal  worse  for  England  by  starting 
the  organization  of  the  committee  system,  which  became  the 
backbone  of  the  Revolution.  Another  little  experiment,  to  see 
if  better  control  of  the  colonies  could  be  gradually  obtained 
without  parliamentary  legislation,  was  also  tried  by  the  Minis- 
try. They  undertook  to  ignore  or  suspend  that  provision  in 
the  Massachusetts  charter  which  provided  that  all  troops,  even 
the  regulars,  should  be  under  the  control  of  the  governor.  It 
seemed  better  to  place  such  troops  under  a  military  officer,  who 
could  more  properly  decide  whether  they  should  be  moved 
here  or  there  as  "Sam  Adams"  or  a  patriot  committee  might 
direct. 

A  great  deal  has  been  written  on  this  alteration  of  the  charter 
of  Massachusetts;  but  it  is  useless  to  debate  the  question  over 
again  at  this  late  day.  To  the  Americans  a  charter  was  a  time- 
honored,  solemn  contract,  which  could  never  be  altered  except 
by  the  consent  of  the  colonists.  To  the  English  the  charters 
were  mere  conveniences  of  colonial  government,  which  had  been 
altered  or  annulled  on  several  occasions  in  the  past  and  must,  of 
necessity,  be  altered  from  time  to  time  in  the  future.  If  you 
are  an  Englishman  and  believe  independence  a  crime  and  that 
the  colonies  should  have  been  saved  from  independence,  you  will 
see  in  the  alteration  of  the  Massachusetts  charter  merely  a  mili- 
tary or  British  necessity.  If  you  are  a  patriot,  and  believe 
independence  and  self-government  to  be  natural  rights,  you  will 
see  in  the  alteration  an  atrocious  crime. 


'Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  i,  pp.  313,  314; 
Report  American  Historical  Association,  1901,  p.  243;  Van  Tyne,  "Loy- 
alists," pp.  63,  90;  John  Adams,  Works,  vol.  ii,  pp.  162,  219;  Winsor, 
"  Handbook  of  the  Revolution,"  p.  20. 

156 


XIII. 

THE  WHATELY  LETTERS  INCREASE  THE  ILL  FEELING 

About  the  same  time  that  the  question  of  the  salaries  was 
causing  irritation  and  encouraging  a  better  organization  of 
the  patriot  party,  another  event  occurred  which  brought  the 
outbreak  of  hostilities  a  step  nearer  by  irritating  both  English- 
men and  colonists,  and  destroying  their  confidence  in  the 
conciliatory  policy. 

In  the  year  1768,  when  the  mob  in  Boston  rescued  the  sloop 
"Liberty,"  which  had  been  seized  for  violating  the  revenue 
laws,  and  when  the  customs  officers  were  mobbed  and  beaten  and 
obliged  to  seek  safety  on  a  British  man-of-war,  several  officials 
of  the  colony,  notably  Hutchinson  and  Oliver,  as  well  as  the 
commissioners  of  customs,  wrote  letters  to  important  persons 
in  England,  suggesting  that  troops  should  be  sent  to  Boston 
and  some  severe  repressive  measures  taken,  which,  they  said, 
were  absolutely  necessary  to  protect  the  lives  of  public  officials, 
restore  order,  and  pacify  the  country.  Many  of  these  letters 
were  addressed  to  Mr.  William  Whately,  a  well-known  Tory 
politician,  and  were  handed  about  in  London  as  part  of  the 
evidence  of  the  condition  of  affairs  in  America. 

Franklin,  who  was  still  in  London  as  the  agent  of  Pennsyl- 
vania, Georgia,  and  Massachusetts,  was  a  strong  advocate  of  the 
conciliatory  policy,  and  wanted  it  carried  still  further.  He 
always  represented  the  colonies  as  most  loyal  and  loving  and 
without  any  desire  for  absolute  independence;  by  which  of 
course  he  meant  that  they  were  loyal  to  the  King  and  willing  to 
live  under  his  headship  if  they  could  be  entirely  independent 
of  Parliament.  He  argued  that  it  was  a  mistake  to  send  troops 
to  Boston,  and  a  mistake  to  keep  them  there.  They  were  not 
necessary;  they  caused  riots  and  tumults,  like  the  "  Boston 
Massacre, ' '  which  irritated  the  colonists,  created  an  unfortunate 
impression  in  England,  and  widened  the  breach  with  America. 

157 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

When  he  was  talking  in  this  strain  one  day  in  the  year 
1772,  a  member  of  Parliament  told  him  that  he  must  be  mis- 
taken about  the  condition  of  affairs  in  America;  the  disorders 
and  rebellion  were  much  worse  than  he  supposed;  the  troops 
had  been  absolutely  necessary  and  had  been  asked  for  by  the 
Massachusetts  officials.  When  Franklin  expressed  surprise 
and  doubt,  the  member  said  he  would  soon  satisfy  him ;  and  in 
a  few  days  placed  in  his  hands  the  packet  of  letters  written  to 
Mr.  William  Whately  by  officials  of  the  colonial  government 
of  Massachusetts. 

The  letters  described  the  well-known  situation  in  Boston  in 
the  year  1768;  the  riotous  proceedings  when  John  Hancock's 
sloop  was  seized  for  violating  the  revenue  laws ;  how  the  custom 
officials  were  insulted  and  beaten,  the  windows  of  their  houses 
broken,  and  they  obliged  to  take  refuge  on  the  "Romney" 
man-of-war.  Such  proceedings  the  writers  of  the  letters  inti- 
mated were  approved  by  a  majority  of  the  people,  and  they 
recommended  that  these  turbulent  colonists  should,  for  their 
own  good,  be  restrained  by  force,  and  the  liberty  they  were 
misusing  curtailed.  "There  must  be  an  abridgement,"  said 
one  of  Hutchinson's  letters,  "of  what  are  called  English 
liberties. ' ' 

Franklin  immediately  sent  the  letters  to  Massachusetts, 
where  they  aroused  the  greatest  indignation  among  the  patriots 
when  it  was  discovered  that  the  detested  troops  had  been  sent 
largely  through  the  representations  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,  who 
had  now  become  governor,  and  of  Andrew  Oliver,  who  had 
become  lieutenant-governor.1 

The  member  of  Parliament  had  lent  the  letters  to  Franklin 
on  condition  that  they  should  not  be  printed  or  copied,  and 
after  having  been  read  in  Massachusetts  they  were  to  be 
returned  to  London.  Franklin,  of  course,  mentioned  this  con- 
dition when  he  sent  the  letters  to  Cushing  in  Massachusetts ; 


1  Franklin's  Works,  Bigelow  edition,  vol.  v,  pp.  378,  282,  284,  408; 
Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  i,  p.  328;  "Diary  and 
Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.  i,  pp.  82,  93. 

158 


FRANKLIN  ACCUSED 

but  the  state  of  feeling  between  England  and  America  had 
become  so  violent  that  the  condition  was  not  respected.  The 
letters  were  soon  in  print  in  London  as  well  as  in  the  colonies, 
causing  a  great  scandal  and  setting  all  England  wondering 
how  the  private  letters  of  Mr.  William  Whately,  who  was  now 
dead,  could  have  got  abroad  and  in  print. 

Mr.  Whately 's  brother  suspected  that  Mr.  John  Temple,  who 
had  lived  in  Massachusetts  and  was  very  hostile  to  Governor 
Hutchinson,  had  abstracted  the  letters  from  a  bundle  of  the 
deceased  Whately 's  papers  which  he  had  been  allowed  to 
examine.  Temple  denied  this  positively;  but  the  suspicion 
against  him  getting  into  the  newspapers,  and  Whately 's  brother 
not  entirely  exonerating  him,  the  two  fought  a  duel  and 
Whately  was  badly  wounded. 

Franklin  then  came  forward  and  announced  that  he  was 
the  person  who  had  obtained  the  letters  and  sent  them  to 
Massachusetts.  This  partially  exonerated  Temple,  but  threw 
suspicion  on  Franklin,  who  was  roundly  accused  of  having 
obtained  these  private  letters  by  fraud  or  theft.  He  had 
promised  not  to  reveal  the  name  of  the  member  of  Parliament 
who  lent  them  to  him,  and  was,  therefore,  compelled  to  keep 
silence. 

Prominent  people  in  London  appear  to  have  always  believed 
that,  in  spite  of  his  denials,  Temple  was  the  man  who  abstracted 
the  Whately  letters  from  the  bundle  he  was  allowed  to  examine, 
and  gave  them  to  Franklin  for  the  purpose  of  making  mischief. 
Many  years  after  the  Revolution  John  Adams  said  that  Temple 
confessed  to  him  in  Holland  that  he  had  given  the  letters  to 
Franklin,  although  he  had  not  procured  them,  he  said,  in  the 
manner  represented.  They  were  procured,  it  is  supposed,  by 
Dr.  Hugh  Williamson,  a  Philadelphia  physician  who  was  in 
London  at  the  time  raising  money  for  the  College  of  Philadel- 
phia. He  learned  in  some  way  of  their  existence  and  contents, 
and  that  they  were  deposited  in  a  public  office  where  they  did 
not  regularly  belong.  He  went  to  the  office,  and  finding  the 
head  of  it  out,  demanded  the  letters  in  a  bold  tone,  as  if  he  were 
a  person  in  authority.    A  subordinate  handed  them  to  him  and 

159 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

he  put  them  in  a  way  to  reach  the  hands  of  Franklin.  He  may 
have  given  them  to  Temple  to  give  to  Franklin,  and  John 
Adams  believed  that  Temple  employed  Williamson  to  obtain  the 
letters  from  the  public  office.2 

In  consequence  of  the  revelations  in  the  Whately  letters  the 
Massachusetts  Assembly  sent  a  petition  to  the  Crown  asking 
that  Hutchinson  and  Oliver  be  removed  from  office  because  they 
had  become  abhorrent  to  the  people,  had  plotted  to  intensify 
the  quarrel  of  the  colonies  with  the  mother-country,  had  caused, 
by  their  false  representations,  a  fleet  and  army  to  be  brought  to 
Massachusetts,  and  were,  therefore,  the  cause  of  the  confusion 
and  bloodshed  of  the  ' '  Boston  Massacre. ' ' 

This  petition  reached  the  King  in  the  summer  of  1773.  The 
whole  affair  of  the  Whately  letters  caused  the  greatest  excite- 
ment and  scandal  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic.  London  society 
kept  talking  about  it  for  years  afterwards,  and  never  grew 
weary  of  denouncing  Franklin  for  what  they  considered  his 
fraud,  theft,  and  most  disgraceful  and  dishonorable  conduct  in 
obtaining  possession  of  private  correspondence.  The  letters, 
however,  were  of  a  decidedly  public  nature,  and  Whately,  to 
whom  they  were  addressed,  was  a  politician  wTho  had  held  some 
subordinate  public  offices.  There  is  no  evidence  that  Franklin 
obtained  them  improperly ;  and  having  obtained  them,  it  was  his 
duty  as  an  American  and  the  agent  of  the  patriot  party  in 
Massachusetts  to  send  them  to  the  leaders  of  his  party  in  that 
province.  It  seems  now  as  if  everybody  had  made  more  fuss 
over  the  incident  than  it  deserved ;  but  the  opinion  of  the  time 
was  that  it  had  greatly  intensified  hostile  feeling,  visibly 
widened  the  breach;  and  it  practically  destroyed  Franklin's 
influence  in  England. 

He  had  been  becoming  more  and  more  unpopular  with  the 
Tories  because  he  took  part  so  conspicuously  with  the  Whigs, 


2  <C 


Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.  i,  pp.  82-93, 
160,  163,  204,  205,  210,  221,  222,  232,  244,  279,  411;  vol.  ii,  pp.  79,  118; 
Biographical  Memoir  of  Hugh  Williamson  by  Dr.  David  Hossack,  pp. 
30-41,  75-78. 

160 


MODERATE  PATRIOTS  SATISFIED 

and  wrote  Whig  articles  in  the  newspapers ;  and  as  his  reputa- 
tion seemed  now  to  be  smirched  by  his  supposed  discreditable 
connection  with  the  Whately  letters,  he  could  do  nothing  more 
as  an  ambassador  or  a  peacemaker.  He  had  become  persona 
non  grata,  too  much  disliked  and  even  hated  by  the  persons  with 
whom  he  must  make  the  peace.  The  Tories  were  watching  their 
opportunity  to  assail  him,  drive  him  from  office  and  from 
England,  where,  in  their  eyes,  he  had  become  only  a  mischief- 
maker. 

All  the  recent  occurrences — the  salaries,  the  New  York  riot, 
the  "Boston  Massacre,"  the  burning  of  the  "Gaspee,"  the 
infringement  of  the  Massachusetts  charter,  and  the  Whately 
letters — tended  to  widen  the  breach;  and  yet  in  spite  of  these 
events,  some  of  which  were  actual  hostilities,  there  was  no 
formal  break ;  and  the  condition  of  affairs  was  quite  satisfactory 
to  all  the  moderate  patriots.  England  was  gaining  no  advan- 
tage over  them.  They  were  holding  their  own,  and  better.  If 
the  conciliatory  experiment  were  continued,  America  would 
drift  gradually  and  peacefully  towards  absolute  independence. 
Wedderburn  is  reported  to  have  said  in  Parliament,  at  this 
time,  that  the  colonists  were  already  lost  to  the  Crown. 

The  patriots  learned  that  in  jjlace  of  the  aggressive  Lord 
Hillsborough  they  were  to  have  as  secretary  of  the  colonies  the 
good  Lord  Dartmouth,  a  gentle  soul  who  said  his  prayers — "an 
insignificant  character,"  if  we  can  believe  Arthur  Lee,  "with 
an  affectation  of  piety  and  good  intentions  towards  the  pub- 
lic. ' ' 8  The  patriots  felt  that  they  had  either  repealed  or 
successfully  defied  all  the  new  legislation  and  plans  for  remod- 
elling the  colonies.  They  were  back  again  in  the  old  semi- 
independent  condition  which  they  had  enjoyed  before  the  close 
of  the  French  war.  They  were  perhaps  in  an  improved  and 
more  independent  position,  for  had  they  not  ordered  the  British 
troops  out  of  Boston  and,  in  effect,  locked  them  up  on  an  island 
in  the  harbor;  and  could  they  not  do  this  again  whenever  the 


3  Wells,  "  Life  of  Samuel  Adams,"  vol.  i,  p.  483. 
11  161 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

mother-country's  soldiery  became  troublesome?  Therefore, 
they  were  willing  to  ignore,  for  the  time,  the  attempt  on  sala- 
ries in  Massachusetts  and  the  "Boston Massacre,"  and  they  were 
indifferent  about  the  slight  tax  on  tea,  because  they  continued 
to  smuggle  from  Holland  all  the  tea  they  needed. 

The  more  radical  patriots  could  not,  however,  look  upon  the 
situation  so  complacently.  They  made  violent  efforts  to  keep 
up  the  non-importation  associations,  but  without  success.  One 
by  one  the  Southern  colonies,  and  then  Pennsylvania  and  the 
New  England  colonies  and  New  York,  began  importing  all 
English  commodities,  except  tea.  The  protest  which  the  extreme 
patriots  made  against  this  is  instructive,  as  showing  the  condi- 
tion of  parties.  They  declared  that  the  spirit  of  liberty  was 
dead.  The  students  at  Princeton,  among  whom  was  James 
Madison,  put  on  black  gowns,  and  Lynch,  of  South  Carolina, 
is  said  to  have  shed  tears  over  what  he  deemed  the  lost  cause. 

These  extreme  patriots  feared  that  England  by  the  concilia- 
tory policy  had  cunningly  trapped  the  people  into  remaining 
quiet  until  they  should  lose  all  desire  for  political  manhood. 
They  could  be  then  enslaved  when  the  government  became  more 
powerful.  The  leaders  dreaded  the  weakening  effects  of  concilia- 
tion. They  longed  for  some  severity,  some  outrage  on  the  part 
of  England,  that  would  stimulate  the  patriot  party  to  throw  off 
every  form  of  dependence.  The  savage  Hillsborough  had  been 
infinitely  better  than  the  pious  Dartmouth. 

"  If  I  am  to  have  a  master,"  said  Samuel  Adams,  "  let  me  have  a 
severe  one,  that  I  may  constantly  have  the  mortifying  sense  of  it.  I  shall 
then  be  constantly  disposed  to  take  the  first  fair  opportunity  of  ridding 
myself  of  his  tyranny.  There  is  danger  of  the  people  being  nattered  with 
such  partial  relief  as  Lord  Dartmouth  may  be  able  (if  disposed)  to 
obtain  for  them,  and  building  upon  vain  hopes,  till  their  chains  are 
riveted." — Wells,  "  Life  of  Samuel  Adams,"  vol.  i,  p.  484. 

The  severity  for  which  the  radical  patriots  hoped  and 
prayed  was  sure  to  come  in  time ;  for  England  could  not  remain 
indefinitely  satisfied  with  a  conciliatory  policy  which  accom- 
plished nothing  towards  consolidating  the  empire;  which  left 

162 


CONFLICT  MUST  COME 

the  colonies  more  independent  than  they  had  been  before  the 
French  War,  and  which  encouraged  them  to  strengthen  their 
independent  position.  Gentle  attempts  to  secure  control,  as 
in  the  matter  of  salaries,  were  sure  to  become  less  gentle;  or 
some  accident  would  happen  which  would  enable  the  radical 
patriots  to  precipitate  a  conflict;  and,  in  fact,  the  accident 
occurred  in  the  very  next  gentle  attempt,  which  was  the  very 
mild  device,  as  it  seemed  to  England,  of  sending  to  America 
cheap  East  India  tea  which  would  undersell  the  tea  smuggled 
from  Holland. 


XIV. 

THE  TEA  EPISODE 

Before  the  passage  of  the  Paint,  Paper,  and  Glass  Act;  tea 
had  been  taxed  on  its  arrival  in  England  at  the  high  rate  of  a 
shilling  per  pound.  This  made  the  tea  so  expensive  that  the 
colonists  usually  smuggled  cheaper  tea  from  Holland.  It  was  in 
the  hope  of  breaking  up  this  smuggling  and  encouraging  the 
sale  of  English  tea  that  Parliament,  in  the  Paint,  Paper,  and 
Glass  Act,  struck  off  the  shilling  duty,  and  on  all  tea  sent  to  the 
colonies  placed  a  duty  of  only  threepence  per  pound,  to  be  paid 
in  the  colonial  ports.  Thus  the  colonists  would  pay  ninepence 
per  pound  less  tax,  the  sale  of  tea  from  English  provinces  in  the 
far  East,  and  especially  the  tea  of  the  great  East  India  Com- 
pany, would  be  promoted,  the  smuggling  of  the  Americans 
checked,  and  everybody  made  happy  with  good  tea. 

Some  of  this  threepence-per-pound  tea  seems  to  have  been 
imported ;  most  of  it,  apparently,  in  Boston ;  and  the  duty  paid. 
But  because  the  duty  was  a  tax,  associations  or  clubs  were 
formed  whose  members  agreed  not  to  drink  this  threepence 
tea.  Merchants  were  applauded  for  not  importing  it,  and 
encouraged  to  smuggle  the  Holland  tea;  and  the  smuggling, 
being  very  profitable,  was  extensively  practised,  especially  in 
New  York,  Philadelphia,  and  other  towns  south  of  Massachu- 
setts. In  New  York  the  smuggled  Holland  tea  was  openly 
carted  about  at  noon-day.1 

There  was,  therefore,  every  reason  why  the  patriots  should 
be  content  for  the  present ;  for  they  were  successfully  defeating 
England   and  the  tea  act  by  their  old   methods,    and  their 


1  Drake,  "Tea  Leaves,"  pp.  193,  194,  196,  201;  Hutchinson,  "His- 
tory  of  Massachusetts,"  vol.  iii,  pp.  331,  332,  351,  422;  "  Free  Thoughts  on 
the  Proceedings  of  the  Continental  Congress,"  p.  10,  New  York,  1774. 
Snow,  "Administration  of  Dependencies,"  pp.  254-258;  Life  of  Joseph 
Reed,  by  W.  B.  Reed,  vol.  i,  p.  52. 

164 


THE  EAST  INDIA  COMPANY 

merchants  were  growing  rich  by  smuggling.  The  loyalists 
afterwards  said  that  the  trifling  tea  tax  would  soon  have  become 
obsolete,  and  some  liberally  inclined  ministry  would  have 
repealed  it.  Colonial  taxation  had  been  abandoned,  was  dying 
a  natural  death,  and  harmony  was  returning,  they  said,  if  both 
England  and  the  Americans  would  only  be  careful  and  for- 
bearing.2 

The  Ministry  might  possibly  have  refrained  for  some  time 
from  trying  another  experiment  to  test  their  control  of  the 
colonies,  if  that  great  corporation,  the  East  India  Company, 
had  not  brought  a  pressure  on  the  Government  which  could 
not  be  resisted.  The  company  was  at  that  time  in  a  bad  condi- 
tion, and  was  generally  supposed  to  be  insolvent.  Its  stock  was 
rapidly  depreciating,  and  the  fall  of  such  a  vast  concern  would 
precipitate  a  financial  panic.  The  great  company  had  already 
sunk  so  low  that  the  panic  was  thought  to  have  begun.  Business 
firms  were  going  bankrupt,  and  merchants,  manufacturers,  and 
traders  suffering.  It  seemed  quite  absurd  to  Englishmen  that 
the  company  could  not  sell  its  tea  in  colonies  that  belonged  to 
England,  while  Holland  sold  in  those  colonies  thousands  of 
pounds  of  tea  every  year.  There  was,  in  fact,  laid  up  in  ware- 
houses in  England  seventeen  million  pounds  of  the  East  India 
Company's  tea,  which  might,  it  was  thought,  obtain  a  ready 
sale  in  America,  were  it  not  for  the  smuggling  practices  of 
those  independence-loving  colonists. 

The  East  India  Company  and  the  Government  were  closely 
allied.  The  Government  had  already  lent  money  to  the  Com- 
pany, and  was  now  asked  to  lend  a  million  and  a  half  more. 
The  Company,  besides  paying  into  the  exchequer  £400,000  per 
year,  was  really  a  branch  of  the  government  for  the  control  of 
India;  and  it  afterwards  became  merged  in  a  department  of 
the  government.  Parliament  accordingly  in  March,  1773,  took 
into  consideration  the  condition  of  the  Company  and,  besides 
regulating  its  affairs  in  various  ways,  made  what  seemed  to 


2Ryerson,  "American  Loyalists,"  vol.  i,  p.  371;  Hutchinson,  "His- 
tory of  Massachusetts,"  vol.  iii,  p.  331. 

165 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

Englishmen  a  very  harmless  and  reasonable  arrangement  for 
sending  the  Company 's  tea  to  America. 

The  Company's  tea  had  to  pay  duty  on  its  arrival  in  Eng- 
land ;  but  three-fifths  of  this  duty  was  remitted  or  drawn  back, 
as  the  expression  was,  when  the  tea  was  exported  to  the  colonies. 
It  was  now  proposed  that  all  of  this  duty  should  be  remitted  on 
exportation  to  America,  so  that  the  East  India  Company  could 
undersell  the  tea  which  the  colonists  smuggled  from  the  Dutch. 
Accordingly  an  act  of  Parliament  was  passed,  May  10,  1773, 
remitting  the  duty  in  England,  but  retaining  the  threepence  tax 
to  be  paid  in  the  colonies;  and  the  East  India  Company 
freighted  ships  with  tea  for  Boston,  New  York,  Philadelphia, 
and  Charleston.3 

The  East  India  Company  had  at  first  asked  that  the  three- 
pence tax  to  be  paid  in  the  colonies  should  be  abolished,  which 
would  have  given  them  still  better  opportunities  to  undersell  the 
smuggled  Dutch  tea  and  would  have  still  further  conciliated  the 
colonists  by  wiping  out  the  last  remnant  of  the  new  taxation 
to  which  they  had  so  strenuously  objected,  leaving  only  the  old 
taxes  like  those  on  sugar,  molasses,  and  rum,  to  which  they  had 
grown  accustomed.  Such  a  course  would  no  doubt  have  post- 
poned the  outbreak  of  the  Revolution;  it  would  have  pleased 
the  loyalists  who  considered  it  all  that  was  necessary  to  keep 
the  colonies  within  the  empire;  and  it  would  have  pleased  the 
moderate  patriots,  like  Cushing,  who  believed  that  American 
independence  could  be  obtained  gradually  by  growth  of  popula- 
tion and  the  natural  course  of  events. 

But  as  the  threepence  tax  stood  for  the  right  of  Parliament 
to  tax  the  colonies — was,  in  short,  a  sort  of  badge  and  insignia 
of  the  slight  sovereignty  still  remaining  to  Great  Britain  in 
America— the  Ministry  would  not  abolish  it.  Lord  North 
dodged  responsibility   by  saying  that   the   King   insisted   on 


'"History  of  Great  Britain  During  the  Administration  of  Lord 
North/'  p.  108;  Stedman,  "American  War,"  vol.  i,  p.  85;  Drake's  "Tea 
Leaves,"  p.  218;  Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  i, 
p.  324. 

166 


THE  TEA  MUST  BE  KEPT  OUT 

retaining  the  tax  and  was  determined  to  try  the  issue  with  the 
Americans. 

Looked  at  in  cold  blood  the  whole  plan  was  a  rather  amusing 
and  very  English  device  for  helping  out  the  bankrupt  company, 
coaxing  the  colonists  to  accept  English  taxed  tea,  and,  if  possi- 
ble, stopping  by  ingenuity  the  smuggling  that  could  not  be 
stopped  by  revenue-cutters,  boards  of  commissioners,  troops, 
and  men-of-war.  It  was  so  far  from  being  tyrannous  and  cruel 
that  it  was  pitiable ;  pitiable  for  a  proud  nation  to  be  reduced 
to  such  straits  for  controlling  its  colonies. 

The  colonists  had  the  whole  summer  and  most  of  the  autumn 
of  1773  to  think  over  the  matter,  for  the  tea-ships  did  not  begin 
to  arrive  until  November.  The  patriots  in  all  the  colonies  were 
well  aware  that  not  a  little  English  taxed  tea  had  been  imported 
and  the  tax  paid;  but  they  were  determined  to  resist  this  new 
plan  of  the  Company  and  the  Ministry.  The  tea  must  not  be 
received ;  it  must  not  be  sold ;  the  duty  must  not  be  paid.  The 
best  course  was  not  to  allow  it  to  be  landed ;  for  if  once  landed 
some  one  might  pay  the  duty ;  or  the  Government  itself  might 
surreptitiously  pay  the  duty,  and  then  the  plan  of  the  King 
and  the  Ministry  would  be  successful.  They  could  boast  that 
the  colonies  had  submitted. 

There  was  now  an  opportunity  for  agitation,  and  the  radical 
patriots  bestirred  themselves.  The  committees  of  correspond- 
ence worked  upon  the  people  all  over  the  country.  The  tea 
was  described  as  poison,  a  nauseous  draft  of  slavery.  Some  of 
the  newspapers  openly  advocated  independence.  The  attacks 
upon  the  East  India  Company  as  a  soulless  corporation  and  an 
inhuman  monopoly  remind  us  of  the  language  of  our  own  times. 

If  such  a  company,  it  was  said,  once  got  a  foothold  in  Amer- 
ica, it  would  trade  in  other  articles  besides  tea,  and  drive 
American  merchants  out  of  business.  It  would  draw  to  itself 
all  sorts  of  trade  and  the  profits  of  American  commerce.  The 
gold  and  silver  and  the  bills  of  exchange,  would  tend  to  centre 
in  its  hands.    A  printed  handbill4  was  circulated  in  Pennsyl- 


*  It  was  addressed,  "  To  the  Tradesmen  and  Mechanics  of  Pennsyl- 

167 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

vania  describing  the  company's  shocking  deeds  of  plunder  and 
cruelty  in  India,  and  arguing  that  it  would  overwhelm  America 
with  the  same  rapacity  and  slaughter  that  had  been  inflicted 
on  the  unfortunate  East  Indians.  Franklin's  old  friend,  the 
Bishop  of  St.  Asaph,  prepared  a  speech  for  the  "House  of 
Lords,  denouncing  the  Government  for  turning  loose  upon 
the  Americans  a  corporation  with  such  a  record  of  bloodshed 
and  tyranny. 

It  was  at  this  time  that  Samuel  Adams  and  the  more  ardent 
patriots  took  the  next  step  in  their  plan,  and  suggested  a  union 
of  all  the  colonies  in  a  Congress.  The  Boston  Gazette  had  been 
openly  suggesting  independence  for  over  a  year.  It  now 
demanded  a  ''Congress  of  American  States  to  frame  a  bill  of 
rights,"  or  to  "form  an  independent  state,  an  American  com- 
monwealth."5 The  boldness  and  impunity  with  which  this 
was  done  show  the  effect  of  the  conciliatory  policy  and  the 
weakness  of  England. 

Some  of  the  patriots  of  the  type  of  Cushing,  of  Massachu- 
setts, or  Eeed  and  Dickinson,  of  Pennsylvania,  advocated 
caution.  We  were  not  yet  strong  enough,  not  sufficiently  united 
or  sufficiently  numerous,  for  a  dash  for  independence.  But  the 
radical  patriots  of  Boston  would  have  no  delay.  They  were  for 
forcing  a  conflict;  striking  at  once;  for,  said  they,  "when  our 
liberty  is  gone,  history  and  experience  will  teach  us  that  an 
increase  of  inhabitants  will  be  but  an  increase  of  slaves. ' '  6 

The  majority  of  the  patriots  were  apparently  for  modera- 
tion, and  had  they  had  their  way  this  episode  would  have  been 
tided  over.  Their  plan  was  quietly  to  prevent  the  landing  and 
payment  of  duty  on  the  tea;  send  it  all  back  to  England,  and 
thus  show  that  the  Tea  Act,  the  last  remnant  of  the  taxation 


vania."  Copies  are  now  rare.  The  one  I  have  examined  is  in  the 
collection  of  Mr.  Joseph  Y.  Jeanes,  of  Philadelphia.  See  also  Drake, 
"Tea  Leaves,"  pp.  216,  274. 

BHosmer,   "Life  of   Samuel   Adams,"   p.   238;    Gordon,   "American 
Revolution,"  Ed.  1788,  vol.  i,  p.  331. 

•Boston  Gazette,  Sept.  13,  1773,  Essay  signed  A;   Wells,  "Life  of 
Samuel  Adams,"  vol.  ii,  pp.  87,  88. 

168 


THE  RADICAL  ARGUMENT 

system  begun  eight  years  before,  was  a  failure.  The  act  would 
then  soon  be  repealed  and  taxation  never  again  be  attempted. 
It  must  be  confessed  that  there  were  plausible  reasons  for  sup- 
posing that  this  plan  might  have  accomplished  peaceful  inde- 
pendence. "Our  natural  increase  in  wealth  and  population," 
said  Cushing,  "will  in  a  course  of  years  settle  this  dispute  in 
our  favor. ' ' 7 

On  the  other  hand,  Samuel  Adams  and  the  radicals  had 
strong  grounds  for  believing  that  the  course  of  years  would  not 
necessarily  bring  independence  without  a  war  to  settle  it. 
England  would  not  finally  recognize  the  absolute  independence 
of  the  colonies  without  fighting.  No  nation  had  ever  done  so. 
The  inherent  right  of  a  naturally  separated  people  to  be  inde- 
pendent according  to  their  rights  as  men  might  be  just  and 
sound,  but  no  nation  had  as  yet  recognized  its  justice.  As  there 
must  be  a  fight,  it  was  better,  the  radicals  thought,  to  have  it 
now  at  once  while  our  people  were  hot  and  England  was  so 
weak.  It  would  be  an  advantage  to  break  from  England  before 
she  recovered  from  the  recent  great  war  with  France  and  the 
heavy  debt  it  entailed.  The  longer  she  rested  from  that  war 
the  more  capable  she  would  become  to  attack  the  colonies  and 
reduce  them  to  absolute  dependence  on  the  will  of  Parliament. 
Her  conciliatory  policy  was  merely  to  gain  time.  She  might 
settle  the  taxation  question  satisfactorily,  and  in  the  future 
settle  the  smuggling  question,  and  be  so  conciliatory  that  the 
mass  of  the  people,  no  matter  how  numerous  they  became, 
would  forget  the  past  and  be  content  to  live  under  an  easy 
yoke,  as  mere  dependencies. 

For  several  years  the  argument  had  been  insinuated  that 
the  weak,  debt-ridden  state  of  England  had  been  ordained  in 
the  providence  of  God  to  give  us  a  chance  for  independence. 
"It  is  now  or  never,"  wrote  Joseph  Hawley,  one  of  the 
patriot  leaders  of  the  western  part  of  Massachusetts.  If  the 
contest  for  independence  were  delayed,  independence,  he  said, 
would  be  lost.    If  England  succeeded  in  getting  the  control  she 


TMass.  Historical  Soc.  Collections,  fourth  series,  vol.  iv,  pp.  360,  363. 

169 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

wanted,  the  character  of  the  independence-loving  Americans 
would  be  changed,  and  after  twenty  years  of  such  control  the 
loyalists  would  be  as  numerous  as  the  patriots.8 

Most  strenuous  efforts  were  made  by  the  extreme  patriots  to 
bring  the  moderates  out  of  their  contented  state  of  mind  and 
arouse  them  to  the  importance  of  an  immediate  contest  for 
independence,  instead  of  a  reliance  on  mere  lapse  of  time  under 
the  conciliatory  policy  which  England  had  adopted.  The 
patriot  party  in  Boston  was  usually  regarded  as  extreme 
enough ;  but  so  much  English  tea  had  been  accepted  there  that 
the  Southern  patriots  feared  that  the  Bostonians  would  be  too 
lenient  and  would  allow  the  tea  to  be  landed  and  the  duty  paid. 
Boston  merchants  had  during  the  last  five  years  imported  nearly 
three  thousand  chests  of  English  taxed  tea,  when  New  York  and 
Philadelphia  supplied  the  whole  demand  of  their  markets  with 
smuggled  tea  from  Holland.  A  part  of  this  taxed  tea  imported 
to  Boston  was  apparently  stored  and  not  sold,  and  John  Han- 
cock had  lent  one  of  his  ships  to  carry  some  of  it  back  to 
England.  There  appears  to  have  been  much  conflict  of  opinion 
in  Boston.  There  were  associations  pledging  their  members  not 
to  drink  taxed  tea,  and  a  great  deal  of  watching  and  threatening 
of  merchants  to  prevent  their  importing  and  selling;  and  yet 
considerable  taxed  tea  seems  to  have  been  imported.  Thomas 
Mifflin,  one  of  the  patriot  leaders  of  Philadelphia,  appears  to 
have  gone  to  Boston  to  stiffen  the  patriots  there,  and  he  took  a 
promise  from  them  not  to  allow  any  tea  to  be  landed,  and  he 
pledged  Philadelphia  to  the  same  course.9 

On  the  18th  of  October,  1773,  the  Philadelphia  patriots  led 
off  in  formal  opposition  to  the  tea  by  adopting  a  very  vigorous 
and  complete  set  of  resolutions  going  over  the  whole  ground  of 
the  controversy;  and  these  same  resolutions  were  afterwards 
adopted  in  Boston.     In  fact,  the  Bostonians  were  so  aroused 


8Niles,  "  Principles  and  Acts  of  the  Revolution,"  edition  1876,  p.  107; 
Hosmer,  Life  of  Samuel  Adams,  p.  134. 

•Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  i,  p.  331; 
Drake,  "  Tea  Leaves,"  pp.  10,  15,  298,  304,  330. 

170 


THE  FIRST  TEA  SHIP 

that  they  resorted  to  more  violent  opposition  than  Mifflin  and 
the  Philadelphia  patriots  intended. 

The  first  tea-ship  to  reach  America  was  the  "Dartmouth," 
which  arrived  in  Boston  harbor  about  the  26th  of  November, 
1773,  and  was  followed  some  days  later  by  two  others.10  The 
consignees  of  the  cargoes  were  five  in  number,  including  the 
two  sons  of  Governor  Hutchinson,  who,  like  their  father,  were 
devoted  loyalists,  believing  in  the  supremacy  of  the  British 
empire,  and  regarding  American  independence  as  a  delusion 
and  a  crime.  They  would  not  resign.  Town  meetings  were 
held  upon  them,  committees  visited  them,  their  lives  were 
threatened  in  anonymous  letters,  they  were  called  tigers  and 
mad  dogs,  which,  for  the  sake  of  public  safety,  should  be 
destroyed;  but  they  remained  firm.  They  did  not,  however, 
attempt  to  land  the  cargoes.  The  patriots  adopted  the  strong 
Philadelphia  resolutions;  expressed  the  greatest  regret  that 
they  had  ever  allowed  any  of  the  taxed  tea  to  be  imported; 
placed  a  guard  over  the  ships,  and  Hancock  and  Samuel  Adams 
served  on  this  guard.  Six  horsemen  held  themselves  ready  to 
alarm  the  country  towns ;  and  some  of  these  towns  collected  all 
the  taxed  tea  they  could  find  among  their  people  and  burnt  it 
on  the  public  common.  The  radicals  were  determined  to  begin 
the  active  revolution  at  this  point. 

The  moderate  patriots  and  a  strong  loyalist  minority  pro- 
tested. They  foresaw  violence;  "the  town  and  the  colony 
would  be  drawn  into  a  quarrel  with  Great  Britain."  Very 
likely,  was  the  reply;  but  it  must  come  to  that  sooner  or  later, 
and  what  better  time  than  the  present?  Hundreds  of  years 
may  pass  away  before  the  Parliament  will  make  such  a  number 
of  acts  in  violation  of  the  British  Constitution  as  it  has  done  of 
late  years,  and  by  which  it  has  excited  so  formidable  an  opposi- 
tion. Besides,  the  longer  the  contest  is  delayed  the  more  the 
Ministry  will  be  strengthened.11 


10  There  is  said  to  have  been  a  fourth  tea-ship  which  was  wrecked  on 
Cape  Cod  and  never  reached  Boston.  ( Gordon,  "  American  Revolution," 
vol.  i,  p.  341.) 

11  Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  i,  p.  335. 

171 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

The  owners  and  the  captains  of  the  ships  were  willing  to 
take  the  tea  back  to  England,  but  unfortunately  no  precautions 
had  been  taken  by  any  one  to  stop  the  ships  and  send  them  back 
before  they  reached  the  wharves  and  entered  their  cargoes  at 
the  custom-house.  The  custom-house  officers  could  not  give  the 
ships  a  clearance  until  the  duty  had  been  paid  on  the  tea,  and 
without  a  clearance  the  governor  would  not  give  a  permit  to 
pass  the  castle  outward  bound.  Meanwhile,  during  these  dis- 
putes the  twenty  days  were  passing,  and  at  the  end  of  that 
period  the  tea  could  be  seized  by  the  custom-house  and  sold  for 
duty.  The  party  of  violence  was  in  the  ascendant;  the  town 
was  placarded  with  liberty  posters ;  riders  were  hurrying  back 
and  forth  from  the  neighboring  towns ;  and  the  country  people 
were  beginning  to  flock  into  Boston. 

The  common  statements  in  some  books  of  the  Revolution  that 
Governor  Hutchinson  was  malignant,  treacherous,  or  the  vacil- 
lating and  cowardly  agent  of  tyranny,  are  utterly  without 
foundation.  He  was  a  man  of  learning,  ability,  and  refinement, 
a  native  of  the  colony,  a  graduate  of  Harvard  College,  a  col- 
lector of  historical  material,  and  the  author  of  an  excellent 
history  of  Massachusetts;  but  like  some  other  Americans,  his 
tastes  and  feelings  were  with  Europe  and  his  intellect  was 
overawed  by  English  culture.  He  never  could  bring  himself  to 
see  the  slightest  advantage  in  American  nationality. 

He  was  now  sixty-two  years  old,  and  had  been  a  useful 
public  man  in  Massachusetts.  He  had  had  a  long  career  as  a 
member  of  the  legislature,  as  a  member  of  the  council,  as  judge 
and  as  lieutenant-governor;  and  all  the  best  citizens  were 
grateful  to  him  for  his  services.  He  had  supported  for  years  at 
the  sacrifice  of  popularity  a  sound  specie  currency,  had  fought 
the  land-banks  and  paper-money  schemes,  and  largely  con- 
tributed to  save  the  province  from  bankruptcy.  The  charge 
that  he  opposed  the  patriot  party  in  expectation  of  a  high 
position  in  England  as  a  reward  for  his  loyalism  does  not  seem 
to  be  sustained  because  he  was  offered  a  baronetcy  and 
declined  it. 

His  opinions  were  entirely  sincere  and  honest,  but  they  were 

172 


CHARACTER  OF  HUTCHINSON 

not  American.  He  seems  to  have  really  loved  New  England, 
but  only  as  a  subject  province  and  dependency  of  Great 
Britain.  In  his  letters  to  the  British  Government  he  explained 
that  the  tendency  of  Massachusetts  to  independence  could  never 
be  overcome  except  by  force,  and  he  recommended  the  sending 
of  troops  and  the  use  of  the  utmost  severity.  It  was  natural 
that  the  patriots  should  describe  this  as  his  contemptible 
treachery  and  meanness  to  his  native  province.  He  exasperated 
them  by  upholding  the  laws  against  the  smugglers  and  dis- 
countenancing the  odium  in  which  those  who  informed  upon 
smugglers  were  held.  But  looked  at  from  the  point  of  view  of 
history  he  was  doing  what  every  colonial  governor  in  an 
empire  is  bound  to  do.  If  the  British  system  of  empire  was 
right,  Hutchinson  was  right,  and  was  an  ideal  governor.  He 
found  his  duties  congenial;  for  he  was  as  completely  devoted 
to  colonialism  by  tastes,  feelings,  and  convictions  as  any  loyalist 
that  ever  lived.12 

As  for  his  conduct  with  the  tea-ships,  he  was  merely  acting 
within  the  laws  he  had  sworn  to  administer.  There  was  no 
breach  of  legality  in  the  English  government  reducing  the  tax 
on  tea  and  a  private  corporation  sending  three  cargoes  to 
Boston  to  undersell  smuggled  tea.  The  ships  had  come  up  to 
the  docks  within  custom-house  jurisdiction,  and  no  clearance 
could  under  the  law  be  given  to  take  the  tea  back  to  England 
until  the  duties  had  been  paid.  Hutchinson  was  perfectly 
justified  in  refusing  to  give  a  permit  unless  there  was  a  clear- 
ance, and  it  was  legally  absurd  to  ask  him  for  a  permit  before  a 
clearance  showed  the  payment  of  duties. 

It  is  said  that  he  stiffened  the  consignees  in  their  resolution 
not  to  resign  and  that  but  for  him  they  would  have  resigned. 
But  their  resignation  would  hardly  have  changed  the  situation, 
because  the  ships  having  come  up  to  the  wharves  and  within 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  custom-house  the  duties  had  to  be  paid 


12  Violent  abuse  of  Hutchinson  can  be  found  in  Bancroft's  "  History 
of  the  United  States  "  and  in  Wells'  "  Life  of  Samuel  Adams,"  vol.  i,  pp. 
268,  269.  See  also  John  Adams'  clever  summary  of  him,  Works,  vol.  ii, 
pp.  170,  189,  190. 

173 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

and  it  was  on  the  question  of  duties  that  the  whole  dispute 
hinged.  The  consignees  of  the  tea  that  went  to  South  Carolina 
resigned,  but  that  did  not  prevent  the  custom-house  finally 
seizing  the  tea  and  offering  it  for  sale  to  pay  the  duty.  If  the 
Boston  patriots  had  stopped  the  ships,  as  was  done  at  Phila- 
delphia, before  they  got  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  custom- 
house, and  persuaded  the  captains  to  go  back  to  England,  there 
would  have  been  an  end  to  all  difficulties.  Hutchinson  sug- 
gested this  course  and  advised  the  consignees  to  have  the  ships 
anchor  below  the  castle,  so  that  if  it  should  appear  to  be  unsafe 
to  land  the  tea  the  ships  might  return  to  England.  If  this 
advice  of  Hutchinson  had  been  followed  we  should  probably 
never  have  heard  of  the  "Boston  tea  party"  and  the  Revolution 
would  have  been  postponed  for  several  years,  or  until  some 
other  accident  or  incident  caused  an  outbreak. 

The  consignees  were  entirely  willing,  it  is  said,  to  follow 
Hutchinson's  advice,  and  the  first  tea-ship  that  arrived 
anchored  below  the  castle  outside  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
custom-house.  But  when  the  captain  came  up  to  town  Hutchin- 
son says  that  a  committee  composed  of  Samuel  Adams  and 
others  prevailed  upon  him  to  bring  his  ship  up  to  the  wharves 
and  land  all  of  his  cargo  except  the  tea.  This  is  Hutchinson's 
version,  and  he  seems  to  mean  that  the  radical  patriots  did  not 
want  a  peaceful  settlement,  but  were  determined  to  bring  the 
tea  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  custom-house  so  that  there 
could  be  a  contest  over  the  disposal  of  it.13 

Governor  Hutchinson  followed  the  conciliatory  policy  of 
the  home  government.  He  abstained  from  any  use  of  the  men- 
of-war  in  the  harbor  or  of  the  two  "Sam  Adams"  regiments 
that  were  still  down  at  the  castle,  except,  it  is  said,  to  order  them 
to  see  that  no  vessel,  except  a  coaster,  should  go  to  sea  without 
a  permit.  He  left  everything  to  the  patriots.  He  even  al- 
lowed them  to  guard  the  tea-ships.  The  war-ships  or  the 
soldiers    could   have    taken    possession    of    the    tea-ships    and 


"Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,  vol.  i,  pp.  100,  101,  103 
Drake,  "  Tea  Leaves,"  p.  42. 

174 


MEETING  IN  THE  OLD  SOUTH 

have  prevented  all  that  happened.  But  British  sovereignty 
was  on  this  occasion  a  mere  spectator  and  visitor  in  what  had 
been  its  American  colonies. 

The  difficulty  might  have  been  settled  as  in  South  Carolina, 
by  allowing  the  customs  officials  to  seize  the  tea  at  the  end  of  the 
twenty  days  and  offer  it  for  sale  to  pay  the  duties.  No  one 
would  have  had  the  temerity  to  buy  it;  the  patriots  of  Boston 
could  surely  have  prevented  its  sale  as  easily  as  a  sale  was 
prevented  by  the  patriots  of  Charleston ;  and  the  tea  would  then 
have  been  stored  till  it  rotted. 

But  the  radical  patriots  would  not  take  this  conservative 
and  moderate  course,  and  their  refusal  to  do  so  shows  that  they 
were  planning  an  outbreak  which  would  commit  the  patriot 
party  all  over  the  country  to  a  more  violent  and  radical  posi- 
tion— an  outbreak  which  would  be  self-restrained,  and  yet  suffi- 
ciently violent  to  force  both  England  and  America  to  an  open 
contest  on  the  one  great  question  which  lay  beneath  all  the  past 
eight  years  of  wrangling. 

They  prepared  everything  for  action  on  the  night  of  the 
16th  of  December,  because  two  days  after  that  the  twenty  days ' 
limit  would  expire  on  the  "Dartmouth,"  which  had  been  the 
first  ship  to  arrive.  Seven  thousand  people  filled  the  Old  South 
Meeting  House  on  that  afternoon,  while  Rotch,  the  Quaker 
owner  of  the  "Dartmouth,"  drove  out  to  Milton  to  Governor 
Hutchinson's  country  place,  to  ask  him  for  a  permit  to  pass 
the  castle.  Every  one  knew  or  felt  confident  that  the  permit 
would  be  refused;  so  that  this  meeting  cannot  be  called  a 
deliberative  one. 

Darkness  came  on,  and  still  the  meeting  waited.  At  last 
Rotch  returned,  and  made  the  formal  announcement  that  the 
permit  had  been  refused.  Samuel  Adams  arose  and  gave  the 
signal^that  had  evidently  been  agreed  upon:  "This  meeting 
can  do  nothing  more  to  save  the  country." 

Immediately,  as  has  been  so  often  related,  the  warwhoop  was 
heard  outside  the  door.  Some  forty  or  fifty  men,  painted  and 
disguised  as  Indians,  and  with  hatchets  in  their  hands,  suddenly 
appeared  from  some  place  where  they  had  been  waiting,  and 

175 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

hurried  down  to  the  tea-ships,  directly  encouraged  by  Adams, 
Hancock,  and  other  patriots.  The  crowd  formed  around  them 
as  a  protection,  and  posted  guards  about  the  wharf  to  prevent 
interference  while  the  Indians  worked  with  their  hatchets.  It  is 
said  that  the  vast  crowd  was  perfectly  silent,  a  most  respectful 
Boston  silence,  and  not  a  sound  could  be  heard  for  three  hours 
save  the  cracking  of  the  hatchets  on  the  chests  of  tea  in  all  three 
ships.14 

At  the  end  of  that  time  every  pound  of  tea  was  in  the  water 
and  a  delicious  aroma  from  it  arose  all  along  the  wharves. 
There  was  not  the  slightest  attempt  by  the  governor,  or  the 
soldiers,  to  interfere  with  the  work  of  the  mob.  The  fleet  which 
was  lying  within  sight  of  the  tea-ships  did  nothing.  The  admiral 
it  is  said  was  on  shore  and  as  the  crowd  returned  he  good 
naturedly  joked  with  them,  and  said  that  having  had  their 
sport  they  might  soon  have  to  pay  the  piper. 

All  these  proceedings,  with  their  deliberateness  and  success, 
were  certainly  a  violation  of  the  rights  of  private  property,  for 
the  tea  belonged  to  the  East  India  Company.  They  were  con- 
ducted in  a  regular  and  systematic  manner  and  yet  they  were 
rioting.  The  most  comical  part  was  that  the  Indians  claimed 
particular  credit  for  not  having  injured  any  other  property  on 
the  ships,  and  declared  that  "all  things  were  conducted  with 
great  order,  decency,  and  perfect  submission  to  government. ' ' 
Our  ancestors  had  a  fine  sense  of  humor. 

Seriously  considered,  the  destruction  of  this  private  prop- 
erty can  be  justified  only  by  the  argument  of  the  radical 
patriots  who  did  it.  They  were  unwilling  to  resort  to  the 
conservative  method  of  allowing  the  tea  to  be  seized  and  put 
up  for  sale  to  pay  the  duty  because  that  "was  too  precarious 
a  ground  on  which  to  risk  the  salvation  of  the  country. ' '  Some 
loyalists  might  have  bought  the  tea ;  and  then  the  opposition  to 
England  would  have  been  broken,  the  budding  union  of  the 
colonies  dissolved  never  to  be  restored,  and  all  hopes  of  pre- 
venting British  reorganization  and  curtailment  of  old  privileges 

"Mass.  Hist.  Soc.  Proc,  1871-1873,  pp.  177,  178;  "The  Origin  of 
the  American  Contest  with  Great  Britain,"  p.  39,  New  York,  1775. 

176 


MODERATION  OF  THE  RIOT 

shattered.  Moreover,  if,  as  many  believed,  the  only  real  safety 
lay  in  independence,  and  if  independence  was  the  natural  right 
of  every  naturally  separated  people,  then  the  sooner  an  open 
breach  occurred  and  independence  was  fought  for  the  better. 
England  would  never  willingly  allow  the  old  semi-independent 
condition  to  continue.  She  was  determined  to  remodel  and 
consolidate  her  empire  and  have  America  for  a  mere  depen- 
dency. Her  present  conciliatory  policy,  the  comparative  mildness 
of  sending  over  a  few  cargoes  of  tea,  was  mere  insidiousness,  a 
cunning  way  to  gain  time  until  she  was  strong  enough  for  more 
effective  measures  of  subjugation.15 

From  the  point  of  view  of  the  radicals  there  never  was  a 
piece  of  liberty  or  revolutionary  rioting  that  was  so  sagaciously 
and  accurately  calculated  to  effect  its  purpose,  and  not  go  too 
far.  If  it  had  been  very  violent  disorder,  or  brutality,  it  might 
have  alienated  moderate  or  doubtful  patriots  whom  it  was 
important  to  win  over.  It  was  intended  to  be  violent  enough 
to  irritate  England  into  abandoning  smooth  conciliation  and 
beginning  rugged  severity.  It  was  no  doubt  expected  that  it 
would  be  followed  in  other  colonies,  and  thus  bring  on  a  general 
punishment  that  would  arouse  them  all.  But  there  seems  to 
have  been  no  disposition  to  follow  Boston's  example,  except  in 
the  instance  of  the  destruction  of  eighteen  cases  of  tea  in  New 
York,  of  which  the  British  Government  took  no  notice. 

The  Philadelphians  on  the  24th  of  December  heard  of 
what  had  happened  in  Boston,  and  the  next  day  learned  that  a 
tea-ship  had  arrived  at  Chester,  fourteen  miles  below  Philadel- 
phia. Some  weeks  before  printed  circulars  had  been  issued  to 
all  the  pilots  of  the  river,  reminding  them  that  tar  and  feathers 
and  other  unpleasant  experiences  would  be  the  reward  of  any 
one  of  them  who  brought  a  tea-ship  up  from  the  capes.  This 
threat  and  the  88  miles  of  difficult  navigation  up  the  Delaware 
would,  it  was  supposed,  protect  the  Quaker  City  from  an  inva- 
sion by  the  East  India  Company's  ships.  But  here  was  one  of 
them  close  at  hand ;  and  it  was  discovered  that  she  had  no  pilot, 


"Gordon,  supra,  vol.  i,  pp.  341,  342. 
12  177 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

but  had  been  able  to  follow  close  after  another  vessel  with  a 
pilot  on  board. 

A  mass  meeting  passed  a  resolution  approving  the  conduct 
of  the  Boston  patriots  ' '  in  destroying  the  tea  rather  than  suffer 
it  to  be  landed,"  and  a  committee  started  for  Chester  to  stop 
the  further  progress  of  the  ship  and  keep  her  out  of  custom- 
house jurisdiction.  But  before  they  had  gone  half  way  her 
captain  moved  her  up  to  within  sight  of  Philadelphia  at 
Gloucester  Point,  where  crowds  of  people  on  the  banks  hailed 
her  and  asked  the  captain  to  come  ashore.  He  landed,  walked 
up  through  a  lane  formed  by  the  crowd,  and  was  escorted  to  the 
city,  where  he  was  soon  convinced  that  the  best  thing  he  could 
do  was  to  take  his  ship  immediately  back  to  England  without 
touching  a  wharf  or  entering  her  at  the  custom-house.  He  was 
supplied  with  fresh  provisions  and  on  the  27th  of  December 
sailed  down  the  river.16 

The  Charleston  ship  arrived  on  the  2nd  of  December.  The 
consignees  were  induced  to  resign;  but  nothing  more  was 
done.  When  the  twenty  days  expired  the  Carolinians  had 
probably  not  heard  of  and  were  apparently  uninfluenced  by  the 
Boston  affair.  The  tea  was  seized  by  the  customs  officers  to  pay 
the  duty ;  but  no  one  dared  to  buy  it ;  it  could  not  be  sold ;  and 
was  stored  in  warehouses,  where  it  remained  for  several  years. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  the  moderate  patriots  this  was  a 
proper  way  of  solving  the  difficulty.  It  was  perfectly  lawful ; 
there  was  no  violence;  the  British  Government  could  make  no 
complaint,  and  yet  the  tea  act,  the  duty,  and  the  plan  of  the 
East  India  Company  were  killed  as  dead  as  Caesar.17 

The  New  York  tea-ship  "Nancy"  was  beaten  off  the  coast 


18  Pennsylvania  Magazine  of  History,  vol.  15,  p.  385.  See  also  vol.  14, 
p.  78;  Mrs.  Drinker's  Journal,  39;  Niles,  "Principles  and  Acts  of  the 
Revolution,"  edition  1826,  p.  202;  Drake,  "Tea  Leaves,"  p.  361. 

"McCready,  "History  of  South  Carolina,"  vol.  1719-1776,  p.  727; 
Drake,  "  Tea  Leaves,"  pp.  339,  342.  After  the  declaration  of  independence 
this  tea  was  sold  as  property  of  the  State  of  South  Carolina  and  the 
money  turned  into  the  state  treasury.  {American  Archives,  fifth  series, 
vol.  iii,  pp.  16,  20.) 

178 


THE  NEW  YORK  TEA 

by  contrary  winds  and  did  not  arrive  until  April,  1774,  five 
months  after  the  Boston  affair.  Some  of  the  patriots,  under 
the  leadership  of  such  men  as  Sears  and  McDougal,  appear  to 
have  been  wrought  up  into  a  very  violent  mood,  and  if  oppor- 
tunity had  offered  would  have  gone  to  any  extremity.  The 
governor,  William  Tryon,  whose  acquaintance  we  made  when 
he  was  the  ruler  of  North  Carolina,  tried  like  Hutchinson  to 
have  the  tea-ships  go  back  to  England  without  coming  within 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  New  York  custom-house.  In  this  he  was 
ably  assisted  by  the  consignees  of  the  tea,  who  sent  a  letter  to 
the  captain  of  the  tea-ship,  at  Sandy  Hook,  instructing  him  to 
return  to  England  without  attempting  to  enter  New  York 
harbor,  and  sending  him  newspapers  and  other  evidences  of 
the  feeling  of  the  people  and  of  the  fate  which  had  befallen  the 
other  tea-ships.  In  a  subsequent  letter  they  assured  him  that  if 
the  tea  were  brought  up  to  the  town  it  would  certainly  be 
destroyed.  He  was  wise  enough  to  follow  their  advice,  and 
thus  prevented  a  violent  outbreak  in  New  York. 

Another  ship,  called  the  "London,"  arrived  at  New  York 
about  the  same  time,  having  in  her  cargo  eighteen  cases  of  tea, 
belonging  not  to  the  East  India  Company,  but  to  her  captain. 
Observing  the  excited  state  of  public  feeling  he  kept  very  quiet 
about  his  tea ;  but  at  last  it  became  known  that  he  had  it,  and 
the  vessel  was  boarded  by  a  party  of  the  Sons  of  Liberty,  calling 
themselves  Mohawks,  who  threw  overboard  the  eighteen  cases. 
The  British  Government,  however,  took  no  notice  of  this  riot 
and  attempted  no  punishment.18 

In  June,  1774,  twenty-seven  chests  of  tea  arrived  at  Ports- 
mouth, New  Hampshire,  and,  by  the  skill  of  Governor  Went- 
worth,  who  was  a  very  judicious  man  and  popular  with  both 
parties,  it  was  all  landed  and  the  duty  paid.  But  the  patriot 
committee  persuaded  the  consignee  to  send  it  away  and  it  was 
re-shipped  and  sent  to  Halifax.19 


""Memorial  History  of  New  York,"  vol.  ii,  p.   432;   Drake,  "Tea 
Leaves,"  pp.  358,  360 ;  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  i,  pp.  249,  250. 
19  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  i,  pp.  512,  783,  786,  964. 

179 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

The  most  curious  effect  of  the  Boston  example  and  the 
subsequent  agitation  occurred  at  Annapolis,  Maryland.  The 
brig  " Peggy  Stewart,"  with  seventeen  cases  of  tea  among  her 
cargo,  arrived  at  that  town  in  October,  1774,  almost  a  year  after 
the  Boston  affair.  The  captain  had  refused  to  take  any  tea 
and  the  seventeen  cases  had  been  smuggled  on  board  concealed 
in  blankets  and  without  his  knowledge.  The  tea  was  consigned 
to  T.  C.  Williams  and  Company,  merchants  of  Annapolis.  Mr. 
Anthony  Stewart,  the  owner  of  the  brig,  was  anxious  to  have 
her  discharged  of  her  cargo  as  quickly  as  possible,  because  she 
was  leaky  and  there  were  fifty-three  indentured  servants  on 
board  who  had  been  confined  to  the  ship  for  nearly  three 
months.  He  at  first  tried  to  enter  at  the  custom-house  all  the 
cargo  except  the  tea ;  but  the  custom  officials  refused  to  accept 
such  an  entry.  Then  he  entered  all,  and  unwisely  paid  the 
duty  on  the  tea,  which  instantly  brought  the  mob  upon  him. 

The  patriots  all  over  the  country  had  by  this  time  become 
more  confident  and  their  organization  more  complete.  The 
Boston  Port  Bill  had  been  passed,  the  Continental  Congress 
had  assembled,  hostility  to  England  had  increased,  and  there 
had  been  serious  violences  committed  upon  loyalists  during  the 
summer.  The  Maryland  patriots  wrarned  and  threatened  Mr. 
Stewart  in  a  way  which  seems  to  have  completely  terrorized 
both  him  and  his  friends  as  well  as  the  owners  of  the  tea.  He 
and  the  owners  signed  their  names  to  a  very  repentant  and 
humiliating  paper,  in  which  they  offered  to  burn  the  tea  in  the 
presence  of  the  multitude;  but  the  patriots  would  not  permit 
that,  because  in  order  to  be  burned  the  tea  would  have  to  be 
landed.  It  was  bad  enough  that  the  duty  had  been  paid,  and  if 
the  tea  itself  was  also  landed  the  whole  object  of  the  Ministry 
would  be  accomplished.  They  must  burn  ship,  cargo,  and  tea 
all  together. 

This  seemed  to  entail  such  loss  to  Stewart  and  also  to  his 
captain,  who  owned  a  small  interest  in  the  ship,  that  many 
patriots  objected  and  when  put  to  vote  in  a  meeting  a  large 
majority  decided  that  Stewart  need  not  burn  his  ship.  But 
the  minority  gave  such  significant  warnings  about  the  rest  of 

180 


PARLIAMENT  AROUSED 

his  property  and  his  life  that  Mr.  Stewart,  whose  wife  was 
about  to  be  delivered  of  a  child,  yielded  to  the  advice  of  his 
friends,  went  down  to  the  brig,  set  her  on  fire  with  his  own 
hands,  and  in  the  presence  of  a  large  crowd  of  people  watched 
her  and  the  cargo  burn  to  the  water's  edge.20 

But  neither  this  incident  nor  the  incident  of  the  eighteen 
cases  destroyed  in  New  York  moved  the  British  people  or  their 
government  to  make  the  punishment  general  or  look  beyond 
Boston  for  reparation.  The  destruction  by  a  Boston  mob  of 
over  £15,000  worth  of  tea,  the  private  property  of  the  East 
India  Company,  absorbed  their  whole  attention  and  awoke  both 
Whigs  and  Tories  from  their  dream  of  conciliation.  That  the 
mob  had  been  guided  by  respectable  and  wealthy  men  like 
Hancock,  Molineaux,  Warren,  and  Young,  who  prevented 
uproar  and  noise  and  enforced  decency  and  order,  made  it  all 
the  worse  in  English  eyes.  Parliament  and  the  Ministry 
resolved  at  all  hazards  and  at  any  cost  to  establish  British 
sovereignty  in  Massachusetts. 


20  Pennsylvania  Magazine  of  History,  vol.  25,  p.  248 ;  Eddis,  "  Letters 
from  America,"  pp.  171-185;  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  ii, 
p.  310,  vol.  i.  p.  885.  Warfield,  "  Founders  of  Anne  Arundel  and  Howard 
Counties,"  p.  445 ;  Riley,  "  History  of  the  General  Assembly  of  Mary- 
land," p.  302.  Mr.  Richard  D.  Fisher  has  collected  some  interesting 
documents  relating  to  the  burning  of  the  "  Peggy  Stewart,"  which  have 
been  deposited  with  the  Maryland  Historical  Society  and  were  published 
in  the  Baltimore  Neivs.  Stewart,  who  was  an  Englishman  by  birth  and 
a  merchant  of  wealth  and  prominence,  afterwards  became  a  loyalist,  his 
property  was  confiscated  and  his  life  closed  in  great  poverty  in  England. 


XV. 

THE  PUNISHMENT  OF  BOSTON 

The  Tory  party,  now  thoroughly  aroused,  aimed  their  first 
blow  at  Franklin.  The  petition  of  the  Massachusetts  legislature 
asking  for  the  removal  from  office  of  Governor  Hutchinson  and 
Lieutenant-Governor  Oliver  for  writing  the  Whately  letters  had 
been  pigeon-holed.  It  was  now  brought  before  the  Privy 
Council  for  decision.  Franklin  appeared  as  the  representative 
of  Massachusetts,  and  was  assailed  by  the  Solicitor  General, 
Alexander  Wedderburn,  in  a  speech  of  unexampled  denuncia- 
tion. He  was  charged  as  the  arch  plotter  and  traitor  who,  while 
living  in  England  as  a  peacemaker,  had  secretly  fomented  the 
rebellion  in  the  colonies,  and  had  been  guilty  of  the  most 
contemptible  of  all  petty  crimes,  the  stealing  of  private  letters. 

The  petition  of  the  Massachusetts  Assembly  was  rejected, 
Franklin  summarily  deprived  of  his  office  of  post-master  gen- 
eral of  the  colonies,  and  his  influence  in  England  as  a  repre- 
sentative of  the  colonies  destroyed.1  But  with  characteristic 
persistence  and  courage  he  remained  in  England  for  another 
year  and  even  when  finally  leaving  for  America  entertained 
the  hope  that  the  controversy  would  be  amicably  settled.1 

As  to  Boston,  that  town,  Englishmen  said,  must  be  fined  and 
pay  damages  for  allowing  private  property  to  be  destroyed  by 
a  mob  within  its  limits.  This  fine  could  not  very  well  be 
enforced  through  the  courts  of  Massachusetts,  and  there  were 
not  sufficient  troops  there  to  collect  it ;  but  there  was  a  consid- 
erable force  of  British  warships  in  those  waters ;  and  an  act  of 
Parliament  was  accordingly  passed,  known  as  the  Boston  Port 
Bill,  which  closed  the  harbor  of  the  town  by  the  blockade  of  a 
fleet.  No  trading  vessels  or  commerce  of  any  sort  could  pass 
in  or  out. 


1  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  i,  p.  235. 

182 


THE  BOSTON  PORT  BILL 

The  custom-house  officials,  "who  were  now  not  safe  in 
Boston  or  safe  no  longer  than  while  they  neglected  their  duty, ' ' 
were  moved  to  Salem.  This  closing  of  the  port  of  Boston  was 
to  continue  until  Boston,  by  her  own  official  act,  paid  for  the 
£15,000  worth  of  tea  she  had  allowed  to  be  destroyed,  and 
reimbursed  the  customs  officials  for  damage  done  by  the  mobs. 
When  the  governor  should  certify  that  this  had  been  done,  and 
that  the  colony  was  peaceable  and  orderly,  the  blockade  should 
be  removed  and  the  port  opened. 

There  was  some  slight  opposition  to  this  measure  in  Parlia- 
ment ;  but  the  bill  was  quite  generally  approved  by  both  parties. 
Even  extreme  Whigs  like  Colonel  Barre  were  in  favor  of  it  as  a 
just  and  proper  punishment,  in  the  interests  of  good  order,  for 
the  unpardonable  mob  violence  in  destroying  the  cargoes  of 
peaceful  British  merchant-vessels.  "I  like  it,"  said  Barre, 
' '  adopt  and  embrace  it  for  its  moderation. ' '  2 

Englishmen  argued  that  if  such  acts  as  destroying  the  tea 
were  allowed  to  go  unpunished,  British  commerce  would  not  be 
safe.  The  Boston  people,  they  said,  can  easily  escape  from 
any  hardships  they  suffer  from  the  closing  of  their  port  by 
simply  paying  for  the  tea.  The  punishment  is  not  tyranny, 
because  it  is  not  intended  to  be  perpetual.  It  will  not  last  an 
hour  after  they  make  reparation.    It  all  rests  with  themselves. 

The  Port  Bill  was  the  first  strong,  forceful  measure  under- 
taken by  Great  Britain,  and  yet  it  left  open  a  door  by  which  a 
return  could  be  made  to  the  conciliatory  policy.  If  the  tea 
were  paid  for  the  colonies  would  apparently  be  again  under  the 
let-alone  policy  by  which  the  moderate  patriots  believed  full 
freedom  would  be  eventually  attained.  There  was  a  strong 
feeling  in  the  patriot  party  throughout  the  country  in  favor  of 
paying  for  the  tea  as  an  act  of  good  policy  in  the  interests  of 
peace.  Franklin  was  in  favor  of  this  course  to  the  last,  and 
the  feeling  showed  itself  even  in  Boston,  where  the  loyalists 


2  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  i,  pp.  40,  514;  Annual  Regis- 
ter, 1774,  chap.  vi. 

183 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

and  moderates  tried  to  carry  a  town  meeting  in  favor  of 
payment.3 

But  the  extreme  patriots  declared  that  they  would  never 
pay  for  the  tea.  They  might  just  as  well,  they  said,  pay  for  the 
powder  and  ball  with  which  the  regulars  shot  down  Boston 
citizens  four  years  before  on  the  5th  of  March.  They  exerted 
themselves  to  the  utmost  to  prevent  payment.  They  argued 
that  the  town  had  no  legal  power  to  pay  for  the  tea  or  pay  any 
damages  to  any  one.  Only  the  assembly  could  authorize  such 
payment.  Some  of  them  quieted  the  scruples  of  the  moderates 
by  admitting  the  justice  of  payment,  but  at  the  same  time 
pointing  out  that  the  question  had  become  one  which  might 
affect  all  the  colonies;  and  there  would  in  all  probability  soon 
be  a  meeting  of  a  continental  congress.  It  would  be  better  to 
wait  till  then  and  take  the  sense  of  the  continent.  The  congress 
would  very  likely  recommend  payment  and  then  each  colony 
would  willingly  pay  its  share ;  whereas  if  Boston  or  the  Massa- 
chusetts Assembly  should  immediately  order  payment  the  other 
colonies  might  resent  it  as  submitting  to  the  tax  on  tea,  and 
thus  the  union  and  harmony  among  the  colonies  would  be 
destroyed.4 

Thus  payment  was  prevented;  there  was  no  return  to  the 
conciliatory  policy,  and  the  Revolution  moved  on.  The  Massa- 
chusetts patriots  stirred  the  whole  continent  into  a  state  of 
resentment  against  the  punishment  of  Boston.  It  was  a  punish- 
ment, they  said,  which  included  the  innocent  with  the  guilty, 
and  punished  the  whole  town  for  the  acts  of  a  few.  It  was 
absurd,  they  said,  to  ask  Boston  to  pay  for  the  tea,  for  by  closing 
her  port  the  town  within  a  few  weeks  lost  far  more  than  the 


3  Niles,  "  Principles  and  Acts  of  the  Revolution,"  edition  1876,  p.  206; 
Wells,  "Life  of  Samuel  Adams,"  vol.  ii,  pp.  175,  185,  186;  Franklin's 
Works,  Bigelow  edition,  vol.  v,  pp.  452,  454;  vol.  vii,  p.  3.  The  Virginia 
patriots  seem  to  have  been  opposed  to  payment.     (Niles,  supra,  p.  273.) 

4 "  Observations  on  the  Act  of  Parliament  Commonly  Called  the 
Boston  Port  Bill,"  Boston,  1774;  "The  Two  Congresses  Cut  Up,"  Boston, 
1774  (Carter  Brown  collection)  ;  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  i, 
p.  487. 

184 


ASSISTANCE  FOR  BOSTON 

value  of  the  tea.  Instead  of  such  wholesale  punishment,  the 
Government  should  proceed  in  the  regular  way  in  the  courts  of 
law  and  obtain  any  damages  that  were  due.  It  would  certainly 
have  been  rare  sport  for  the  patriots  to  watch  the  Government 
trying  to  obtain  verdicts  from  Boston  juries. 

No  attempt  was  made  to  punish  any  of  the  disguised  persons 
who  had  destroyed  the  tea.  Their  names  were  known  to  many ; 
and  in  modern  times  have  been  published.5 

The  closing  of  the  port  was  intended  to  be  severe,  and  it 
was  severe.  Within  a  few  weeks  thousands  of  people  were  out 
of  work  and  threatened  with  starvation.  "Would  Boston  be  able 
to  hold  out  indefinitely,  or  must  she  at  last  pay  for  the  tea 
and  the  other  damage  in  order  to  have  her  port  and  means  of 
livelihood  restored? 

The  people  of  the  country  districts  rallied  to  her  assistance 
and  began  sending  in  supplies  of  food.  Soon  this  system  spread 
to  the  other  colonies;  provisions  and  subscriptions  in  money 
began  streaming  along  all  the  colonial  roads,  even  from  far 
down  in  the  Southern  colonies.  If  this  could  be  kept  up 
England  was  beaten  again;  for  the  patriot  party  in  Boston 
would  hold  out  against  paying  for  the  tea  as  long  as  it  was 
possible.6 

The  supplies  were  continued  for  over  a  year.  But  such  a 
contest  could  not  be  kept  up  indefinitely.  A  break  would  have 
to  come,  and  what  that  break  should  be  depended  on  how  much 
rebellion  and  independence  Massachusetts  could  arouse  in  the 
other  colonies. 

The  second  measure  of  punishment  for  Boston  was  an  act  of 
Parliament  accomplishing  a  long-threatened  change  in  the 
Massachusetts  charter,  so  that  the  colony  could  be  held  under 


B  Drake,  "  Tea  Leaves,"  pp.  84,  85. 

6  The  loyalists,  who  were  now  beginning  to  be  heard  from,  objected 
to  these  supplies.  Boston,  they  said,  was  becoming  too  important.  Let 
her  take  care  of  herself.  One  of  them  complained  that  it  seemed  as  if 
"  God  had  made  Boston  for  Himself,  and  all.  the  rest  of  the  world  for 
Boston."      ("The  Congress  Canvassed,"  p.  17,  New  York,  1777.) 

185 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

control  and  prevented  from  rushing  at  its  will  to  independence. 
The  change  provided  that  the  governor's  counsel,  heretofore 
elected  by  the  legislative  assembly,  should  be  appointed  by  the 
Crown;  that  the  governor  should  appoint  and  remove  at 
pleasure  judges,  sheriffs,  and  all  executive  officers;  that  the 
judges '  salaries  should  be  paid  by  the  Crown  instead  of  by  the 
legislature;  that  town  meetings  should  be  prohibited,  except 
by  permit  from  the  governor;  that  juries,  instead  of  being 
elected  by  the  inhabitants,  should  be  selected  by  the  sheriffs. 

This  change  from  the  election  of  jurors  by  the  people  to 
the  selection  of  them  by  the  sheriffs  does  not  now  seem  a  serious 
change,  because  the  modern  method  is  to  have  all  jurors  selected 
by  the  sheriffs.  It  was  a  change,  however,  which  Parliament 
thought  very  important  because  the  election  of  jurors  by  the 
people  of  Massachusetts  was  believed  to  be  an  aid  to  riot  and 
rebellion. 

"  Juries  were  packed.  They  were  nominated  at  the  town  meetings  by 
the  heads  of  a  party.  A  jury,  for  instance,  was  summoned  to  inquire 
into  riots.  Among  these  impartial  and  respectable  jurors  one  was 
returned  who  was  a  principal  in  the  very  riot  into  which  it  was  the 
business  of  the  very  jury  to  inquire.  Can  any  man  entertain  a  moment's 
doubt  whether  this  part  of  their  constitution  stood  in  need  of  reforma- 
tion ? " — "  An  Answer  to  the  Declaration  of  the  American  Congress," 
London,  1776,  p.  69.    See  also  Annual  Register,  1774,  chap.  vii. 

All  these  alterations  in  the  charter  were  as  fiercely 
denounced  as  the  Boston  Port  Bill,  and  the  echoes  of  that 
denunciation  are  still  repeating  themselves  in  our  history.  But 
when  impartially  examined,  and  compared  with  other  instances 
of  colonial  regulation,  they  did  not  go  so  far  as  England  has 
often  gone  in  regulating  dependencies.  There  are  to-day 
dependencies  of  Great  Britain  which  have  no  better  government 
than  that  which  the  alteration  in  the  Massachusetts  charter 
provided,  and  many  that  have  less  self-government  than  was 
left  to  Massachusetts.  But  compared  with  the  semi-independ- 
ence Massachusetts  had  once  known,  and  the  absolute  inde- 
pendence she  was  seeking,  this  alteration  was  a  punishment 
which  set  her  patriot  party  furious  with  indignation. 

186 


AN  UNPOPULAR  LAW 

As  to  the  constitutional  right  to  alter  or  suspend  a  colonial 
charter  there  were  numerous  precedents.  William  III,  that 
great  founder  of  liberty,  once  withdrew  all  self-government 
from  both  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania  without  even  an  act  of 
Parliament ;  and  George  I  took  the  government  of  South  Caro- 
lina into  his  own  hands.  The  Crown  had  always  considered 
itself  at  liberty  to  grant  new  charters,  alter  old  ones,  or  take 
part  of  the  land  included  in  an  old  charter,  and  give  it  to 
another  colony.  New  charters  had  been  granted  and  rescinded 
for  Virginia  until  she  was  left  without  any  charter ;  part  of  her 
territory  had  been  given  to  Maryland ;  New  Jersey  charters  had 
been  granted  and  rescinded;  Massachusetts'  first  charter  can- 
celled and  a  new  one  granted ;  and  all  this  without  the  consent 
of  the  colonies  concerned.7 

Two  minor  measures  of  regulation  were  adopted:  a  law 
providing  that  persons  indicted  in  the  colonies  for  murder  in 
suppressing  riots  might  be  taken  for  trial  to  another  county,  or 
to  England;  and  a  law  legalizing  the  quartering  of  troops  on 
the  inhabitants  in  the  town  of  Boston.  All  these  measures  of 
punishment  became  laws  before  the  first  of  April,  and  were  to 
go  into  force  in  June,  1774. 

The  law  for  preventing  the  colonists  from  trying  for  murder 
British  officials  who  should  take  life  in  suppressing  riots  was 
severely  denounced  as  contrary  to  all  the  principles  of  English 
liberty,  and  Barre  was  very  much  opposed  to  it  as  unfair  and 
unnecessary.  He  pointed  out  that  Captain  Preston  and  his 
soldiers  who  were  tried  by  the  colonists  for  shooting  citizens  in 
the  streets  of  Boston,  in  March,  1770,  had  been  fairly  tried  by 
a  colonial  jury  and  most  of  them  acquitted.  But  the  supporters 
of  the  new  measure,  although  they  never  enforced  it,  rested 
its  rightfulness  on  the  reasons  recited  in  the  preamble,  namely, 
that  the  colonists  had  denied  the  authority  and  validity  of 
certain  acts  of  Parliament  and  it  was  reasonable  to  suppose 


7 "  The  Address  of  the  People  of  Great  Britain  to  the  Inhabitants  of 
America,"  p.  49,  London,  1775;  "An  Answer  to  the  Declaration  of  the 
American  Congress,"  p.  81,  London,  1776. 

187 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

that  their  juries  would  find  any  official  guilty  of  murder  who 
took  life  in  enforcing  those  acts.8 

Thoroughly  aroused,  at  last,  to  the  necessity  of  the  most 
strenuous  endeavors,  Parliament  at  this  same  time  passed  the 
famous  Quebec  Act.  Canada  had  been  in  an  unsettled  condi- 
tion ever  since  it  had  been  conquered  from  France  in  1763. 
It  was  ruled  by  military  governors,  with  the  French  population 
clamoring  for  their  old  French  rights,  and  the  less  numerous 
English  settlers  clamoring  against  the  French.  There  was 
supposed  to  be  danger  that  the  French  population  might  join 
the  union  that  was  forming  to  the  south  of  them.  Massachu- 
setts and  the  patriot  party  had  as  yet  done  nothing  to  secure 
the  Canadians.  It  would  be  well,  therefore,  to  cut  off  all  chance 
of  such  action ;  and  accordingly  we  find  the  Quebec  Act  giving 
to  those  French  people  their  Roman  Catholic  religion  estab- 
lished by  law,  the  French  code  of  laws  in  civil  matters,  and  the 
English  law  in  crimes. 

Having  thus  secured  the  loyalty  of  the  Canadian  French 
the  Act  went  on  and  established  what  was  considered  in  Amer- 
ica an  extremely  arbitrary  crown-colony  government,  of  a 
governor  and  council  appointed  by  the  Crown,  without  any 
legislature  or  representation  of  the  people,  and  without  trial  by 
jury;  and  the  boundaries  of  Canada  were  extended  southward 
to  the  Ohio  River  so  as  to  include  the  present  states  of  Ohio, 
Indiana,  Illinois,  Michigan,  Wisconsin,  and  Minnesota,  a  region 
which  the  patriot  party  hoped  to  have  for  their  own  Protestant 
expansion.9 


"American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  i,  pp.  112,  128,  129. 

9 "  The  Other  Side  of  the  Question ;  or,  a  Defence  of  the  Liberties  of 
North  America,"  p.  23,  New  York,  1774;  Hamilton's  Works,  Lodge 
edition,  vol.  i,  p.  173;  Annual  Register,  1774,  chap,  vii;  Achenwall, 
"  Observations  on  North  America,"  1767  (translated  by  J.  G.  Rosen- 
garten),  Philadelphia,  1903;  "Reflections  on  the  Present  Combination  of 
the  American  Colonies,"  p.  40,  London,  1777;  D'e  Courcy,  "Catholic 
Church  in  the  United  States"  (translated  by  Shea),  pp.  209,  210; 
Bourinot,  "Story  of  Canada,"  pp.  276-279,  304;  Gordon,  "American 
Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  i,  pp.  357,  359;  American  Archives,  fourth 
series,  vol.  ii,  p.  519. 

188 


A  CONGRESS  DEMANDED 

The  establishment  of  Roman  Catholicism  and  despotic  gov- 
ernment and  the  extending  of  these  institutions  to  the  westward 
of  the  colonists  in  the  fertile  valley  of  the  Mississippi  naturally 
aroused  the  patriot  party  to  still  greater  hostility  against  the 
mother-country.  But  from  England 's  point  of  view  the  Quebec 
Act  was  the  only  successful  measure  passed  by  Parliament  that 
year.  It  was  a  bold  and  sagacious  piece  of  statecraft  and  saved 
Canada  for  the  British  empire.  After  the  passage  of  that  Act 
all  our  efforts  to  win  over  the  Canadians  were  in  vain. 

The  weak  point  about  the  other  measures,  the  Boston  Port 
Bill  and  the  alterations  in  the  Massachusetts  charter,  was  that 
they  would  not  necessarily  prevent  Massachusetts  from  forming 
a  confederacy  of  all  the  colonies;  and  it  was  this  tendency  to 
united  action  and  a  confederacy  that  was  the  real  danger  to  the 
British  empire.  The  Massachusetts  patriots  saw  this  very 
clearly,  and  they  called  aloud  for  assistance  and  united  support. 
They  demanded  a  congress  of  delegates  from  all  of  the  colonies 
to  consider  the  Massachusetts  difficulty,  as  a  national  question 
concerning  them  all.  But  the  word  national  was  as  yet  too 
strong  to  be  used ;  so  continental  was  used,  and  the  congress  is 
still  known  as  the  continental  congress.10 


10  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  i,  pp.  oo,  412. 


XVI. 

THE  CULMINATION  OF  THE  PATRIOT  ARGUMENT 

The  Revolution  was  on  in  earnest,  and  all  over  the  country 
preparations  were  made  for  electing  the  continental  congress, 
the  most  daring  act  of  union  that  had  yet  been  attempted.  In 
every  colony  there  were  groups  of  patriots  or,  as  they  seemed  to 
the  English,  secret  knots  of  conspirators,  who  met,  like  Jeffer- 
son and  his  Virginia  friends,  at  the  Raleigh  Tavern  in  Williams- 
burg; or  like  Reed,  Dickinson,  Thomson,  and  Mifflin  in 
Philadelphia;  or  Sears,  Lamb,  McDougal,  and  Scott  in  New 
York.  In  Boston  the  North  End  Caucus  which  met  at  William 
Campbell's  house  and  at  the  Green  Dragon  Tavern  had  been 
established  by  Dr.  Joseph  Warren.  "We  were  so  careful," 
says  Paul  Revere, ' '  that  our  meetings  should  be  kept  secret,  that 
every  time  we  met  every  person  swore  upon  the  Bible  not  to 
discover  any  of  our  transactions  but  to  Hancock,  Warren,  or 
Church  and  one  or  two  more  leaders. " 1 

A  similar  organization,  called  the  Long  Room  Club,  pre- 
pared paragraphs  and  articles  for  the  Boston  Gazette,  which  in 
the  advocacy  of  extreme  opinions  far  outstripped  all  the  other 
patriot  newspapers.  Cushing,  Wells,  Otis,  Pemberton,  Gray, 
Austin,  Waldo,  Inches,  were  prominent  in  this  work,  as  well  as 
Quincy,  Mayhew,  Cooper,  Paine,  Molineaux,  Dexter,  Thatcher, 
Avery,  Crafts,  Barr,  Chase,  and  Eddis,  with  the  indefatigable 
Samuel  Adams.  John  Adams  describes  an  evening  spent  with 
some  of  these  choice  spirits  "  in  preparing  for  the  next  day's 
newspaper — a  curious  employment,  cooking  up  paragraphs, 
articles  and  occurrences,  &c,  working  the  political  engine."  2 


1  Drake,  "  Tea  Leaves,"  p.  23. 

2  John  Adams,  Works,  vol.  ii,  pp.  162,  219;  Hudson,  "  Journalism  in 
America,"  pp.  102,  105. 

100 


ADAMS  AND  HANCOCK 

All  the  clubs  and  groups  seem  to  have  been  a  part  of  the 
general  organization  of  the  Sons  of  Liberty  which  was  found  in 
every  colony.  It  managed  the  details  of  the  revolutionary 
movement,  was  very  secret  in  its  councils,  with  private  pass- 
words and  other  precautions  against  the  investigations  of 
loyalists  or  British  government  agents.  As  it  grew  in  impor- 
tance it  rivalled  in  authority  the  regular  government;  it  had 
its  headquarters  in  New  York,  with  a  system  of  correspondence 
all  over  the  country  and  means  of  obtaining  exact  information 
from  England.  In  its  early  days  in  Boston  in  January,  1766, 
John  Adams  describes  it  as  occupying  a  very  small  room  in 
Chase  and  Speakman's  distillery  in  Hanover  Square.3 

Of  the  numerous  names  of  the  Boston  patriot  workers  all 
are  now  meaningless  to  most  of  us  except  Adams,  Hancock, 
Warren,  and  Otis;  and  of  these  Samuel  Adams  and  John 
Hancock  are  now  best  known,  and  were  in  their  day  also  the 
most  conspicuous.  They  were  regarded  as  typical  of  all  the 
rest,  and  more  persistent  and  effective.  In  the  offers  of  pardon, 
which  the  British  Government  soon  began  to  make,  John 
Hancock  and  Samuel  Adams  were  always  excepted.  Their 
conduct  was  regarded  as  absolutely  unpardonable ;  and  if  Great 
Britain  had  been  able  to  use  a  little  more  power,  or  to  use  it 
more  quickly,  as  she  has  done  at  times  in  Ireland  or  in  India 
or  in  the  Canadian  rebellion  of  1837,  there  is  very  little  doubt 
that  these  two  worthy  patriots  would  have  ended  their  careers 
on  a  gallows  in  London  and  their  ghastly  heads  would  have 
ornamented  London  Bridge  or  Temple  Bar. 

It  is  not  altogether  clear  why  the  ministry  regarded  Hancock 
as  such  a  particularly  dangerous  patriot.  One  would  suppose 
that  Otis,  or  Warren,  or  the  publishers  of  the  Boston  Gazette 
had  been  far  more  effective  in  developing  the  revolutionary 
movement.  Hancock  had  none  of  the  arts  of  the  orator  or  the 
writer ;  he  had  framed  no  remarkable  arguments  on  the  patriot 


3  Drake,  "  Tea  Leaves,"  p.   24 ;    Pennsylvania  Magazine  of  History, 
vol.  25,  p.  438. 

191 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

side;  nor  does  he  appear  to  have  been  more  active  in  party 
management  than  many  of  the  others. 

He  was  a  young  man,  thirty-six  years  old,  fond  of  dress; 
somewhat  vain  and  sensitive,  his  critics  said ;  and  it  afterwards 
appeared  that  he  fancied  he  could  command  armies..  He  was 
more  conspicuous  for  his  wealth  than  for  any  personal  quality. 
He  had  recently  inherited  his  uncle 's  fortune  and  business  as  a 
merchant  and  the  wealth  and  position  may  have  aided  the 
patriot  cause  in  ways  which  were  well  known  at  the  time.  He 
risked  a  great  deal  by  becoming  a  patriot,  and  his  devotion  to 
that  cause  must  have  grown  out  of  a  strong  and  honest  convic- 
tion of  its  merits.  His  uncle  had  been  a  loyalist;  and  one 
would  suppose  that  regard  for  the  safety  of  the  inherited  wealth 
would  have  led  the  nephew  to  loyalism.  But  he  was,  on  the 
contrary,  ready  to  sacrifice  his  whole  fortune  for  independence. 
Most  of  his  property  consisted  of  houses  in  Boston,  and  when 
the  question  arose  whether  Boston  should  be  burned  to  prevent 
its  occupation  by  the  British,  he  urged  Washington  not  to 
hesitate  on  his  account. 

His  uncle's  fortune  was  reputed  to  have  been  amassed  by 
the  methods  which  violated  the  laws  of  navigation  and  trade. 
He  himself  was  believed  to  have  continued  those  methods  and 
it  was  his  sloop  " Liberty"  and  her  cargo  which  were  rescued 
by  the  mob  in  the  riot  that  caused  the  troops  to  be  sent  to  control 
Boston.  The  Ministry  perhaps  connected  him  with  this  dis- 
order, and  believed  that  a  young  man  of  such  wealth  and 
position  who  associated  himself  with  smuggling,  rioting,  and 
revolutionary  ideas,  should  be  made  a  conspicuous  example  by 
the  severest  punishment  that  could  be  inflicted. 

As  for  Samuel  Adams,  it  is  not  difficult  to  see  why  he  was 
honored  as  the  other  unpardonable  American.  He  gradually 
became  less  conspicuous  after  the  tea  episode ;  and  in  the  later 
stages  of  the  Revolution,  though  continuing  a  member  of  the 
Congress,  he  adopted  very  narrow-minded  views,  was  always 
opposed  to  Washington,  feared  his  becoming  a  dictator,  and 
suspected  France  of  ulterior  purposes  on  our  liberties  and 
territory.    But  up  to  the  battle  of  Lexington,  if  we  can  judge 

192 


SAMUEL  ADAMS 

from  contemporary  comment,  no  one  of  the  patriot  leaders  was 
so  well  known  or  so  thoroughly  detested  by  both  Englishmen 
and  loyalists. 

He  was  a  man  of  good  education,  a  graduate  of  Harvard 
College;  the  public  documents  he  prepared  show  considerable 
ability;  and  his  patriot  arguments  in  the  Boston  Gazette  are 
quite  remarkable  for  dialectical  skill  and  cautious  sagacity 
in  leading  up  to  his  very  advanced  opinions. 

The  portrait  we  have  of  him,  which  has  often  been  repro- 
duced, represents  what  would  seem  to  be  a  stout,  handsomely 
dressed,  prosperous  merchant,  with  a  very  firm  chin  and  jaw, 
proud  of  his  wealth  and  success,  and  proud  of  his  long-tested 
ability  in  business.  Unfortunately,  the  only  part  of  this 
portrait  which  is  true  to  life  is  that  iron-like  jaw.  Samuel 
Adams  was  not  a  merchant,  was  seldom  well  dressed,  was  not 
at  all  proud,  and  never  rich.  He  was  always  poor.  He  failed 
in  his  malting  business,  was  unthrifty  and  careless  with  money, 
and  had,  in  fact,  no  liking  for,  or  ability  in,  any  business  except 
politics.  He  lived  with  his  family  in  a  dilapidated  house  on 
Purchase  Street,  and  when  in  1774  he  was  elected  a  delegate 
to  the  Continental  Congress  at  Philadelphia,  his  admirers  had 
to  furnish  the  money  to  make  him  look  presentable. 

However  some  may  despise  him,  he  has  certainly  very  many  friends. 
For  not  long  since,  some  persons  (their  names  unknown)  sent  and  asked 
his  permission  to  build  him  a  new  barn,  the  old  one  being  decayed,  which 
was  executed  in  a  few  days.  A  second  sent  to  ask  leave  to  repair  his 
house,  which  was  thoroughly  effected  soon.  A  third  sent  to  beg  the  favor 
of  him  to  call  at  a  tailor's  shop,  and  be  measured  for  a  suit  of  clothes, 
and  choose  his  cloth,  which  were  finished  and  sent  home  for  his  accept- 
ance. A  fourth  presented  him  with  a  new  wig,  a  fifth  with  a  new  hat, 
a  sixth  with  six  pairs  of  the  best  silk  hose,  a  seventh  with  six  pairs  of 
fine  thread  ditto,  an  eighth  with  six  pairs  of  shoes,  and  a  ninth  modestly 
inquired  of  him  whether  his  finances  were  not  rather  low  than  otherwise. 
He  replied  it  was  true  that  was  the  case,  but  he  was  very  indifferent 
about  these  matters,  so  that  his  poor  abilities  were  of  any  service  to  the 
public;  upon  which  the  gentleman  obliged  him  to  accept  a  purse  con- 
taining about  fifteen  or  twenty  Johannes.  I  mention  this  to  show  you 
how  much  he  is  esteemed  here.  They  value  him  for  his  good  sense,  great 
abilities,  amazing  fortitude,  noble  resolution,  and  undaunted  courage; 
13  193 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

being  firm  and  unmoved  at  all  the  various  reports  that  were  propagated 
in  regard  to  his  being  taken  up  and  sent  home,  notwithstanding  he  had 
repeated  letters  from  his  friends,  both  in  England  as  well  as  here,  to 
keep  out  of  the  way. — Wells,  "  Life  of  Samuel  Adams,"  vol.  ii,  p.  209. 

All  this  assistance  Adams  was  not  too  proud  to  accept.  A 
year  afterwards,  when  he  quitted  Boston  at  the  time  of  the 
battle  of  Lexington,  these  new  clothes  were  left  in  his  house 
and  he  could  not  return  for  them  with  the  British  troops 
occupying  the  town  under  orders  to  capture  him  and  send  him 
to  England.  He  required  good  clothes  in  which  to  attend  the 
congress  of  May,  1775,  in  Philadelphia;  but  was  so  poor  that 
he  felt  justified  in  charging  the  expense  of  a  new  outfit  on  the 
public  funds  of  Massachusetts.4 

He  had  long  been  engaged  in  small  local  politics.  His 
father  had  been  so  successful  in  organizing  the  ship-calkers 
for  political  purposes  that  the  modern  word  caucus  is  supposed 
to  be  a  corruption  of  his  ' '  Calker  's  Club. ' '  The  son  displayed 
even  greater  talent  in  political  management,  and  the  small 
salaries  furnished  the  means  which,  with  the  aid  of  a  thrifty 
New  England  wife,  gave  him  some  of  the  comforts  of  home  in 
the  old  house  on  Purchase  Street. 

He  had  been  made  one  of  the  tax  collectors  of  Boston  shortly 
before  the  time  of  the  Stamp  Act,  and  had  failed  to  collect  and 
turn  over  such  a  large  part  of  the  taxes  committed  to  him,  that 
suit  was  brought  against  him  by  the  city  treasurer,  and  judg- 
ment obtained  for  a  sum  which  would  have  ruined  him  and 
sent  him  to  prison  if  a  town  meeting  and  the  legislature  had 
not  come  to  his  rescue.5 

"  Samuel  Adams  had  great  virtue,  but  he  was  not  a  good  collector  of 
taxes.  He  was  not  even  a  good  man  of  business.  Neither  in  the  Provin- 
cial Assembly  nor  in  the  Continental  Congress  did  he  shine  as  a  practical 
legislator.    His  crude  notions  as  to  maintaining  the  army  and  conducting 


4  Hosmer,  "  Life  of  Samuel  Adams,"  pp.  37-47,  240. 

6  Wells,  "  Life  of  Samuel  Adams,"  vol.  i,  pp.  3,  273,  37-40  note; 
vol.  ii,  p.  301;  Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  i, 
pp.  348,  365 ;  Hutchinson,  "  History  of  Massachusetts,"  vol.  iii,  pp.  274, 
275;  Mass.  Hist.  Soe.  Proc,  1882-1883,  vol.  20,  pp.  213-226. 

194 


HATRED  FOR  ADAMS 

the  war  gave  Washington  infinite  trouble;  and  when  he  became  governor, 
he  did  not  administer  his  office  particularly  well. 

"  That  anybody  should  ever  have  thought  to  make  Samuel  Adams  a 
collector  of  taxes  is  a  marvel.  His  hatred  of  taxes  was  not  so  much  a 
conviction  as  an  instinct.  Apart  from  his  unbusiness-like  habits,  he  was 
about  as  well  fitted  to  collect  taxes  as  Garrison  to  personally  conduct  a 
coffle,  or  Andrew  to  work  a  guillotine." — Massachusetts  Historical  Society 
Proceedings,  1882-1883,  vol.  20,  pp.  224,  225. 

The  patriots  easily  forgave  Adams  this  lapse,  which  was 
not  repeated  in  his  subsequent  career ;  and  his  political  influence 
and  importance  rapidly  increased.  But  among  loyalists  and 
Englishmen  his  misfortune  in  the  tax  office,  coupled  with  his 
poverty  and  shiftlessness,  and  a  constitutional  tremulousness  of 
his  head  and  hands,  naturally  intensified  the  disgust  with  which 
those  opponents  of  the  revolutionary  movement  regarded  him. 
No  epithets  of  abuse  were  too  strong  for  this  patriot  who,  they 
said,  had  deluded  the  youthful  and  wealthy  Hancock. 

"  With  his  oily  tongue  he  duped  a  man  whose  brains  were  shallow 
and  pockets  deep,  and  ushered  him  to  the  public  as  a  patriot,  too.  He 
filled  his  head  with  importance  and  emptied  his  pockets,  and  as  a  reward 
kicked  him  up  the  ladder,  where  he  now  presides  over  the  "  Twelve 
United  Provinces,"  and  where  they  both  are  at  present  plunging  you, 
my  countrymen,  into  the  depths  of  distress." — Wells,  "  Adams,"  vol.  ii, 
p."  431. 

"  Mr.  Adams's  character  may  be  defined  in  a  few  words.  He  is  a 
hypocrite  in  religion — a  republican  in  politics — of  sufficient  cunning  to 
form  a  consummate  knave — possessed  of  as  much  learning  as  is  necessary 
to  disguise  the  truth  with  sophistry,  and  so  complete  a  moralist  that"  it 
is  one  of  his  favorite  maxims  that  "  the  end  will  justify  the  means." 
When  to  such  accomplished  talents  and  principles  we  add  an  empty 
pocket,  an  unbounded  ambition,  and  a  violent  disaffection  to  Great 
Britain,  we  shall  be  able  to  form  some  idea  of  Mr.  Samuel  Adams." — 
"Independency  the  Object  of  the  Congress,"  pp.  15,  16;  Wells,  "Adams," 
vol.  ii,  p.  426. 

Adams's  capacity  for  inspiring  all  this  British  hatred  lay 
in  his  unusual  skill  and  indefatigable  persistence  in  party  man- 
agement. Incompetent  in  money  matters  and  business,  and 
unable  to  grasp  the  larger  and  more  complicated  questions  of 
statecraft  which  arose  later  in  the  Revolution,  he  was  neverthe- 
less of  infinite  value  in  the  early  stages  as  an  organizer  of 

195 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

agitation  and  a  master  of  the  small  details.  He  watched  the 
growth  of  every  promising  young  man  in  Massachusetts,  won 
his  interest  and  affection,  and  drew  him  to  the  side  of  patriot- 
ism and  independence.  He  understood  the  temper  of  the  people 
from  the  bottom,  and  knew  how  to  draw  them  into*  the  move- 
ment of  the  Revolution.  An  account  of  his  language  and  advice 
to  such  people,  to  fight  England,  to  ' '  destroy  every  soldier  that 
dare  put  his  foot  on  shore, ' '  and  that  ' '  we  shall  have  it  in  our 
power  to  give  laws  to  England,"  was  reported  to  the  home 
government  as  a  basis  of  an  indictment  for  treason.6 

He  was  assailed  or  lauded  as  Sam  the  Malster,  Sam  the 
Publican,  the  Father  of  America,  the  Palinurus  of  the  Revolu- 
tion, the  Grand  Incendiary,  the  American  Cato.  He  was  one 
of  those  men  whom  we  call  a  devoted  and  enlightened  patriot, 
or  scoundrel,  conspirator,  and  fanatic,  according  as  we  are  on 
the  side  of  the  government  or  of  the  rebellion.  He  was  unques- 
tionably one  of  England's  most  dangerous  enemies;  and  if  the 
expansion  of  the  British  empire  is  as  right  and  beneficent  as 
Englishmen  believe  it,  Adams  was  the  worst  political  criminal 
that  has  ever  lived. 

The  clear-sighted  consistency  and  determination  of  purpose 
with  which  he  labored  to  shape  the  first  arguments  of  the 
Revolution  were  more  than  mere  political  agitation.  He  saw 
that  there  was  only  one  issue.  He  spurned  all  compromises. 
All  modifications  of  colonial  rule  to  make  it  easier  or  better 
were  to  him  mere  delusions.  The  liberality  of  the  "Whigs  or 
the  conciliatory  policy  of  the  Tories,  their  affectation  of  broad- 
mindedness  and  friendliness,  those  methods  which  in  modern 
times  we  have  learned  to  call  pacific  penetration,  were  to  him 
mere  cunning  means  of  inducing  a  weaker  people  to  hew 
wood  and  draw  water  for  the  stronger,  or  imperceptibly  to  sur- 
render their  national  rights.  Colonialism  in  itself  was  wrong ; 
any  form  of  it  was  to  him  despicable  and  contemptible  beyond 
expression;  and  to  its  utter  destruction  he  devoted  all  the 
powers  of  his  being. 


Hosmer,  "Life  of  Samuel  Adams,"  p.  117 

196 


ADVANCEMENT  OF  ARGUMENT 

Among  all  the  millions  of  patriots  who  in  almost  every 
climate  of  the  world  have  resisted  the  British  empire  and  her 
methods,  and  who  for  their  resistance  have  perished  in  battle, 
on  the  scaffold,  or  in  exile,  it  is  not  likely  that  there  have  been 
any  who  were  more  sincere  and  earnest  in  their  hatred  of  alien 
rule  than  Samuel  Adams ;  and  most  wonderful  of  all,  he  escaped 
all  changes  and  chances,  lived  to  see  the  full  measure  of  his 
passion  gratified,  his  most  extreme  ideas  adopted,  and  the  new 
nation  of  his  fondest  hopes  created  out  of  the  ruins  of 
colonialism. 

His  extreme  views  of  abolishing  altogether  the  British  con- 
nection were  shared,  of  course,  by  many  who  did  not  openly 
avow  them.  But  now,  in  1774,  the  patriot  party  had  educated 
itself  up  to  these  radical  opinions  and  was  on  the  eve  of  form- 
ally adopting  them.  All  acts  of  Parliament  that  had  been  dis- 
liked had  now  been  either  repealed,  disregarded,  or  defeated  by 
force.  The  only  acts  that  were  enforced  were  old  ones  like 
the  Post-office  Act,  which  had  always  been  regarded  as  great 
conveniences.  Even  these  might  soon  be  disposed  of;  for  in 
July,  1774,  the  Maryland  Journal,  a  patriot  newspaper,  was  so 
enterprising  that  it  started  an  American  post-office  to  carry 
the  Southern  mails  and  take  the  place  of  the  British  Colonial 
post-office  established  by  Parliament.7 

The  patriot  argument  had  now  advanced  to  the  position  of 
denying  all  authority  of  Parliament.  The  old  notion  that 
Parliament  had  full  power  over  the  colonies  except  in  the  one 
item  of  internal  taxes,  and  Dickinson's  distinction  that  Parlia- 
ment had  no  authority  except  to  regulate  their  external  ocean 
commerce,  were  both  thrown  to  the  winds  as  rubbish;  and  a 
new  ground  was  taken  that  only  the  king,  the  original  creator 
of  the  colonies,  had  any  authority  over  them.  All  acts  of 
Parliament,  even  those  like  the  Post-office  Act,  that  the  colon- 
ists had  accepted  and  lived  under  for  generations,  were  mere 
usurpations,  accepted  perhaps  without  protest,  because,  as  the 
Continental  Congress  afterwards  put  it,  the  colonists  "were 


''American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  i,  p.  500. 

197 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

too  sensible  of  their  weakness  to  be  fully  sensible  of  their 
rights." 

The  argument  in  support  of  this  new  position  was  largely 
based  upon  the  charters.  Those  charters,  the  patriots  said, 
contained  words  which  cut  off  Parliament  entirely  from  any 
control  of  those  much-discussed  internal  affairs,  or  vital  organs, 
of  the  colonies.  Some  of  the  charters,  they  said,  might  at  first 
appear  non-committal,  or  seem  to  say  nothing  directly  about 
the  authority  of  Parliament.  But  these  non-committal  ones 
often  contained  general  expressions  giving  a  great  deal  of 
vague  authority  to  the  colony  or  to  its  legislature;  and  such 
authority,  given  in  such  a  broad  and  general  way,  must  be 
exclusive  and  imply  an  extinguishment  of  any  rights  of  Parlia- 
ment. 

Queen  Elizabeth's  charter  to  Sir  Walter  Raleigh  gave  him 
such  vast  prerogatives  and  privileges  in  America,  was  so 
sweeping  and  general,  that  it  must  have  been  intended  to  ex- 
clude the  authority  of  Parliament.  The  first  Virginia  charter 
provided  that  the  colony  was  to  be  ruled  by  such  laws  as  the 
king  should  make,  which  necessarily  excluded,  it  was  said,  the 
making  of  laws  by  Parliament.  There  was  a  clause  which  said 
that  the  colonists  should  have  the  same  liberties  in  other 
British  dominions  "as  if  they  had  been  abiding  and  born 
within  our  realm  of  England,"  which  showed  that  the  colony 
was  a  territory  outside  of  the  realm,  and  therefore,  inferenti- 
ally,  outside  of  all  authority  of  Parliament.  The  second  Vir- 
ginia charter  declared  that  all  the  colony's  privileges  were  to 
be  held  of  the  king,  which  again  excluded  all  authority  of 
Parliament.  Indeed,  such  charters  as  those  of  Connecticut 
and  Rhode  Island,  which  gave  such  large  privileges  to  the 
colonists,  and  spoke  only  of  the  colonists  and  the  king  without 
any  mention  of  Parliament,  seemed  to  exclude  the  authority  of 
Parliament. 

Diligent  students  also  found  instances  where  the  action  of 
British  officials,  and  even  of  Parliament  itself,  looked  in  the 
same  direction.  In  April,  1621,  a  bill  had  been  introduced  in 
Parliament  for  indulging  British  subjects  with  the  privilege  of 

198 


THE  PENNSYLVANIA  CHARTER 

fishing  on  the  coast  of  America;  but  the  House  was  informed 
through  the  Secretary  of  State,  by  order  of  his  Majesty,  King 
James,  that  "  America  was  not  annexed  to  the  realm,  and 
that  it  was  not  fitting  that  Parliament  should  make  laws  for 
these  countries." 

This  was  certainly  strong  evidence,  and  supported  all  that 
had  been  said.  The  evidence  became  stronger  still  when  they 
found  that  some  years  afterwards,  in  the  reign  of  Charles  I, 
the  same  bill  had  been  again  proposed  in  Parliament,  and  the 
same  answer  made  that  "it  was  unnecessary;  that  the  colonies 
were  without  the  realm  and  the  jurisdiction  of  Parliament. ' ' 8 

These  charters  and  the  action  of  high  officials  seemed  to 
show  that  in  the  early  days  Parliament  had  no  authority  what- 
ever over  the  colonies;  could  not  tax  them,  and  could  not 
regulate  their  internal  affairs  in  any  way  whatsoever.  The 
colonies  were,  in  short,  outside  the  realm  and  to  be  controlled 
only  by  the  king. 

There  was  one  charter,  however,  that  of  Pennsylvania, 
granted  in  1681,  which  looked  the  other  way.  It  provided  in 
unmistakable  language  that  the  king  could  never  levy  any 
custom  or  tax  on  the  inhabitants  of  the  province  except  "with 
the  consent  of  the  proprietors,  or  chief  governor  or  assembly, 
or  by  act  of  Parliament  in  England."  That  was  a  flat  contra- 
diction of  the  doctrine  drawn  from  the  other  charters,  and  what 
could  be  done  with  it  ?  Pennsylvania  could  surely  be  taxed  by 
Parliament  as  much  as  Parliament  pleased;  and  her  people, 
said  the  loyalists,  had  no  possible  excuse  for  their  rebellion 
except  to  call  it  by  its  name  and  fight  it  out.  But  the  patriot 
writers  replied  that  such  a  reservation  of  the  right  to  tax  showed 
that  there  could  be  no  such  right  without  express  reservation. 

The  king,  the  patriots  went  on  to  say,  had  originally 
granted  the  charters  to  the  colonies  because  in  the  early  times 
Parliament  had  no  power  to  charter  corporations.     He  had 


8 "  The  Farmer  Refuted,"  p.  27 ;  Hamilton,  Works,  Lodge  edition, 
vol.  i,  pp.  53,  89 ;  "  An  Address  on  Public  Liberty  in  General  and  Ameri- 
can Affairs  in  Particular,"  p.  17,  London,  1774;  American  Archives, 
fourth  series,  vol.  i,  pp.  338,  448. 

199 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

also  given  the  colonists  the  title  to  the  land  they  were  to 
occupy  in  America,  for  Parliament  had  not  then  the  right 
to  grant  away  the  public  domain.  He  had  also  given  the  colo- 
nists permission  to  leave  the  realm,  a  permission  which  at 
that  time  could  be  granted  only  by  the  king.  These  facts 
showed,  it  was  said,  that  the  colonies  were  exclusively  the  king 's 
property,  because  he  and  not  Parliament  had  created  them. 
They  were  completely  outside  of  parliamentary  jurisdiction, 
and  were  to  be  ruled  by  the  king  alone. 

This  meant  no  rule  at  all,  because  the  king  had  now  lost 
nearly  all  his  old  powers,  which  had  been  absorbed  by  Parlia- 
ment ;  and  this  thread  of  attachment  to  the  king  was,  of  course, 
much  ridiculed  by  the  loyalists  as  well  as  by  people  in  England.9 

"  Here  we  have  a  full  view  of  the  plan  of  the  delegates  of  North 
America,  which,  when  examined,  appears  to  be  that  of  absolute  inde- 
pendence on  the  mother-state.  But  conscious  that  a  scheme  which  ha9 
so  great  a  tendency  to  the  forfeiture  of  her  rights,  and  so  destructive 
to  her  safety  and  happiness,  could  not  meet  with  the  approbation  and 
support  of  the  colonists  in  general,  unless  in  some  measure  disguised, 
they  have  endeavored  to  throw  a  veil  over  it,  by  graciously  conceding 
to  the  mother-state  a  whimsical  authority,  useless  and  impractical,  in 
the  nature." — "A  Candid  Examination  of  the  Mutual  Claims  of  Great 
Britain  and  the  Colonies,"  p.  27,  New  York,  1775. 

The  argument  was,  in  effect,  that  the  colonies  were  inde- 
pendent in  government  and  merely  under  the  protecting  in- 
fluence of  the  king  who  would  keep  foreign  nations  from  inter- 
fering with  them,  a  condition  which  in  international  law  is 
called  a  protectorate.  They  could  not  be  brought  into  subjec- 
tion to  Parliament,  because  the  king,  as  Edward  Bancroft 
put  it,  "had  a  right  to  constitute  distinct  states  in  America,' ' 
and  had  so  constituted  the  colonies.  No  power  could  unite 
them  to  the  realm  or  to  the  authority  of  Parliament  without 
the  consent  of  the  king  and  their  own  consent,  given  as  form- 
ally and  as  solemnly  as  Scotland  gave  her  consent  to  the  union 


•Niles,  "Principles  and  Acts  of  the  Revolution,"  edition  1876,  p. 
204 ;  Snow,  "  Administration  of  Dependencies,"  pp.  223,  294 ;  "  The  Asso- 
ciation," by  "  Bob  Jingle,"  being  some  political  verses  of  the  period. 

200 


GREAT  CHANGE  SINCE  1688 

with  England.  Such  consent,  so  far  as  the  colonies  were  con- 
cerned, had  never  been  given.10 

This  argument  Englishmen  might  admit  to  be  entirely 
sound  up  to  a  certain  point.  The  colonies  as  originally  consti- 
tuted had  been  perhaps  the  creations  of  the  Crown,  and  Parlia- 
ment had  had  little  or  nothing  to  do  with  them.  But  had  not 
that  condition  changed  and  had  not  Parliament  since  the  year 
1700  gradually  acquired  an  authority  in  the  colonies? 

All  those  instances  of  the  exclusion  of  the  authority  of 
Parliament  from  the  colonies  occurred  previous  to  the  year 
1700 ;  not  a  single  instance  could  be  found  after  that  date.  In 
fact,  a  totally  reverse  condition  could  be  found;  for  it  was 
since  that  time  that  Parliament  had  been  habitually  regulating 
the  internal  affairs  of  the  colonies;  and  until  quite  recently 
the  colonists  had  submitted  to  it. 

Those  charters  containing  clauses  impliedly  excluding 
Parliament  from  the  government  of  the  colonies,  and  those 
admissions  by  British  officials  to  the  same  effect,  were  previous 
to  the  revolution  of  1688,  by  which  any  power  there  might 
have  been  in  the  crown  to  dispense  with  or  abrogate  laws  or 
rights  of  Parliament  was  abolished.  If  the  king,  in  granting 
those  early  charters,  intended  to  abrogate  or  dispense  with 
the  taxing  power  or  any  other  legislative  power  of  Parliament 
in  the  colonies,  those  charters  were  to  that  extent  now  void, 
because  the  dispensing  power  of  the  English  kings  had  been 
abolished  by  the  revolution  of  1688,  which  put  William  III 
on  the  throne.  In  other  words,  the  dispensing  power  had  been 
abolished  for  nearly  a  hundred  years;  and  the  colonists,  as 
good  Whigs  and  lovers  of  liberty,  would  surely  not  uphold  the 
wicked  dispensing  power  of  the  Stuart  kings  against  whom 
their  Puritan  ancestors  had  fought.11 


10 "  Remarks  on  the  Review  of  the  Controversy  between  Great  Britain 
and  her  Colonies,"  pp.  48,  49 ;  Jenkyns,  "  British  Rule  and  Jurisdiction 
beyond  the  Seas,"  p.  165. 

11  It  was  and  still  is  the  unbroken  opinion  of  English  lawyers  that 
all  charters  which  kings  had  granted  were  since  1689  subordinate  to  the 
will  of  Parliament.    Indeed,  any  one  who  has  made  the  slightest  attempt 

201 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

Moreover,  said  Englishmen,  the  present  King  George  III, 
whom  the  colonists  pretend  to  be  so  anxious  to  have  govern 
them,  to  the  exclusion  of  Parliament,  is  king  by  the  act  of 
Parliament  which  placed  the  house  of  Hanover  on  the  throne. 
The  colonists  are,  therefore,  compelled  to  acknowledge  that 
Parliament  can  give  them  a  king,  which  is,  of  all  other  things, 
the  highest  act  of  sovereignty  and  legislative  power.  If  Parlia- 
ment has  the  right  to  give  them  a  king,  it  surely  has  the  right 
to  tax  them  or  rule  them  in  every  other  way.  Since  the  revo- 
lution of  1688  Parliament  has  become  omnipotent.  One  hun- 
dred years  ago  it  may  have  been  the  law  that  Parliament  had 
no  authority  in  the  colonies,  but  within  the  last  hundred  years 
the  law  has  evidently  changed,  for  Parliament  has  been  exer- 
cising in  them  a  great  deal  of  authority,  which  the  colonists 
cannot  deny. 

The  colonists  were,  therefore,  asking  for  independence  of 
Parliament  under  an  ancient  form  of  the  British  Constitu- 
tion,— a  form  which  had  been  abolished  in  the  previous  century 
by  their  friends  the  Whigs  and  William  III.  In  the  time  of 
those  old  Virginia  charters  Parliament  was  of  little  importance 
and  small  authority.  Sometimes  many  years  passed  without  a 
Parliament  being  held.  The  king  was  then  necessarily  the  im- 
portant power  in  the  government.  He  both  created  and 
governed  the  colonies.  But  Parliament  had  now  become 
vastly  more  powerful.  It  was  in  session  part  of  every  year. 
The  revolution  of  1688,  the  steady  development  of  ideas,  the 
needs  of  a  nation  that  was  rapidly  increasing  its  trade  and 
commerce  and  adding  new  conquests  and  territories  to  its 
domain,   compelled  a  very   different,   a  more   powerful,   far- 


to  understand  the  development  of  English  history  knows  that  for  a 
century  previous  to  1689,  under  the  Stuart  kings,  the  great  contest  was 
whether  Parliament  had  any  power  at  all.  That  was  the  problem  with 
which  Cromwell  struggled,  and  the  problem  which  William  III  solved 
in  favor  of  Parliament  in  1689.  (See  Bernard's  "Select  Letters  on  the 
Trade  and  Government  of  America,"  London,  1774.) 

202 


PARLIAMENT  OMNIPOTENT 

reaching  Parliament  than  that  of  the  time  of  Charles  I,  who 
hated  parliaments  and  tried  to  rule  without  them.12 

Parliament  had  abolished  the  former  powers  of  the  king 
and  extended  itself  to  every  part  of  the  empire,  just  as  to-day 
the  power  of  Parliament  is  sovereign  and  unlimited  over  all  the 
British  colonies.  To  suppose  that  there  was  any  part  of  the 
empire  to  which  the  whole  power  of  Parliament  did  not  extend 
was  as  absurd  to  an  Englishman  in  1774  as  it  is  to-day.  It 
had  the  same  authority  over  the  people  in  America  that  it  had 
over  the  people  in  London. 

"  It  is  a  contradiction,  in  the  nature  of  things,"  said  one  of  the 
ablest  loyalists,  "  and  as  absurd  as  that  a  part  should  be  greater  than 
the  whole,  to  suppose  that  the  supreme  legislative  power  of  any  king- 
dom does  not  extend  to  the  utmost  bounds  of  that  kingdom.  If  these 
colonies,  which  originally  belonged  to  England,  are  not  now  to  be 
regulated  and  governed  by  authority  of  Great  Britain,  then  the  conse- 
quences are  plain.  They  are  not  dependent  upon  Great  Britain;  they 
are  not  included  within  its  territories;  they  are  not  part  of  its  dominion; 
the  inhabitants  are  not  English,  they  can  have  no  claim  to  the  privileges 
of  Englishmen;  they  are,  with  regard  to  England,  foreigners  and  aliens; 
nay,  worse,  as  they  have  never  been  legally  discharged  from  the  duty 
they  owe  it,  they  are  rebels  and  apostates." — "A  Friendly  Address  to  all 
Reasonable  Americans,"  p.  3,  1774. 

Thus,  in  the  year  1774,  all  the  reasoning  and  argument  of 
the  last  ten  years  was  brought  to  one  direct  and  simple  issue: 
Was  Parliament  omnipotent  in  the  colonies?  It  was  either 
omnipotent  there  or  it  had  no  power  at  all  there.  The  English 
people,  both  Whigs  and  Tories,  Burke,  Chatham,  and  Barre,  as 
well  as  North,  Germain  and  Mansfield,  were  entirely  agreed 
that  Parliament  was  supreme  in  the  colonies.  The  American 
patriot  pamphleters  denied  that  supremacy  in  toto;  and  faced 
the  ridicule  of  Englishmen  and  loyalists,  who  took  great  pleasure 

""The  Right  of  the  British  Legislature  to  Tax  the  American 
Colonies,"  pp.  18,  19,  London,  1774;  "The  Address  of  the  People  of 
Great  Britain  to  the  Inhabitants  of  America ;  "  "  The  Supremacy  of  the 
British  Legislature  over  the  Colonies  candidly  discussed,"  London,  1775. 
See,  also,  "  The  Claim  of  the  Colonies  to  an  Exemption  from  Internal 
Taxes  examined,"  London,  1766;  American  Historical  Review,  vol.  i, 
p.  37.) 

203 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

in  pointing  out  that  if  Parliament  had  no  authority  whatever 
in  the  colonies  then  the  colonists  during  the  last  hundred  years 
had  been  accepting  and  living  under  invalid  acts  of  Parliament 
like  the  Post-office  Act  and  numerous  others,  of  which  they 
never  had  complained:  and  all  the  numerous  colonists  "who  had 
been  fined,  imprisoned,  or  hung  under  acts  of  Parliament,  had 
been  illegally  punished,  and  those  now  in  jail  should  be  set 
free.13 

But  to  the  patriots  it  seemed  that  a  stand  must  be  made 
against  the  whole  idea  of  parliamentary  supremacy,  which 
England  was  now  enlarging  into  a  consolidation  of  empire  con- 
trary to  the  natural  rights  of  man.  It  was  this  consolidation 
under  the  doctrine  of  the  absolute  supremacy  of  Parliament 
that  the  patriots  dreaded  as  they  saw  it  steadily  developed  to 
form  the  legal  basis  of  the  modern  British  empire.  The  com- 
plete supremacy  of  Parliament  is  absolutely  essential  to  a 
colonial  empire  like  that  of  England,  and  it  is  now  never 
questioned  in  the  British  colonies.  But  the  American  patriots, 
with  the  longing  for  self  rule  and  nationality  firing  their 
blood,  revolted  with  the  most  passionate  indignation  from  this 
prospect  of  modern  colonialism.  They  would  do  anything,  they 
would  tear  the  British  empire  to  pieces,  to  escape  from  it.  They 
saw  in  it  nothing  but  infamy,  repression  of  their  energies  and 
ambition,  dwarfing  of  their  political  manhood,  and  political 
degradation  for  themselves  and  their  children.  They  described 
it  as  slavery ;  their  leaders  denounced  it  in  every  term  of  abuse 
that  the  language  would  supply  and  appealed  to  every  sentiment 
of  honor,  unselfishness  and  high  courage  among  the  people.14 

Honor,  justice,  and  humanity  call  upon  us  to  hold,  and  to  transmit  to 
our  posterity,  that  liberty  which  we  receive  from  our  ancestors.  It  is  not 
our  duty  to  leave  wealth  to  our  children ;  but  it  is  our  duty  to  leave  liberty 
to  them.   No  infamy,  iniquity,  or  cruelty,  can  exceed  our  own,  if  we,  born 


18  See  an  article  quoted  from  some  London  Journal  in  the  Boston 
Gazette,  for  April  28,  1766. 

"See  "Address  to  the  Pennsylvania  Assembly,"  in  1774;  Niles, 
"Principles  and  Acts  of  the  Revolution,"  edition  1876,  p.  204;  "Diary 
and  Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.  i,  pp.  234,  266. 

204 


THE  DREAD  OF  PARLIAMENT 

and  educated  in  a  country  of  freedom,  entitled  to  its  blessings,  and  know- 
ing their  value,  pusillanimously  deserting  the  post  assigned  us  by  Divine 
Providence,  surrender  succeeding  generations  to  a  condition  of  wretched- 
ness, from  which  no  human  efforts,  in  all  probability,  will  be  sufficient 
to  extricate  them;  the  experience  of  all  states  mournfully  demonstrating 
to  us,  that  when  arbitrary  power  has  been  established  over  them  even 
the  wisest  and  bravest  nations,  that  ever  flourished,  have,  in  a  few  years, 
degenerated  into  abject  and  wretched  vassals. — Niles,  "  Principles  and 
Acts  of  the  Revolution,"  edition  1876,  p.  204.) 

So  alarming,  said  the  patriots,  was  the  development  of  this 
absolute  authority  of  Parliament,  with  such  artful  and  inces- 
sant vigilance  was  it  supported,  so  cunning  was  its  creeping 
process  when  carried  on  by  conciliation  and  kindness,  to  such 
apathy  and  contented  indifference  did  it  reduce  a  people,  and 
to  such  a  height  had  it  attained  in  the  year  1774,  that  unless 
they  could  interrupt  it  at  once,  their  children,  debilitated  by  its 
grasp,  would  never  be  able  to  overthrow  it  when  completed; 
and  as  a  matter  of  fact,  it  has  never  since  then  been  over- 
thrown in  any  of  the  other  British  colonies.15 


15  See  on  this  subject,  "  Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson," 
vol.  i,  pp.  202,  266,  272,  388,  389;  vol.  ii,  pp.  93,  141,  163,  164;  Wells, 
"  Life  of  Samuel  Adams,"  vol.  ii,  pp.  29,  46.  The  pamphlet  containing 
Hutchinson's  famous  argument,  with  Answers  of  the  Massachusetts 
Assembly,  is  entitled,  "  The  Speeches  of  His  Excellency  Governor  Hutch- 
inson to  the  General  Assembly  of  Massachusetts  Bay,  etc.,  with  the 
Answers  of  his  Majesty's  Council  and  the  House  of  Representatives," 
Boston,  1773.  The  contents  of  the  pamphlet  will  also  be  found  in 
"  Speeches  of  the  Governor  of  Massachusetts  from  1765  to  1775,"  Boston, 
1818,  pp.  336-396,  which  is  a  volume  more  easily  obtained.  Jefferson's 
argument  that  all  acts  of  Parliament,  even  those  that  the  colonists  had 
accepted  without  complaint,  were  usurpations  and  void,  is  well  worth 
reading.  It  was  called,  "  A  Summary  of  the  Rights  of  British  America," 
and  is  in  the  Ford  edition  of  his  wrorks,  vol.  i,  p.  434.  See  also  Lewis, 
"  Government  of  Dependencies,"  p.  331 ;  Todd,  "  Parliamentary  Govern- 
ment in  the  British  Colonies,"  edition  1894,  pp.  241,  242,  244,  245;  and 
James  Wilson's  pamphlet,  "  Considerations  on  the  Nature  and  Extent  of 
the  Legislative  Authority  of  the  British  Parliament."  Many  of  the 
chapters  in  Snow's  "  Administration  of  Dependencies "  are  very  inter- 
esting in  this  connection. 


XVII. 

THE  PASSION  FOR  INDEPENDENCE  RESTRAINED 
OR  CONCEALED 

That  a  large  and  growing  party  in  America  wanted  abso- 
lute independence  and  had  been  working  to  that  end  for  a 
long  time  admits  of  no  doubt,  was  well  known  in  England, 
and  can  be  shown  from  various  sources.  Sometimes  the  inten- 
tion, though  partially  veiled,  was  notorious,  as  in  the  case  of 
Samuel  Adams;  sometimes  it  was  openly  expressed,  as  in  the 
Boston  Gazette;  and  very  often  it  was  nourished  in  secret,  or 
the  individuals  who  entertained  it  were  scarcely  conscious  of 
how  far  they  were  going,  or  hesitated  about  the  risks  to  be  run. 

In  the  first  chapter  of  this  volume  a  passage  has  been  cited 
from  the  Swedish  botanist,  Kalm,  who  travelled  in  the  colonies 
in  1748,  and  described  the  movement  for  independence  as  so 
advanced  that  the  people  were  foretelling  a  total  separation 
within  thirty  or  fifty  years,  which  forecast  was  literally  ful- 
filled. Franklin  himself,  in  1766,  two  years  after  he  went  to 
England,  had  received  a  letter  from  Joseph  Galloway  describ- 
ing the  plans  for  independence : 

"  A  certain  sect  of  people,  if  I  may  judge  from  their  late  conduct, 
seem  to  look  on  this  as  a  favorable  opportunity  of  establishing  their 
republican  principles,  and  of  throwing  off  all  connection  with  their 
mother-country.  Many  of  their  publications  justify  the  thought.  Be- 
sides, I  have  other  reasons  to  think  that  they  are  not  only  forming  a 
private  union  among  themselves  from  one  end  of  the  continent  to  the 
other,  but  endeavoring  also  to  bring  into  this  union  the  Quakers  and  all 
other  dissenters,  if  possible." — Sparks,  "Franklin,"  vol.  vii,  p.  303.  (See 
also  "Diary  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.  i,  p.  12.) 

John  Wesley,  in  one  of  his  pamphlets,  says  that  his  brother 
visited  the  colonies  in  1737,  and  reported  "the  most  serious 
people  and  men  of  consequence  almost  continually  crying  out, 

206 


EARLY  IDEAS  OF  INDEPENDENCE 

'We  must  be  independent;  we  shall  never  be  well  until  we 
shake  off  the  English  yoke.'  " x 

"  You  may  depend  upon  it,"  says  a  loyalist,  writing  from  Phila- 
delphia August,  1775,  "  that  the  present  breach  with  England  is  not  the 
device  of  a  day  and  has  not  arisen  with  the  question  about  taxation 
(though  that  has  been  a  favourable  plea)  but  is  part  of  a  system 
which  has  been  forming  here  even  before  the  late  war." — American 
Archives,  seventh  series,  vol.  iii,  p.  30.  (See  also  Jones,  "New  York 
in  the  Revolution,"  vol.  i,  p.  24.) 

Galloway,  in  his  examination  before  the  House  of  Com- 
mons, testified  that  there  had  been  a  considerable  number  of 
persons  wTho  advocated  independence  in  the  principal  towns  of 
the  colonies  as  early  as  1754.  Dr.  Eliot,  writing  to  England, 
in  1767,  says,  "We  are  not  ripe  for  disunion;  but  our  growth 
is  so  great  that  in  a  few  years  Great  Britain  will  not  be  able  to 
compel  our  submission. ' ' 2 

That  very  plain-spoken  Englishman,  Dean  Tucker,  writing 
in  1774,  took  a  common-sense  view  when  he  said, — 


1  "  A  Calm  Address  to  the  Inhabitants  of  England,"  pp.  6,  9,  Lon- 
don, 1777. 

2  Massachusetts  Historical  Society,  4th  series,  vol.  iv,  p.  240 ; 
"  Kalm's  Travels,"  vol.  i,  p.  265.  A  pamphlet  called  "  The  Conduct  of 
the  Late  Administration  examined,"  pp.  22,  31,  37,  43,  44,  45,  London, 
1767,  refers  to  the  plans  for  independence  in  numerous  passages.  People 
were  saying  that  their  children  would  "  live  to  see  a  duty  laid  by 
Americans  on  some  things  imported  from  Great  Britain."  The  ministry, 
it  was  said,  had  been  repeatedly  informed  of  the  plans  for  independence 
(p.  37).  In  "Reflections  on  the  Present  Combination  of  the  American 
Colonies,"  p.  5,  London,  1777,  the  author  says  he  has  been  personally 
acquainted  with  the  colonies  for  forty  years,  and  that  they  had  been 
talking  independence  all  that  time.  "  The  principles  they  suck  in  with 
milk,"  he  says,  "  naturally  lead  to  rebellion."     On  page  35  he  gives  the 

patriot   toast  to  the  mother-country  as  "  Damn   the   old   B ."     See, 

also,  Bancroft,  "  History  of  the  United  States,"  edition  of  1883,  vol.  iii, 
pp.  406,  427;  Boston  Evening  Post,  May  27,  June  24,  October  28,  1765; 
Boston  Gazette,  January  6  and  27,  March  2,  August  17  and  24,  Novem- 
ber 1  and  2,  1772;  January  11,  March  15,  1773;  American-  Whig,  April  11, 
1768;  "Americans  against  Liberty,"  p.  39,  London,  1776;  "The  Consti- 
tutional Right  of  the  Legislature  of  Great  Britain  to  tax  the  British 
Colonies,"  pp.  27,  28,  et  passim,  London,  1768. 

207 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

It  is  the  nature  of  them  all  (i.e.,  colonies)  to  aspire  after  indepen- 
dence, and  to  set  up  for  themselves  as  soon  as  ever  they  find  they  are 
able  to  subsist  without  being  beholden  to  the  mother-country,  and  if 
our  Americans  have  expressed  themselves  sooner  on  this  head  than  others 
have  done,  or  in  a  more  direct  and  daring  manner,  this  ought  not  to  be 
imputed  to  any  greater  malignity. — "  The  True  Interest  of  Great  Britain 
set  forth,"  p.  12.  (See,  also,  Stedman,  "American  War,"  vol.  i,  p.  1, 
London,  1794.) 

Of  course,  it  is  true  that  all  the  patriot  documents  are  full 
of  profuse  expressions  of  the  most  devoted  loyalty,  and  the 
leaders  were  constantly  putting  forth  these  profuse  expressions. 
If  such  assertions  are  proof,  it  is  easy  enough  to  accumulate 
great  numbers  of  them.  In  fact,  judged  by  their  documents, 
the  nearer  the  patriots  approached  to  the  year  1776,  the  more 
devoted,  loving,  and  loyal  they  became,  and  the  more  they 
detested  the  thought  of  independence. 

There  are  many  letters  of  John  Jay,  Jefferson  and  others 
regretting  separation  or  "looking  with  fondness  towards  re- 
conciliation, ' '  and  some  patriot  documents  like  the  first  Consti- 
tution of  New  Hampshire  professed  to  provide  mere  temporary 
arrangements  until  reconciliation  could  be  effected.  But  what 
did  they  mean  by  reconciliation?  They  meant  reconciliation 
on  their  own  terms,  which  England  would  not  grant  and  never 
has  granted  to  any  of  her  colonies ;  that  is,  entire  freedom  from 
any  sort  of  control  by  Parliament,  which  was  in  effect  inde- 
pendence, or  so  slightly  removed  from  it  that  absolute 
independence  could  soon  be  assumed.  When  they  insisted  that 
they  were  loyal  they  meant  that  they  were  loyal  to  this  idea  of 
the  government  of  the  king  without  Parliament.  Their  idea  of 
reconciliation  was  that  England  should  accept  their  plan  and 
restore  friendly  feelings  as  between  two  independent  nations, 
the  sort  of  reconciliation  which  we  now  have  with  England. 

When  Franklin  in  England  in  August,  1774,  assured  Lord 
Chatham  that  he  had  never  heard  in  America  "from  any 
person  drunk  orv  sober,  the  least  expression  of  a  wish  for 
separation, " 3  he  must  have  meant  separation  from  the  king  as 

8  Franklin,  Works,  Bigelow  edition,  vol.  v,  pp.  345,  446 ;  The  state- 
ment of  Washington,  October  9,  1774,  that  it  was  not  the  wish  or  inter- 

208 


ADAMS  ON  INDEPENDENCE 

general  head  or  protector  of  the  empire.  He  had  then  been  in 
England  for  ten  years  and  could,  of  course,  say  that  he  had 
not  heard  any  of  the  independence  talk  in  America  in  that 
time,  although  in  1766  he  had  received  the  letter  from  Galloway 
already  quoted  describing  the  independence  movement. 

That  bluff  and  vigorous  patriot,  John  Adams,  writing  long 
after  the  Revolution,  said  that  there  never  was  a  time  during 
the  contest  when  he  would  not  have  given  everything  he  pos- 
sessed "for  a  restoration  to  the  state  of  things  before  the 
contest  began,  provided  we  could  have  had  a  sufficient  security 
for  its  continuance. ' '  He  saves  his  statement  by  the  proviso 
that  there  must  be  "sufficient  security"  for  the  continuance 
of  the  old  times.  That  is  to  say,  he  would  be  loyal  if  allowed 
to  give  his  own  definition  of  loyalty  and  have  things  his  own 
way.  There  was  the  rub.  England  would  not  give  that 
security;  the  only  security  as  Adams  well  knew  was  inde- 
pendence ;  and  in  the  same  letter  he  throws  light  on  the  way  in 
which  the  subject  was  regarded: 

There  is  great  ambiguity  in  the  expression,  there  existed  in  the 
Colonies  a  desire  of  Independence.  It  is  true  there  always  existed  in  the 
Colonies  a  desire  of  Independence  of  Parliament  in  the  articles  of  internal 
Taxation,  and  internal  Policy;  and  a  very  general  if  not  a  universal 
opinion,  that  they  were  constitutionally  entitled  to  it,  and  as  general  a 
determination  if  possible  to  maintain,  and  defend  it;  but  there  never 
existed  a  desire  of  Independence  of  the  Crown,  or  of  general  regulations 
of  Commerce,  for  the  equal  and  impartial  benefit  of  all  parts  of  the 
Empire.  It  is  true  there  might  be  times  and  circumstances  in  which  an 
Individual,  or  a  few  Individuals,  might  entertain  and  express  a  wish 
that  America  was  Independent  in  all  respects,  but  these  were  "  Uari 
nantes  in  gurgite  vasto."  For  example,  in  one  thousand  seven  hundred 
and  fifty-six,  seven  and  eight,  the  conduct  of  the  British  Generals 
Shirley,  Braddock,  Loudon,  Webb  and  Abercromby  was  so  absurd,  dis- 
astrous, and  destructive,  that  a  very  general  opinion  prevailed  that  the 
War  was  conducted  by  a  mixture  of  Ignorance,  Treachery,  and  Cowardice, 


est  of  any  of  the  colony  governments  to  set  up  for  independence  was  of 
course  true  at  the  time  he  wrote  it.  A  year  or  two  afterwards  those 
governments  were  captured  by  the  patriots  and  one  after  another 
declared  for  independence;  but  in  October,  1774,  they  were  not  ready 
for  it.  (Washington,  Writings,  Ford  edition  of  1889,  vol.  ii,  p.  443.) 
14  209 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

and  some  persons  wished  we  had  nothing  to  do  with  Great  Britain  for 
ever.  Of  this  number  I  distinctly  remember,  I  was  myself,  one,  fully 
believing  that  we  were  able  to  defend  ourselves  against  the  French 
and    Indians,    without    any    assistance    or    embarrassment    from    Great 

Britain. New  England  Historical  and  Genealogical  Register,  1876,  vol. 

30,  p.  329. 

After  that,  lie  says,  he  would  have  been  willing  to  be  loyal 
again  "had  not  the  King  and  Parliament  committed  high 
treason  and  rebellion  against  America"  in  attempting  to  reor- 
ganize the  colonies.  In  other  words,  the  patriot  party  always 
wanted  independence  of  Parliament.  "When  they  said  that  they 
did  not  want  independence  they  meant  independence  of  the 
King,  whom,  however,  they  stood  ready  to  cast  off  at  any 
moment  if  he  did  not  fulfil  their  wishes. 

Another  reason  for  the  rather  confusing  statements  on  the 
subject  of  independence,  was  that  the  patriot  leaders  felt  that 
an  open  advocacy  of  absolute  independence  would  lose  them 
the  support  of  the  English  Whigs,  whose  stock  argument  was 
that  the  colonies  if  leniently  treated  would  voluntarily  remain 
within  the  empire.  The  open  advocacy  of  absolute  inde- 
pendence would  also  shock  many  timid  patriots  and  alienate 
loyalists  who  might  become  patriots.  To  refrain  from  advo- 
cating absolute  independence  was,  therefore,  a  policy  which 
would  tend  to  unite  America  and  divide  England ;  and  so  con- 
vinced were  the  patriots  of  the  importance  of  this  policy  that 
in  several  instances  the  revolutionary  committees  prosecuted 
and  punished  those  who  asserted  that  the  colonies  were  aiming 
at  independence.4 

Jefferson  and  Elbridge  Gerry  have  described  the  great  care 
that  had  to  be  taken  to  lead  the  masses  of  the  patriot  party 
step  by  step  and  slowly  accustom  them  to  the  thought  of  abso- 
lute separation.  "Some  timid  minds,"  said  Gerry,  "are  terri- 
fied at  the  word  independence  *  *  *  the  fruit  must  have  time 
to  ripen."     "Regrets"  and  "distress"  at  separation  had  to 


4  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  21,  158,  644.  See, 
also,  title  "Independence"  in  the  index  of  vol.  iii,  fourth  series,  and 
other  volumes  of  the  American  Archives. 

210 


UNEASINESS  OF  PATRIOTS 

be  expressed,  and  all  sorts  of  phrases  used  about  the  King 
and  loyalty  by  men  who  in  their  hearts  entirely  agreed  with 
John  Adams  that  "  there  is  something  very  unnatural  and 
odious  in  a  government  a  thousand  leagues  off;"  and  that  it  is 
a  kindly  or  liberal  government  does  not  materially  lessen  its 
odiousness  to  men  of  spirit,  ability,  and  ambition.5 

To  many  o*f  the  patriot  party  such  an  inspiring  idea  as 
independence  seemed  at  first  too  much  like  a  beautiful 
dream.  Thousands  of  them  were  in  terrible  uncertainty.  At 
the  thought  of  independence  they  trembled  about  the  future 
which  they  could  not  see  or  fathom;  on  which  was  no  land- 
mark or  familiar  ground ;  and  which  their  imaginations  peopled 
with  monsters  and  dragons  like  those  with  which  the  old 
geographers  before  Columbus  filled  the  Western  Ocean.  We 
laugh  at  their  fears,  because  that  future  has  now  become  the 
past.  But  their  fears  were  largely  justified  by  the  history  of 
the  world  up  to  that  time. 

They  felt  that  the  old  argument  with  which  the  loyalists 
continually  plied  them  might  very  well  be  true.  The  colonies, 
if  left  to  themselves,  would  fight  one  another  about  their 
boundaries.  They  had  been  quarrelling  about  boundaries  for 
a  century,  with  England  for  their  final  arbiter.  What  would 
they  do  when  they  had  no  arbiter  but  the  might  of  the  strong- 
est? Would  not  Pennsylvania  combine  with  the  South  to 
conquer  New  England?  or,  more  likely  still,  New  England 
would  combine  with  New  York  to  conquer  all  the  South, — 
New  York,  for  the  sake  of  her  old  Dutch  idea  of  trade,  and 
New  England,  for  the  sake  of  improving  the  fox-hunting, 
Sabbath-breaking  Southerner  and  freeing  his  slaves;  for  the 
estrangement  between  North  and  South  on  the  slavery  question 
was  already  quite  obvious  at  the  time  of  the  Revolution.  Then 
there  would  be  rebellions  and  struggles  to  reform  the  map  and 
straighten  the  lines  and  boundaries.  If  in  the  confusion 
France  or  Spain  did  not  conquer  them,  or  England  reduce 


5  Hudson,   "Journalism    in   the   United   States,"    p.    114;    American 
Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  vi,  p.  488;  vol.  i,  p.  690  note;  vol.  v,  p.  507. 

211 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

them  again  to  colonies,  they  would  likely  enough  try  to  form 
a  confederacy  among  themselves  for  protection  against  Europe. 
Then  there  would  be  one  war  to  decide  which  section  should 
have  the  commercial  advantage  of  the  seat  of  government  in 
this  confederacy,  and  another  war  to  decide  what  should  be  the 
form  of  government  of  the  confederacy, — monarchical,  aristo- 
cratic, or  republican, — and  probably  a  third  war  to  establish 
securely  the  form  of  government  finally  adopted.6 

We  must  remember  that  in  South  America  there  has  been 
much  confusion  and  misgovernment  as  the  result  of  indepen- 
dence, and  out  of  it  only  two  or  three  stable  governments, — 
like  Chili  and  Brazil, — have  as  yet  arisen.  The  monsters  that 
the  timid  ones  saw  were  unquestionably  possibilities;  and  the 
loyalist  prophecies  of  sectional  war  have  been  largely  fulfilled. 
We  have  not  had  quite  as  many  sectional  wars  as  they  foretold. 
But  we  have  had  one  great  war  between  the  North  and  the 
South,  very  much  as  they  foretold ;  and  in  costliness,  slaughter, 
and  fierceness  of  contest  far  exceeding  their  warnings. 

They  foretold  also  that  even  if,  with  the  assistance  of 
France,  a  sort  of  independence  was  won,  it  would  be  an  inde- 
pendence only  on  the  land.  Great  Britain  would  still  retain 
sovereignty  on  the  sea;  and  there  would  be  another  war  or 
series  of  wars  over  this  question.  This  happened  exactly  as 
they  foretold,  and  thirty  years  after  the  Revolution  we  fought 
the  war  of  1812,  often  called  at  the  time  of  its  occurrence  the 
Second  War  for  Independence. 

So  the  suggestion  that  they  could  abolish  Parliament  and 
yet  remain  entirely  loyal  by  submitting  themselves  to  the  king 


8  "  A  Candid  Examination  of  the  Mutual  Claims  of  Great  Britain 
and  the  Colonies,"  p.  47,  New  York,  1775;  "What  think  ye  of  the  Con- 
gress now?"  p.  25,  New  York,  1775;  Works  of  John  Adams,  vol.  ii, 
p.  351 ;  "  The  Origin  of  the  American  Contest  with  Great  Britain,"  New 
York,  1775;  Bancroft,  "History  of  the  United  States,"  edition  of  1886, 
vol.  v,  p.  406.  The  patriots  put  forth  some  very  interesting  arguments 
to  show  that  there  would  be  no  danger  of  sectionalism,  and  that  inde- 
pendence once  attained  would  be  the  greatest  blessing,  which  could  never 
be  interfered  with  by  the  European  nations. — American  Archives,  fourth 
series,  vol.  iii,  p.  1013;  vol.  iv,  p.  1143;  vol.  v,  p.  96. 

212 


WOULD  PRAY  FOR  THE  KING 

alone  was  a  great  help  to  the  timid  ones.  By  a  slender  thread 
connecting  them  in  a  romantic  sort  of  way  with  the  king  they 
would  remain  a  part  of  the  British  empire,  and  always  have  the 
advantage  of  its  steadying  hand,  with  Parliament  merely  an 
object  of  outside  historic  interest.  They  would  always  pray 
for  the  king,  as  some  one  in  New  England  suggested,  and 
would  kindly  vote  him  from  time  to  time  little  presents  of 
money  to  help  him  in  his  wars,  he  in  return  to  protect  them 
from  the  ravages  of  the  great  powers,  France  and  Spain,  and 
possibly  from  their  own  disunion  and  anarchy.7 


TIt  is  interesting  to  observe  that  when  in  modern  times  imperial 
rule  presses  a  little  severely  on  a  British  colony  the  patriot  party  in 
that  colony  will  repeat  the  plan  of  our  patriot  party  and  suggest  the 
rule  of  the  king  alone  as  a  substitute  or  step  towards  the  desired  end. 
In  the  autumn  of  1903,  when  there  was  much  dissatisfaction  in  Canada 
over  England's  settlement  of  the  Alaska  boundary,  the  Halifax  Chronicle, 
after  declaring  that  the  subordinate  condition  of  Canada  was  no  longer 
endurable,  was  reported  to  have  said  that  "  there  are  now  only  two 
courses  open  to  Canada — complete  legislative  independence  within  the 
empire,  acknowledging  the  sovereignty  of  the  king  of  England  alone,  or 
the  status  of  an  independent  nation;  "  and  that  there  was  much  to 
commend  the  latter  step. — Philadelphia  Record  and  other  American 
journals  of  October  29  and  30,  1903. 


XVIII. 

THE  BOSTON  PORT  BILL  IS  ENFORCED 

Governor  Hutchinson  of  Massachusetts  had  obtained  leave 
to  visit  England  to  recuperate  his  health  and  attend  to  private 
business,  as  well  as  to  give  the  Ministry  information  on  public 
affairs.  General  Thomas  Gage  was  meantime  sent  out  to 
enforce  the  Port  Bill  and  have  the  province  reduced  to  good 
order  and  loyalty  by  the  time  Hutchinson  should  return. 

General  Gage  arrived  in  Boston  the  13th  May,  1774,  with  four 
regiments,  which  with  the  assistance  of  the  fleet,  would  close 
the  harbor  and  put  the  Port  Bill  in  force  on  the  first  day  of 
June.  On  the  morning  of  that  pleasant  June  day,  when  Gage 
took  command,  Governor  Hutchinson  left  his  country  place  at 
Milton  and  walked  along  the  road  bidding  his  neighbors 
good-by.  When  near  Dorchester  Neck  he  got  into  his  carriage, 
which  had  followed  him,  and  drove  to  Dorchester  Point,  where 
a  boat  took  him  on  board  the  "Minerva,"  bound  for  England.1 

It  was  significant  of  the  change  that  was  taking  place  in 
affairs  and  forming  the  loyalists  into  a  distinct  party,  that  over 
one  hundred  and  twenty  merchants  and  gentlemen  met  together 
in  Boston  and  presented  Hutchinson  with  a  farewell  address, 
extolling  his  conduct,  and  regretting  his  departure.  About  the 
same  time  twenty-four  members  of  the  Boston  Bar  presented 
him  with  a  similar  address,  and  he  also  received  addresses  from 
the  merchants  of  Marblehead  and  the  magistrates  of  Middlesex 
County.  There  were  patriot  protests  against  this  laudation  of 
the  governor.  Those  who  signed  the  addresses  became  marked 
men,  and  some  of  them  suffered  severe  treatment  at  the  hands 
of  the  pariots.2 


1  Diary  and  Letters,  vol.  pp.   104,   152;    Gordon,  "American  Revo- 
lution," edition  1788,  vol.  i,  p.  359,  360. 

2  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  i,  pp.  358-364. 

214 


HUTCHINSON  IN  ENGLAND 

Hutchinson  was  so  thoroughly  detested  by  the  patriots  that 
they  always  tried  to  persuade  themselves  that  his  conduct  was 
disapproved  even  in  England,  and  statements  to  this  effect 
have  crept  into  many  of  our  histories.  But  the  recent  publica- 
tion of  his  journal  and  letters  shows  that  he  was  received  in 
England  with  every  mark  of  approval  and  distinction.  The 
London  newspapers  reported  that  his  services  were  "held  in  so 
capital  a  light  that  a  Patent  of  English  Peerage  is  talked  of 
for  him."  He  was  offered  a  baronetcy,  but  declined  it  on 
account  of  his  small  estate  and  declining  years;  and  he  was 
also  offered  a  seat  in  Parliament.  During  the  remainder  of 
his  life  he  was  always  treated  in  England  with  the  greatest 
consideration,  and  he  certainly  deserved  all  that  the  Govern- 
ment and  English  society  could  do  for  him.  He  had  held  the 
most  difficult  governorship  in  the  most  rebellious  colony,  among 
the  most  determined,  energetic,  and  independence-loving  people 
in  America.  He  had  argued  with  them  and  resisted  them  with 
most  remarkable  persistence  and  ability;  and  the  extent  of  his 
service  to  the  crown  is  shown  by  the  contempt  and  infamy  in 
which  his  name  has  been  held  in  Massachusetts  down  even  to 
our  own  time. 

He  was  a  native  of  the  province ;  his  family  had  lived  there 
for  four  generations ;  they  had  accumulated  wealth ;  his  father 
was  a  rich  man ;  he  himself  owned  houses  and  valuable  wharves 
in  Boston,  a  valuable  estate  in  Rhode  Island,  and  another  in 
Maine,  besides  considerable  personal  property.  All  this  the 
patriots  confiscated  and  reduced  him  from  affluence  to  penury. 
He  was  the  target  for  as  much  vindictive  abuse  and  misrepre- 
sentation as  has  ever  been  heaped  on  a  human  being;  his  chil- 
dren and  their  families  suffered  with  him,  and  he  was  turned 
adrift  in  his  old  age  to  live  in  a  foreign  land  among  strangers. 

The  English  government  gave  him  a  pension  which  enabled 
him  to  live  in  London  as  became  his  station  in  life;  and  he 
rented  a  house  where  he  entertained  prominent  people,  and  all 
the  respectable  refugee  loyalists  that  arrived  from  America. 
He  rode  in  his  own  coach  with  a  footman,  took  part  in  all  the 

215 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

social  functions  of  the  Court  and  town  and  was  a  frequent 
visitor  at  the  country  seats  of  Lord  Hardwicke  and  Wilbore 
Ellis.  Oxford  University  gave  him  the  degree  of  D.C.L.,  and 
he  was  frequently  consulted  by  the  Tory  ministers. 

But  although  he  suited  London  life,  that  life  did  not  suit 
him;  and  it  is  very  touching  to  read  of  his  longing  to  return 
to  Massachusetts  when  she  should  be  reduced  by  conquest  to 
her  proper  sphere  of  usefulness  in  the  empire  which  he  wor- 
shipped. His  strangely  perverted  and  artificial  nature  loved 
his  native  country  only  when  conquered,  and  he  clung  to  this 
hope  of  conquest  until  the  surrender  of  Burgoyne  in  1777, 
when  he  lost  all  confidence  in  a  restoration  of  order,  and  saw 
nothing  in  store  for  America  but  tumultuous  independence 
with  all  the  horrors  of  paper  money,  sectional  wars,  mob  rule, 
and  democracy  which  the  loyalists  foretold  and  dreaded.3 

He,  of  course,  never  returned  to  America,  and  died  in 
London  in  1780  at  the  age  of  sixty-nine.  About  the  same  time 
that  he  went  to  England,  Governor  Tryon  of  New  York  and 
Carleton  from  Canada  also  returned  there  and  consulted  with 
the  Government.  Like  Hutchinson,  they  believed  that  force 
and  spirited  measures  were  absolutely  necessary.  Hutchinson 
thought  that  the  colonists  would  not  fight.  Carleton  said  that 
10,000  troops  would  subdue  them.  But  Tryon  believed  that 
large  armies  and  long  effort  would  be  needed. 

On  the  first  of  June  General  Gage  with  the  troops  and  war- 
ships closed  Boston  harbor  and  put  the  Port  Bill  into  effect. 
He  had  received  numerous  addresses  of  welcome  from  loyalists 
in  different  parts  of  the  province.  But  the  patriots  printed 
copies  of  the  Port  Bill  with  a  wide  black  border  of  mourning, 
posted  them  on  walls,  and  spat  on  them  as  they  passed  by. 
They  were  obliged,  however,  to  submit  to  all  that  the  Bill 
required.  Warehouses  were  closed,  ships  lay  dismantled  at 
the  wharves,  the  harbor  was  deserted,  work  in  all  occupations 
gradually  ceased,  and  rents  fell  to  nothing,  while  Gage  built 


3 "  Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.  ii,  pp.  75,  77, 
216,  291,  292,  335,  365,  367;  vol.  i,  pp.  283,  387,  389,  542,  543. 

216 


SYMPATHY  FOR  BOSTON 

his  camps  and  barracks,  quartered  his  troops  and  threw  up 
fortifications  to  make  Boston  a  British  stronghold.4 

On  the  13th  of  May,  the  day  of  Gage's  arrival,  the  patriots 
had  held  a  public  meeting  and  passed  resolutions  denouncing  the 
Port  Bill  and  calling  on  the  other  colonies  to  adopt  a  strict  system 
of  non-importation  of  British  goods  until  the  bill  was  repealed. 
Copies  of  these  resolutions  were  sent  all  over  the  country.  Paul 
Revere  carried  them  to  Philadelphia  and  consulted  with  the 
patriot  leaders,  Mifflin,  Thomson,  and  Reed.  They  called  a 
meeting  of  prominent  Philadelphians,  and  in  spite  of  a  strong 
feeling  of  conservatism  among  the  loyalists  and  Quakers,  a 
committee  was  appointed  which  sent  a  letter  of  sympathy  to 
Boston.  Copies  of  this  letter  were  sent  to  other  colonies;  and 
a  month  afterwards,  the  28th  of  June,  a  mass  meeting  was  held 
which  came  out  strongly  in  favor  of  Boston,  recommended  a 
general  congress  of  all  the  colonies  and  appointed  a  committee 
to  organize  the  patriot  movement  in  Pennsylvania.5 

This  action  influenced  the  patriots  in  other  colonies;  and 
that  summer  was  a  tumultuous  one.  Patriot  conventions  and 
meetings  all  over  the  country  passed  resolutions  of  sympathy 
with  Boston,  suffering  in  the  common  cause;  the  objectionable 
acts  of  Parliament  printed  on  mourning  paper  were  burnt  on 
village  commons;  subscription  papers  were  passed  about  to  as- 
sist starving  Boston;  droves  of  cattle  and  wagons  and  ships 
loaded  with  wheat,  corn,  rice  and  provisions  from  as  far  south 
as  the  Carolinas,  were  moving  northwards  to  Boston  all  summer. 

"  All  America  is  in  a  flame !  I  hear  strange  language  every  day. 
The  colonists  are  ripe  for  any  measure  that  will  tend  to  the  preserva- 
tion of  what  they  call  their  natural  liberty.  I  enclose  you  the  resolves 
of  our  citizens;  they  have  caught  the  general  contagion.  Expresses 
are  flying  from  province  to  province." — Eddis,  "  Letters  from  America," 
p.  158. 


*  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  i,  pp.  333,  398,  401,  402,  424, 
515;  Elliot,  "History  of  New  England,"  vol.  ii,  p.  284;  Gordon,  "Amer- 
ican Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  i,  p.  361. 

5  H.  W.  Smith,  "  Life  of  Rev.  W.  Smith,"  vol.  i,  p.  491;  Harley,  "Life 
of  Charles  Thomson,"  p.  68. 

217 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

But  the  people  were  by  no  means  unanimous;  for  a  few 
days  afterwards  Eddis  describes  a  loyalist  meeting  protesting 
by  resolutions  against  the  patriot  methods. 

The  Massachusetts  patriots  were  collecting  guns  and  knap- 
sacks and  casting  bullets.  Gage  was  receiving  reinforcements 
at  Boston  from  Ireland  and  New  York;  he  strengthened  the 
British  control  of  Boston  by  fortifying  the  narrow  neck  or 
isthmus  which  at  that  time  joined  Boston  to  the  mainland,  and 
he  seized  the  powder  in  the  arsenal  at  Charlestown.  The  patriots 
steadily  annoyed  him  by  burning  his  straw  and  upsetting  the 
wagons  that  hauled  wood  and  supplies  for  his  men. 

He  was  required  by  his  instructions  to  make  his  headquar- 
ters at  Salem;  and  Boston  he  left  in  charge  of  a  very  capable 
officer,  Earl  Percy,  who  had  a  vigorous  Tory  contempt  for 
Americans.  "The  people  here,"  says  Percy,  "are  a  set  of  sly 
artful  hypocritical  rascals,  cruel,  and  cowards.  I  must  own  I 
cannot  but  despise  them  completely. ' ' 6  Meantime,  he  and 
Gage  found  the  greatest  difficulty  in  carrying  on  the  govern- 
ment of  the  province.  The  patriots  easily  eluded  that  part  of 
the  act  of  Parliament  forbidding  town  meetings.  They  held 
adjourned  meetings,  meetings  without  formal  notice,  and  often 
county  meetings  which,  they  said,  were  not  mentioned  or  pro- 
hibited in  the  act.7  The  loyalists  who  held  office  were  com- 
pelled by  the  threats  of  the  patriots  to  resign,  and  patriot 
officials  blocked  and  thwarted  Gage  at  every  step.  When  he 
seized  the  powder  at  Charlestown,  the  1st  of  September,  a  rumor 
was  spread  that  the  fleet  and  troops  were  firing  upon  Boston. 
The  patriots  all  over  New  England  were  aroused,  and  from 
thirty  to  fifty  thousand  armed  men  are  said  to  have  started 
from  their  homes  in  various  parts  of  New  England  and  had 
marched  twenty  or  thirty  miles  towards  Boston  before  they 
were  undeceived.8 


•"Letters  of  Earl  Percy,"  edited  by  C.  K.  Bolton,  pp.  28,  31,  40,  44. 

T "  Letters  of  Earl  Percy,"  p.  35 ;  American  Archives,  fourth  series, 
vol.  i,  pp.  743,  767. 

8  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  i,  pp.  793,  804,  942;  vol.  ii, 
p.  157;  Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  i,  p.  388. 

218 


ATTACKS  UPON  LOYALISTS 

The  number  must  have  been  greatly  exaggerated.  There 
could  not  have  been  as  many  as  thirty  thousand ;  and  there  were 
probably  not  five  thousand.  But  the  incident  was  a  warning. 
Gage  immediately  abandoned  his  headquarters  at  Salem,  con- 
centrated all  his  force  inside  of  Boston,  and  was  never  again 
able  to  seize  any  military  supplies.  The  patriots  began  to  drill 
more  diligently  and  hunted  down  loyalists  more  mercilessly. 
The  officials  and  members  of  the  governor's  council  whom  Gage 
had  appointed  were  obliged  to  fly  for  their  lives  and  take  refuge 
with  the  army  in  Boston ;  and  in  this  summer  of  1774  the  severe 
methods  of  dealing  with  the  loyalists  began.9 

1 '  Out  with  him !  Out  with  him ! ' '  shouted  the  mob,  as  they 
rushed  after  Francis  Green  into  the  inn  at  Norwich,  Connecti- 
cut, where  he  was  taking  refuge.  He  had  already  been  driven 
out  of  Windham.  They  tumbled  him  into  his  carriage,  lashed 
his  horses,  and,  shouting  and  yelling,  chased  him  out  of  Nor- 
wich. What  was  his  crime?  He  had  signed  the  farewell 
address  to  Governor  Hutchinson,  of  Massachusetts. 

In  Berkshire,  Massachusetts,  in  that  same  summer  of  1774, 
the  mob  forced  the  judges  from  their  seats  and  shut  up  the 
court-house,  drove  David  Ingersoll  from  his  house,  and  laid  his 
lands  and  fences  waste;  they  riddled  the  house  of  Daniel 
Leonard  with  bullets,  and  drove  him  to  Boston ;  they  attacked 
Colonel  Gilbert,  of  Freetown,  in  the  night,  but  he  fought  them 
off.  That  same  night  Brigadier  Ruggles  fought  off  a  mob,  but 
they  revenged  themselves  by  painting  his  horse  and  cutting 
off  its  mane  and  tail.  They  robbed  his  house  of  all  the  weapons 
in  it  and  poisoned  his  other  horse.  They  stopped  the  judges  in 
the  highway,  insulted  them,  and  hissed  them  as  they  entered 
court.  The  house  of  Sewell,  attorney-general  of  Massachusetts, 
was  wrecked ;  Oliver,  president  of  the  council,  was  mobbed  and 
compelled  to  resign;  an  armed  mob  of  five  thousand  at  Wor- 
cester compelled  the  judges,  sheriffs,  and  gentlemen  of  the  bar 
to  march  up  and  down  before  them,  cap  in  hand,  and  read 


•Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  i,  pp.  384,  388, 
389,  411-414;  "  Letters  of  Earl  Percy,"  p.  37;  American  Archives,  fourth 
series,  vol.  i,  pp.  744,  767. 

219 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

thirty  times  their  disavowal  of  holding  court  under  Parliament. 
In  a  similar  way  the  courts  at  Taunton,  Springfield,  Ply- 
mouth, and  Great  Barrington  were  mobbed.  Loyalists  every- 
where were  driven  from  their  houses  and  families,  some  being 
obliged  to  take  to  the  woods,  where  they  nearly  lost  their  lives. 
One  Dunbar,  who  had  bought  fat  cattle  from  a  loyalist,  was, 
for  that  offence,  put  into  the  belly  of  one  of  the  oxen  that  had 
been  dressed,  carted  four  miles,  and  deprived  of  four  head  of 
cattle  and  a  horse.  For  the  three  months  of  July,  August, 
and  September  of  this  year,  1774,  one  can  find  in  the  American 
Archives  alone  some  thirty  descriptions  of  attacks  of  this  sort 
upon  loyalists  in  New  England.10 


American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  i,  p.  1261. 


XIX. 

THE  CONTINENTAL  CONGRESS  IS  ELECTED 

The  Connecticut  Assembly,  being  entirely  in  control  of 
patriots,  took  the  lead  in  sending  delegates  to  the  Congress  and 
on  the  13th  of  June,  1774,  authorized  the  patriot  committee  of 
correspondence  to  choose  suitable  persons.  In  other  colonies 
similar  methods  were  adopted,  and  by  the  middle  of  August 
delegates  were  chosen  in  all  the  colonies  except  Canada,  Georgia, 
and  Florida.1 

The  loyalists  afterwards  complained  that  the  Congress  was 
created  in  an  irregular,  one-sided  manner,  and  could  not  be 
called  representative.  They  ridiculed  and  denounced  most  un- 
sparingly the  methods  that  were  used.  It  was  certainly  not 
representative  in  the  sense  in  which  the  word  is  usually  under- 
stood. It  was  not  chosen  by  a  vote  of  the  people  at  large. 
The  delegates  sent  by  Connecticut,  by  the  New  York  counties, 
by  New  Jersey,  and  by  Maryland,  were  chosen  by  the  patriot 
committees  of  correspondence  without  any  vote  of  the  people 
at  large.  These  delegates  were,  therefore,  merely  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  patriot  movement  in  those  colonies.  The 
loyalists,  who  were  now  beginning  to  increase  in  numbers,  had 
no  voice  whatever.  In  Massachusetts,  Rhode  Island,  Pennsyl- 
vania, and  apparently  also  in  Delaware,  the  delegates  were 
chosen  by  the  legislative  assemblies,  which  in  those  provinces 
happened  to  be  more  or  less  in  control  of  the  patriot  party. 

In  Massachusetts,  with  the  British  army  in  control  of 
Boston  and  General  Gage  acting  as  military  governor,  one 
would  suppose  that  the  patriot  committees  would  have  chosen 
the  delegates.     But  Samuel  Adams  was  equal  to  the  occasion. 


1  The  certificates  showing  the  dates  and  manner  of  election  of  each 
delegation  can  be  found  in  "  Journals  of  the  American  Congress,"  vol.  i, 
pp.  2-7.  See,  also,  as  to  South  Carolina  delegates,  American  Archives, 
fourth  series,  vol.  i,  pp.  525,  534. 

221 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

The  plans  were  all  secretly  prepared,  a  majority  of  the  assem- 
bly very  adroitly  won  over  in  a  private  way,  and  at  the  next 
meeting  the  doorkeeper  was  ordered  to  let  no  one  enter  or  leave 
after  the  meeting  began.  As  he  seemed  to  hesitate,  Samuel 
Adams  locked  the  door  and  put  the  key  in  his  pocket.  One 
of  the  minority  pleaded  sickness  and  was  allowed  to  go  out.  He 
ran  to  Gage,  informed  him  of  what  was  intended,  and  the 
general  instantly  drew  a  proclamation  dissolving  the  assembly. 
But  the  messenger  who  carried  the  proclamation  found  the  door 
locked  and  was  obliged  to  read  the  document  from  the  steps. 
Meanwhile,  the  assembly  had  chosen  as  delegates  Thomas  Cush- 
ing,  Samuel  and  John  Adams,  Robert  Treat  Paine,  and  James 
Bowdoin.2 

South  Carolina  appears  to  have  sent  her  delegates  by  a 
general  convention  of  the  white  people  of  the  province.  These 
delegates  were  as  stanch  for  patriotism  as  any  that  appeared. 
Either  the  loyalists  were  very  few,  or  they  were  absent  or 
passive.  A  few  years  afterwards  they  were  very  numerous, 
and  seem  to  have  constituted  fully  half  the  population  of  the 
province. 

In  New  Hampshire,  the  towns  appear  to  have  appointed 
deputies  who  met  on  the  2nd  of  July,  and  chose  the  delegates  to 
the  Congress.  The  only  instance  besides  South  Carolina  where 
there  seems  to  have  been  a  chance  for  a  perfectly  free  vote 
was  in  the  town  of  New  York,  where  a  vote  was  taken  generally 
among  the  people.  The  loyalists  on  this  occasion  voted  with 
the  patriots  and  for  reasons  which  have  been  quite  clearly  set 
forth  by  one  of  their  number : 

They  were  chosen  by  the  people  at  large  with  little  or  no  opposition 
all  parties,  denominations,  and  religions  apprehending  at  the  time  that 
the  colonies  labored  under  grievances  which  wanted  redressing.  To 
redress  which  and  to  form  a  happy,  perpetual,  and  lasting  alliance,  be- 
tween Great  Britain  and  America,  were  the  reasons  which  induced  the 
New  York  loyalists  so  readily  to  agree  to  the  delegation.  The  republicans 
wanted  members  chosen  out  of  their  own   faction.     This   the   loyalists 


2  Hosmer,  "  Life  of  Samuel  Adams."  pp.  290,  297 ;  Gordon,  "  Amer- 
ican Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  i,  p.  365. 

222 


LOYALISTS  PASSIVE 

opposed  and  a  kind  of  compromise  took  place.  .  .  .  With  such  a  delega- 
tion the  New  York  loyalists  thought  themselves  safe.  A  redress  of  griev- 
ances and  a  firm  union  between  Great  Britain  and  America  upon  consti- 
tutional principles  was  their  only  aim.  This  they  hoped  for,  this  they 
wished  for,  this  they  expected.  To  this  purport  they  also  verbally 
instructed  their  delegates. — Jones,  "  New  York  in  the  Revolution,"  vol.  i, 
pp.  34,  35;  also  pp.  449-467. 

The  people  who  at  that  time  inclined  to  loyalism  appear  to 
have  been  willing  in  all  the  colonies  to  let  the  patriot  party 
have  its  own  way  in  electing  the  Congress.  This  passivity  was 
a  loyalist  trait.  They  were  never  as  aggressive  as  the  patriots, 
and  lacked  the  patriot  genius  for  organization.  They  believed 
that  the  Congress  would  be  conservative  and  adopt  some  plan 
of  reconciliation  or  compromise.  The  majority  of  the  members 
would  restrain  the  hot-heads  from  Massachusetts ;  and  in  any 
event  it  would  take  the  controversy  out  of  the  hands  of  the 
rabble.  The  Congress  was  avowedly  for  the  redress  of  griev- 
ances ;  and  the  loyalists  relied,  they  said,  on  this  purpose  being 
fulfilled.  They  professed  to  be  very  much  surprised  when  they 
found  it  taking  decided  steps  towards  independence.3 

As  the  assembling  of  such  a  body  was  a  serious  menace  to 
English  sovereignty,  the  question  naturally  arises,  why  did  not 
the  home  government  break  up  the  Congress,  prevent  the  elec- 
tion of  delegates  in  the  different  colonies,  or  disperse  with 
troops  the  Congress  itself  when  it  assembled?  Its  meeting  was 
fraught  with  more  danger  to  the  empire  than  any  other  project 
of  the  patriots;  for  it  united  nearly  the  whole  continent  in 
opposition. 


3 "  An  Alarm  to  the  Legislature  of  the  Province  of  New  York,"  p.  4. 
New  York,  1774;  "The  Congress  Canvassed,"  p.  10,  New  York,  1774; 
"  A  View  of  the  Controversy  between  Great  Britain  and  her  Colonies," 
etc.,  pp.  7,  8,  New  York,  1774;  "Galloway's  Examination  before  Parlia- 
ment," p.  11.  See,  also,  Flick,  "Loyalism  in  New  York,"  pp.  23,  24; 
Van  Tyne,  "Loyalist  of  the  American  Revolution,"  pp.  87,  88,  116; 
Political  Science  Quarterly,  vol.  xviii,  pp.  44,  45;  American  Historical 
Review,  vol.  ix,  pp.  60,  66;  New  York  Historical  Society  Collections,  1877, 
p.  360;  Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  i,  pp.  365;  372; 
American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  i,  p.  819. 

223 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

But  it  was  impossible  to  foresee  in  the  year  1774  what  the 
Congress  would  do,  and  England  had  never  before  had  such  an 
experience.  The  subject  was  discussed,  however,  in  some  inter- 
esting correspondence  between  Lord  Dartmouth  and  Lieuten- 
ant-Governor Colden  of  New  York. 

"  An  attempt  by  the  power  of  the  civil  magistrates,"  said  Colden, 
"  would  only  show  their  weakness,  and  it  is  not  easy  to  say  upon  what 
foundation  a  military  aid  should  be  called  in;  such  a  measure  would 
involve  us  in  troubles,  which  it  is  thought  much  more  prudent  to  avoid; 
and  to  shun  all  extremes,  while  it  is  yet  possible  things  may  take  a  more 
favorable  turn." — American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  i,  p.  517;  also 
Jones,  "  New  York  in  the  Revolution,"  vol.  i,  pp.  468-475. 

The  truth  was  that  England  was  so  hopelessly  weak  in 
military  force  in  America  that  it  would  have  been  extremely 
difficult  for  those  of  her  statesmen  who  feared  the  effects  of  the 
Congress  to  take  any  strong  measures.  The  Revolution  had 
already  progressed  so  far  that  no  governor,  except  in  Canada, 
had  sufficient  power  to  prevent  the  election  or  assembling  of 
the  delegates.  Some  people  thought  the  Congress  should  be 
suppressed;  but  most  Englishmen  saw  no  danger  in  it.  " No- 
body," says  Hutchinson,  writing  from  London,  "seems  to  give 
themselves  the  least  concern  about  the  consequences  of  the 
projected  Congress,  supposing  it  can  do  no  hurt  to  the  king- 
dom."4 

After  the  election  Governor  Colden  congratulated  himself 
and  the  Ministry  that  no  attempt  at  repression  had  been  made. 
' '  If  the  government  had  interfered, ' '  he  said,  ' '  the  most  violent 
men  would  have  gained  great  advantage,  and  would  have  pre- 
vented the  acquiescence  in  the  nomination  of  moderate  men, 
which  has  now  taken  place."5 

The  only  governor  who  succeeded  in  checking  for  a  time 
the  election  of  delegates  was  Wentworth  of  New  Hampshire. 
Learning  that  the  committee  of  correspondence  was  about  to 
meet  and  hold  the  election,  he  appeared  before  them  accom- 
panied by  his  council  and  the  sheriff;  rebuked  them  in  a  set 

4 "  Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.  i,  pp.  221,  415,  419, 
5  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  i,  pp.  669,  782,  783. 

224 


CONGRESS  UNOPPOSED 

speech,  and  the  sheriff  ordered  them  to  disperse.  But  soon 
afterwards  the  patriots  in  the  different  parishes  secretly  chose 
persons  to  meet  at  Exeter  and  appoint  the  delegates;  and  this 
plan  the  governor  found  himself  unable  to  obstruct. 

In  Canada  the  governor  would  have  been  strong  enough  to 
stop  the  delegates ;  but  the  patriot  party  was  so  few  in  numbers 
and  so  weak  that  they  made  no  attempt  to  send  any.  In  Georgia 
there  were  some  patriots,  but  they  were  not  yet  organized ;  and 
in  Florida,  which  had  recently  come  from  under  Spanish  rule, 
there  were  practically  no  patriots. 

As  for  breaking  up  the  Congress  when  it  assembled,  that 
could  no  doubt  have  been  done  with  a  comparatively  small 
force.  But  as  the  Congress  had  been  avowedly  called  for  a 
redress  of  grievances,  and  there  was  a  great  difference  of 
opinion  among  the  patriots  as  to  paying  for  the  tea,  it  was 
supposed  that  the  Congress  might  as  likely  as  not  turn  out  to 
be  a  conservative  body  that  would  favor  the  empire  rather  than 
independence,  take  the  controversy  out  of  the  passions  of  local 
politics,  and  advise  Boston  to  comply  with  the  Port  Bill  and 
pay  for  the  tea.6 


6  American   Archives,  fourth   series,  vol.   i,   pp.    516,   517,   536,   669, 
742,  782,  783,  880,  1062. 


15 


XX. 

THE  CONGRESS  GIVES  ENGLAND  AN  ULTIMATUM 

The  Congress  held  its  sessions  in  Philadelphia  in  a  neat 
brick  building  used  by  a  sort  of  guild  called  the  Carpenters' 
Company,  and  both  the  building  and  the  guild  are  still  in 
existence.  The  session  lasted  from  the  5th  of  September  until 
the  26th  of  October,  a  delightful  time  of  year  to  be  in  the 
metropolis  of  the  colonies  and  discuss  great  questions  of  state. 

Fifty-two  delegates  finally  assembled.  Most  of  them  were 
able  and  some  became  very  conspicuous  men.  Whatever  inten- 
tions they  may  have  had  as  to  ultimate  independence,  most  of 
them  seem  to  have  thought  that  it  would  be  well  to  act  as 
conservatively  as  possible.  But  John  and  Samuel  Adams, 
Cushing,  and  Paine,  were  inclined  to  break  through  all  re- 
straint. Coming  from  Boston,  crippled  and  suffering  under 
the  exactions  of  the  Port  Bill,  these  Massachusetts  delegates 
were  very  violent.  They  were  known  to  be  so  hot  for  extreme 
measures  that  some  of  the  patriots  rode  out  to  them  before 
-  they  reached  Philadlphia,  and  warned  them  to  be  careful  and 
not  to  utter  the  word  independence.1 

From  Virginia  came  Randolph,  Washington,  Henry,  Bland, 
Harrison,  and  Pendleton,  the  best  delegates  of  all,  calm, 
judicious,  earnest  patriots  with  a  very  broad  range  of  ability. 
From  South  Carolina  came  Middleton,  John  Rutledge,  Gadsden, 
Lynch,  and  Edward  Rutledge,  who  were  almost  if  not  quite 
the  equals  of  the  Virginians.  Pennsylvania  sent  a  very  con- 
servative but  not  a  very  strong  delegation.  Galloway  was  the 
only  eminent  man  in  it.  A  few  weeks  later  Dickinson  was 
added ;  and  a  year  or  two  later  the  addition  of  Robert  Morris, 
Franklin,  and  Dr.  Rush  made  a  considerable  change  both  in 


1  John  Adams,  Works,  vol.  ii,  p.  512. 

226 


PLEASURES  OF  DELEGATES 

its  ability  and  conservatism.  The  little  community  of  Dela- 
ware sent  three  good  men, — McKean,  Rodney,  and  Read.  From 
New  York  John  Jay  was  the  only  delegate  who  afterwards 
attained  much  prominence. 

The  delegates  and  the  townsfolk  seem  to  have  enjoyed  most 
thoroughly  the  excitement  of  that  session  of  nearly  two  months. 
The  early  steps  of  a  rebellion  are  easy  and  fascinating.  The 
golden  October  days  and  the  bracing  change  to  the  cool  air  of 
autumn  were  a  delightful  medium  in  which  to  discuss  great 
questions ;  see  and  hear  the  ablest  and  most  attractive  men  from 
the  colonies;  and  dine  at  country  places  and  the  best  inns.  It 
was  a  mental  enlargement  and  an  experience  which  must  have 
been  long  remembered  by  every  one. 

Every  form  of  festivity  and  pleasure-going  increased. 
Many  who  afterwards  were  loyalists,  or  neutrals,  could  as  yet 
be  on  friendly  terms  with  patriots;  for  was  not  the  avowed 
intention  merely  to  accomplish  redress  of  grievances?  No  one 
had  ever  seen  the  streets  so  crowded  with  the  bright  and  gay 
colors  of  the  time.  We  read  in  Adams's  diary  that  one  of  the 
delegates  from  New  Jersey  was  very  much  condemned  because 
he  ' '  wore  black  clothes  and  his  own  hair. ' '  Everybody  saw  all 
the  delegates,  and  there  were  few  who  could  not  boast  of  having 
had  a  word  with  some  of  them  in  the  streets,  shops,  or  market- 
place. 

Philadelphia  was  at  that  time  a  pretty  place  on  the  water- 
side. The  houses,  wharves,  warehouses,  and  inns  were  scattered 
in  picturesque  confusion  along  the  river  front  from  Vine 
Street  to  South  Street,  a  distance  of  exactly  one  mile.  West- 
ward, the  town  reached  back  from  the  river  about  half  a  mile — 
to  the  present  Fifth  Street.  The  chime  of  bells  in  the  steeple 
of  Christ  Church  was  an  object  of  great  interest.  These  bells 
played  tunes  on  market  days,  as  well  as  Sundays,  for  the  edifi- 
cation of  the  country  people,  who  had  come  in  with  their  great 
wagon-loads  of  poultry  and  vegetables. 

John  Adams  relates  how  he  and  some  of  the  delegates 
climbed  up  into  the  steeple  of  Christ  Church  and  looked  over 

227 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

all  the  roofs  of  the  town,  and  saw  the  country  with  its  villas 
and  woods  beyond.  It  was  their  first  bird's-eye  view  of  the 
metropolis  of  the  colonies  of  which  they  had  so  often  heard; 
and  they  thought  it  a  wonderful  sight. 

The  Philadelphia  Library,  founded  by  Franklin  and  James 
Logan,  had  its  rooms  in  the  Carpenters'  Hall.  The  directors 
of  the  library  passed  a  vote  giving  the  Congress  free  use  of  all 
the  books.  No  doubt  some  of  them  worked  hard  among  the 
volumes,  burying  themselves  in  Grotius,  Puffendorf,  Burlama- 
qui,  and  Locke.  It  was  their  duty  to  understand  the  state  of 
nature  and  the  natural  rights  of  man ;  those  arguments  which 
showed  that  rebellion  was  sometimes  not  treason.  They  must 
have  read  with  hard,  uneasy  faces  the  recent  heroic  struggles, 
but  sad  fate,  of  Corsica,  of  Poland,  and  of  Sweden. 

Both  John  and  Samuel  Adams  and  all  of  the  Massachusetts 
delegates  pressed  hard  for  resolutions  which  would  commit  all 
the  colonies  to  the  cause  of  Boston,  as  Boston  had  chosen  to 
make  her  cause.  She  would  not  yield,  would  not  pay  for  the 
tea,  would  not  pay  damages  of  any  sort.  The  British  troops 
must  be  withdrawn,  the  Boston  Port  Bill  must  be  repealed, 
the  act  altering  the  government  of  Massachusetts  must  be 
repealed,  and  also  the  ten  or  twelve  other  acts  which  were 
not  acceptable  in  America.  The  Congress  sat  with  closed  doors, 
and  nothing,  as  a  rule,  was  known  of  their  proceedings  except 
the  results  which  took  the  shape  of  certain  documents,  which 
shall  be  discussed  in  their  place.  There  was,  however,  one  act 
of  the  Congress  known  as  the  approval  of  the  Suffolk  resolu- 
tions, which  became  known  at  the  time  of  its  occurrence,  which 
committed  the  Congress  irrevocably  to  the  cause  of  Boston  and 
marked  a  turning-point  in  the  Revolution. 

Paul  Revere,  deserting  his  silversmith  shop  and  his  engrav- 
ing tools,  rode  to  and  fro  from  Boston  to  Philadelphia  on 
horseback,  carrying  documents  and  letters  in  his  saddle-bags. 
He  had  already,  it  appears,  on  several  occasions  during  the 
Massachusetts  disturbances,  voluntarily  acted  as  messenger  in 
this  way.     He  was  evidently  fond  of  horses.     He  had  been 

228 


SUFFOLK  RESOLUTIONS 

shut  up  for  so  many  years  hammering  out  silverware,  tea-pots 
and  sugar-bowls,  and  wearing  out  his  eyesight  with  engraving- 
tools,  that  he  no  doubt  found  himself  delighted  with  this  excuse 
for  riding  over  the  wild  woodland  roads  of  the  colonies. 

Town  meetings  having  been  prohibited  in  Massachusetts  by 
act  of  Parliament,  the  patriots  of  Suffolk  County,  in  which 
Boston  was  situated,  held  a  county  meeting,  which  was  not 
prohibited  in  the  act,  and  this  meeting  passed  the  famous 
Suffolk  resolutions  and  sent  them  by  Paul  Revere  to  the 
Congress.  The  purpose  of  these  resolutions  was  to  create  a 
new  government  for  Massachusetts,  independent  of  the  govern- 
ment under  the  charter  as  modified  by  Parliament  and  now 
administered  by  General  Gage.  To  that  end  the  Suffolk  reso- 
lutions declared  that  no  obedience  was  due  from  the  people  to 
either  the  Boston  Port  Bill  or  to  the  act  altering  the  charter; 
that  no  regard  should  be  paid  to  the  present  judges  of  the 
courts,  and  that  sheriffs,  deputies,  constables,  and  jurors  must 
refuse  to  carry  into  execution  any  orders  of  the  courts.  Cred- 
itors, debtors,  and  litigants  were  advised  to  settle  their  disputes 
amicably  or  by  arbitration.  This  had  the  effect  desired  and 
abolished  the  administration  of  the  law  for  a  long  period  in 
Massachusetts, — a  period  extremely  interesting  to  political  stu- 
dents for  the  ease  with  which  the  people,  by  tacit  consent,  got 
on  without  the  aid  of  courts  or  juries. 

The  resolutions  further  recommended  that  collectors  of 
taxes  and  other  officials  having  public  money  in  their  hands 
should  retain  those  funds  and  not  pay  them  over  to  the  govern- 
ment under  Gage  until  all  disputes  were  settled.  The  persons 
who  had  accepted  seats  on  the  council  board  under  the  Gage 
government  were  bluntly  told  that  they  were  wicked  persons 
and  enemies  of  the  country,  which  was  in  effect  to  turn  the 
mob  upon  them  at  the  first  opportunity.  The  patriot  in- 
habitants of  each  town  were  instructed  to  form  a  militia, 
to  learn  the  art  of  war  as  speedily  as  possible,  but  for  the 
present  to  act  only  on  the  defensive.  If  any  patriots  were 
seized  or  were  arrested,  officials  of  the  Gage  government  must 

229 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

be  seized  and  held  as  hostages.  All  this  was  rather  vigorous 
rebellion,  which  could  not  be  leniently  regarded  in  England; 
and,  finally,  it  was  recommended  that  all  the  towns  of  the 
colony  should  choose  delegates  to  a  provincial  congress  to  act 
in  place  of  the  assembly  under  the  Gage  government. 

This  provincial  congress  suggested  by  the  Suffolk  resolu- 
tions was  elected  and  became  the  government  of  Massachusetts 
for  a  long  period  during  the  Revolution.  It  is  quite  obvious 
that  the  resolutions  were  in  effect  a  declaration  of  independence 
by  the  patriots  of  Massachusetts,  although  the  word  inde- 
pendence was  not  used.  If  Congress  approved  of  them,  ap- 
proved of  a  government  set  up  by  the  patriots  in  hostility  to  the 
British  government,  it  was  certainly  committing  the  rest  of  the 
colonies  to  an  open  rebellion  and  war  unless  England  was 
willing  to  back  down  completely,  as  she  had  done  in  the  case 
of  the  Stamp  Act  and  in  the  case  of  the  Paint,  Paper,  and  Glass 
Act. 

Besides  creating  a  new  government  for  Massachusetts  the 
Suffolk  resolutions  contained  some  strong  expressions  not  likely 
to  assist  the  cause  of  peace.  England  was  described  as  a  parri- 
cide aiming  a  dagger  at  "our  bosoms. "  The  continent  was 
described  as  "swarming  with  millions"  who  would  not  yield 
to  slavery  or  robbery  or  allow  the  streets  of  Boston  to  be 
"thronged  with  military  executioners."  The  people  were  de- 
scribed as  originally  driven  from  England  by  persecution  and 
injustice,  and  they  would  never  allow  the  desert  they  had 
redeemed  and  cultivated  to  be  transmitted  to  their  innocent 
offspring,  clogged  and  fettered  with  foreign  rule  and  tyranny. 

Violent  as  were  the  Suffolk  resolutions,  the  Congress  ap- 
proved of  them  in  a  resolution  justifying  the  Massachusetts 
patriots  in  all  they  had  done.  If  it  had  ever  been  a  Congress 
for  mere  redress  of  grievances,  it  was  now  certainly  changed 
and  had  become  a  Congress  for  making  a  new  nation.  The 
veil,  as  the  loyalists  said,  was  now  drawn  aside  and  inde- 
pendence stood  revealed.  Prom  that  moment  the  numbers  of 
the  loyalists  rapidly  increased.     This  new  step  separated  them 

230 


GALLOWAY'S  PLAN 

more  and  more  from  the  patriots  with  whom  many  of  them  had 
heretofore  been  acting.2 

There  was  an  important  and  far-reaching  measure  of  recon- 
ciliation proposed  in  the  Congress,  but  it  utterly  failed.  Gallo- 
way offered  a  plan  which  would  in  effect  have  been  a  constitu- 
tional union  between  the  colonies  and  the  mother-country. 
There  was  to  be  a  Parliament  or  Congress  elected  by  all  the 
colonies  and  to  hold  its  sessions  at  Philadelphia.  It  should  be 
a  branch  of  the  Parliament  in  England,  and  no  act  relating 
to  the  colonies  should  be  valid  unless  it  was  accepted  by  both 
the  Parliament  in  Philadelphia  and  the  Parliament  in  England. 
This  would,  it  was  said,  settle  all  difficulties  in  the  future ;  for 
it  would  be  a  practical  method  of  obtaining  the  "consent  of 
America,"  which  the  patriots  were  saying  was  necessary  to 
the  validity  of  an  act  of  Parliament  which  was  to  be  applied 
to  the  colonies. 

The  plan  represented  loyalist  opinion,  and  would  in  their 
view  have  prevented  all  taxation  or  internal  regulation,  and 
have  amply  safeguarded  all  the  liberties  for  which  the  patriots 
were  contending.  There  was  sufficient  conservatism  in  the 
Congress  to  approve  of  it  so  far  as  to  refer  it  under  their  rule 
for  further  consideration.  But  soon  all  proceedings  connected 
with  it  were  ordered  to  be  expunged  from  the  minutes  so  that 
they  could  never  be  read.  As  the  meetings  were  secret,  it  may 
have  been  supposed  that  no  news  of  it  would  get  abroad.  But 
the  lo3ralists  took  pains  to  spread  the  history  of  it.  They 
charged  that  the  Congress  had  expunged  the  proceedings 
because  they  feared  that  the  mass  of  the  people  might  hear  of 
the  plan  and  be  willing  to  have  a  reconciliation  effected  on  such 
a  basis  without  an  attempt  at  independence.  They  circulated 
printed  copies  of  the  plan  and  declared  that  the  attempt  to 


2    II 


A  Friendly  Address  to  all  Reasonable  Americans,  p.  32,  New 
York,  1774;  "The  Congress  Canvassed,"  p.  5,  New  York,  1774;  "An 
Alarm  to  the  Legislature  of  the  Province  of  New  York,"  New  York,  1775; 
"Free  Thoughts  on  the  Proceedings  of  the  Congress,"  New  York,  1774; 
Jones,  "  New  York  on  the  Revolution,"  vol.  i,  p.  36. 

231 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

suppress  it  by  expunging  showed  a  clear  intention  to  secretly 
kill  all  efforts  at  reconciliation.3 

The  Congress  closed  its  session,  and  Wednesday,  the  26th  of 
October,  was  the  last  day.  Many  of  the  members  appear  to  have 
lingered  for  a  day  or  two  longer.  But  on  Friday  there  was  a 
general  exodus.  It  was  raining  hard,  John  Adams  tells  us  in 
his  diary,  as  he  took  his  departure  from  Philadelphia,  which  he 
described  as  "the  happy,  the  peaceful,  the  elegant,  the  hos- 
pitable, and  the  polite.' '  There  was  perhaps  a  covert  sneer  in 
the  words.  He  had  found  it  too  peaceful,  too  elegant,  too  polite 
and  happy  to  be  as  enthusiastic  for  independence  as  himself 
and  his  colleagues.4 

It  was  not  likely,  he  said,  that  he  would  ever  see  Philadel- 
phia again,  by  which  he  may  have  meant  that  the  British  lion 
would  surrender  to  the  requirements  of  the  patriots,  and  there 
would  be  no  occasion  for  calling  another  meeting  of  the  Con- 
gress. The  Congress,  however,  had  taken  the  precaution  to 
provide  for  another  meeting  in  the  following  May,  "unless  the 
redress  of  grievances,  which  we  have  desired,  be  obtained  before 
that  time";  and  John  Adams  himself  writing  in  his  old  age, 
more  than  forty  years  afterwards,  said  that  in  that  autumn  of 
1774  he  had  told  Patrick  Henry  that  all  the  documents  of  the 
Congress,  though  "necessary  to  cement  the  union  of  the  colo- 
nies, would  be  but  waste  water  in  England."5 

In  the  minds  of  many  the  documents  of  the  Congress  were 
more  for  the  purpose  of  uniting  the  colonies  and  strengthening 
the  cause  of  independence  than  for  effecting  any  sort  of  pos- 
sible reconciliation  with  England.  Henry,  it  seems,  agreed 
with  Adams  that  the  action  of  the  Congress  would  never  be 
accepted  in  England,  and  there  were  others  who  held  the  same 
view.  Joseph  Hawley  summed  up  the  situation  by  saying: 
"After  all,  we  must  fight."    But  some,  like  Richard  Henry 


3  John  Adams,  Works,  vol.  ii,  p.  387;   American  Archives,  fourth 
series,  vol.  i,  p.  1234. 

4  John  Adams,  Works,  vol.  ii,  p.  402. 

5  Niles,  Register,  vol.  xiv,  p.  258. 

232 


DECLARATION  OF  RIGHTS 

Lee,  professed  to  believe  that  the  Congress  would  carry  all  its 
points;  all  the  objectionable  acts  of  Parliament  would  be  re- 
pealed, and  the  fleet  and  army  would  be  recalled  from  Boston. 

The  documents  which  were  to  produce  this  result  had  been 
carefully  prepared  by  the  Congress  and  sent  to  England ;  and 
they  were  soon  made  public  to  all  the  world  in  newspapers  and 
pamphlets. 

The  first  of  them  was  called  "The  Declaration  of  Rights,' ' 
and  is  profoundly  interesting  as  displaying  the  patriot  reason- 
ing against  the  colonial  relationship.  It  was  the  ultimatum 
which  the  patriots  offered  to  the  mother  country  to  accept  or 
reject.  It  required  that  England  should  repeal  thirteen  acts 
of  Parliament,  the  Boston  Port  Bill,  the  act  changing  the  gov- 
ernment of  Massachusetts,  the  Quebec  Act,  all  the  old  acts  for 
imposing  duties  on  molasses,  wine,  and  other  articles,  and 
extending  the  powers  of  the  admiralty  courts,  together  with  the 
acts  for  keeping  troops  in  America  without  the  consent  of  the 
colonies,  and  for  carrying  to  England  for  trial  persons  accused 
of  certain  offences.  No  colonies  before  or  since,  have  ever  been 
in  a  position  to  demand  such  a  sweeping  change.  It  mast  be 
confessed  that  it  was  a  rather  stiff  demand,  and  hard  for 
England  to  accept,  because  it  in  effect  abolished  her  colonial 
system. 

The  rest  of  the  document  argued  out  the  question  very 
much  as  we  have  already  described  it  as  argued  in  the 
pamphlets  of  the  time,  except  that  the  Congress  stopped  just 
short  of  the  most  extreme  views  of  the  pamphlets.  There  had 
been  great  difference  of  opinion  in  the  Congress  as  to  whether 
they  should  deny  that  Parliament  had  any  authority  at  all  in 
the  colonies.  Dickinson  repeated  his  argument  of  the  "Farm- 
er's Letters"  that  Parliament  should  have  no  power  whatever 
in  the  colonies,  but  might  be  allowed  to  regulate  the  external 
commerce  of  the  empire  provided  it  could  be  done  without 
duties  and  taxation  for  revenue.  But  others  like  the  Adamses 
and  Gadsden  would  allow  Parliament  no  power  of  any  kind. 
America  and  England,  so  far  as  their  legislatures  were  con- 

233 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

cerned,  must  be  independent  communities.  But  they  might 
recognize  perhaps  a  common  king.6 

The  vote  was  for  a  long  time  about  evenly  divided;  and 
every  phase  of  the  subject  was  debated.  In  the  end  Dickinson's 
view  prevailed.  The  king  was  to  retain  his  power  of  vetoing 
the  laws  of  the  colonial  assemblies;  and  the  power  of  Parlia- 
ment over  the  colonies  was  to  be  abolished  except  as  regards 
' 'our  external  commerce  for  the  purpose  of  securing  the  com- 
mercial advantages  of  the  whole  empire. ' '  But  this  regulation 
of  external  commerce  must  not  be  accomplished  by  taxation  of 
any  kind  for  raising  a  revenue. 

This  small  scrap  of  impossible  power  left  to  Parliament  was 
no  doubt  a  wise  concession  which  quieted  many  timid  patriots. 
It  meant  nothing;  for  how  could  Parliament  regulate  colonial 
commerce  without  duties  and  penalties  which  would  in  effect  be 
taxes  and  raise  revenue;  and  would  not  England  resent  the 
cutting  down  of  her  imperial  power  to  this  insignificant  and 
impossible  privilege  just  as  much  as  if  they  had  decided  to  cut 
off  Parliament 's  authority  altogether  ? 

The  next  document,  ' '  The  Association, "  as  it  was  called, 
was  quite  a  remarkable  and  curious  paper,  signed  by  all  the 
delegates  on  behalf  of  themselves  and  of  those  whom  they 
represented,  and  was  intended  to  be  the  most  complete  non- 
importation, non-exportation,  and  non-consumption  agreement 
that  had  yet  been  attempted.  The  previous  measures  of  this 
sort  which  had  been  so  effective  had  been  voluntary  and  tacit 
understandings  carried  out  in  a  general  way.  But  this  asso- 
ciation of  the  Congress  was  intended  to  be  systematic,  thorough, 
and  compulsory.  The  whole  British  trade  was  interdicted,  and 
punishments  were  most  ingeniously  provided  for  those  mer- 
chants who  would  not  obey. 

Although  it  was  in  form  only  an  agreement,  yet  it  was 
worded  as  if  it  were  a  law  passed  by  a  legislative  body.  In 
some  paragraphs  we  find  it  speaking  as  a  mere  agreement,  as, 


8  John  Adams,  Works,  vol.  ii,  pp.  374,  379,  393,  397 ;  Snow,  "  Admin- 
istration of  Dependencies,"  pp.  284,  286,  290;  American  Archives,  fourth 
series,  vol.  i,  p.  541. 

234 


FEARS  OF  A  REPUBLIC 

for  example,  ' '  we  will  use  our  utmost  endeavors  to  improve  the 
breed  of  sheep ; "  or  "we  will,  in  our  several  States,  encourage 
frugality,  economy,  "etc.  In  other  paragraphs  it  speaks  in  the 
language  of  a  legislature: 

"  That  a  committee  be  chosen  in  every  county,  city,  and  town  by 
those  who  are  qualified  to  vote  for  representatives  in  the  legislature, 
whose  business  it  shall  be  attentively  to  observe  the  conduct  of  all  per- 
sons touching  this  association." 

A  large  part  of  the  document  is  taken  up  with  these  positive 
commands,  directing  the  committees  of  correspondence  to  in- 
spect the  entries  in  "their  custom-houses";  directing  owners 
of  vessels  to  give  positive  orders  to  their  captains,  and  directing 
that  all  manufactures  be  sold  at  reasonable  prices. 

The  Congress,  it  must  be  remembered,  had  no  law-making 
power.  It  was  a  mere  convention,  without  the  authority  of 
law.  Yet  here  it  was  adroitly  assuming  for  itself  legislative 
functions.  From  our  point  of  view,  it  was  a  most  interesting 
beginning  of  the  instinctive  feeling  of  nationality  and  union, 
the  determination,  consciously  or  unconsciously,  to  form  a 
nation  out  of  a  convention  that  had  been  called  merely  for 
"a  redress  of  grievances." 

But  the  loyalists  were  unable  to  see  it  in  this  light.  They 
attacked  it  at  once  as  an  usurpation ;  and  they  called  on  all  the 
legislative  assemblies  of  the  colonies  to  protect  themselves 
against  this  monster  of  a  Congress,  which  would  soon  take  away 
from  them  all  their  power.  From  a  legal  point  of  view  the 
loyalist  position  was  unquestionably  sound,  for  the  assemblies 
in  each  colony  were  the  only  bodies  that  had  any  law-making 
power.  The  Congress  seemed  to  the  loyalists  to  threaten  an 
American  republic,  and  their  premonition  was  certainly  justi- 
fied by  events: 

"  Are  you  sure,"  asks  a  loyalist,  "  that  while  you  are  supporting 
the  authority  of  the  Congress,  and  exalting  it  over  your  own  legislature, 
that  you  are  not  nourishing  and  bringing  to  maturity  a  grand  American 
Republic,  which  shall  after  a  while  rise  to  power  and  grandeur,  upon  the 
ruins  of  our  present  constitution.  To  me  the  danger  appears  more  than 
possible.  The  outlines  of  it  seem  already  to  be  drawn.  We  have  had  a 
grand  Continental  Congress  at  Philadelphia.     Another  is  to  meet  in  May 

235 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

next.  There  has  been  a  Provincial  Congress  held  in  Boston  government. 
And  as  all  the  colonies  seem  fond  of  imitating  Boston  politics,  it  is  very 
probable  that  the  scheme  will  spread  and  increase;  and  in  a  little  time 
the  Commonwealth  be  completely  formed." — "  The  Congress  Canvassed," 
p.  24,  New  York,  1774. 

There  was  a  considerable  body  of  people  at  that  time  who 
assumed,  as  a  matter  of  course,  that  an  American  republic 
would  be  anything  but  a  blessing.  They  were  still  more  shocked 
when  they  read  in  the  association  how  the  Congress  intended 
to  have  its  attempted  laws  and  commands  enforced.  Those 
who  would  not  obey  the  rules  of  the  association  against  import- 
ing and  exporting  were  to  have  their  names  published  as  enemies 
of  the  country,  and  no  one  was  to  buy  of  them  or  sell  to 
them;  they  were  to  be  cut  off  from  intercourse  with  their 
fellows ;  to  be  ostracized  and  outlawed.  In  short,  they  were  to 
be  boycotted,  as  we  would  now  say,  and  turned  over  to  the  mob. 

In  this  arrangement  and  in  the  committees  that  were  to 
pry  about  and  act  as  informers,  the  loyalists  saw  a  most 
atrocious  violation  of  personal  liberty.  These  county  commit- 
tees, who  were  given  the  judicial  power  to  publish,  denounce, 
and  ruin  people  merely  of  their  own  motion,  without  any  of  the 
usual  safeguards  of  courts,  evidence,  proof,  or  trial,  would,  they 
said,  be  worse  than  the  Inquisition.  How  could  the  patriots, 
they  said,  consistently  object  to  admiralty  courts  when  they 
were  setting  up  these  extraordinary  tribunals  that  could  con- 
demn men  unseen  and  unheard?  They  looked  forward  to  a 
long  reign  of  anarchy,  and  their  expectations  were  largely 
fulfilled.  Men  like  John  Adams  admitted  the  injustice  often 
inflicted  by  patriot  committees,  and  dreaded  the  effect  of  it 
on  American  morals  and  character.7 

The  tenth  article  of  the  association  provided  that  if  any 
goods  arrived  for  a  merchant  they  were  to  be  seized;  if  he 
would  not  reship  them,  they  were  to  be  sold,  his  necessary 

'"The  Congress  Canvassed,"  pp.  14-20,  New  York,  1774;  Adams, 
Works,  vol.  iii,  p.  34;  "The  Two  Congresses  Cut  Up,"  Boston,  1774,  pp. 
8,  9 ;  Van  Tyne,  "  Loyalists,"  pp.  63,  69.  For  the  injustice  of  forcing  the 
paper  money  upon  the  people  at  its  par  value,  see  Phillips,  "  Sketches  of 
American  Paper  Currency,"  vol.  ii,  pp.  63,  65,  67,  79,  154,  158. 

236 


THE  ASSOCIATION 

charges  repaid,  and  the  profits  to  go  to  the  poor  of  Boston. 
In  other  words,  said  the  loyalists,  a  man's  private  property  is 
to  be  taken  from  him,  without  his  consent,  by  the  "recom- 
mendation" of  a  Congress  that  has  no  legal  power;  and  the 
same  Congress  is  sending  petitions  to  England  arguing  that 
Parliament  cannot  tax  us  because  it  would  be  taking  our  prop- 
erty without  our  consent. 

It  would  be  easy  to  multiply  these  inconsistencies;  and  the 
more  the  loyalists  called  attention  to  them  the  more  the  patriots 
felt  compelled  to  violate  personal  liberty  in  suppressing  the 
loyalists,  until  free  speech  was  extinguished  and  thousands  of 
loyalists  driven  from  the  country.  On  a  smaller  scale,  and 
with  less  wholesale  atrocity,  it  was  like  the  French  Revolution, 
in  which  we  are  told  that  "the  revolutionary  party  felt  them- 
selves obliged  to  take  stringent  measures;  that  is,  the  party 
which  asserted  the  rights  of  man  felt  themselves  obliged  to 
refuse  to  those  who  opposed  them  the  exercise  of  those  rights. ' ' 8 

Every  provision  in  the  association  shows  a  people  who  were 
uniting  in  a  struggle  for  nationality,  and  therefore  cared  little 
for  their  inconsistencies  or  violation  of  rights.  Struggles  for 
independence  are  not  apt  to  be  tame  or  necessarily  legal.  There 
is  nothing  so  elementary  and  natural  as  the  nation-forming 
instinct;  its  efforts  are  always  violent;  and  in  such  a  contest 
the  laws  are  thrust  aside. 

For  the  milder  forms  of  this  struggle,  as  shown  in  the  asso- 
ciation, we  find  them  agreeing  to  kill  as  few  lambs  as 
possible,  to  start  domestic  manufactures,  and  encourage  agri- 
culture, especially  wool,  so  as  to  be  independent  of  England  in 
the  matter  of  clothing.  And  they  were  trying  to  be  economical, 
to  discourage  horse-racing,  gaming,  cock-fighting,  shows,  and 
plays,  to  discontinue  the  slave  trade,  and  to  give  up  the  ex- 
travagant mourning-garments  and  funerals  which  were  so 
excessive  and  expensive  at  that  time. 

Another  document  put  forth  by  the  Congress  was  "The 
Address  to  the  People  of  Great  Britain."    It  claimed  for  the 


8  Ropes,  "  Napoleon,"  p.  8. 

237 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

Americans  all  the  privileges  of  British  subjects,  the  right  of 
disposing  of  their  own  property  and  of  ruling  themselves. 
"Why  should  "English  subjects,  who  live  three  thousand  miles 
from  the  royal  palace,  enjoy  less  liberty  than  those  who  are 
three  hundred  miles  distant  from  it?"  Like  all  the  other 
documents,  it  had  much  to  say  about  the  wickedness  of  the 
Quebec  Act,  which  had  established  Roman  Catholicism  in 
Canada ;  and  it  restated  all  the  patriot  arguments  against  con- 
trol by  Parliament. 

The  most  striking  part  of  it  was  an  argument  that  if  the 
ministry  were  allowed  to  tax  and  rule  America  as  they  pleased, 
the  enormous  streams  of  wealth  to  be  gathered  from  such  a  vast 
continent,  together  with  the  Roman  Catholic  inhabitants  of 
Canada,  would  be  used  to  inflict  the  most  atrocious  persecution 
and  tyranny  on  the  masses  of  the  people  in  England.  This 
attempt  to  excite  the  English  masses  against  Parliament  and 
the  ministry  was  very  much  resented  in  England,  and  was  not 
likely  to  bring  a  favorable  compromise  any  more  than  was  a 
similar  attempt  to  arouse  rebellion  in  Ireland,  which  was  tried 
the  next  year. 

Another  document,  called  "An  Address  to  the  Inhabitants 
of  Canada,"  was  much  ridiculed  by  both  the  loyalists  and  the 
English,  because  it  seemed  so  very  inconsistent  with  "The 
Address  to  the  People  of  Great  Britain."  In  addressing  the 
people  of  Great  Britain  the  Congress  vilified  and  abused  the 
religion  of  the  Canadians  as  despotism,  murder,  persecution, 
and  rebellion.  Yet  they  asked  those  same  Canadians  to  join  the 
rebellious  colonies  against  England;  and  they  sent  to  them  a 
long  document  instructing  them  in  their  rights,  and  quoting 
Montesquieu  and  other  Frenchmen,  to  show  what  a  mistake 
they  were  making  by  submitting  to  the  tyranny  of  Great 
Britain.  The  Canadians,  said  the  loyalists,  would,  of  course, 
see  both  documents  and  laugh  at  the  Congress.9 

The  last  paper  put  forth  by  the  Congress  was  "The  Peti- 

"Codman,  "Arnold's  Expedition  to  Quebec,"  p.  9.  All  the  docu- 
ments put  forth  by  the  Congress  and  also  the  Suffolk  Resolution  can  be 
read  in  full  in  "  Journals  of  the  American  Congress,"  1774-1788,  vol.  i. 

238 


BANQUET  TO  THE  CONGRESS 

tion  to  the  King, ' '  drawn  by  Dickinson  and  intended  to  soften 
the  denial  of  the  authority  of  Parliament  by  showing  that, 
although  Parliament  was  rejected  and  no  allegiance  to  it  ad- 
mitted, yet  the  colonists  were  willing  to  accept  the  King  as 
general  head  of  the  British  empire.  He  was  implored  to  protect 
them  from  the  usurpations  of  Parliament  and  the  Ministry ;  to 
obtain  for  them  a  repeal  of  the  Boston  Port  Bill,  the  Quebec 
Act  and  all  the  other  objectionable  legislation  of  recent  years; 
and  to  remedy  all  their  other  grievances,  which  were  again 
recited  in  full.  The  Congress  was  therefore  not  rebellious  or 
disloyal;  for  were  they  not  showing  the  greatest  loyalty  and 
the  most  unquestioning  devotion  to  the  King  ? 

In  line  with  this  petition  was  a  banquet  given  in  the  State 
House  to  the  members  of  the  Congress  about  the  middle  of 
September  by  some  of  the  prominent  citizens  of  Philadelphia. 
It  was  evidently  one  of  those  magnificent  colonial  entertain- 
ments, frequent  in  Philadelphia  in  those  days,  with  tables  loaded 
down  with  every  imaginable  form  of  food,  drink,  and  delicacy. 
There  were  thirty-two  formal  toasts  carefully  prepared  to  sup- 
port ardent  patriotism  and  at  the  same  time  to  favor  ' '  A  happy 
reconciliation  between  Great  Britain  and  her  colonies  on  con- 
stitutional ground."  Every  toast  was  accompanied  by  a  dis- 
charge of  cannon  followed  by  music,  cheers,  and  shouts  from 
the  five  hundred  guests.10 

All  these  demonstrations  and  dinners  being  finished,  the 
documents  having  been  sent  forth  and  the  Congress  adjourned, 
the  people  settled  down  to  comparative  quietude  for  the  whole 
of  the  following  winter.  There  was  nothing  more  to  be  said, 
because  what  had  been  done  had  been  done,  and  there  was  no 
help  for  it.  The  result  must  be  calmly  awaited  during  four 
or  five  months  while  the  vessels  that  communicated  with  Eng- 
land should  beat  their  way  over  and  back  against  the  winter 
gales  of  the  Atlantic. 


10  Jones,  "New  York  in  the  Revolution,"  vol.  i,  pp.  475,  476;  John 
Adams,  Works,  vol.  ii,  pp.  379,  387,  374,  393,  397,  423,  539;  Niles, 
Register,  vol.  xiv,  p.  258,  No.  16,  July  13,  1818;  Snow,  "Administration 
of  Dependencies,"  pp.  284,  286,  290,  etc. 

239 


XXI. 

THE  RISE  AND  NUMBERS  OF  THE  LOYALISTS 

As  it  is  from  the  year  1774  that  we  date  the  rise  of  the 
loyalists  as  a  distinct  and  powerful  party,  it  will  contribute  to 
a  clearer  understanding  of  the  Revolution  to  give  the  main 
features  of  their  history  at  this  point  in  our  narrative.  As  the 
patriot  position  became  more  pronounced  and  leaned  more 
towards  independence,  it  naturally  developed  the  feeling  and 
opposition  of  the  loyalists.  They  were  compelled  to  take  a 
distinct,  outspoken  position  of  their  own,  and  their  numbers 
were  greatly  increased. 

In  their  origin  and  principles  they  were  a  party  which  is 
apt  to  appear  whenever  the  question  of  independence  arises, 
whenever  a  country  or  a  party  within  a  country  wishes  com- 
plete self-government  and  separation  from  an  empire  or  an  alien 
control.  In  all  the  histories  of  struggles  for  independence,  in 
Poland,  Greece,  Switzerland,  the  South  American  republics, 
Mexico,  Cuba,  and  in  the  South  African  difficulties  of  Cape 
Colony,  the  Transvaal,  and  the  Orange  Free  State,  we  find  a 
loyalist  party  arguing  in  favor  of  alien  control  as  necessary  to 
peace  and  order;  or  as  more  beneficial  to  business  stability, 
prosperity,  morals,  and  progress ;  and  such  loyalists  often  have 
a  passionate  belief  in  their  creed  which  they  are  ready  to  seal 
with  their  blood. 

The  loyalists  of  the  American  Revolution  were  in  some 
respects  more  sincere  and  more  in  earnest  than  the  mother - 
country.  They  were  less  willing  to  quit  the  game;  they  be- 
lieved that  England  gave  up  too  easily  and  made  peace  when 
the  patriots  were  on  the  verge  of  exhaustion.  They  seemed 
more  anxious  to  have  America  conquered  and  reduced  to  com- 
plete dependence  under  the  empire  than  the  English  generals 
or  the  Tory  Ministry  that  carried  on  the  war.  They  were 
thorough  believers  in  empire  as  against  independence. 

240 


CONTEMPT  FOR  LOYALISTS 

The  fatal  defect  in  the  loyalist  position  was  its  unnatural- 
ness.  They  gave  their  devotion  not  to  the  land  they  lived  in, 
and  the  government  and  social  system  that  would  naturally 
grow  from  that  soil.  They  loved  and  worshipped  a  country 
and  a  government  three  thousand  miles  away.  They  had 
vaguely  magnificent  ideas  that  the  colonists  should  support  and 
encourage  the  superiority  of  England,  join  her  in  vast  schemes 
of  conquest,  and  reap  some  enormous  reward  in  the  plunder 
of  inferior  peoples  in  Asia,  Africa,  and  India.  The  desire  of 
the  patriot  party  to  own  America  as  their  own  country  was,  the 
loyalists  said  a  mere  " sentiment  of  self  importance,"  too 
ridiculous  to  be  mentioned  in  the  presence  of  the  "  power  and 
splendor  of  Great  Britain."  All  the  loyalist  writings  and 
arguments  are  filled  with  this  awe-struck  admiration  for  the 
wonderful  British  constitution  and  the  glorious  British  empire. 
Such  devotion  to  a  distant  excellence,  an  excellence  not  of  our 
own  creation  and  environment,  is  both  political  and  spiritual 
degeneration.  In  the  long  run  nothing  but  contempt  awaits 
the  men  who  will  not  stand  by  their  own,  who  weakly  wish  to 
be  ruled  by  a  foreign  power  for  the  sake  of  what  they  suppose 
to  be  a  superior  refinement  or  civilization.1 

Previous  to  the  year  1774  most  of  the  people  who  after- 
wards became  loyalists  had  supported  the  measures  for  resisting 
taxation  and  had  been  in  favor  of  not  importing  English 
goods,  and  of  cutting  off  all  trade  with  England  in  order  to 
bring  her  to  terms.  Such  measures  they  regarded  as  a  legal 
and  constitutional  means  for  redressing  grievances  in  which 
loyal  colonists  could  with  perfect  propriety  take  a  part.  Some 
of  them  went  a  little  farther,  and  held  that  a  mild  show  of 
force  against  Great  Britain  would  be  allowable ;  and  those  who 
held  this  view  continued  to  act  with  the  patriots  until  the 
adoption  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  which  they  re- 
garded as  going  altogether  too  far. 

There  had  been,  however,  even  in  the  times  before  1774,  a 
small  but  socially  powerful  loyalist  party  under  the  leadership 


See  for  example  Eddis,  "Letters  from  America,"  pp.  139,  145,  149. 
16  241 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

of  the  government  officials  and  some  of  the  Anglican  clergy  who 
defended  taxation  by  the  mother-country,  approved  of  the 
stamp  tax,  and  denounced  the  Stamp  Act  Congress  as  unconsti- 
tutional and  unlawful.  These  early  loyalists  were  extremely 
consistent,  and  foreseeing;  for  they  believed  that  they  saw  in 
the  proceedings  of  the  patriots  the  beginning  of  open  rebellion.2 

It  is  a  mistake,  however,  to  infer,  as  most  of  us  have  done, 
that  the  loyalism  which  finally  developed  was  altogether  an 
affair  of  the  Episcopal  clergy  and  their  people  and  govern- 
ment officials,  or  that  it  was  an  affair  merely  of  the  upper 
classes.  The  loyalist  pamphleteers  and  leaders  were,  it  is  true, 
usually  lawyers,  clergymen,  doctors,  or  officials,  like  Leonard, 
Sewall,  Hutchinson  or  Oliver  of  Massachusetts ;  or  Isaac  Hunt, 
Galloway,  Kearsley,  or  the  Allen  family  of  Philadelphia ;  or  the 
Rev.  Dr.  Cooper  and  Isaac  Wilkins  of  New  York;  or  such 
Anglican  clergymen  as  Seabury,  Chandler,  Inglis,  and  Vardhill. 
But  the  rank  and  file  of  the  party  was  composed  of  all  faiths — 
Presbyterians,  Lutherans,  Roman  Catholics,  Methodists,  and 
Quakers;  of  all  races  and  nationalities — English,  Dutch,  Ger- 
man, French,  Irish,  Scotch,  Indians,  and  Negroes;  and  of  all 
classes  of  society  from  cobblers,  blacksmiths,  and  farmers  up 
to  rich  merchants,  lawyers,  and  gentlemen.3 

At  the  time  of  the  Revolution  a  large  part  of  the  lower 
classes  of  our  people  were  more  or  less  on  the  loyalist  side, 
because  of  the  habit  of  dependence  on  England,  fear  of  change 
or  lack  of  conviction  of  any  material  advantage  in  American- 
ism. As  William  Wirt  long  ago  pointed  out  in  his  "Life  of 
Patrick  Henry."  the  Revolution  originated  among  the  upper 
classes  of  Americans,  among  rich  planters,  merchants,  and 
lawyers,  who  led  the  masses  into  the  movement  often  very  much 
against  their  will.     The  whole  fabric  and  foundation  of  the 


2  New  York  Mercury,  May  20,  1765,  No.  708;  June  17,  1765,  No.  712; 
New  York  Assembly  Journal,  vol.  ii,  p.  787;  New  York  Historical  Society 
Collection,  1877,  pp.  35,  61 ;  Jones,  "  New  York  in  the  [Revolution,"  vol.  i, 
p.  34;  Dawson,  "Westchester  County,"  p.  11. 

3  Flick,  "  Loyalism  in  New  York,"  p.  35 ;  American  Archives,  fourth 
series,  vol.  vi,  p.  1157. 

242 


RELIGION  AND  LOYALISM 

Revolution,  those  long  years  of  argumentation  from  1764  to 
1775,  that  basis  of  constitutional  and  legal  reasoning,  that 
application  of  the  Reformation  doctrines  of  the  rights  of  man, 
could  never  have  been  wrought  out  in  their  perfection  and 
finally  expressed  in  effective  language  and  drafted  into  state 
constitutions  and  governmental  documents  except  by  men  of 
the  highest  education  and  training.  No  ignorant  or  untrained 
man,  no  upstart  or  mere  popular  demagogue  can  be  found 
among  the  great  leaders  of  the  patriot  party.  It  was  the  work 
of  a  Hamilton,  a  Jefferson,  a  Dickinson,  the  Adamses,  the 
Lees,  and  the  Rutledges,  a  Bland,  a  Mason,  a  Drayton,  a  Cush- 
ing,  or  a  Laurens. 

After  the  Revolution  wras  over,  however,  all  feeling  of 
mental  or  moral  dependence  on  England  passed  completely 
away  from  the  masses  of  our  people,  who  became  American  to 
the  core  as  soon  as  they  really  tasted  national  independence. 
They  saw  their  advantage  in  the  rights  of  man,  equality  and 
all  the  other  doctrines  of  the  Revolution.  But  among  many 
of  our  modern  people  of  wealth  and  of  fashion,  among  the 
collegiate  and  educated  or  over-educated  classes,  the  feeling 
of  mental  and  moral  dependence  on  England  is  still  often  as 
strong  as  it  was  among  the  loyalists  of  the  Revolution. 

In  New  York  the  loyalist  party  was  no  doubt  considerably 
dominated  by  the  Anglican  Church.  In  New  England,  also, 
the  Anglican  Church  and  loyalism  were  more  or  less  closely 
associated,  although  the  most  notorious  New  England  loyalist, 
Governor  Hutchinson,  was  of  the  faith  of  the  old  Puritans. 
The  masses  of  the  patriot  party  in  New  England  were  encour- 
aged by  their  Congregationalist  preachers  to  favor  independence 
as  a  means  of  escaping  from  English  bishops,  who,  it  was  said, 
were  to  be  sent  over  as  part  of  the  reorganization  of  the 
colonies.  The  bishops  were  magnified  into  monsters,  and  de- 
scribed as  "biting  beasts  and  whelps  of  the  Roman  litter," 
that  would  renew  all  the  persecutions  of  Archbishop  Laud. 

But  south  of  New  York  it  can  hardly  be  said  that  the 
Church  of  England  was  distinctly  associated  with  loyalism. 
We  must  remember  that  Washington  was  an  Anglican  Church- 

243 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

man,  and  that  most  of  the  Virginia  patriots,  as  well  as  a  large 
proportion  of  the  members  of  the  Continental  Congress,  were 
of  the  same  faith.  In  South  Carolina  the  patriots  were  usually 
of  the  Church  of  England  and  only  five  out  of  twenty  of  the 
clergy  were  loyalists.  The  Rev.  William  White  of  Philadel- 
phia, afterwards  Bishop  of  Pennsylvania,  was  an  ardent 
patriot ;  and  loyalism  in  the  neighborhood  of  Philadelphia  was 
largely  supported  by  the  Quakers. 

As  time  went  on  all  sorts  of  influences  contributed  to  the 
increase  of  the  loyalists.  Persons  inclined  to  patriotism  became 
wearied  with  the  length  of  the  war,  its  cruelties  and  atrocities ; 
they  were  disheartened  by  the  long  interruption  to  business 
and  money-making,  and  they  lost  hope  of  any  final  success. 
Such  people  gradually  drifted  to  the  loyalist  party,  until  it 
was  composed  of  many  shades  of  opinion  and  under  the  influ- 
ence of  a  variety  of  motives. 

As  to  the  actual  numbers  of  the  loyalists,  there  has  been 
great  diversity  of  opinion.  No  census  was  taken,  and  there 
is  no  collection  of  statistics  by  which  we  can  learn  the  relative 
numbers  of  loyalists  and  patriots.  It  is  all  estimating  and 
guessing;  and  in  this  respect  the  men  who  took  part  in  the 
Revolution  were  not  much  better  off  than  we  are. 

The  loyalists  themselves  always  believed  that  they  were  a 
majority.  Twenty-five  thousand  of  them,  and  according  to 
some  accounts  fifty  thousand,  are  said  to  have  enlisted  in  the 
British  army;  and  their  writers  have  been  fond  of  citing  a 
letter  of  Germain's  in  which  he  said  that  in  1781  there  were 
more  of  them  in  the  British  army  than  there  were  soldiers  in 
the  patriot  armies  of  the  Congress.  But  these  estimates  were 
exaggerations.  Clinton  denied  Germain's  estimate,  and  showed 
that  the  loyalists  in  the  British  army  at  that  time  were  only 
8,168,  while  the  Continental  patriot  troops  numbered  9,400.4 


4  << 


In  nearly  every  loyalists's  letter,"  says  Sabine,  "  or  paper  which 
I  have  examined,  and  in  which  the  subject  is  mentioned,  it  is  either 
assumed  or  stated  in  terms  that  the  loyalists  were  the  majority." — 
"American  Loyalists,"  edition  of  1847,  p.  65;  Ryerson,  "Loyalists  of 
America,"  vol.   ii,  pp.  57,   123;   Niles,   "Principles  and  Acts,"   p.   504; 

244 


NUMBERS  OF  LOYALISTS 

"When  we  examine  all  the  various  estimates  which  were  made 
of  their  numbers  by  their  contemporaries,  we  find  the  most 
extraordinary  disagreement.  Harry  Lee  estimated  them  at  one 
tenth  of  the  whole  population.  John  Adams,  writing  in  1780, 
estimated  them  at  not  more  than  a  twentieth.  In  1815  he  esti- 
mated them  at  a  little  more  than  a  third.  Galloway,  in  his 
examination  before  Parliament,  and  in  one  of  his  pamphlets, 
estimated  them  at  nine-tenths  and  at  four-fifths.  General  Rob- 
ertson, in  his  testimony  before  the  committee  on  the  conduct 
of  the  war,  estimated  them  at  two-thirds.  He  described  the 
population  as  one-third  for  the  Congress,  one-third  neutral, 
and  one-third  loyal,  which  he  thought  gave  two-thirds  which 
could  be  called  loyal. 

These  discrepancies  may  possibly  be  reconciled  by  defining 
what  is  meant  by  the  term  loyalist.  There  were,  in  a  general 
way,  four  classes  of  persons  to  whom  the  name  could  be  applied. 
The  first  class  was  composed  of  people  who  were  thoroughly 
English,  untouched  by  the  American  environment  and  not  only 
uninfluenced  by  the  rights-of-man  and  Whig  principles,  but 
loathing  and  detesting  everything  of  that  kind.  Most  of  these 
people  finally  left  the  country  and  went  to  live  in  England, 
Canada,  or  the  West  Indies.  That  very  muscular  Christian, 
Rev.  Dr.  Boucher,  of  Maryland,  was  of  this  class ;  and  perhaps 
Jonathan  Sewall  and  Daniel  Leonard  might  be  included  in  it. 

The  second  class  were  somewhat  more  Americanized.  They 
were  anxious  to  remain;  but  they  wished  the  country  to  be 
ruled  by  England.  They  had  no  confidence  in  any  other  rule. 
They  were  willing  to  argue  and  struggle  ina"  legal  and  consti- 
tutional manner,"  as  they  called  it,  for  greater  privileges,  or 
for  "redress  of  grievances";  but  if  England  decided  against 


B.  F.  Stevens,  Clinton-Cornwallis  Controversy,  vol.  i,  p.  335;  vol.  ii, 
p.  83;  Van  Tyne,  "Loyalists  of  the  American  Revolution,"  pp.  172,  183; 
Stedman,  American  War,  vol.  ii,  pp.  168,  448;  Johnson,  Life  of  General 
Greene,  vol.  i,  pp.  257-260.  In  the  preface  to  the  correspondence  of 
German  published  in  1784  it  is  very  positively  asserted  "that  the 
American  loyalists  alone  were  superior  in  numbers  to  the  rebels,"  B.  F. 
Stevens,  supra,  vol.  ii,  p.  308. 

245 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

them  that  would  end  the  matter.  These  were  the  people  who 
were  willing  to  accept  British  rule  without  "guarantees  of 
liberty,"  having  full  confidence  that  in  the  long  run  that  rule 
would  be  satisfactory,  and  that  the  "guarantees"  which  the 
patriots  demanded  were  unnecessary.  They  were  strong  be- 
lievers in  the  empire,  and  wished  to  live  in  colonies  which 
were  part  of  the  empire.  Curwen,  of  Massachusetts,  and  Van 
Schaack,  of  New  York,  who  have  left  us  such  interesting 
memoirs,  seem  to  have  been  of  this  class;  so  also  were  some 
of  the  De  Lancey  family  of  New  York,  and  Joseph  Galloway 
and  the  Allen  family,  of  Pennsylvania. 

The  great  stumbling-block  with  these  people  was  the  Decla- 
ration of  Independence.  In  the  early  stages  of  the  Revo- 
lution they  had  acted  with  the  patriots  and  prevented  any  dis- 
tinct line  of  demarcation  between  the  parties.  But  when  the 
movement  for  independence  showed  itself  strongly,  as  in  the 
approval  by  the  Congress  of  the  Suffolk  resolutions,  they  began 
to  drop  out  of  the  patriot  ranks;  and  when  it  became  evident 
that  there  was  to  be  an  open  declaration  of  independence,  they 
went  out  in  greater  numbers.  They  were  often  treated  with 
contempt  by  British  officers,  and  called  "whitewashed  rebels"; 
and  the  well-to-do  among  them  were  sometimes  informed  that 
by  their  former  association  with  the  rebels  they  had  forfeited 
their  right  to  be  treated  as  gentlemen.  A  very  large  propor- 
tion of  this  second  class  left  the  country  before  the  war  was 
over  and  never  returned. 

These  two  classes  included  all  that  could  be  strictly  called 
loyalists.  But  the  term  was  often  applied  to  the  neutrals  and 
those  who,  for  want  of  a  better  name,  may  be  called  the  hesitat- 
ing class.  The  neutrals  would  have  nothing  to  do  with  the 
contest  either  one  way  or  the  other.  Most  of  the  Quakers  of 
Pennsylvania,  and  many  of  the  Pennsylvania  Germans,  who 
held  the  same  religious  belief  as  the  Quakers,  were  neutrals. 
There  were  also  all  sorts  of  persons  scattered  over  the  country 
who  held  entirely  aloof,  and  are  properly  described  as  neutral. 

The  hesitating  class  have  sometimes  been  described  as  the 
people  who  were  wondering  on  which  side  their  bread  was 

246 


EXPLANATION  OF  ESTIMATES 

buttered.  Some  of  them  would  at  times  enlist  for  a  few 
weeks  with  the  patriots;  but  a  patriot  disaster  would  scatter 
them;  and  many  of  them  deserted  to  the  British  or  took  the 
British  oath  of  allegiance,  which  they  not  infrequently  broke 
at  the  first  opportunity. 

Most  of  them,  however,  never  enlisted  at  all.  They  were 
more  or  less  willing  that  the  patriots  should  win ;  but  they  were 
waiting  for  that  event  to  happen.  All  through  the  Revolution 
we  hear  of  the  prominent  ones  among  them,  especially  in  New 
York,  going  over  to  the  British  side,  having  made  up  their 
minds  that  at  last  the  current  had  set  that  way.  In  the  dark 
days  of  1780  a  great  many  of  them  went  over,  and  these  defec- 
tions were  particularly  numerous  in  the  Southern  colonies. 

When  these  classes  were  counted  together,  there  was  a 
certain  amount  of  plausibility  in  General  Robertson's  saying 
that  the  loyalists  were  two-thirds  of  the  people;  and  when 
Galloway  says  that  they  were  four-fifths  or  nine-tenths,  he  was 
evidently  counting,  with  considerable  exaggeration,  all  the 
people  that  could  be  in  any  way  relied  upon,  positively  or 
negatively,  to  assist  the  British  cause.5 

When  Adams  said  that  the  loyalists  were  only  one-twentieth 
of  the  people,  he  was  interested  in  making  their  numbers  seem 
as  small  as  possible,  and  we  may  assume  that  he  was  speaking 
only  of  the  extreme  loyalists,  possibly  only  of  the  class  first 
mentioned.  He  was  then  in  Amsterdam  trying  to  persuade 
the  Dutch  to  take  the  side  of  the  American  patriots  with  loans 
of  money,  if  not  by  actual  war.  He  was  answering  a  request 
of  the  famous  Dutch  lawyer,  Calkoen,  who  had  asked  him  "to 
prove  by  striking  facts  that  an  implacable  hatred  of  England 
reigns  throughout  America, "  and,  "to  show  that  this  is  gen- 


6  Since  the  first  edition  of  this  work  appeared  the  analysis  made 
by  Dr.  Rush  in  1777  has  been  published  and  agrees  substantially  with 
mine.  {Pennsylvania  Magazine  of  History,  vol.  xxvii,  pp.  143-145.  See, 
also,  Van  Tyne,  "Loyalists  of  the  American  Revolution,"  p.  158.) 
Washington  speaks  of  "  half  tories,"  as  he  calls  them,  who  could  under 
certain  circumstances  be  employed  as  spies.  (Writings  of  Washington, 
Ford  edition,  vol.  vii,  p.  345.) 

247 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

eral,  that  the  Tories  are  in  so  small  a  number  and  of  such 
little  force  that  they  are  counted  as  nothing. ' ' 

Adams  complied  to  the  best  of  his  ability,  and  did  not  think 
it  necessary  to  count  the  neutrals  and  hesitating  class,  or  to 
exaggerate  at  all  the  numbers  of  the  extreme  loyalists.  Many 
years  after  the  Kevolution,  in  1813,  he  said  that  the  loyalists 
had  been  about  a  third,  and  he  was  then  evidently  counting  the 
first  and  second  classes.  In  1815  he  said  substantially  the  same, 
and  gives  an  interesting  estimate  which  is  very  like  that  of 
General  Robertson.6 

"  I  should  say  that  full  one-third  were  averse  to  the  Revolution. 
These,  retaining  that  overweening  fondness,  in  which  they  had  been 
educated,  for  the  English,  could  not  cordially  like  the  French;  indeed, 
they  most  heartily  detested  them.  An  opposite  third  conceived  a  hatred 
for  the  English,  and  gave  themselves  up  to  an  enthusiastic  gratitude  to 
France.  The  middle  third,  composed  principally  of  the  yeomanry,  the 
soundest  part  of  the  nation,  and  always  averse  to  war,  were  rather  luke- 
warm to  both  England  and  France;  and  sometimes  stragglers  from 
them,  and  sometimes  the  whole  body,  united  with  the  first  or  last  third, 
according  to  circumstances." — Adams,  Works,  vol.  x,  p.  110  . 

The  violence,  the  tar  and  feathers,  and  the  restricted  free- 
dom of  speech  must,  as  Sabine  points  out,  have  turned  many 
patriots  into  loyalists.  Many  who  sympathized  with  patriot 
principles  tried  to  check  what  they  considered  the  patriot 
disorders  and  the  violation  of  the  rights  of  person  and  prop- 
erty. But  failing  in  this,  and  being  treated  with  suspicion, 
abuse,  and  contempt,  they  were  forced  in  self-defence  into  the 
ranks  of  the  loyalists. 

After  hostilities  began  and  the  Revolution  was  well  under 
way,  the  loyalists  were  a  minority  in  Virginia  and  in  New 
England,  but  probably  a  majority  in  New  York  and  in  Georgia. 
In  South  Carolina  they  are  said  to  have  been  a  minority  in  the 
eastern  part  of  the  State  and  a  majority  in  the  western.     In 


'Adams,  Works,  vol.  vii,  p.  270;  vol.  x,  pp.  63,  110,  193;  American 
Historical  Review,  vol.  i,  p.  27 ;  "  View  of  the  Evidence,  etc.,  on  Conduct 
of  General  Howe,"  pp.  46,  50;  Lee,  Memoirs,  vol.  i,  p.  212,  note.  See, 
also,  Egerton,  "Origin  and  Growth  of  English  Colonies,"  edition  1903, 
p.   160. 

248 


EVIDENCE  OF  NUMBERS 

Pennsylvania,  Maryland,  and  New  Jersey,  they  are  supposed 
to  have  been  evenly  balanced,  each  side  claiming  the  majority. 
Even  in  New  England  and  Virginia  the  loyalists  were  more 
numerous  than  is  generally  supposed. 

General  Reed  thought  that  the  loyalists  might  be  a  majority 
in  Pennsylvania.  In  1781  he  said  that  the  majority  of  people 
from  New  York  southward  were  in  the  British  interest ;  and  he 
probably  included  in  this  description  all  classes  of  loyalists 
including  possibly  the  hesitating  class  just  described.  General 
Greene,  writing  from  South  Carolina,  described  the  people  as 
at  first  about  "equally  divided  between  the  King's  interest  and 
ours";  but  afterwards  the  loyalists  were  in  the  majority 
because  many  patriots  had  left  the  country.  In  North  Carolina 
he  said  the  loyalists  were  more  numerous  than  the  patriots.7 

There  would  probably  not  have  been  so  many  loyalists  if 
the  patriots  had  not  been  under  the  necessity  of  seeking  an 
alliance  with  France.  It  was  generally  admitted  on  all  sides 
that  independence  was  impossible  without  French  assistance; 
and  many  of  the  colonists  could  not  endure  the  thought  of 
begging  assistance  from  the  great  Roman  Catholic  power,  the 
hereditary  enemy  of  the  English  race,  that  had  been  fought 
for  generations  in  Canada,  and  that  being  devoted  to  despotism 
would  never  really  give  independence,  but  would  use  the  oppor- 
tunity to  inflict  on  America  the  worst  form  of  colonialism  and 
destroy  the  protestant  religion. 

In  a  carefully  prepared  letter  which  in  October,  1776,  was 
sent  to  France  by  the  secret  committee  of  Congress,  the  loyalists 
are  described  as  so  numerous  that  they  were  more  dangerous 
than  the  British  army: 

"  The  only  source  of  uneasiness  amongst  us  arises  from  the  number 
of  Tories  we  find  in  every  State.  They  are  more  numerous  than  formerly 
and  speak  openly;  but  Tories  are  now  of  various  kinds  and  various 
principles.  Some  are  so  from  real  attachment  to  Britain,  some  from 
interested  views,  many,  very  many,  from  fear  of  the  British  force;  some 
because  they  are  dissatisfied  with  the  general  measures  of  Congress,  more 


7 "  Life  of  Joseph  Reed,"  by  W.  B.  Reed,  vol.  ii,  pp.  351,  352,  358, 
372 ;  Johnson,  Life  of  General  Greene,  vol.  i,  pp.  257-260. 

249 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

because  they  disapprove  of  the  men  in  power  and  the  measures  in  their 
respective  States;  .  .  .  and  if  America  falls,  it  will  be  owing  to  such 
divisions  more  than  the  force  of  our  enemies."  (American  Archives, 
fifth  series,  vol.  ii,  p.  821.) 

An  example  of  the  way  in  which  the  large  hesitating  class 
could  be  worked  upon  and  kept  in  the  British  interest  is  seen 
in  the  mischief  which  was  believed  to  have  been  done  by  the 
captured  British  officers.  They  were  paroled  and  put  to  board 
with  families  in  villages  throughout  the  country  where  they 
talked  with  the  characteristic  confidence  of  the  true  Briton. 

"  I  am  convinced,"  said  Washington,  "  that  more  mischief  has  been 
done  by  the  British  officers  who  have  been  prisoners,  than  by  any  other 
set  of  people.  During  their  captivity  in  the  country  they  have  con- 
firmed the  disaffected,  converted  many  ignorant  people,  and  frightened 
the  lukewarm  and  timid  by  their  stories  of  the  power  of  Britain."  ( W. 
B.  Reed,  "  Life  of  Joseph  Reed,"  vol.  ii,  p.  27,  note. ) 

We  may  also  form  some  idea  of  the  numbers  of  the  loyalists 
when  we  learn  that  all  through  the  Revolution  they  were  leav- 
ing the  country  by  thousands.  Eddis  describes  them  as  begin- 
ning to  leave  Maryland  as  early  as  1775;  and  after  that  we 
read  of  three  thousand  leaving  here,  four  thousand  there, 
twelve  thousand  at  another  place,  up  even  to  one  hundred 
thousand,  that  are  said  to  have  left  when  Sir  Guy  Carleton 
evacuated  New  York.8 

In  spite  of  all  these  migrations  the  patriots  found  it  neces- 
sary, all  through  the  Revolution,  to  banish,  confiscate,  lessen 
their  numbers,  and  break  their  spirit  in  every  possible  way. 
Some  of  the  severest  measures  were  taken  against  them  after 
peace  was  declared,  and  this  is  said  to  have  caused  the  great 
migration  with  Sir  Guy  Carleton.  Many  of  them  became  con- 
vinced that  there  would  be  no  use  in  trying  to  live  in  the 
country  even  in  peaceful  times.  There  was  quite  a  strong 
opinion  among  the  patriots  that  if  the  extreme  loyalists  re- 


8  De  Lancey's  note  to  Jones'  "  New  York  in  the  Revolution,"  vol.  ii, 
p.  504;  Elizabeth  Johnston,  "Recollections  of  a  Georgia  Loyalist;" 
Eddis,  "Letters  from  America,"  pp.  226,  230,  231,  232,  235,  272;  Van 
Tyne,  "  Loyalists  of  the  American  Revolution,"  p.  293. 

250 


LOYALISTS  IN  CANADA 

mained  they  would  form  a  dangerous  political  party  which 
would  check  the  growth  of  nationality  and  watch  every  oppor- 
tunity to  assist  England  to  recover  some  sort  of  suzerainty  or 
control  over  America ;  and  no  doubt  England  had  hopes  of  this 
for  many  years. 

The  province  of  New  Brunswick  in  Canada  was  settled  by 
loyalists,  and  cut  off  from  Nova  Scotia  for  their  satisfaction 
and  accommodation.  They  became  also  the  founders  of  Upper 
Canada.  They  appear  to  have  held  extreme  Tory  opinions  and 
were  opposed  to  free  institutions.  They  infused  a  strong 
English  strain  among  the  Canadian  French  and  prevented  that 
country  becoming  altogether  French.  Between  forty  and  fifty 
thousand  of  them  are  believed  to  have  entered  Canada  by  the 
year  1786.  Sir  George  Bourinot  has  described  them  as  the 
founders  of  the  present  Dominion  of  Canada  and  imbued  with 
the  loftiest  principles  of  self  sacrifice.  Animated  with  a  feeling 
of  intense  animosity  against  the  United  States,  both  they  and 
their  descendants  have  shown  this  feeling  in  later  times  when- 
ever questions  of  difference  have  arisen  between  ourselves  and 
England.9 

The  serious  effect  which  the  neutrals  and  hesitating  class 
had  in  increasing  the  strength  of  the  loyalists  and  in  weakening 
the  patriots  is  seen  in  the  number  of  Washington 's  forces.  One 
of  the  most  intelligent  estimates  of  the  number  of  the  patriot 
population  puts  them  at  two-thirds,  or,  say,  1,400,000  out 
of  the  2,200,000  white  population.  But  if  there  were  really 
1,400,000  patriots,  a  great  number  of  them  were  lukewarm 
or  they  would  surely  have  furnished  more  than  the  ten 
or  fifteen  thousand  men  which  Washington  usually  had  for  his 
battles.  He  should  have  had  at  least  50,000  out  of  a  patriot 
population  of  1,400,000;  and,  indeed,  50,000  is  the  number 
which  the  Congress  always  expected  to  have,  but  never  ob- 
tained. They  could  never  obtain  25,000  all  told.  For  par- 
ticular occasions  considerable  numbers  could  sometimes  be 
raised,  as,  for  example,  the  20,000  at  the  time  of  the  Battle  of 


9  Bourinot,  "  Story  of  Canada,"  pp.  280,  292,  297. 

251 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

Long  Island,  or  the  11,000  at  Brandywine.  But  between  5,000 
and  10,000  were  all  that  could  be  raised  and  maintained  con- 
tinuously.10 

There  was  supposed  to  be  quite  a  considerable  patriot  force 
composed  of  those  who  would  not  join  Washington  or  any  of 
the  patriot  armies,  but  who  professed  a  willingness  to  consider 
themselves  as  militia  to  protect  their  own  province  from  inva- 
sion, watch  the  loyalists  or  guard  particular  points.  These 
troops  may  have  been  numerous  on  paper,  but  when  called  on 
for  active  service  very  few  of  them  would  appear.  In  May, 
1776,  the  number  of  possible  patriot  troops  was  estimated  at 
80,000  in  addition  to  which  there  were  supposed  to  be  140,000 
minute  men.  Pennsylvania,  New  Jersey,  and  New  York  would 
alone  furnish,  it  was  said,  35,000.  But  two  months  later,  when 
these  troops  were  called  upon  to  prevent  General  Howe  from 
taking  New  York,  it  was  with  the  greatest  difficulty  and  by 
drawing  on  all  the  New  England,  Middle,  and  Southern  colonies 
that  20,000  ragged,  half-armed  militia  could  be  collected,  and 
of  these  only  14,000  were  effectives.11 

During  the  winter  of  1777-78  the  patriots  must  have  been 
very  few  in  number  in  Pennsylvania;  for  during  that  winter 


10  Writings  of  Washington,  Ford  edition,  vol.  i,  p.  242;  vol.  viii, 
p.  235. 

In  the  Boer  War,  in  South  Africa  in  the  year  1900,  the  Boers  of 
the  Transvaal  and  Orange  Free  State  did  not  number  300,000  and  yet 
they  put  into  the  field  an  army  of  over  40,000.  Their  greater  unanimity 
is,  of  course,  easily  explained,  because  they  already  had  independence, 
which  they  were  fighting  to  retain,  while  we  were  colonies  rebelling  to 
obtain  independence. 

An  error  has  crept  into  some  standard  books  of  statistics,  to  the 
effect  that  the  number  of  patriot  troops  in  the  Revolution  was  231,959. 
These  astonishing  figures,  so  irreconcilable  with  Washington's  returns 
and  the  reports  of  battles,  grew  out  of  some  incomplete  and  random 
statements  of  General  Knox,  not  at  all  intended  to  produce  the  inferences 
that  were  drawn  from  them.  (See  Massachusetts  Historical  Society 
Proceedings,  second  series,  vol.  ii,  p.  204,  where  Mr.  Justin  Winsor  deals 
with  the  subject.) 

nNiles,  "Principles  and  Acts  of  the  Revolution,"  edition  of  1826, 
p.  493.    Jones,  "  New  York  in  the  Revolution,"  vol.  i,  p.  599. 

252 


PENNSYLVANIA  LOYALISTS 

Washington's  small  force  of  less  than  nine  thousand  men 
almost  starved  to  death  at  Valley  Forge.  They  were  surrounded 
in  every  direction  by  a  rich  farming  country.  The  British 
army  of  twenty  thousand  shut  up  in  Philadelphia  relied  chiefly 
on  ships  which  brought  supplies  up  the  river.  But  the  farmers 
of  the  surrounding  country  voluntarily  brought  and  sold  their 
supplies  to  the  British  in  Philadelphia,  leaving  the  patriot 
army  to  starve.  The  few  provisions  Washington  had  were 
obtained  by  raiding  these  loyalist  supply  wagons  on  their  way 
to  Philadelphia  and  by  sending  far  to  the  south  in  Virginia  and 
the  Carolinas.12 

The  country  round  Philadelphia  was  indeed  overwhelmingly 
loyalist,  as  Washington  found  to  his  sorrow  at  the  time  of  the 
Battle  of  the  Brandy  wine;  and  we  find  much  evidence  to  the 
same  effect  in  the  biography  of  General  Reed.13 

Many  who  believed  in  independence,  and  wished  the  patriot 
cause  success,  were  very  lukewarm  in  giving  it  assistance  or 
enlisting  in  the  army  except  perhaps  for  a  few  weeks.  The 
pay  was  small  and  they  could  see  no  use,  they  said,  in  exerting 
themselves  over  much  in  a  cause  from  which  others  would 
reap  as  much  benefit  as  themselves. 

After  the  first  emotions  are  over,  a  soldier  reasoned  with  upon  the 
goodness  of  the  cause  he  is  engaged  in,  and  the  inestimable  rights  he  is 
contending  for,  hears  you  with  patience,  and  acknowledges  the  truth  of 
your  observation,  but  adds,  that  it  is  of  no  more  importance  to  him 
than  others.  The  officer  makes  you  the  same  reply,  with  this  further 
remark,  that  his  pay  will  not  support  him,  and  he  cannot  ruin  himself 
and  family  to  serve  his  country  when  every  member  of  the  community  is 
equally  interested  and  benefitted  by  his  labors. — Washington  to  Hancock, 
September  24,  1776. 


"Sargent,  "Life  of  Andre,"  p.  159;  Galloway,  "Letter  to  Right 
Honorable  Lord  Viscount  Howe,"  p.  27,  London,  1779;  Cobbett,  "Parlia- 
mentary History,"  vol.  xx,  p.  346;  Parliamentary  Register,  vol.  xiii, 
p.  464. 

13  Baker,  "  Itinerary  of  Washington,"  p.  92 ;  "  Life  of  Joseph  Reed," 
by  W.  B.  Reed,  vol.  i,  pp.  305,  308,  313,  380.  See,  also,  Niles,  "  Principles 
and  Acts  of  the  Revolution,"  edition  of  1876,  p.  227;  Graydon,  "Me- 
moirs," edition  1846,  pp.  34,  37. 

253 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

The  truth  is  that  those  who  were  really  willing  to  risk 
themselves  or  their  property  in  the  cause  of  independence,  and 
die  in  the  last  ditch,  were  comparatively  few.  There  is  every 
reason  to  suppose  that  they  were  less  than  a  million.  They 
were  the  heroic  element,  deeply  inspired  by  the  desire  for  a 
country  of  their  own.  Then  there  were  those  only  a  little 
inspired,  who  were  willing  that  the  heroes  should  perform  the 
miracle  of  succeeding.  But  they  could  not  see  any  advantage 
in  risking  their  own  necks,  health,  property,  or  comfort  in  the 
performance  of  something,  which,  after  all,  might  be  super- 
human. They  were  waiting  and  watching.  If  the  rebellion 
were  crushed  they  would  be  sorry,  but  they  would  also  be  safe. 

After  the  Eevolution  had  proved  itself  successful  this  class 
threw  up  their  caps  and  shouted  for  independence.  They  were 
heroic  at  Fourth  of  July  celebrations  and  in  politics;  they 
governed  the  country;  and  were  inclined  to  ignore  the  old 
soldiers  of  the  war.14 


14  W.  B.  Reed,  "  Life  of  Joseph  Reed,"  vol.  ii,  pp.  372,  373 ;  Johnson, 
Life  of  Greene,  vol.  ii,  p.  453;  also  Graydon's  Memoirs,  where  in  several 
passages  he  complains  that  the  majority  which  ruled  the  country  after 
the  Revolution  was  principally  composed  of  the  neutrals  and  hesitators 
who  had  stood  aloof  during  the  contest. 


XXII. 

THE  METHODS  OF  SUPPRESSING  THE  LOYALISTS 

The  loyalists  were  so  numerous  that  the  patriots  had  to 
resort  to  measures  of  the  utmost  severity  for  suppressing  them. 
These  measures  amounted  to  another  war,  which  if  described 
in  detail,  would  fill  as  much  space  in  history  as  is  usually  given 
to  the  war  with  the  British  Army.  But  the  details  of  the 
loyalist  war  are  so  shocking  and  unpleasant  that  they  have 
usually  been  entirely  omitted. 

The  loyalists  were  far  more  numerous  than  the  British 
Army  ever  became.  They  were  to  be  found  in  every  county 
and  village  and  in  such  places  often  in  a  decided  majority.  In 
some  parts  of  the  country  it  was  necessary  for  the  patriot  militia 
to  stay  at  home  to  overawe  the  loyalists  and  prevent  them 
gaining  control.  In  parts  of  Maryland  and  Delaware,  in  Mon- 
mouth County,  New  Jersey,  and  in  various  parts  of  New  York, 
as  in  Westchester  County,  Long  Island,  and  the  region  around 
Albany,  they  at  times  were  in  control ;  and  in  the  Carolinas  and 
Georgia  they  were  still  more  numerous,  materially  assisted  the 
British  in  subjugation,  and  were  most  murderous  in  their 
dealings  with  the  patriots.1 

In  every  part  of  the  country  they  knew  of  all  the  doings  of 
the  patriots,  all  the  movements  of  the  patriot  forces,  and  ren- 
dered the  British  spy  system  and  secret  service  far-reaching 
and  complete.  Powder  was  stolen  from  the  magazines  of  the 
patriots,  stores  of  salt  broken  open,  and  horses  and  cattle 
driven  to  the  British  lines  and  sold.  They  supplied  the  British 
army  with  provisions  as  well  as  information ;  and  were  particu- 
larly useful  in  depreciating  the  value  of  the  Continental  paper- 


1  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  vi,  pp.  808,  83;  fifth  series, 
vol.  i,  p.  9;  Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol,  ii,  p. 
426,  474;  "Life  of  George  Read,"  by  W.  T.  Read,  pp.  212,  213;  Van 
Tyne,  "  Loyalists,"  pp.  162,  167. 

255 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

money.  The  British  army  had  presses  for  counterfeiting  and 
printing  this  paper  money,  which  was  given  in  large  quantities 
to  the  loyalists,  and  the  more  they  circulated  it  the  more  it 
weakened  the  patriot  cause.  They  would  enlist  in  the  patriot 
service,  draw  the  bounty  money,  and  then  desert  to  the  British. 
Washington  often  found  his  whole  army,  by  reason  of  these 
methods,  largely  disaffected,  and  it  was  wonderful  that  he  was 
able  to  hold  it  together.2 

In  Northern  New  York,  near  the  Canada  line,  loyalist  bands 
conducted  savage  raids,  often  in  company  with  Indians,  and 
inflicted  barbarous  cruelties  on  the  patriots ;  and  the  massacres 
by  loyalists  and  Indians  in  the  Wyoming  Valley  of  Pennsyl- 
vania, and  in  Cherry  Valley,  in  New  York,  were  the  most 
merciless  raiding  of  the  war. 

The  loyalists  enlisted  in  British  regiments  and  were  per- 
mitted to  a  certain  extent  to  form  military  organizations  of 
their  own.  In  1779  the  British  Government  allowed  them  to 
commission  privateers,  which  were  fitted  out  in  New  York  and 
had  their  station  at  Lloyd 's  Neck.  Of  the  separate  loyalist  regi- 
ments, Tarleton's  command  was  active  in  the  southern  cam- 
paigns, and  the  troops  defeated  at  the  battle  of  King 's  Mountain 
were  Ferguson's  loyalists.  That  battle  was  the  only  important 
engagement  of  the  war  in  which  the  force  on  the  British  side 
was  entirely  loyalist.  There  was  also  a  very  active  and  in  their 
own  estimation  very  efficient  regiment  of  loyalists  known  as 
the  Queen's  Rangers,  commanded  by  Colonel  Simcoe,  who  was 
afterwards  governor  of  Canada.  Robert  Rogers,  of  New  Hamp- 
shire, who  had  been  a  distinguished  Indian  fighter  and  partisan 
officer  in  the  war  against  the  French,  joined  the  British  and 
raised  a  regiment  of  loyalists  who  fought  in  the  battles  round 
New  York  in  1776.  One  of  the  DeLancey  family  of  New 
York  commanded  another  well-known  loyalist  regiment.  There 
was  the  Royal  Highland  Regiment,  composed  of  Scotch  loyal- 
ists; the  "Royal  Invincible  Americans,"  the  "Royal  Greens, " 


2  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  ii,  p.  821;  also  vol.  i,  p.  1492; 
also  fourth  series,  vol.  vi,  p.  1072;  Flick,  "Loyalism  in  New  York/'  p.  100. 

256 


LOYALIST  BANDS 

Jessup's  Battalion,  Pieter's  Corps,  the  ''King's  American 
Kegiment,"  the  New  Jersey  Volunteers,  and  others  of  which 
little  can  now  be  known.  In  Pennsylvania  a  loyalist  regiment 
was  raised  among  the  Pennsylvania  Germans,  and  another 
among  the  Irish,  called  "Rawdon's  Volunteers  of  Ireland."3 

Besides  these  and  the  ordinary  enlistments  in  the  regular 
British  army,  there  were  numerous  temporary  loyalist  bands 
which  preyed  upon  the  patriots  and  inflicted  serious  loss  and 
damage.  During  the  British  occupation  of  New  York  these 
bands  raided  in  Connecticut  and  New  Jersey,  destroying  prop- 
erty, pillaging  and  burning.  This  petty  marauding  warfare 
made  the  name  of  loyalist  more  detested  than  ever  among  the 
patriots. 

Besides  the  damage  to  property,  the  loyalist  bands  were 
often  active  in  seizing  prominent  patriots  and  bringing  them 
prisoners  to  New  York.  Richard  Stockton,  a  signer  of  the 
Declaration  of  Independence  and  a  man  of  wealth  and  influence, 
was  seized  by  a  band  of  loyalists  on  the  night  of  the  30th  of 
November,  1776,  while  staying  with  John  Covenhoven  at  Mon- 
mouth, New  Jersey,  and  both  he  and  Covenhoven  carried  fo 
New  York,  where  Stockton  was  imprisoned  until  his  health 
was  broken  and  his  usefulness  to  the  patriot  cause  destroyed. 
Prominent  patriots  in  some  places  near  the  British  army  had 
to  keep  constantly  on  the  move  and  dared  not  remain  at  home 
more  than  one  day  at  a  time.4  If  the  loyalists  had  been  encour- 
aged to  carry  out  this  system  more  thoroughly,  it  might  have 
been  very  disastrous  to  the  patriots,  for  a  little  energy  and 
enterprise  might  have  captured  the  whole  Continental  Congress. 

Joseph  Galloway,  a  very  prominent  loyalist,  who  actively 
assisted  the  British  army  with  information  and  advice,  planned 
some  daring  enterprises  which  might  have  been  terrible  blows 
to  the  patriots  had  General  Howe  allowed  them  to  be  executed. 


3  David  Fanning,  Narrative,  p.  79;  Orderly  Book  of  C.  Jones,  edited 
by  R.  L.  Ford,  in  Brooklyn  Historical  Print  Club;  American  Catholic 
Historical  Researches,  vol.  14,  pp.  65-80;  Caulkins,  "History  of  New- 
London,"  p.  546 ;  Stedman,  American  War,  vol.  ii,  p.  168. 

4 "  Life  of  Joseph  Reed,"  by  W.  B.  Reed,  vol.  i,  p.  359. 
17  257 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

One  of  Galloway's  plans  was  to  seize  the  patriot  governor, 
council  and  assembly  of  New  Jersey;  and  he  also  prepared  a 
plan  for  capturing  the  Continental  Congress.  Governor  Tryon, 
of  New  York,  had  a  similar  plan  to  capture  the  New  York 
Assembly,  and  there  were  several  plans  for  seizing  Washington, 
any  one  of  which  might  by  chance  have  been  as  successful  and 
as  effective  as  the  capture  of  Richard  Stockton,  or  General 
Funston's  capture  of  the  insurgent  leader,  Aguinaldo,  in  the 
Philippine  Islands. 

There  was  also  the  Hickey  plot  among  the  loyalists  in  New 
York,  in  June,  1776,  to  assassinate  Washington  and  his  staff 
officers  and  to  blow  up  the  patriot  magazine.  But  fortunately 
for  us,  these  staggering  blows,  which  in  other  lands  have 
changed  dynasties  or  ended  rebellions  for  liberty,  were  never 
delivered.5 

It  was  evident  that  in  the  end  England  would  have  to  rely 
upon  the  loyalists.  Without  their  assistance,  as  Germain  put 
it,  "an  attempt  to  subdue  and  retain  dominion  of  the  country 
will  be  fruitless."  If  the  patriot  party  and  its  army  had  been 
conquered,  Great  Britain  would  have  had  to  depend  solely  upon 
the  loyalists  to  take  possession  of  the  various  state  governments 
and  hold  them  in  the  interests  of  the  empire.6 

Nothing  but  the  promptness  of  the  patriot  party  in  attacking 
the  loyalists,  disarming  them,  and  breaking  up  their  organiza- 
tion, saved  American  independence.  The  disarming  was  one  of 
the  first  measures,  and  probably  had  more  effect  on  the  final 
result  of  the  Revolution  than  any  other  method  that  was 
adopted.  Disarming  parties  went  from  house  to  house  and  took 
away  all  loyalist  weapons.  This  broke  up  their  union  and 
organization  and  prevented  them  taking  advantage  of  their 


BVan  Tyne,  "Loyalists,"  p.  161;  Flick,  "  Loyalism  in  New  York," 
pp.  100-115;  Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,  vol.  ii,  259; 
Jones,  "  New  York  in  the  Revolution,"  vol.  i,  pp.  237,  238 ;  David 
Fanning,  Narrative,  p.  79;  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  vi,  pp. 
1054,  1058,  1101,  1116,  1118,  1120. 

8  B.  F.  Stevens,  Clinton-Cornwallis  Controversy,  vol.  i,  p.  461 ;  vol. 
ii,  pp.  85,  121,  179,  180;  Van  Tyne,  "Loyalists,"  pp.  165,  167. 

258 


DISARMING  LOYALISTS 

numbers.  It  was  the  foundation  of  all  other  measures.  With- 
out it  all  other  measures  might  have  been  in  vain,  because  the 
loyalists  might  have  been  able  to  resist  them. 

It  was  a  method  which  the  British  Government  had  thought 
of  using  against  the  patriots;  and  they  inquired  of  General 
Gage  as  to  the  feasibility  of  disarming  all  the  people  of  certain 
provinces.  But  he  replied  that  it  would  first  be  necessary  to 
be  in  complete  possession  of  the  country,  and  for  that  he  had 
not  sufficient  force.  That  was  the  great  difficulty.  The  British 
army  was  not  strong  enough  to  protect  the  loyalists,  and  the 
loyalists  were  not  prompt  enough  to  protect  themselves.  They 
were  always  waiting  for  the  British  army  to  help  them.  They 
looked  to  the  King  and  Parliament  for  protection.  If  they  had 
been  as  full  of  the  American  atmosphere  of  energy  and  organi- 
zation as  were  the  patriots,  they  might  have  got  the  start  with 
the  disarming,  and  worked  it  to  the  suppression  of  inde- 
pendence.7 

But  loyalism  seldom  inspires  as  much  aggressiveness  and 
courage  as  patriotism.  A  few  patriots  are  usually  a  match  for 
almost  twice  their  number  of  loyalists.  Men  do  not  throw  their 
whole  soul  into  the  contest  and  fight  with  such  desperate  energy 
and  intelligence  for  alien  government  as  for  separateness  and 
nationality.  In  such  wars  the  advantage  at  first  is  nearly 
always  with  the  patriots,  and  loyalism,  if  it  wins,  usually 
conquers  by  overwhelming  numbers,  and  great  wealth  and  re- 
sources applied  steadily  and  persistently  for  a  long  period. 

The  energy  and  promptness  of  the  disarming  parties  soon 
collected  in  the  revolutionary  committee-rooms  piles  of  curious 
and  beautiful  weapons,  which  would  now  be  the  delight  of 
collectors.  Duelling  pistols,  brass-barrelled  pistols,  holster 
pistols,  blunderbusses,  hangers,  cutlasses,  silver-hilted  swords, 
morning  swords,  muskets,  guns,  belts,  cartouch-boxes,  powder- 
horns,  and  ammunition  of  all  sorts,  were  brought  in,  labelled, 
listed,  and  appraised,  so  that  they  might  be  returned  or  paid  for 


7  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  i,  p.   1046;   vol.  ii,  p.  451; 
Van  Tyne,  "  Loyalists,"  pp.  125,  128,  163. 

259 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

after  the  war.  In  the  spring  of  1776  the  Continental  Congress 
became  anxious  that  the  measure  should  be  more  completely 
carried  out,  and  recommended  to  all  the  colonies  that  all  persons 
"notoriously  disaffected  to  the  cause  of  America"  should  be 
disarmed.8 

But  other  systematic  measures  besides  disarming  were  neces- 
sary, and  these  had  to  be  kept  up  all  through  the  Revolution ; 
for  there  never  was  a  day  or  an  hour  from  1774  to  1783  in 
which  the  patriots  could  relax  their  vigilance.  There  were 
two  classes  of  measures,  the  regular  procedure  of  district  com- 
mittees and  State  legislatures  using  imprisonment,  banishment, 
and  confiscation,  and  the  violent,  irregular  procedure  of  mobs 
which  used  tar  and  feathers  or  other  methods  of  terror  and 
cruelty. 

The  committees  of  correspondence,  which  originated  in 
Massachusetts  and  were  adopted  in  all  the  colonies  for  encour- 
aging and  organizing  the  patriot  party  in  its  resistance  to  acts 
of  Parliament,  soon  had  a  natural  development  into  revolu- 
tionary committees  of  a  more  active  character.  These  com- 
mittees were  known  by  various  names,  as  Committees  of 
Safety,  Committees  of  Sixty,  Committees  of  One  Hundred, 
Town  Committees,  Precinct  Committees,  Committees  of  Inspec- 
tion, Committees  of  Observation.  There  was  often  a  District 
Committee,  representing  the  patriots  of  a  small  locality  like  a 
township,  and  a  County  Committee,  which  acted  in  a  larger 
field  and  had  a  certain  controlling  influence  over  the  district 
committees.  Above  this  was  a  general  body  for  the  whole 
province,  elected  by  the  patriots  and  usually  called  a  conven- 
tion, but  in  Massachusetts  and  New  York  it  was  called  a  provin- 
cial congress.  It  was  in  effect  the  patriot  legislature  of  the 
province,  and  acted  as  such  until  as  the  Revolution  progressed 
State  constitutions  and  modern  legislatures  were  adopted. 

The  investigation,  trial,  and  punishment  of  loyalists  was  the 
principal  work  of  the  district  and  county  committees;  and  as 


*  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  v,  pp.  215,  873,  1638;  vol.  vi, 
p.  984. 

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PROCEDURE  OF  COMMITTEES 

we  read  of  their  doings  and  steady,  continuous  efforts  in  every 
part  of  the  country,  and  through  every  week,  month,  and  year 
of  the  Revolution — supplemented  by  the  efforts  of  the  legisla- 
tures in  confiscation  of  loyalist  property — we  gradually  reach 
the  conclusion  that  the  patriot  organization  for  holding  in 
check  and  destroying  loyalism  was  fully  as  systematic,  elaborate, 
and  far-reaching  as  the  military  establishment  which  Wash- 
ington and  his  generals  directed  against  the  British  regular 
army. 

The  proceedings  of  these  committees  were  entirely  arbitrary. 
They  called  such  witnesses  as  they  pleased;  they  made  secret 
investigations ;  they  often  condemned  their  victim  in  his  absence, 
without  anything  like  a  regular  trial;  and  in  Albany  they  do 
not  appear  to  have  allowed  loyalists  to  employ  counsel.  They 
were  not  in  any  sense  trial  courts;  but  rather  investigating, 
inquisitorial,  and  executive  bodies.  Great  injustice  and  unfair- 
ness must  necessarily  have  been  sometimes  committed.9 

The  various  offences  which  were  usually  included  under  the 
general  term  ' '  loyalism ' '  were  very  numerous. 

"  Loyalists  were  arrested  for  arming  to  support  the  British  or  aiding 
the  enemy  in  any  way;  for  harboring  or  associating  with  Tories;  recruit- 
ing soldiers;  refusing  to  muster;  corresponding  with  loyalists  or  with 
British;  refusing  to  sign  the  association,  or  violating  its  provisions; 
denouncing  or  refusing  to  obey  congresses  and  committees;  writing  or 
speaking  against  the  American  cause;  rejecting  continental  money; 
refusing  to  give  up  arms ;  drinking  the  King's  health ;  inciting  or  taking 
part  in  Tory  plots  and  riots ;  being  royal  officers ;  and  even  for  endeavor- 
ing to  remain  neutral.  Mere  suspicion  was  sufficient  to  cause  seizure,  and 
this  meant  at  least  imprisonment.  On  this  wide  definition  of  loyalism, 
hundreds  were  arrested,  and  soon  all  the  jails  were  overflowing." — Flick, 
"  Loyalism  in  New  York,"  p.  83. 

The  committees  were  usually  deluged  with  business.  They 
were  kept  busy  fining,  imprisoning,  dismissing  on  parole,  releas- 
ing under  bond,  banishing,  disarming,  sometimes  inflicting  the 


9 American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  i,  pp.  361,  381;  Flick,  "Loyal- 
ism in  New  York,"  pp.  82,  122;  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  vi, 
p.  1273 ;  "  Life  of  John  Jay,"  pp.  41,  42,  49,  50. 

261 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

penalty  of  death,  and  adopting  every  imaginable  form  of  pun- 
ishment and  repression  to  suit  individual  cases,  and  wear  out, 
convert,  or  destroy  the  loyalists.  It  was  quite  a  wonderful 
system  in  its  way,  beginning  with  the  Continental  Congress  and 
passing  down  through  provincial  congresses,  and  conventions, 
to  the  county,  district,  and  precinct  committees,  without  any 
legal  basis  and  resting  entirely  on  the  voluntary  consent  and 
action  of  the  patriot  party  and  their  earnestness  in  the  cause 
of  independence. 

"A  loyalist,"  said  the  patriots,  "is  a  thing  whose  head  is  in 
England,  whose  body  is  in  America,  and  its  neck  ought  to  be 
stretched."  In  the  elections  which  took  place  under  the  new 
revolutionary  state  constitutions,  no  loyalist  was  allowed  to 
vote.  He  could  hold  no  office  of  trust  or  profit.  In  some  of 
the  states  he  could  make  no  use  of  the  courts  of  law.  He  could 
bring  no  suit  to  recover  money  that  was  due  him  or  to  recover 
damages  for  trespass,  assault,  or  slander.  He  could  not  act  as 
executor,  administrator,  guardian,  juryman,  or  attorney,  or 
convey  or  receive  a  valid  title  to  land.  Even  some  mercantile 
callings,  like  that  of  apothecary,  were  denied  him.  He  became, 
in  fact,  a  political  and  legal  outcast,  and  was  obliged  to  content 
himself  with  drinking  silent  healths  to  royalty.  It  was  not  often 
that  he  could  join  openly  with  his  companions  in  singing  what 
they  called  their  ■ '  grand  and  animating  song,  *  God  Save  great 
George  our  King. '  ' ' 

His  position,  however,  varied  in  the  different  states.  Some 
of  them  did  not  deprive  him  of  as  many  rights  as  were  taken 
from  him  by  others ;  nor  were  the  restrictions  always  enforced, 
unless  an  emergency  arose.  But  he  considered  his  position  from 
his  own  point  of  view  well  described  by  a  writer  who  said: 
"There  is  more  liberty  in  Turkey  than  in  the  dominions  of  the 
Congress. ' ' 

When  a  full  account  of  all  the  restrictions  and  disabilities, 
together  with  incidents  of  tarring  and  feathering  and  other  mob 
violence,  was  stated,  it  unquestionably  looked  like  very  arbi- 
trary, tyrannous  conduct  on  the  part  of  people  who  were  at  the 
same  time  clamoring  for  more  liberty  for  themselves.     The 

262 


NECESSITY  OF  SEVERITIES 

complaints  of  the  loyalists  remind  us  somewhat  of  the  com- 
plaints in  the  French  Revolution  that  the  revolutionary  com- 
mittees which  were  overthrowing  the  tyranny  of  kings  "had 
perpetrated  more  atrocities  in  twelve  months  than  all  the  kings 
of  France  had  in  twelve  centuries. ' '  The  proclamations  issued 
by  British  generals  or  royal  governors  usually  described  the 
British  Government  and  its  army  as  coming  to  America  "to 
deliver  his  Majesty's  people  from  the  intolerable  yoke  of 
arbitrary  power,  which  his  Majesty  with  indignation  sees 
imposed  by  the  tyranny  of  the  rebel  congress. ' ' 10 

The  patriot  party  believed  that  these  severities  to  the  loyal- 
ists were  necessary,  a  mere  temporary  violation  of  individual 
liberty  for  the  sake  of  securing  national  independence  and 
larger  liberty  for  all  in  the  future.  But  the  English  Tory  party 
and  the  majority  of  Englishmen,  on  their  part,  believed  that 
the  patriots  were  the  most  frightful  and  lawless  anarchists  that 
the  world  had  ever  seen,  and  that  England  was  doing  no  more 
than  her  duty  to  law  and  civilization  by  repressing  them. 

The  Revolution  was,  in  short,  the  very  worst  kind  of  a  civil 
war.  It  was  more  of  a  civil  war  than  the  conflict  between  the 
states  in  1861,  because  that  was  essentially  a  war  between  two 
sections  of  the  country,  while  the  Revolution  was  a  war  between 
two  parties,  each  of  which  was  numerous  in  every  part  of  the 
country.11 

All  through  the  Revolution  the  loyalists,  disarmed  and  dis- 
organized, were  the  prey  of  the  rough  element  among  the 
patriots.  Everywhere  they  were  seized  unexpectedly,  at  the 
humor  of  the  mob ;  tarred  and  feathered,  paraded  through  the 
towns,  or  left  tied  to  trees  in  the  woods.  Any  accidental  circum- 
stance would  cause  these  visitations,  and  often  the  victim  was 
not  as  politically  guilty  as  some  of  his  neighbors,  who,  by  pru- 
dence or  accident,  remained  unharmed  to  the  end  of  the  war. 

Men  were  ridden  and  tossed  on  fence-rails ;  were  gagged  and 
bound  for  days  at  a  time ;  pelted  with  stones ;  fastened  in  rooms 


"Niles,  "  Principles  and  Acts  of  the  Revolution,"  edition  1876,  p.  317. 
11  Lee,  Memoirs,  vol.  i,  p.  212,  note. 

263 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

where  there  was  a  fire  with  the  chimney  stopped  on  top ;  adver- 
tised as  public  enemies,  so  that  they  would  be  cut  off  from  all 
dealing  with  their  neighbors.  They  had  bullets  shot  into  their 
bedrooms ;  money  or  valuable  plate  extorted  to  save  them  from 
violence  and  on  pretence  of  taking  security  for  their  good 
behavior.  Their  houses  and  ships  were  burnt ;  they  were  com- 
pelled to  pay  the  guards  who  watched  them  in  their  houses; 
and  when  carted  about  for  the  mob  to  stare  at  and  abuse,  they 
were  compelled  to  pay  something  at  every  town. 

The  expenses  put  upon  loyalists  of  means  were  sometimes 
very  heavy.  Mr.  James  Christie,  a  merchant  of  Baltimore, 
after  narrowly  escaping  with  his  life,  had  to  pay  nine  shillings 
per  day  to  each  of  the  men  who  guarded  his  house,  and  was 
ordered  to  pay  five  hundred  pounds  to  the  revolutionary  con- 
vention, "to  be  expended  occasionally  towards  his  proportion 
of  all  charges  and  expenses,  incurred  or  to  be  incurred,  for  the 
defence  of  America  during  the  present  contest. ' ' 12 

Sometimes  the  loyalists  were  put  to  work  like  criminals  in  a 
chain-gang.  In  Vermont,  in  January,  1778,  the  overseer  of  the 
imprisoned  loyalists  was  ordered  to  take  them  for  three  days 
into  the  Green  Mountains  to  ' '  march  and  tread  the  snow  in  said 
road  of  suitable  width  for  a  sleigh  and  span  of  horses. ' '  After 
the  battle  of  Bennington  loyalists  were  tied  in  pairs  and 
attached  by  traces  to  horses,  which  were,  in  some  cases,  driverj 
by  negroes.  All  this  was  considered  necessary  in  order  to 
repress  these  enemies  of  independence  and  punish  them  for 
assisting  the  British.  But  hatred  for  loyalism  and  the  excite- 
ment of  the  times  carried  the  patriots  to  deeds  of  which  after- 
wards they  often  repented.  "One  Tory  with  his  left  eye  shot 
out/'  says  a  patriot,  "  was  led  by  me  mounted  on  a  horse  who 
had  also  lost  his  left  eye.  It  seems  to  me  cruel  now — it  did  not 
then."13 

Some  of  us,  perhaps,  have  read  of  the  treatment  of  the  Rev. 
Samuel  Seabury,  afterwards  the  first  bishop  of  the  Protestant 


12  Bolton,  "  A  Private  Soldier  under  Washington,"  pp.  214,  215. 

13  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  105,  125,  129. 

264 


METHODS  IN  THE  SOUTH 

Episcopal  Church  in  the  United  States.  His  house  was  invaded 
by  the  mob,  his  daughters  insulted,  their  lives  threatened, 
bayonets  thrust  through  their  caps,  and  all  the  money  and 
silverware  in  the  house  taken.  Seabury  himself  was  paraded 
through  New  Haven  and  imprisoned  for  a  month.  Afterwards 
he  and  some  other  loyalists  fled  for  their  lives,  and  lived  in  a 
secret  room,  behind  the  chimney,  in  a  private  house,  where  they 
were  fed  by  their  friends  through  a  trap-door. 

In  South  Carolina  the  mob,  in  one  instance,  after  applying 
the  tar  and  feathers,  displayed  their  Southern  generosity  and 
politeness  by  scraping  their  victim  clean,  instead  of  turning 
him  adrift,  as  was  usually  done,  to  go  home  to  his  wife  and 
family  in  his  horrible  condition  or  seek  a  pitiable  refuge  at  the 
house  of  a  friend,  if  he  could  find  one. 

"  Of  the  few  who  objected  (to  the  Charleston  Association)  there  were 
only  two  who  were  hardy  enough  to  ridicule  or  treat  it  with  contempt, — 
viz.,  Laughlin  Martin  and  John  Dealey,  on  which  account  .  .  .  Yesterday 
they  were  carted  through  the  principal  streets  of  the  town  in  complete 
suits  of  tar  and  feathers.  The  very  indecent  and  daring  behaviours  of 
the  two  culprits  in  several  instances  occasioned  their  being  made  public 
spectacles  of.  After  having  been  exhibited  for  about  half  an  hour,  and 
having  made  many  acknowledgments  of  their  crime,  they  were  conducted 
home,  cleaned,  and  quietly  put  on  board  of  Captain  Lasley's  ship." — 
American  Archives,  fourth  series,  ii,  p.  922. 

From  a  letter  written  at  Charleston,  in  August,  1775,  we 
gain  another  glimpse  of  such  proceedings : 

"Yesterday  evening  the  gunner  of  Fort  Johnson  (one  Walker)  had 
a  decent  tarring  and  feathering,  for  some  insolent  speech  he  had  made. 
There  is  hardly  a  street  through  which  he  was  not  paraded — nor  a  tory 
house  where  they  did  not  halt — particularly  Innes's,  Simpson's,  Wragg's, 
Milligan's,    Irving's,     &c,    &c,    &c.        At    Gen.    Bull's    they    stopped; 

called  for  grog;    had  it — made  Walker  drink  d n  to  Bull,  threw  a 

bag  of  feathers  into  his  balcony — desired  he  would  take  care  of  it  till  his 
turn  came,  and  that  he  would  charge  the  grog  to  the  account  of  Lord 
North.  Finally  the  wretch  was  discharged  at  Milligan's  door.  The 
people  were  in  such  a  humor,  that  I  believe  there  was  scarce  a  non-sub- 
scriber who  did  not  tremble  and  Wells  had  his  shop  close  shut." — Gibbs, 
"  Documentary  History  of  the  American  Revolution,"  1764-1776,  p.  139. 

265 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

The  South  Carolina  patriots  had  a  secret  committee  of 
which  William  Henry  Drayton,  Arthur  Middleton,  and  Charles 
Cotesworth  Pinckriey  were  the  leading  members.  It  was  bold 
and  prompt  in  its  action,  and  its  secret  orders  to  the  patriot 
populace  were  instantly  obeyed.  If  the  Revolution  had  been 
overthrown,  the  loyalists  would  have  no  doubt  demanded  from 
Great  Britain  some  very  summary  vengeance  upon  the  men 
who  composed  this  committee.14 

Instances  of  severity  to  loyalists  at  every  stage  of  the  Revo- 
lution might  possibly  be  collected  in  great  numbers  from  the 
records.  But  we  would  not  then  have  them  all ;  for  there  must 
have  been  countless  instances  of  violence  which  were  not 
recorded  in  print.  Like  the  other  instances,  they  played  their 
part ;  were  well  known  by  common  report ;  contributed  towards 
forming  opinion  and  action  in  the  great  problem;  and  now, 
being  unpleasant  or  inconvenient  to  remember,  have  passed  out 
of  human  recollection  as  though  they  had  never  happened.15 

Many  saved  themselves  by  yielding,  by  resigning  the  offices 
they  held  under  British  authority,  or  by  writing  out  a  humiliat- 
ing apology  and  reading  it  aloud,  or  letting  it  be  published  in 
the  newspapers.  When  this  system  of  terrorism  was  once  well 
under  way,  there  was  a  crop  of  these  recantations  everywhere. 
But  we  do  not  always  know  from  the  records  the  severity  by 
which  these  recantations  were  forced. 

Loyalists  would  often  resist  for  a  time  before  subjecting 
themselves  to  the  ignominy  of  a  recantation.  In  one  instance 
twenty-nine  loyalists  were  carried  about  by  a  party  of  militia 
for  several  days  from  town  to  town.    They  were  told  that  they 


14  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  ii,  p.  923. 

**  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  i,  pp.  630,  663,  716,  724,  731, 
732,  745,  763,  787,  806,  885,  965,  970,  974,  1009,  1042,  1061,  1070,  1105, 
1106,  1178,  1236,  1243,  1253,  1260;  fourth  series,  ii,  pp.  33,  34,  91,  131, 
174,  176,  318,  337,  340,  466,  507,  545,  552,  622,  725,  875,  920,  922,  1652, 
1688,  1697;  fourth  series,  iii,  pp.  52,  59,  105,  119,  127,  145,  151,  170,  326, 
462,  682,  823,  1072,  1254,  1266;  fourth  series,  iv,  pp.  19,  29,  203,  247,  288, 
475,  564,  679,  719,  847,  884,  887,  941,  1043,  1228,  1237,  1241,  1284,  1288, 
1571,  1580,  1585,  1590,  1692,  1717.  See  also  title  "Tories"  in  the  indices 
of  the  volumes  of  the  American  Archives. 

266 


TAR  AND  FEATHERS 

were  to  be  put  in  the  Simsbury  mines,  which  were  damp,  under- 
ground passages  for  mining  copper  in  Connecticut,  not  far 
from  Hartford.  These  mines  were  often  used  for  terrorizing 
loyalists.  The  twenty-nine  were  exhibited  and  tormented  until, 
before  they  reached  the  mines,  the  last  one  had  humbled  him- 
self by  a  public  confession  and  apology. 

As  time  went  on  there  were  comparatively  few  who,  when 
visited  by  the  mob,  did  not  finally  make  a  public  apology, 
because,  although  that  was  bad  enough,  they  knew  that  in  the 
end  there  was  the  far  worse  infamy  and  torture  of  the  tar  and 
feathers.  There  were  few  men  of  any  position  or  respectability 
— and  it  was  such  men  that  were  usually  attacked — who 
could  bear  the  thought  or  survive  the  infliction  of  that  process, 
unless  they  afterwards  left  the  country  altogether.  To  be 
stripped  naked,  smeared  all  over  with  disgusting  black  pitch, 
the  contents  of  two  or  three  pillows  rubbed  into  it,  and  in  that 
condition  to  be  paraded  through  the  streets  of  the  town  for 
neighbors  and  acquaintances  to  stare  at,  was  enough  to  break 
down  very  daring  spirits. 

One  could  never  tell  when  an  angry  mob  might  rush  to  this 
last  resource.  On  the  24th  of  August,  1774,  a  mob  at  New 
London  were  carrying  off  Colonel  Willard,  when  he  agreed  to 
apologize  and  resign  his  office.    But  the  account  goes  on  to  say : 

One  Captain  Davis,  of  Brimfield,  was  present,  who  showing  resent- 
ment and  treating  the  people  with  bad  language,  was  stripped  and 
honoured  with  the  new-fashion  dress  of  tar  and  feathers;  a  proof  this 
that  the  act  of  tarring  and  feathering  is  not  repealed. — American 
Archives,  fourth  series,  i,  731. 

In  the  raids  to  break  up  the  loyalists  on  Long  Island  they 
were  hunted,  says  Judge  Jones,  like  wolves  and  bears  from 
swamp  to  swamp  and  from  hill  to  hill.  When  we  consider  that 
this  mob  rule  was  steadily  practised  for  a  period  of  nearly  ten 
years,  it  is  not  surprising  that  it  left  an  almost  indelible  mark 
on  our  people.  They  may  have  acquired  from  it  that  fixed 
habit  now  called  lynch  law,  which  is  still  practised  among  us  in 
many  parts  of  the  country  in  a  most  regular  and  systematic 
manner,  and  participated  in  by  respectable  people.     The  term 

267 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

lynch  law  originated  in  the  method  of  handling  the  loyalists  in 
the  Revolution,  and  perhaps  derived  its  name  from  the  brother 
of  the  man  who  founded  Lynchburg,  in  Virginia.16 

By  the  year  1775  the  patriot  portion  of  the  people  had 
grown  so  accustomed  to  dealing  with  the  loyalists  by  means  of 
the  mob,  that  they  regarded  it  as  a  sort  of  established  and  legal- 
ized procedure.  In  New  Jersey  we  find  an  account  of  tar  and 
feathers  inflicted  on  a  loyalist  closing  with  the  words,  "The 
whole  was  conducted  with  that  regularity  and  decorum  that 
ought  to  be  observed  in  all  public  punishments.17 

As  for  the  liberty  of  the  press,  the  mobs  had  pretty  much 
extinguished  it  by  the  year  1775;  and  after  that  some  of  the 
legislatures,  under  the  revolutionary  constitutions,  formally 
abolished  it  as  a  necessary  war  measure.  Evil  speaking  against 
the  Congress  or  the  patriot  cause  was  prohibited  even  in  prayer, 
for  some  did  under  "that  guise  wish  for  the  success  of  the 
King's  arms,  and  that  he  might  vanquish  and  overcome  all  his 
enemies. ' ' 

James  Rivington,  of  New  York,  who  printed  and  published 
many  of  the  loyalist  pamphlets,  was  boycotted  and  assailed  by 
town  and  village  committees  and  his  printing  presses  seized  by 
a  party  of  patriots  from  Connecticut  under  command  of  Isaac 
Sears  of  New  York.  Rivington  apologized  and  humbled  him- 
self, but  narrowly  escaped  with  his  life,  and  finally  took  refuge 
on  a  British  man-of-war.18 

Such  severity  in  extinguishing  free  speech  was  deemed  neces- 
sary, because  the  loyalists  were  unremitting  in  their  arguments, 
their  ridicule  of  Continental  paper  money,  and  everything 
patriotic.  The  stars  and  stripes  of  the  patriot  flag,  they  said, 
had  originated  in  Mrs.  Washington's  mottled  tom-cat,   with 


18 Jones,  "New  York  in  the  Revolution,"  vol.  i,  pp.  68,  69,  71,  109, 
568;  Atlantic  Monthly,  vol.  lxxxviii,  p.  731;  The  Nation,  vol.  lxv,  p.  439; 
Cutler,  "  Lynch  Law,"  p.  23. 

"  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  iv,  p.  203. 

18  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iii,  p.  1707;  vol.  iv,  pp.  185, 
186,  393,  400,  401;  vol.  v,  p.  439;  Jones,  "  Revolution  in  New  York,"  vol. 
i,  pp.  64,  66,  561. 

268 


PATRIOTS  PROTEST 

thirteen  yellow  rings  round  his  tail,  which  he  waved  so  often 
that  it  suggested  the  rebel  flag  to  the  Congress. 19 

People  engaged  in  a  revolution  must  necessarily  take  meas- 
ures which  may  afterwards  seem  extreme.  Their  minds  are 
wrought  up  to  a  state  of  excitement  in  which  trifles  seem  impor- 
tant; and  it  need  not  surprise  us  when  we  find  a  patriot 
committee  calling  an  Episcopal  clergyman  before  them  to 
answer  the  charge  of  having  baptized  a  child  by  ' '  the  opprobri- 
ous name  Thomas  Gage,"  which  the  committee  described  as  a 
' ' religious  manoeuvre"  to  insult  the  cause  of  liberty.20 

Patriots  were  often  moved  to  protest  against  some  of  the 
shocking  scenes  they  were  compelled  to  witness.  The  carting 
of  Dr.  Kearsley  wounded  and  bleeding  through  the  streets  of 
Philadelphia  was  more  than  Captain  Graydon  could  endure  in 
silence.  John  Adams  protested  against  the  treatment  of  Richard 
King,  whose  store  was  broken  open  by  the  mob  and  his  property 
laid  waste  as  early  in  the  difficulties  with  England  as  1766. 
Seven  or  eight  years  afterward,  in  1774,  the  mob  assailed  him 
again  because  one  of  his  cargoes  of  lumber,  without  any  fault 
of  his,  had  been  purchased  by  the  British  army  in  Boston. 
Forty  men  visited  him  on  this  occasion,  and,  by  threatening  his 
life,  compelled  him  to  disavow  his  loyalist  opinions.  He  shortly 
afterwards  went  insane  and  died. 

"  The  terror  and  distress,  the  distraction  and  horror  of  his  family," 
writes  John  Adams  to  his  wife,  "  cannot  be  described  in  words  or  painted 
upon  canvas.  It  is  enough  to  move  a  statue,  to  melt  a  heart  of  stone,  to 
read  the  story.  A  mind  susceptible  of  the  feelings  of  humanity,  a  heart 
which  can  be  touched  with  sensibility  for  human  misery  and  wretchedness 
must  relent,  must  burn  with  resentment  and  indignation  at  such  out- 
rageous injuries.     These  private  mobs  I  do  and  will  detest.    .    .    .    But 


"Van  Tyne,  "Loyalists,"  p.  200. 

20  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  v,  pp.  405,  406.  For  other 
curious  and  noteworthy  instances,  see  ibid.,  vol.  iv,  pp.  1630,  1631;  vol.  v, 
p.  951;  vol.  vi,  p.  626;  vol.  ii,  pp.  35,  466,  467;  vol.  iii,  pp.  170,  176,  986; 
Niles,  "  Principles  and  Acts  of  the  Revolution,"  edition  1876,  pp.  247, 
262,  263;  "Life  and  Correspondence  of  George  Read,"  p.  137;  Graydon's 
Memoirs,  edition  of  1846,  p.  127;  Ryerson,  "Loyalists,'  vol.  ii,  pp. 
123-144;  "  Life  of  Peter  Van  Schaack,"  pp.  109,  110,  112,  113,  126,  127. 

269 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

these  tarrings  and  featherings,  this  breaking  open  houses  by  rude  and 
insolent  rabble  in  resentment  for  private  wrongs  or  in  pursuance  of 
private  prejudices  and  passions,  must  be  discountenanced.  It  cannot  be 
even  excused  upon  any  principle  which  can  be  entertained  by  a  good 
citizen,  a  worthy  member  of  society."—"  Familiar  Letters  of  John  Adams 
to  His  Wife,"  p.  20. 

The  disorder  and  confusion  wrought  by  the  mobs  in  business 
and  in  every  department  of  life  caused  torturing  doubts  to 
many  enthusiastic  souls  who  had  been  reading  about  the  rights 
of  man.  Many  were  no  doubt  driven  from  the  patriot  cause 
by  it  and  joined  the  loyalists,  and  it  sometimes  almost  unnerved 
John  Adams.  A  man  in  Massachusetts  one  day  congratulated 
him  on  the  anarchy,  the  mob  violence,  the  insults  to  judges, 
the  closing  of  the  courts,  and  the  tar  and  feathers,  which  the 
patriots  and  their  Congress  were  producing. 

"  Oh,  Mr.  Adams,  what  great  things  have  you  and  your  colleagues 
done  for  us.  We  can  never  be  grateful  enough  to  you.  There  are  no 
courts  of  justice  now  in  this  province,  and  I  hope  there  never  will  be 
another." 

"  Is  this  the  object  for  which  I  have  been  contending,  said  I  to 
myself,  for  I  rode  along  without  any  answer  to  this  wretch ;  are  these  the 
sentiments  of  such  people,  and  how  many  of  them  are  there  in  the 
country?  Half  the  nation,  for  what  I  know;  for  half  the  nation  are 
debtors,  if  not  more;  and  these  have  been  in  all  countries  the  sentiments 
of  debtors.  If  the  power  of  the  country  should  get  into  such  hands,  and 
there  is  a  great  danger  that  it  will,  to  what  purpose  have  we  sacrificed 
our  time,  health  and  everything  else?" — Works  of  John  Adams,  vol.  ii, 
p.  420. 

There  appears  to  have  been  some  difference  of  opinion  among 
the  patriot  leaders  as  to  how  far  mob  violence  should  be  encour- 
aged. In  the  town  of  New  York  one  of  the  favorite  methods  of 
the  mob  in  dealing  with  loyalists  was  to  ride  them  astride  of  a 
rail  carried  on  the  shoulders  of  two  tall  men,  with  a  man  on  each 
side  to  keep  the  victim  straight  and  fixed  in  his  seat.  General 
Putnam  accidentally  meeting  one  of  these  processions  in  the 
street,  attempted  to  put  a  stop  to  it,  and  both  he  and  General 
Mifflin  appealed  to  the  Provincial  Congress  of  New  York  to  put 
an  end  to  what  they  thought  unnecessary  severity.  But  the 
Congress  would  do  nothing  definite  to  stop  the  work  of  the 

270 


LOYALISTS  SILENCED 

mobs,  except  to  pass  a  resolution  saying  that  they  disapproved 
of  such  riots,  but  they  had  no  doubt  they  "proceeded  from  a 
real  regard  to  liberty  and  a  detestation  of  those  persons  who  by 
their  language  and  conduct  have  discovered  themselves  to  be 
inimical  to  the  cause  of  America/ ' 21 

As  a  matter  of  fact  the  work  of  the  mobs  could  not  be 
stopped,  for  no  one  had  any  control  of  the  patriot  masses. 
Thoughtful  patriots  who  deplored  the  confusion,  the  turmoil 
and  the  mobs,  nevertheless  felt  satisfied  that  it  was  a  phase 
through  which  we  must  pass,  a  price  which  we  must  pay  for 
independence.  The  long  years  of  anarchy  were  trying,  terrible, 
and  digusting;  but  to  remain  the  political  slaves  of  England 
was,  they  said,  infinitely  worse.22 

The  claim  of  the  loyalists  that  they  should  at  least  be  allowed 
to  talk  and  write  in  vindication  of  their  opinions  could  not  be 
allowed.  The  majority  of  patriots  took  the  very  natural  view 
that  a  talking  influential  loyalist  making  converts  was  just  as 
dangerous  to  the  cause  of  independence  as  the  invading  soldier 
from  Great  Britain.  These  civilian  unarmed  enemies  must  be 
terrorized,  punished  with  suffering  in  body  and  mind,  and 
driven  out  of  the  country. 

"  Why  should  persons,"  said  Washington,  "  who  are  preying  on  the 
vitals  of  the  country,  be  suffered  to  stalk  at  large,  whilst  we  know  that 
they  will  do  us  every  mischief  in  their  power." 23 — Sparks,  "  Writings 
of  Washington,"  vol.  iii,  p.  263. 

Patriot  ministers  of  the  Gospel  declared  that  the  loyalists 
should  be  silenced.  The  situation,  said  the  Rev.  Dr.  Wither- 
spoon  in  his  sermon  of  the  11th  of  May,  1776,  was  like  that  of  a 
leaking  ship  at  sea.    After  the  proper  course  has  been  resolved 


21 "  Memorial  History  of  New  York  City,"  vol.  ii,  p.  495 ;  Lamb's 
"History  of  New  York  City,"  vol.  ii,  pp.  77-78;  Jones,  "History  of  New 
York,"  vol.  i,  pp.  101-103,  596;  Flick,  "  Loyalism  in  New  York/'  pp.  74, 
75;  Journal  New  York  Provincial  Congress,  vol.  i,  p.  232. 

^Journals  of  Congress,  vol.  i,  pp.  222,  224,  225,  285;  Niles,  "Prin- 
ciples and  Acts  of  the  Revolution,"  edition  1876,  p.  221. 

23  For  other  expressions  by  Washington  on  the  subject  of  the  loyalists, 
see  Ford's  edition  of  his  Writings,  vol.  iii,  p.  506;  vol.  iv,  p.  6. 

271 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

upon  those  who  object  or  complain  or  discourage  others  should 
"be  thrown  overboard  in  less  time  than  I  have  taken  to  state 
the  case."  Patriot  lawyers  announced  that  civil  rights,  free 
speech,  and  a  free  press  must  be  temporarily  suspended  until 
independence  was  secure.24 

The  contest  was  one  of  fundamental  principles.  It  was  a 
question  between  the  right  of  empire  and  the  right  of  national 
independence.  It  was  war  to  the  knife;  and  the  day  of  argu- 
ment had  passed.  It  was  idle  to  talk  of  civil  rights,  free  speech, 
and  the  ways  of  peace.  The  loyalists  were  by  no  means  free 
from  severity  and  cruelty  when  they  got  the  upper  hand,  and  if 
they  had  gained  anything  like  permanent  control  they  would 
have  adopted  measures  of  unparalleled  rigor  to  exterminate  or 
exile  most  of  the  patriots  and  hold  down  the  remnant.  Only  by 
relentless  severity  could  the  American  provinces  be  turned  into 
colonies,  and  only  by  similar  means  could  they  be  saved  for 
independence. 

So  the  mobs  and  the  revolutionary  committees  and  the  state 
legislatures  went  on  with  their  terrible  work.  At  first  there  was 
no  attempt  to  confiscate  loyalist  property.  In  fact,  orders  were 
often  issued  for  the  careful  protection  and  preservation  of  the 
property  of  loyalists  who  were  arrested  or  punished.  But  after 
independence  was  declared  and  violent  feelings  and  active  war- 
fare increased,  the  patriots  adopted  confiscation  as  a  necessary 
measure.  The  British  Government  had  already  ordered  Amer- 
ican ships  and  cargoes  on  the  high  seas  to  be  confiscated;  and 
General  Howe  confiscated  patriot  property  in  New  York.  The 
loyalists  expected  to  be  rewarded  for  their  fidelity  by  gifts  of 
rebel  estates.  This  method  had  been  adopted  in  the  subjugation 
of  the  Irish  and  has  been  the  foundation  of  a  large  part  of  the 
subsequent  troubles  and  degradation  in  Ireland,  and  would 
undoubtedly  have  produced  a  worse  state  of  confusion  and 
misery  in  America,  if  the  loyalist  cause  had  been  successful. 

By  the  year  1777  the  confiscation  of  the  personal  property 


**  Gribbs,    "  Documentary    History    of    the    American    Revolution/' 
1764-1776,  pp.  12,  13;  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  i,  p.  403. 

272 


AFTER  THE  PEACE  OF  1783 

and  land  of  such  loyalists  as  had  left  the  country  was  well 
under  way,  and  was  carried  out  systematically  during  the  rest 
of  the  Revolution  and  even  long  after  the  treaty  of  peace  of 
1783.  Forfeitures  were  made  after  the  year  1800,  and  some 
sales  of  forfeited  lands  were  not  complete  until  1819.  More 
than  half  the  landed  property  in  New  York  is  said  to  have 
belonged  to  loyalists,  and  it  has  been  estimated  that  New  York 
received  $3,160,000  from  the  forfeited  land  and  $3,600,000 
from  forfeited  personal  property.  There  were  also  large  for- 
feitures in  Pennsylvania  from  the  estates  of  rich  loyalists  like 
Joseph  Galloway. 

The  treaty  of  peace  of  1783  provided  that  the  Congress 
should  recommend  to  the  states  the  restoration  of  the  rights 
and  possessions  of  real  British  subjects  and  of  loyalists  who  had 
not  borne  arms  against  the  patriots,  and  that  other  loyalists 
should  be  allowed  to  go  into  any  state  within  a  year  to  adjust 
their  affairs  and  recover  their  confiscated  property  on  paying 
the  sale  price.  But  the  Continental  Congress,  with  which  the 
treaty  was  made,  had  no  power  to  compel  the  states  to  carry  out 
any  of  these  measures,  and  the  states  refused  to  carry  them  out. 
Loyalists  who  returned  to  New  York  to  settle  their  affairs  after 
the  treaty  of  peace  were  insulted,  and  tarred  and  feathered. 
About  a  thousand  of  the  richest  of  them  were  indicted  by  the 
grand  jury  for  treason.25 

Every  effort  was  made  to  drive  them  out  of  the  country  and 
keep  them  out.  Some  who  had  been  banished  were  forbidden  to 
return  under  pain  of  death.  A  year  after  the  treaty  of  peace 
most  of  the  loyalists  in  New  York  were  disfranchised  and  dis- 
qualified from  holding  office.  They  were  taxed,  and  debts  due 
them  were  cancelled  on  condition  that  one-fortieth  was  paid 
into  the  state  treasury. 

Men  like  Alexander  Hamilton  protested  against  such  treat- 
ment, and  tried  to  check  it,  but  with  very  little  result.  Hatred 
and  love  of  vengeance  were  too  strong  among  the  masses  of 


25 Flick,  "Loyalism  in  New  York,"  158;   Jones,  "New  York  in  the 
Revolution,"  vol.  i,  pp.  xil,  xvii,  150. 
18  273 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

the  patriot  party,  and  there  was  a  feeling  that  if  the  loyalists 
were  allowed  to  remain  in  the  country  they  might  still  be  able 
to  thwart  the  continuance  of  independence.  It  was  no  doubt 
well  to  be  rid  of  them,  for  they  were  not  Americans.  But  at 
the  same  time  it  must  be  confessed  that  their  exodus'  deprived 
the  country  of  a  fine  stock  of  people  who  could  ill  be  spared. 

The  British  Government  made  great  efforts  to  lighten  their 
sufferings,  supported  thousands  of  them  with  food,  money, 
clothing,  employment,  pensions,  and  offices,  as  well  as  liberal 
grants  of  land  in  Canada.  They  were  supplied  with  rations, 
tools,  and  seeds  to  start  life  afresh,  and  the  wealthy  ones  were 
partially  reimbursed  for  the  fortunes  they  had  lost.  England 
spent  altogether  over  $30,000,000  in  maintaining  and  rehabili- 
tating the  loyalists,  and  that  sum  was  fully  the  equivalent  of 
$100,000,000  to-day.26 


Flick,  "  Loyalism  in  New  York,"  p.  213. 


XXIII. 

ENGLAND   REJECTS   THE   ULTIMATUM 
OF  THE  CONGRESS 

The  ships  which  had  sailed  in  the  autumn  with  the  docu- 
ments of  the  American  Congress,  when  scarcely  ten  days  out, 
were  driven  back  by  a  gale.  They  returned  to  port,  and  several 
weeks  were  lost  before  they  were  again  on  their  way.  But  at 
last,  about  the  middle  of  December,  they  began  arriving  at 
different  ports,  and  the  petition,  the  declaration  of  rights,  the 
articles  of  association,  and  all  the  papers,  with  their  duplicates, 
travelled  by  various  means  to  London. 

Soon  they  were  published,  and  everybody  was  reading  them. 
But  it  was  so  near  Christmas  time  that  nothing  could  be  done. 
Parliament  adjourned  over  the  holidays,  and  members,  minis- 
ters, and  officials  rushed  off  to  the  country  to  enjoy  the  pleasures 
of  the  winter  sports,  house-parties,  and  family  gatherings. 

The  impression  produced  by  the  documents  of  the  Congress 
was  at  first,  Franklin  said,  rather  favorable.  By  this  he  seems 
to  have  meant  that  the  Whigs  were  pleased  because  the  rebellion 
party  were  making  a  good  fight  and  not  yielding  in  their 
demands,  and  the  Tory  administration  was  rather  staggered  at 
the  uncompromising  nature  of  the  demands,  and  a  little  inclined 
to  grant  some  of  them. 

During  the  Christmas  holidays,  every  one  in  town  and 
country  discussed  the  documents.  Dr.  Johnson  began  his  vigor- 
ous refutation  of  them  in  his  pamphlet,  "Taxation  no 
Tyranny. ' '  Lord  Chatham  read  them  with  delight  and  admira- 
tion. They  gave  him  a  strong  interest  and  roused  the  mighty 
energies  of  the  mind  that  had  saved  the  colonies  from  France 
and  won  a  whole  empire  for  England.  Burke  and  Fox  admired 
them,  and  so  also  did  all  the  Whigs,  as  a  matter  of  course. 

But  that  was  not  enough,  because  the  Whigs  were  already 

275 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

on  the  side  of  the  colonies,  and  willing  to  grant  any  favors  short 
of  absolute  independence  and  withdrawal  of  the  supremacy  of 
Parliament.  The  object  of  the  documents,  if  they  were  to 
accomplish  peace,  was  to  win  over  the  doubting  Tories  in  such 
numbers  that  they  would  turn  the  Whig  minority  into  a 
majority,  which  would  compromise  with  the  colonies.  In  that 
they  utterly  failed,  exactly  as  the  loyalists  foretold,  and  as 
such  men  as  Samuel  Adams  hoped  and  prayed  they  might. 

In  fact,  these  documents,  instead  of  accomplishing  reconcil- 
iation, made  reconciliation  impossible.  When  the  Tories  recov- 
ered from  their  first  surprise  at  the  boldness  of  the  demands 
their  indignation  and  resentment  mounted  higher  and  higher 
every  day.  If  the  members  of  the  Congress  could  have  passed 
December  in  Tory  households,  they  would  not  have  eaten  their 
Christmas  dinners  with  much  complacency.  Their  statements 
of  American  rights,  which  are  still  so  much  admired  by  us  and 
which  were  admired  by  Lord  Chatham  and  the  Whigs,  seemed 
ridiculous  to  the  Tories.  The  documents  were  admirable  only 
to  those  who  already  believed  their  sentiments,  and  they  were 
exasperating  and  hateful  to  others  in  exact  proportion  as  they 
were  admirable  to  us.  It  would  be  difficult  to  find  in  any 
previous  period  of  English  history  more  vigorous  denunciation 
than  was  soon  poured  forth  by  Tory  writers  and  orators. 

The  Tories  saw  independence  in  every  line.  Why,  they 
would  say,  their  very  first  resolution  says  that  they  have  never 
ceded  to  any  power  the  disposal  of  their  life,  liberty,  and  prop- 
erty. They  assume,  in  other  words,  that  they  have  a  right  to 
cede  it  if  they  wish.  They  believe  that  they  are  already  inde- 
pendent of  us.  They  deny  that  they  are  British  subjects.  They 
deny  that  they  are  subject  to  the  British  constitution,  by  which 
alone  the  life,  liberty,  and  property  of  every  Englishman  is 
held. 

The  inconsistency  of  asking  in  one  document  for  a  repeal  of 
the  Quebec  Act,  because  it  established  in  Canada  the  bigotry 
and  ignorance  of  the  Roman  Catholic  religion,  mingled  with  the 
absurd  customs  of  Paris,  and  in  another  document  appealing  to 
these  same  French  Roman  Catholics,  in  flattering  phrases,  to 

276 


TAXATION  NO  TYRANNY 

join  the  Congress  at  Philadelphia,  was  quickly  seen,  and  formed 
one  of  the  stock  jokes  at  every  Tory  gathering. 

"They  complain  of  transubstantiation  in  Canada/ '  said 
Dean  Tucker,  "but  they  have  no  objection  to  their  own  kind 
of  transubstantiation,  by  which  they  turn  bits  of  paper,  worth 
nothing  at  all,  into  legal  tender  for  the  payment  of  debts  to 
British  merchants." 

Dr.  Johnson's  "Taxation  no  Tyranny,"  with  its  whole- 
souled  Toryism,  is  capital  reading.  No  doubt  he  and  many 
another  Tory  were  expressing  the  same  sentiments  in  conversa- 
tion. At  his  Friday  evening  club,  surrounded  by  Sir  Joshua 
Reynolds,  the  ever-faithful  Boswell,  Charles  Fox,  Gibbon, 
Burke,  and  others,  we  can  almost  hear  the  doctor  pant  and  roar 
against  the  Americans  like  an  infuriated  old  lion. 

"Sir,  do  they  suppose  that  when  this  nation  sent  out  a 
colony  it  established  an  independent  power?  They  went  out 
into  those  wildernesses  because  we  protected  them,  and  they 
would  not  otherwise  have  ventured  there.  They  have  been 
incorporatd  by  English  charters;  they  have  been  governed  by 
English  laws,  regulated  by  English  counsels,  protected  by 
English  arms,  and  it  seems  to  follow,  by  a  consequence  not  easily 
avoided,  that  they  are  subject  to  English  government  and 
chargeable  by  English  taxation." 

And  if  Samuel  Adams  had  been  there,  he  might  have  said, 
"You  are  entirely  right,  and  that  is  the  reason  we  are  so 
anxious  to  have  our  independence. ' '  But  he  was  not  there,  and 
so  the  doctor  roared  on,  while  his  listeners  cautiously  smoked 
their  long  pipes. 

"When  by  our  indulgence  and  favor  the  colonists  have 
become  rich,  shall  they  not  help  to  pay  for  their  own  defence, 
If  they  accept  protection,  do  they  not  stipulate  obedience? 
Parliament  may  enact  a  law  for  capital  punishment  in  America, 
and  may  it  not  enact  a  law  for  taxation  ?  If  it  can  take  away  a 
colonist's  life  by  law,  can  it  not  take  away  his  property  by 
law?" 

And  again  Samuel  Adams  would  have  said,  "Why,  yes, 
certainly;  that  is  the  cause  of  the  whole  trouble." 

277 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

' '  Sir,  your  people  are  a  race  of  convicts, ' '  the  doctor  would 
have  replied;  "a  race  of  cowardly  convicts.  Has  not  America 
always  been  our  penal  colony?  Are  they  not  smugglers?  I 
am  willing  to  love  all  mankind  except  an  American.  How  is  it, 
sir,  that  we  hear  the  loudest  yelps  for  liberty  from  these  people, 
who  are  themselves  the  drivers  of  negroes?" 

We  can  easily  imagine  what  a  telling  hit  that  must  have 
been  among  the  Tories,  for  most  of  the  members  of  the  Conti- 
nental Congress  owned  slaves,  and  all  of  them  could  have  owned 
them.  Lord  Mansfield  had  recently  decided  that  a  slave  who 
set  foot  on  the  soil  of  England  was  by  that  act  set  free  while 
he  remained  in  England.  For  Americans  or  colonials  to  talk 
about  liberty,  and  drive  their  slaves  like  cattle,  seemed  very 
absurd  to  Englishmen.1 

The  doctor  made  many  telling  hits,  and  it  would  be  easy  to 
go  on  summarizing  or  paraphrasing  them. 

"One  minute,"  he  would  say,  "the  Whigs  are  telling  us, 
'  Oh,  the  poor  Americans !  have  you  not  oppressed  them  enough 
already?  You  have  forbidden  them  to  manufacture  their  own 
goods,  or  to  carry  their  raw  materials  to  any  but  English  ports. ' 
The  next  minute  they  tell  us  you  can  never  conquer  them ;  they 
are  too  powerful.  'Think  of  their  fertile  land,  their  splendid 
towns,  their  wonderful  prosperity,  which  enables  their  popula- 
tion to  double  itself  every  twenty  years.'  But  I  say,  if  the 
rascals  are  so  prosperous,  oppression  has  agreed  with  them,  or 
else  there  has  been  no  oppression.  You  cannot  escape  one  or 
the  other  of  those  dilemmas. ' ' 

An  English  pamphlet  called  ' '  Considerations  on  the  Ameri- 
can War, ' ' 2  published  during  this  period,  is  interesting  for 
its  forecasts.  It  describes  America 's  unbounded  extent  of  lands, 
such  vast  length  of  coast,  such  harbors,  such  fertility,  such 


1  See,  also,  "  Americans  against  Liberty,"  p.  23,  London,  177C.  The 
Boston  Gazette  of  July  22,  1776,  contained  the  Declaration  of  Inde- 
pendence in  full  and  also  an  advertisement  of  a  slave  for  sale. 

2 "  Considerations  on  the  American  War  addressed  to  the  People  of 
England,"  London.  See,  also,  "  The  Honor  of  Parliament  and  the  Justice 
of  the  Nation  vindicated,"  London,  1776. 

278 


AMERICA  EASY  TO  CONQUER 

prospect  of  provisions  for  ages  to  come,  such  certainty  of  vast 
increase  of  population,  that  unless  subdued  and  controlled  she 
would  before  long  overwhelm  the  mother-country  with  her 
riches  and  power.  As  America  rises  in  independence  England 
will  as  gradually  decay,  and  therefore  the  lawless  colonists  in 
America  should  be  subdued.  No  minister  of  discernment  and 
honesty,  it  was  said,  could  see  the  increasing  power  and  opulence 
of  the  colonies  without  marking  them  with  a  jealous  eye. 

Fears  were  expressed  that  the  patriot  colonists,  having  the 
whole  big  continent  to  hide  in,  might  get  off  into  the  Western 
wilderness  and  live  there  as  free  as  they  pleased.  Doctor  John- 
son ridiculed  this  idea  most  savagely.  If  the  Americans  were 
such  fools  as  that,  they  would  be  leaving  good  houses  to  be 
enjoyed  by  wiser  men.  Others  cited  Ireland  to  show  how  easily 
the  Americans  could  be  conquered.  When  the  great  rebellion,  it 
was  said,  began  in  Ireland  there  were  nearly  as  many  inhab- 
itants there  as  there  are  in  America,  yet  in  nine  years  five 
hundred  thousand  Irish  were  destroyed  by  the  sword  and  by 
famine,  and  Cromwell,  with  but  a  small  body  of  troops,  could 
easily  have  made  a  desert  of  the  whole  island.3  That  was 
many  years  ago,  when  England's  power  was  weak.  England 
had  only  recently  hunted  the  French  out  of  North  America  and 
conquered  the  Indians.    How  could  the  colonists  escape  f 

The  Tory  pamphleteers  complained  bitterly  of  the  Whigs, 
who  by  their  sympathy  and  talk  about  freedom  encouraged 
the  riot  and  rebellion  of  the  Americans.  If  the  Whigs  in 
England  would  cease  to  support  the  disorderly  colonists,  they 
would  soon  quiet  down.  It  was  afterwards  charged  that  the 
Whigs  regularly  furnished  the  patriots  with  information  and 
encouraged  the  rebellion  in  the  hope  that  its  success  would  put 
them  again  in  office  and  power.4 


8 "  The  Right  of  the  British  Legislature  to  tax  the  American  Colo- 
nies," p.  44,  London,  1774. 

4 "  A  View  of  the  Evidence  Relative  to  the  Conduct  of  the  American 
War  under  Sir  William  Howe,"  etc.,  p.  97;  Galloway,  "A  Letter  from 
Cicero  to  Right  Hon.  Lord  Viscount  Howe,"  p.  33,  London,  1781 ;  Lecky, 
"  England  in  the  Eighteenth  Century,"  edition  of  1882,  vol.  iii,  p.  545 ; 

279 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

The  author  of  the  pamphlet  already  cited  uses  Ireland  as 
an  instance  and  a  warning  for  the  Americans.  The  sole  cause 
of  Ireland's  long  years  of  disaster,  devastation,  and  failure,  he 
says,  has  been  because  she  would  never  give  up  her  love  of 
independence.  If  she  would  only  just  give  up  that  one  "teasing 
thought,"  how  happy  and  prosperous  she  might  be.  What 
long  terrors  and  misery  the  Americans  were  preparing  for 
themselves.5 

As  England  had  then  been  six  hundred  years  in  crushing 
the  independent  spirit  of  Ireland,  and  is  still  engaged  in  that 
noble  occupation,  this  Englishman 's  argument  is  a  strange  piece 
of  pathetic  British  intelligence. 

Dean  Tucker  was  the  most  interesting  of  the  political 
writers.  He  was  a  Tory,  and  yet  took  the  ground  that  the 
colonies  should  be  given  complete  independence.  His  reasons 
for  this  were  that  to  conquer  them  would  be  very  expensive, 
and  that  as  independent  communities,  supposing  they  remained 
independent,  they  would  trade  with  Great  Britain  more  than 
they  had  traded  as  colonies.  But  they  would  not  remain  inde- 
pendent, he  said.  They  would  either  lapse  into  a  frightful  state 
of  sectional  wars  and  confusion,  or  they  would  petition  for  a 
reunion  with  England.  In  short,  independence  would  be  a 
cheap  and  excellent  punishment  for  them. 

The  Tories  who  were  so  indignant  at  the  suggestion  of  allow- 
ing America  independence  could  quote  the  French  philosopher 
Raynal.  He  had  written  in  favor  of  the  colonists,  encouraged 
them  in  rebellion,  warned  them  not  to  allow  themselves  to  be 
represented  in  Parliament,  which  would  rivet  their  chains  and 
fetters.  But  he  had  said  that  it  would  be  absurd  to  give  them 
independence.  They  could  not  govern  themselves.  They  would 
burst  the  bonds  of  religion  and  of  laws.  They  would  be- 
come a  dangerous,  tumultuous  military  power;  they  would 
menace  the  peace  of  Europe.     They  would  try  to  seize  the 


Galloway,  "Reply  to  the  Observations  of  Lieutenant-General  Sir  W. 
Howe."  Gordon,  "  American  War,"  vol.  i,  p.  435 ;  Stedman,  "  American 
War,"  vol.  i,  p.  162. 

*  "  The  Right  of  the  British  Legislature  to  tax,"  etc.,  p.  23. 

280 


THE  COLONIES  IN  REBELLION 

French  and  Spanish  possessions  in  the  West  Indies.  The 
moment  the  laws  of  Britain  were  withdrawn  both  continents 
of  America  would  tremble  under  such  unscrupulous  tyrants.8 

The  Christmas  house-parties  soon  broke  up  and  Parliament 
resumed  its  sessions.  January  and  February  dragged  along 
and  March  came  while  the  mightly  assembly  of  the  Anglo-Saxon 
race  tossed  and  struggled  with  the  great  question,  whether 
universal  liberty  was  consistent  with  the  universal  empire. 

The  Tory  majority  was  overwhelming,  and  everything  that 
occurred,  all  the  information  that  arrived,  even  the  arguments 
of  the  Whigs,  convinced  that  majority  more  and  more  that  they 
were  in  the  right.  Letter  after  letter  was  read  from  General 
Gage  and  from  the  provincial  governors  describing  the  situation 
in  the  colonies.  Civil  government  in  Massachusetts  had  ceased ; 
the  courts  of  justice  in  every  county  were  expiring.  British 
officials  were  driven  out  of  the  country  by  terrorism  and  mob 
violence;  and  the  rebels  had  organized  a  government  of  their 
own  independent  of  General  Gage  and  the  charter.  They  were 
drilling  a  militia  of  their  own,  seizing  arms,  ammunition,  and 
artillery,  casting  cannon-balls,  and  looking  for  blacksmiths 
who  could  forge  musket-barrels.  They  upset  the  carts  that 
hauled  firewood  for  the  British  army  and  sank  the  vessels  that 
brought  provisions.  In  New  Hampshire  they  seized  the  fort 
at  Portsmouth  and  carried  away  the  powder,  cannon,  and 
muskets;  and  in  Rhode  Island  they  were  equally  daring  and 
aggressive. 

They  proposed  getting  all  the  women  and  children  out  of 
Boston  and  then  burning  it  to  ashes  over  the  heads  of  Gage  and 
his  soldiers.  They  were  ready  to  attack  him;  and  on  a  false 
rumor  that  his  ships  were  about  to  fire  on  Boston  the  whole 
patriot  party  in  New  England  were  in  arms,  and  the  patriots  in 
Connecticut  made  a  two  days'  march  to  give  their  assistance 
to  Massachusetts. 


*  "The  Sentiments  of  a  Foreigner  on  the  Disputes  of  Great  Britain 
with  America,"  p.  24,  Philadelphia,  1775 ;  translated  from  his  "  Philo- 
sophical and  Political  History  of  the  European  Settlements  in  America." 

281 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

As  the  Whigs  admitted  that  Massachusetts  was  in  rebellion, 
the  Tories  said  that  the  rebellion  must  be  put  down.  How  can 
we  endure  such  insubordination  unless  we  are  willing  to  give 
them  independence  outright  f  If  we  are  to  have  colonies  at  all 
they  must  be  subordinate  in  some  slight  degree. 

' '  You  have  raised  the  rebellion  yourselves, ' '  said  the  Whigs, 
1 '  by  your  excessive  severity  and  intermeddling. ' ' 

' '  No, ' '  said  the  Tories,  ' '  not  at  all ;  we  raised  it  eight  years 
ago  by  repealing  the  Stamp  Act;  by  yielding  for  a  time  to 
whiggery  and  weakness.  We  taught  the  colonists  to  think  that 
they  could  get  anything  they  wanted  if  they  threatened  us. ' ' 

Then  Burke  would  break  forth  in  impassioned  eloquence. 
England  could  not  conquer  the  Americans  without  ruining 
herself.  Remember  the  archer,  he  said,  who  was  drawing  his 
bow  to  send  an  arrow  to  his  enemy's  heart,  when  he  saw  his 
own  child  folded  in  the  enemy's  arms.  America  holds  in  her 
arms  our  commerce,  our  trade,  our  most  valuable  child.  Even 
now  the  tradesmen  and  merchants  of  the  whole  kingdom  are 
thronging  to  the  doors  of  this  house  and  calling  on  you  to  stay 
your  cruel  hand. 

During  these  debates  General  Howe  rose  to  be  recognized  by 
the  chair.  His  constituents  at  Nottingham,  he  said,  had  asked 
him  to  present  a  petition,  and  it  was  handed  to  the  clerk,  who 
read  it.  Nottingham  would  be  ruined,  the  petitioners  said, 
unless  Parliament  found  some  honorable  means  of  conciliating 
the  Americans.  Already  the  trade  of  the  town  was  ceasing, 
useless  goods  were  piling  up  in  the  warehouses;  laboring  men 
would  soon  be  out  of  employment. 

Petitions  from  London,  Bristol,  and  other  towns  told  the 
same  story,  and  Howe  must  have  been  amused  in  watching  the 
effect  of  them.  The  effect  was  the  reverse  of  what  the  petition- 
ers intended ;  for,  said  the  Tories,  can  it  be  endured  that  those 
colonists  shall  have  this  handle  over  us?  Shall  they  be  able, 
every  time  they  are  dissatisfied,  to  raise  a  rebellion  among  the 
commercial  classes  here  in  England,  and  flood  our  tables  with 
petitions,  and  fill  our  lobbies  with  stamping,  impatient  traders  ? 

So  they  investigated,  to  see  if  it  were  really  true  that  the 

282 


REBELLION  MUST  BE  SUBDUED 

Americans  were  starving  England  into  obedience,  and  making 
her  the  dependency  and  America  the  ruler;  and  they  aroused 
an  army  of  counter-petitioners,  who  swarmed  to  Parliament, 
declaring  that  British  trade  could  not  be  injured  by  anything 
America  could  do.  Thus  the  appeal  to  the  commercial  classes  in 
England,  which  had  been  so  successful  in  bringing  about  the 
repeal  of  the  Stamp  Act,  utterly  failed  in  this  second  attempt ; 
for  the  Tories  were  prepared  to  counteract  it.7 

The  Tory  position  that  America  was  attacking  the  supremacy 
of  Parliament,  the  sovereignty  of  the  empire,  was  a  strong 
appeal  to  most  Englishmen,  and  could  not  be  successfully 
answered,  when  letters  and  documents  showed  that  the  rebellion 
was  spreading  from  New  England  to  all  of  the  colonies.  But 
it  would  be  easily  subdued,  the  Tories  said ;  and  General  Grant, 
who  had  served  in  the  French  war,  assured  them  that  the  Amer- 
icans would  not  fight;  they  were  a  people  of  absurd  manners 
and  speech  and  disgusting  habits ;  they  had  none  of  the  qualifi- 
cations of  soldiers,  and  a  small  force  would  overcome  them. 

When  Wilkes  tried  to  prove  at  great  length  that  the  rebellion 
might  become  successful,  he  merely  increased  the  determination 
of  Englishmen  to  put  it  down  at  all  hazards.  When  Burke,  in 
a  torrent  of  eloquence,  declared  that  it  was  not  Boston  alone, 
but  all  America,  with  which  England  must  now  deal,  the  Tories 
thanked  him  for  having  made  their  duty  clearer. 

Could  they  allow  such  a  rebellion  to  go  unpunished  ?  They 
would  lose  all  their  other  possessions.  Canada,  Jamaica,  Barba- 
does,  India,  even  Ireland,  must  be  allowed  to  do  as  they  please, 
rebel  whenever  they  were  dissatisfied,  and  get  what  they  wanted 
by  blustering  and  threatening  to  fight. 

Our  school-boys  still  recite  extracts  from  the  speeches  of 
Burke  and  Barre.  We  shall  always  admire  them.  They  will 
always  seem  to  us  incomparably  and  immortally  eloquent  for 
the  beautiful  and  romantic  aptness  of  language  in  which  they 
expressed  for  us  our  sincerest  thoughts  and  aspirations.     But 


7 "  Letters  of  James  Murray,  Loyalist,"  p.  172 ;  "  Diary  and  Letters 
of  Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.  i,  p.  432. 

283 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

they  never  had  the  slightest  chance  of  accomplishing  the  small- 
est result  in  England.  They  were  mere  useless  protests.  Burke, 
Barre,  and  their  followers  were  not  Englishmen.  They  were 
totally  out  of  sympathy  with  the  principles  and  tone  of  thought 
which  had  ruled  England  for  centuries. 

Burke,  you  may  say,  was  at  this  time  an  American,  a  man 
with  American  ideas  accidentally  living  in  England.  He  was, 
in  fact,  an  Irishman.  He  had  come  to  London,  in  1750,  as  a 
penniless  Irish  adventurer,  and  risen  to  distinction  by  his 
talents  and  brilliant  Irish  mind.  When  he  pleaded  in  Parlia- 
ment for  the  utmost  liberty  to  the  Americans,  was  he  not  show- 
ing the  Irish  side  and  influence  of  his  character,  the  Irishman's 
natural  sympathy  with  home  rule  and  independence  ? 

He  foretold  great  things  for  us,  and  flattered  us  in  the 
most  glowing  language.  He  described  us  as  daring  sailors 
following  the  whales  among  the  "tumbling  mountains"  of 
Arctic  ice,  or  crossing  the  equator  and  the  tropics  to  "pursue 
the  same  dangerous  game  in  the  Antarctic  Circle,  under  the 
frozen  serpent  of  the  South.  No  sea  was  unvexed  by  the  Amer- 
ican fisheries;  no  climate  that  was  not  a  witness  to  their  toils. 
Neither  the  perseverance  of  Holland,  nor  the  activity  of  France, 
nor  the  dexterous  and  firm  sagacity  of  the  English  was  equal  to 
the  enterprise  of  this  recent  people  still  in  the  gristle  and  not 
hardened  into  the  bone  of  manhood. ' ' 

In  glowing  terms  this  Irish-Englishman  went  on  to  describe 
the  rapid  growth  of  our  population.  It  was  impossible  to 
exaggerate  it,  he  said,  for  while  you  were  discussing  whether 
they  were  two  million,  they  had  grown  to  three.  Their  trade 
with  England  was  prodigious,  and  was  now  almost  equal  to 
England's  trade  with  the  whole  world  in  1704.  Should  not 
people  of  such  numbers,  such  energy,  and  such  prosperity  be 
handled  cautiously  and  gently? 

Conscious  of  the  weakness  of  this  argument,  conscious  of 
the  absurdity  of  such  an  appeal  to  the  typical  Englishman,  he 
went  on  to  say  that  he  knew  that  his  descriptions  of  the  great- 
ness of  America  made  her  seem  a  more  noble  prize  to  the  Tories, 
an  object  well  worth  the  fighting  for;    and  to  overcome  this 

284 


BURKE'S  ARGUMENT 

Tory  feeling  he  went  on  arguing  in  a  way  that  made  it  a  great 
deal  worse.  He  was  obliged  to  say  in  effect  that  British  valor 
was  not  equal  to  the  conquest  of  the  Americans.  Even  if  you 
should  conquer  them  at  first,  can  you  go  on  conquering  them, 
can  you  keep  such  a  people  subdued  through  the  years  and 
centuries  that  are  to  come  ? 

Having  enlarged  on  this  point  until  he  had  drawn  against 
himself  the  whole  national  pride  of  England,  and  lost  every  vote 
that  might  be  wavering,  he  went  on  to  ask  eloquently,  beautifully, 
but  ineffectually,  how  are  you  to  subdue  this  stubborn  spirit  of 
your  colonies?  You  cannot  stop  the  rapid  increase  of  their 
population;  you  would  not  wish  to  cut  off  their  commerce, 
for  that  would  be  to  impoverish  yourselves;  you  cannot  stop 
their  internal  prosperity  which  is  spreading  over  the  continent. 
And  here  again  his  fervid  imagination  pictured  a  wonderful 
scene  of  the  colonists  driven  by  British  conquest  from  the 
seaboard  to  dwell  in  the  vaster  and  more  fertile  interior  plains 
of  boundless  America;  how  they  would  become  myriads  of 
raiding  Tartars,  and  pour  down  a  fierce  and  irresistible  cavalry 
upon  the  narrow  strip  of  sea-coast,  sweeping  before  them  ' '  your 
governors,  your  counsellors,  your  collectors  and  comptrollers, 
and  all  the  slaves  that  adhere  to  them. ' ' 8 

His  argument  was  a  good  one  for  independence,  and  possibly 
in  his  heart  he  was  in  favor  of  independence ;  but  he  would  not 
admit  it.  He  clung  to  the  impossible  dream  that  the  colonies 
could  be  retained  as  colonies  without  coercion  and  conquest. 
His  remedy  was  to  give  the  colonists  what  they  asked,  to  comply 
with  the  American  spirit;  "or,  if  you  please,"  he  said,  "submit 
to  it  as  a  necessary  evil." 

A  very  simple  and  easy  method,  laughed  the  Tories.  It 
would  certainly  dispose  of  the  question  completely. 

Barre,  our  other  great  friend  in  Parliament,  who  was  more 
dreaded  than  any  other  orator  of  the  opposition,  was  descended 


8  This  retreat  into  the  interior  beyond  the  Alleghany  Mountains  was 
the  plan  which  Washington  and  the  other  patriot  leaders  intended  to  adopt 
if  hard  pressed,  and  the  Congress  also  announced  it  in  1775,  in  their 
Declaration  of  the  Causes  for  taking  up  Arms. 

285 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

from  a  French  Protestant  family  of  Rochelle  and  had  been 
born  and  educated  in  Ireland.  He  had  served  with  Wolfe  in  the 
French  and  Indian  War,  was  a  favorite  of  that  officer,  and 
shared  his  liberal  opinions.  With  his  Irish  education,  his 
French  blood,  and  the  bias  towards  liberty  of  his  Huguenot 
religion,  he  was  not  an  Englishman  at  all.  He  was  an  Ameri- 
can in  all  but  migration,  and  we  accordingly  read  his  eloquence 
with  great  delight. 

As  for  the  rank  and  file  of  that  hopeless  minority  called  the 
Whig  party,  they  were  largely  made  up  of  those  people  who, 
for  centuries,  had  been  maintaining  doctrines  of  liberty  not 
accepted  by  the  mass  of  Englishmen.  In  the  previous  century 
the  majority  had  persecuted  them  so  terribly  that  they  had  fled 
to  America  by  thousands  as  Quakers  and  Puritans. 

At  intervals  this  minority  has  achieved  success  and  made 
great  and  permanent  changes  in  the  English  Constitution. 
They  had  a  day  and  an  innings  in  Cromwell 's  time ;  a  long  day 
in  Gladstone's  time,  accomplishing  wonderful  changes  and 
reforms  in  England ;  but  perhaps  their  greatest  triumph  was  in 
the  revolution  of  1688,  when  they  dethroned  the  Stuart  line, 
established  religious  liberty,  destroyed  the  power  of  the  Crown 
to  set  aside  acts  of  Parliament,  and  created  representative 
government  in  England.  For  the  most  of  their  existence, 
however,  they  would  have  been  able  to  live  in  America  more 
consistently  with  their  professed  principles  than  in  England. 

On  the  present  occasion,  in  the  year  1775,  after  they  had 
expended  all  of  their  eloquence  and  stated  all  of  their  ideas, 
and  shown  themselves  in  the  eyes  of  the  majority  of  Englishmen 
absolutely  incompetent  to  settle  the  American  question,  except 
by  giving  the  colonies  independence,  the  Tory  majority  pro- 
ceeded to  its  duty  of  preserving  the  integrity  of  the  empire  in 
the  only  way  in  which  it  could  be  preserved. 

They  introduced  five  measures,  well-matured  and  compre- 
hensive plans,  which  would  be  unpleasant  for  our  people,  but 
proper  enough  if  we  once  admit  that  it  is  a  good  thing  to 
preserve  and  enlarge  the  British  empire.  They  declared  Massa- 
chusetts in  a  state  of  rebellion,  and  promised  to  give  the  minis- 


THE  FISHERIES  BILL 

try  every  assistance  in  subduing  her.  They  voted  six  thousand 
additional  men  to  the  land  and  naval  forces.  They  passed  an 
act,  usually  known  as  the  Fisheries  Bill,  by  which  all  the  trade 
of  the  New  England  colonies  was  to  be  confined  by  force  to 
Great  Britain  and  the  British  West  Indies.  This  cutting  off  of 
the  New  England  colonies  from  the  outside  world  was  a  serious 
matter,  but  it  was  not  the  most  important  part  of  the  act.  The 
important  part  was  that  it  prohibited  the  New  England  colonies 
from  trading  with  one  another.  They  must  be  cut  off  from 
every  source  of  supply  except  the  mother-country;  and  if  this 
could  be  enforced  they  would  be  starved  into  submission  and 
dependence,  their  self-reliance  broken,  and  their  budding  unity 
and  nationality  destroyed. 

The  surest  way  to  break  up  a  rebellion  is  to  prevent  the 
rebels  from  uniting,  to  cut  off  not  only  their  outward  supplies, 
but  their  internal  self-reliance.  Having  to  deal  with  colonists 
whom  they  knew  were  aiming  at  independence,  this  act  was 
a  wise  one  for  England.  It  is  easy  and  cheap  to  criticise  it 
now  after  its  execution  has  been  forcibly  prevented  by  France, 
Spain,  and  Holland  turning  in  to  the  assistance  of  the  Ameri- 
cans. But  at  the  time  of  its  passage  it  was  well  calculated  to 
achieve  its  purpose. 

The  Whigs  attacked  it  for  its  cruelty.  Burke  rose  to  such 
heights  of  eloquence  and  denunciation  that  he  had  to  be  called 
to  order.  They  proposed  an  amendment  to  it  which  would 
allow  the  colonists  to  carry  fuel  and  provisions  from  one  colony 
to  another,  but  it  was  voted  down  by  the  three  to  one  majority. 

The  last  part  of  the  act  was  still  more  severe.  It  prohibited 
the  New  England  colonies  from  fishing  on  the  Newfoundland 
banks,  and  allowed  that  privilege  only  to  Canada  and  the  middle 
and  southern  colonies.  These  prohibitions  on  fishing  and  trade 
were  to  last  only  until  the  rebellious  colonies  returned  to  their 
obedience. 

Up  rose  the  Whig  orators  to  protest  in  pathetic  strains 
against  such  hardship.  The  New  Englanders  were  dependent 
for  their  livelihood  on  the  fishery  of  the  banks.  Witnesses 
were  called  to  the  bar  to  show  that  over  six  hundred  vessels  and 

287 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

over  six  thousand  men  were  employed  in  that  fishery,  that  it 
was  the  foundation  of  nearly  all  the  other  occupations  in  New 
England,  and  that  its  prohibition  would  ruin  or  starve  one-half 
the  population. 

1 '  We  are  glad  to  hear  that, ' '  said  the  Tories,  ' '  for  then  they 
will  return  the  sooner  to  obedience.  They  would  have  returned 
to  their  obedience  long  ago  if  they  had  not  been  encouraged  in 
rebellion  by  Whig  oratory  and  eloquence  in  England. ' ' 

When  information  arrived  that  the  rebellion  was  spreading, 
the  Tory  ministry  introduced  another  bill  extending  the  prohi- 
bitions of  the  Fisheries  Act  to  all  the  colonies  except  loyal  New 
York,  North  Carolina,  and  Georgia.  They  intended,  they  said, 
as  far  as  possible  to  separate  the  innocent  from  the  guilty. 
Only  the  guilty  should  be  punished. 

We  do  not  wish  to  oppress  them,  argued  Lord  North.  As 
soon  as  they  return  to  their  duty,  acknowledge  our  supreme 
authority,  and  obey  the  laws  of  the  realm,  their  real  grievances 
shall  be  redressed.  We  must  bring  them  to  obedience  or 
abandon  them.    There  is  no  middle  ground. 

Bills  to  settle  the  American  difficulties  were  introduced  on 
the  Whig  side  by  Lord  Chatham,  by  Burke,  and  by  David 
Hartley,  who  were  for  repealing  the  Boston  Port  Bill  and  all 
the  other  acts  of  Parliament  as  the  colonists  demanded,  and 
allowing  them  to  tax  themselves  for  the  purpose  of  granting 
aids  and  subsidies  to  the  Crown,  very  much  as  they  had  done 
before  the  close  of  the  French  War.  But  Parliament  was  to 
have  complete  sovereignty  over  them,  which  they  must  fully 
recognize  and  formally  acknowledge,  and  the  right  they  claimed 
of  having  no  standing  army  kept  among  them  without  their 
consent  was  firmly  denied.9 

These  bills  were  of  course  rejected  by  the  Tory  majority; 
and  on  the  20th  of  February,  1775,  Lord  North  presented  the  last 
measure  of  the  Ministry 's  policy  in  a  bill  which  at  first  surprised 
everybody  by  being  a  conciliatory  measure.    It  was,  however, 


8  See  an  interesting  discussion  of  these  bills  in  Snow,  "  Administra- 
tion of  Dependencies,"  pp.  299,  311,  315. 

288 


ATTEMPT  TO  ENTICE  NEW  YORK 

partly  intended  to  destroy  the  last  argument  of  the  Whigs  by 
adopting  many  of  the  ideas  contained  in  the  three  bills  which 
Chatham,  Burke,  and  Hartley  had  offered.  It  provided  that 
if  any  colony  would  make  such  voluntary  contribution  to  the 
common  defence  of  the  empire  and  establish  such  fixed  provision 
for  the  support  of  its  own  civil  government  as  met  the  approval 
of  Parliament,  that  colony  should  be  exempted  from  all  taxation 
except  duties  for  the  regulation  of  commerce,  and  the  net 
proceeds  of  such  duties  should  be  turned  over  to  the  colony. 

This  measure  seemed  to  concede  a  good  deal,  for  while  it  did 
not  offer  to  repeal  the  obnoxious  laws,  it  required  no  acknowl- 
edgment of  the  supremacy  of  Parliament  and  left  unsettled 
many  other  matters.  North's  own  party  were  at  first  aghast 
at  so  much  concession ;  but  in  the  end  they  accepted  the  bill  as 
an  admirable  plan  to  break  up  the  union  of  the  colonies  by 
holding  out  a  bait  which  might  capture  two  or  three  of  them. 

The  bill  is  supposed  to  have  been  framed  with  a  special  view 
of  enticing  New  York  to  break  away  from  the  union.  Her 
assembly  had  refused  to  elect  delegates  to  another  congress 
and  they  had  to  be  elected  by  the  patriot  committees.  There 
was  believed  to  be  every  prospect  that  the  loyalist  element  of 
her  population  would  be  strong  enough  to  bring  about  an  open 
and  formal  disavowal  of  the  proceedings  of  the  congress,  and 
considerable  sums  of  money  were,  it  is  said,  sent  over  by  the 
Ministry  to  encourage  the  disaffection.  If  New  York  made  a 
separate  treaty  and  compromise  with  England,  North  Carolina 
might  do  the  same  and  the  united  front  of  American  patriotism 
would  be  broken.10 

After  the  Revolution,  when  all  these  measures  of  the  Min- 
istry and  Parliament  had  failed,  it  became  the  fashion  to 
represent  them  as  a  mere  foolish  scheme  of  the  King,  who  forced 
his  ideas  on  Lord  North.    But  the  contemporary  evidence  shows 


10  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  1,  28,  449,  453,  511, 
535,  594,  600,  1727,  1728 ;  vol.  iii,  p.  1729.  Gordon,  "  American  Revolu- 
tion," edition  1788,  vol.  i,  pp.  432,  436,  437,  464,  471;  Journals  of  Conti- 
nental Congress,  Ford  edition,  1905,  vol.  ii,  p.  62;  Annual  Register,  1775, 
chaps,  vi,  vii,  viii. 

19  289 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

that  the  measures  had  the  full  approval  of  the  majority  of 
Englishmen  both  in  and  out  of  Parliament.  The  attempt  to 
show  that  the  English  nation  at  large  had  no  wish  or  intention 
to  make  war  on  America,  but  was  deluded  into  it  by  some  one 
person,  is  an  easy  and  cheap  way  of  shifting  the  responsibility 
for  measures  that  failed,  but  it  is  a  perversion  of  the  facts  of 
history. 

"lam  fully  persuaded,"  wrote  Governor  Hutchinson  from 
England  in  August,  1774,  "that  there  never  has  been  a  time 
when  the  nation  in  general  was  so  united  against  the  colonies. ' ' 
The  subjugation  of  the  colonies,  the  reducing  them  to  the  condi- 
tion of  mere  dependencies,  was  a  popular  measure  in  England 
from  the  beginning  to  the  end.  ' '  The  war  was  a  popular  war, ' ' 
said  General  Reed,  writing  from  London  in  1784,  "and  only 
ceased  to  be  so  when  all  hope  of  final  success  ceased."  The 
King,  Lord  North,  and  the  Ministry  were  guiding  themselves 
by  what  they  knew  to  be  the  overwhelming  sentiment  of  the 
nation,  which  had  the  same  desire  to  maintain  dominion  over 
as  many  countries  as  possible  that  it  has  to-day.11 

Dominion  of  every  kind,  even  slender  control,  draws  trade  to 
England  and  to  English  ships,  and  gives  a  market  for  English 
manufactures.  Trade  is  the  real  purpose  of  imperialism,  even 
of  Whig  imperialism ;  and  before  the  documents  of  the  Congress 
arrived  some  prominent  Whigs,  seeing  that  a  dangerous  crisis 
was  impending,  entered  into  secret  negotiations  with  Frank- 
lin to  bring  about  a  reconciliation.  When  the  documents  came 
the  danger  of  a  bad  civil  war  was  more  evident  than  ever,  and 
they  increased  their  efforts. 

u"  Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.  i,  pp.  212,  230, 
268,  293,  298,  410,  425,  431,  441.  "  Life  of  Joseph  Reed,"  by  W.  B.  Reed, 
vol.  ii,  p.  403.  See  also  Lecky,  "  England  in  the  Eighteenth  Century," 
edition  of  1882,  vol.  iii,  p.  528 ;  Stedman,  "  American  War,"  vol.  i,  chap, 
xi,  p.  258,  London,  1789;  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  i,  pp. 
709,  1680. 

The  debates  and  proceedings  in  Parliament  are  best  read  in  Cobbett's 
Parliamentary  Debates,  sometimes  called  Cobbett's  Parliamentary  His- 
tory ;  also  in  the  Parliamentary  Register  and  in  the  "  Votes  of  the  House 
of  Commons." 

290 


NEGOTIATION  WITH  FRANKLIN 

The  persons  chiefly  concerned  in  this  undertaking  were 
David  Barclay,  a  Quaker  member  of  Parliament ;  Dr.  Fothergill, 
the  leading  physician  of  London,  also  a  Quaker,  and  Admiral 
Howe,  a  Whig,  very  favorably  inclined  towards  the  colonies 
and  very  ambitious  to  win  the  distinction  of  settling  the  great 
question.  He  hoped  to  be  sent  out  to  America  at  the  head  of  a 
great  peace  commission  which  would  settle  all  difficulties. 

The  plan  of  these  negotiations  was,  by  means  of  private 
interviews  with  Franklin,  to  obtain  from  him  the  final  terms 
on  which  the  patriot  colonists  would  compromise ;  and  by  acting 
as  friendly  messengers  of  these  terms  to  the  Ministry  the  nego- 
tiators hoped  to  prevent  a  war  of  conquest.  Secrecy  was 
necessary,  because  ordinary  Englishmen  might  look  upon  such 
negotiations  as  somewhat  treasonable,  and  the  charge  of  treason 
was  made  when  afterwards  the  negotiations  were  known.12 
Franklin  was  led  into  the  plan  by  being  asked  to  play  chess,  of 
which  he  was  very  fond,  with  Admiral  Howe's  sister,  and  his 
description  of  her  fascination  and  the  gradual  opening  of  the 
plan  are  written  in  his  best  vein.13 

The  ultimate  terms  of  these  negotiations  were  worked  down 
to  as  mild  a  basis  as  possible,  and  Franklin  was  willing  to  be 
much  easier  and  more  complying  than  the  patriot  party  in 
America.  He  was  willing,  for  example,  to  pay  for  the  tea.  But 
even  when  reduced  to  their  mildest  form  one  cannot  read  them 
without  seeing  that  they  would  now  be  regarded  as  most  extra- 
ordinary terms  for  colonies  to  be  suggesting.  They  show  in 
what  a  weak  grasp  England  had  held  her  colonies.  They  are 
absolutely  incompatible  with  any  modern  idea  of  the  colonial 
relation.  It  would  be  utterly  impossible  for  any  British  colony 
of  our  time  to  get  itself,  for  the  fraction  of  a  moment,  into  a 
position  where  it  could  think  of  suggesting  such  terms ;  for  the 
military  and  naval  power  of  England  over  her  colonies  is  now 
overwhelming  and  complete. 


"Works,  Bigelow  edition,  vol.  v,  p.  440;  Galloway,  "A  Letter  from 
Cicero  to  Right  Hon.  Lord  Viscount  Howe,"  London,  1781. 
"Works,  Bigelow  edition,  vol.  v,  p.  440. 

291 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

Most  of  the  terms  were,  of  course,  concerned  with  the  repeal 
of  laws  which  the  colonists  disliked,  and  certainly  the  amount 
of  repealing  demanded  seemed  very  large  to  Englishmen.  But 
some  of  the  other  terms  may  be  mentioned  as  showing  the 
situation.  England  was  not  to  keep  troops  in  time  of  peace  or 
to  build  a  fortification  in  any  colony,  except  by  that  colony's 
consent.  England  must  also  withdraw  all  right  to  regulate 
colonial  internal  affairs  by  act  of  Parliament ;  and  the  colonies 
must  continue  to  control  the  salaries  of  their  governors.  If 
Parliament's  authority  and  the  right  to  keep  troops  had  been 
surrendered  those  concessions  alone  would  have  destroyed  the 
colonial  relation,  and  the  American  communities  would  have 
become  independent.  But  Franklin  knew  he  could  not  yield 
on  these  points,  and  he  even  suggested  to  Lord  Chatham  that 
the  Congress  be  recognized  as  a  permanent  body. 

These  terms  were  too  stiff  even  for  Whigs.  The  friendly 
negotiators  could  only  politely  withdraw  and  say  that  they  were 
very  sorry ;  and  the  delightful  games  of  chess  came  to  an  end. 
The  Ministry  were  amused,  and  believed  that  they  saw  the  situ- 
ation more  clearly  than  ever.  Admiral  Howe  was  deeply 
disappointed.  He  had  expected  to  take  Franklin  out  with  him 
as  one  of  the  members  of  his  peace  commission;  and,  to  make 
the  terms  easier  and  everything  smooth,  Franklin  was  offered 
any  important  reward  he  chose  to  name.  As  a  beginning,  he 
was  to  be  paid  the  arrears  of  his  salary  which  the  colonies, 
whose  agent  he  was,  had  for  some  years  neglected  to  send  to 
him.  But  they  were  entirely  mistaken  in  supposing  that  he 
would  yield  to  any  of  these  temptations. 


XXIV. 

PREPARING  FOR  THE  BREAK 

Meanwhile  during  that  winter  and  spring  of  1775  in 
which  Parliament  was  considering  the  documents  of  the  Con- 
gress and  passing  the  Fisheries  Bill  and  other  repressive  acts, 
General  Gage  was  having  a  curious  experience  in  Massachusetts. 
He  issued  writs,  summoning  the  Massachusetts  Assembly  to 
meet  at  Salem,  on  the  5th  of  October,  1774.  But  soon  after  he 
issued  this  call  the  Congress  at  Philadelphia  approved  of  the 
Suffolk  resolutions,  and  he  immediately  issued  a  proclamation 
suspending  the  meeting  of  the  Assembly.  The  new  members, 
however,  met  in  spite  of  the  proclamation,  and  no  governor 
appearing  to  swear  them  in  they  seized  the  opportunity  to  create 
a  patriot  government  for  the  province,  as  recommended  in  the 
Suffolk  resolutions.  By  the  passage  of  a  mere  resolution  they 
turned  themselves  into  an  independent  government,  which  they 
called  the  Provincial  Congress  of  Massachusetts,  and  it  assumed 
to  itself  the  supreme  authority  of  the  province,  which  Gage  had 
been  unable  to  exercise.  Massachusetts  became  de  facto  inde- 
pendent and  never  again  passed  under  British  authority.  A 
British  colony  had  become  an  independent  American  State.1 

This  had  occurred  before  Parliament  had  received  the  docu- 
ments of  the  Congress.  In  America  both  sides  prepared  for  war 
as  if  they  took  for  granted  that  the  ultimatum  of  the  Congress 
would  be  rejected.  The  patriots  moved  their  private  supplies 
of  arms  and  ammunition  from  Boston.  They  protested  against 
Gage  fortifying  the  narrow  neck  which  at  that  time  connected 
Boston  with  the  mainland.  It  was  an  act,  they  said,  unfriendly 
in  appearance  and  entirely  unnecessary,  for  no  one  intended  to 
hurt  him ;  and  Gage  smilingly  replied  that  neither  had  he  any 


1  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  i,  pp.  829-853,  880;  Stedman, 
"American  War,"  vol.  i,  pp.  107,  108;  Annual  Register,  1775,  chap.  i. 

293 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

intention  of  hurting  anybody.  Each  side  understood  the  other 
quite  thoroughly. 

In  Virginia  the  governor  reported  in  December,  1774,  that 
the  patriots  were  arming  and  drilling  in  every  county,  the 
courts  of  justice  were  abolished,  and  the  royal  government 
"entirely  disregarded  if  not  wholly  overturned."  The  other 
colonies  had  not  gone  so  far  as  Massachusetts  and  Virginia,  but 
contented  themselves  with  passing  county  resolutions  protesting 
against  Parliament  and  the  Ministry  and  professing  the  most 
unbounded  devotion  to  the  King,  whose  ministers  they  said 
were  leading  him  astray.2 

Gage  was  buying  up  all  the  blankets,  canvas,  and  camp 
equipment  he  could  find,  and  the  patriots  were  persuading  the 
merchants  not  to  sell.  The  patriots  were  purchasing  arms  and 
ammunition  in  all  parts  of  Europe,  and  when  the  Ministry 
forbade  the  exportation  of  powder  and  firearms  to  America, 
the  patriots  in  Rhode  Island  seized  all  the  cannon  belonging  to 
the  Crown;  and  in  New  Hampshire  they  surprised  Fort  William 
and  Mary  and  removed  from  it  all  the  arms  and  military  stores. 
An  account  of  their  proceedings  formed  part  of  the  evidence  of 
rebellion  laid  before  Parliament.3 

France  and  Spain  refused  England's  request  to  prohibit 
their  people  from  selling  powder  to  the  Americans.  The  Dutch 
agreed  to  the  prohibition,  but  their  merchants  sold  us  powder 
in  large  glass  bottles  under  the  appearance  of  spirits.4 

Gage  had  only  4000  troops  and  was  unable  to  hold  any  place 


2  Niles,  "  Principles  and  Acts  of  the  Revolution,"  edition  1876,  pp. 
99,  100,  246;  Gordon,  "American  War,"  edition  1788,  vol.  i,  p.  396; 
American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  i,  pp.  780,  806,  939,  954,  1078;  vol. 
ii,  pp.  1062,  1694.  For  the  county  resolutions  see  volumes  i  and  ii  of 
American  Archives,  fourth  series;  Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  vol. 
ii,  p.  74. 

3  Stedman,  "American  War,"  edition  1794,  vol.  i,  pp.  110,  111; 
American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  i,  pp.  1041,  1042,  1053,  1069;  vol. 
iii,  pp.  1199,  1200,  1630. 

4  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  i,  pp.  953,  979,  1065,  1066; 
vol.  ii,  p.  463;  Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  i, 
p.  498. 

294 


BROWN  AND  BERNICRE 

but  Boston,  for  the  patriots  could  put  10,000  militia  in  the 
field.  He,  however,  sent  300  muskets  to  the  loyalists  at  Marsh- 
field,  New  Hampshire;  and  in  the  end  of  February,  1775,  he 
sent  an  expedition  to  seize  some  brass  cannon  at  Salem.  This 
excursion  to  Salem  under  Colonel  Leslie  came  very  near  begin- 
ning the  war.  The  patriots  had  dragged  off  the  cannon  by  the 
time  the  British  troops  arrived  and  the  draw  of  the  bridge  across 
the  river  was  up.  There  was  a  chance  for  a  few  moments  that 
the  troops  and  the  townsmen  would  fight  at  the  bridge.  In  fact, 
Leslie  gave  the  order  to  fire,  but  it  was  not  obeyed,  and  one  of 
the  townsmen  dissuaded  him  from  repeating  it.  Thus  a  slight 
circumstance  postponed  the  war  from  February  to  April.5 

About  the  same  time  Gage  sent  out  two  young  officers, 
Captain  Brown  and  Ensign  Bernicre,  to  travel  in  disguise  as 
far  as  Worcester  and  report  on  roads  and  the  nature  of  the 
country.  They  were  passed  on  from  one  loyalist  family  to 
another,  and  Bernicre 's  journal  gives  an  amusing  account  of 
the  adventures  of  these  two  lambs  which  the  wolves  allowed  to 
play  in  the  forest.  Their  disguise  was  quickly  discovered,  and 
Bernicre  tries  to  leave  the  impression  that  they  were  every 
moment  in  danger.  But  they  were  safe  as  mice  in  a  church. 
The  patriots  watched  them  narrowly  in  a  fatherly  way  and 
saw  that  they  returned  safely  to  Boston;  for  it  would  have 
been  contrary  to  the  policy  that  had  been  adopted  to  allow  a 
British  officer  to  suffer  ill  usage  at  the  hands  of  the  rougher 
element.6 

There  was  naturally  much  curiosity  on  both  sides  to  see 
what  would  happen  on  the  5th  of  March,  the  anniversary  of  the 
Boston  Massacre,  which  for  four  years  had  been  celebrated  by 
a  patriotic  oration  against  standing  armies.  The  oration  of 
the  previous  year  had  been  delivered  by  John  Hancock;  and 
as  there  were  no  British  troops  then  in  Boston,  there  was  no 
danger  in  his  describing  such  armies  as  composed  of  outcasts 

5Stedman,  "American  War,"  edition  1794,  vol.  i,  pp.  113,  114;  "Life 
of  Timothy  Pickering,"  p.  60 ;    Hale  "  One  Hundred  Years  Ago,"  p.  6. 

6 American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  i,  p.  1268;  Hale,  "One 
Hundred  Years  Ago,"  p.  7. 

295 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

unfit  to  live  in  civil  society.  But  now  Dr.  Warren  had  to  deliver 
the  oration  surrounded  by  the  troops,  and  with  officers  and 
privates  composing  a  large  part  of  his  audience.  The  officers 
had  threatened  vengeance  to  any  orator  who  should  dare  repeat 
Hancock's  contemptuous  slurs  on  regular  soldiers.  They  went 
armed  to  hear  the  oration  in  the  Old  South  Church;  and 
Captain  Chapman  is  said  to  have  sat  on  the  pulpit  stairs 
ostentatiously  playing  with  three  pistol  bullets  and  watching 
the  orator. 

It  was  a  trying  and  delicate  position  for  Warren.  He  must 
not  flinch  from  the  patriot  position ;  and  yet  he  could  have  no 
wish  to  precipitate  a  conflict  among  women  and  children  in  the 
church.  It  is  easy  to  see  that  by  a  few  hasty  words  he  might 
have  begun  the  Eevolution  in  the  Old  South  instead  of  a  month 
later  at  Lexington.  But  he  was  equal  to  the  occasion.  He  went 
over  the  whole  patriot  argument  in  a  most  able  and  enlightened 
manner.  He  described  how  the  contest  had  already  raised  an 
almost  universal  inquiry  into  the  rights  of  mankind  in  general 
which  would  advance  the  cause  of  liberalism  in  the  world.  He 
touched  upon  the  actual  scenes  of  the  massacre.  He  made 
those  powerful  appeals  to  passion  and  feeling  for  which  these 
orations  were  intended.  He  called  upon  the  widow  and  the 
mother  to  weep  over  their  dead. 

"  And  to  complete  the  pompous  show  of  wretchedness,  bring  in  each 
hand  thy  infant  children  to  bewail  their  father's  fate.  Take  heed,  ye 
orphan  babes,  lest  whilst  your  streaming  eyes  are  fixed  upon  the  ghastly 
corpse  your  feet  slide  on  the  stones  bespotted  with  your  father's  brains." 

But  he  gave  no  direct  affront  to  the  soldiers  until  he  began 
to  speak  of  the  standing  army  which  was  now  again  quartered 
upon  Boston,  and  said  that  it  must  not  be  allowed  to  destroy 
our  liberty. 

"  Our  streets  are  again  filled  with  armed  men ;  our  harbor  is  crowded 
with  ships  of  war,  but  these  cannot  intimidate  us;  our  liberty  must  be 
preserved;  it  is  far  dearer  than  life;  we  hold  it  even  dear  as  our 
allegiance;  we  must  defend  it  against  the  attacks  of  friends  as  well  as 
enemies ;  we  cannot  suffer  even  Britons  to  ravish  it  from  us." 

296 


STRAIN  OF  THE  SITUATION 

That  was  as  near  as  he  went  to  the  danger  point ;  and  accord- 
ing to  one  account  Captain  Chapman  shouted  that  curious 
English  exclamation,  ''Fie,  Fie!"  and  some  thought  there  was 
a  fire.  But  the  old  Town  Clerk,  William  Cooper,  arose  and  said, 
"There  was  no  fire,  but  the  fire  of  envy  burning  in  the  hearts 
of  our  enemies,  which  he  hoped  soon  to  see  extinguished. ' ' 

According  to  another  account,  the  soldiers  waited  till  the 
oration  was  completed,  and  when  a  motion  was  made  to  appoint 
an  orator  for  the  next  year,  they  hissed  and  made  such  an 
uproar  that  some  of  the  women  in  alarm  jumped  out  of  the 
windows. 

Another  tradition  has  it  that  when  Captain  Chapman 
became  particularly  conspicuous  in  exhibiting  his  pistol-bullets 
the  orator  dropped  a  white  handkerchief  over  them ;  and  there 
are  also  other  versions.  We  shall  never  know  exactly  what 
happened.  But  it  was  really  wonderful  that  there  was  no  riot. 
It  was  an  instance  of  great  self-restraint  on  both  sides,  and  we 
cannot  imagine  such  an  incident  passing  off  so  peaceably  in  a 
revolution  among  Frenchmen.7 

Indeed,  it  had  become  quite  obvious  to  every  one  that  the 
strained  relations  and  affectation  of  friendliness  could  not  be 
continued  much  longer.  Cannon-balls  and  half  barrels  of 
gunpowder  were  now  carried  out  of  Boston  concealed  in  wagon- 
loads  of  manure  or  in  butcher's  carts,  and  paper  cartridges  of 
powder  were  concealed  in  candle-boxes.  The  troops  finally,  on 
the  18th  of  March,  seized  13,425  musket  cartridges  and  300 
pounds  of  ball  which  were  passing  out  in  this  way.  They  were 
private  property,  but  their  destination  was  so  obvious  that 
Gage  felt  compelled  to  confiscate  them  in  spite  of  the  form  of 
friendliness  that  was  being  observed.8 

The  ammunition  which  was  passed  out  of  Boston,  however, 


7  Niles,  "  Principles  and  Acts  of  the  American  Revolution,"  edition 
1876,  p.  113;  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  38,  120,  177; 
E.  E.  Hale,  "  One  Hundred  Years  Ago,"  pp.  8,  9 ;  "  Diary  and  Letters  of 
Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.  i,  p.  529. 

8 Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  i,  p.  473; 
American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  ii,  p.  211. 

297 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

was  nothing  compared  to  the  warlike  material,  spades,  pick- 
axes, camp-pots  and  kettles,  knapsacks,  bullets,  powder,  and 
arms  which  were  being  collected  at  Worcester  and  Concord. 
The  question  was  becoming  more  and  more  important  whether  it 
was  not  the  duty  of  Gage  to  seize  these  supplies  and  arrest 
Hancock,  Adams,  and  Cushing.  The  patriots  had  already  col- 
lected such  a  force  that  it  was  doubtful  whether  Gage  could 
seize  either  the  military  supplies  or  the  leaders,  and  lapse  of 
time  appeared  to  be  making  the  situation  worse  for  him. 

An  attempt  had  been  made  by  Gage  to  win  over  Samuel 
Adams.  Colonel  Fenton  was  sent  to  him  with  an  intimation 
that  it  would  be  greatly  to  his  profit  and  safety  should  he  with- 
draw from  the  rebellion.  The  exact  nature  of  the  reward  he 
was  to  receive  is  not  known ;  but,  no  doubt,  it  was  considerable, 
and  most  tactfully  and  delicately  offered.  But  they  had  again 
mistaken  their  man,  and  Adams  continued  to  be  as  busy  as  a 
bee  with  his  plans  for  independence.9 

From  a  letter  written  in  London  on  the  18th  of  March,  it 
appears  that  Gage  may  have  received  instructions  some  time  in 
February  to  seize  Cushing,  Adams,  and  Hancock,  and  send 
them  to  England  for  trial;  and  subsequently  he  is  supposed 
to  have  received  orders  to  hang  them  in  Boston  without  waiting 
to  send  them  to  England.  Gage  was  unwilling  to  execute  these 
orders,  although  he  apparently  had  a  good  opportunity  to 
execute  the  first  one  at  the  celebration  on  the  5th  of  March.  He 
feared  an  open  conflict  with  the  patriots,  who  were  supposed  to 
have  over  ten  thousand  militia  ready  for  the  outbreak  whenever 
it  should  come.  He  asked  for  reinforcements  and  meanwhile 
hoped  for  favorable  circumstances.10 

It  was  now  the  end  of  March,  and  no  one  in  America  had 
heard  about  the  Fisheries  Act  or  anything  else  that  Parliament 
and  the  Ministry  had  decided  upon.    But  on  the  2nd  of  April, 


"Stedman,  "American  War,"  edition  1794,  vol.  i,  pp.  113,  114;  "Life 
of  Timothy  Pickering,"  p.  60 ;  Hosmer,  "  Life  of  Samuel  Adams,"  p.  302. 

10 Wells,  "Life  of  Samuel  Adams,"  vol.  ii,  pp.  289,  290;  American 
Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  336,  386;  vol.  v,  p.  41;  "Diary  and 
Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.  i,  pp.  183,  203,  219,  416. 

298 


NEWS  OF  FISHERIES  BILL 

1775,  a  vessel  called  the  "  Hawke  "  reached  Marblehead  and 
brought  the  news  of  what  Parliament  had  been  doing  in  Feb- 
ruary. The  vessel  had  left  Falmouth,  England,  February  17, 
and  brought  a  London  newspaper  of  February  11,  which  de- 
scribed the  Fisheries  Bill  which  Lord  North  the  day  before 
had  obtained  leave  to  introduce.11 

The  arrival  of  that  vessel  marks  a  great  turning-point  in 
the  Revolution.  Both  Gordon  and  Earl  Percy  describe  the 
change  which  they  saw  take  place  almost  instantly.  It  was  now 
known  in  America  that  the  ultimatum  had  been  rejected ;  that 
England  would  no  longer  repeal  acts  of  Parliament  and  yield  to 
colonial  demands ;  an  end  had  come  to  one  stage  of  the  contro- 
versy; one  act  of  the  great  drama  was  closed.  From  that 
moment  both  patriot  and  Englishman  were  compelled  to  look 
at  the  situation  in  a  new  light. 


"Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  i,  p.  474;  Boston 
Gazette,  April  3,  1775.  "Letters  of  Hugh,  Earl  Percy,"  p.  48;  American 
Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  i,  pp.  1566,  1570,  1622.  See  also  Boston 
Gazette,  April  17,  1775.  The  news  of  the  final  passage  of  the  Fisheries 
Bill  on  March  30  reached  Philadelphia,  June  7.  (Gordon,  supra,  vol.  ii, 
p.  63.) 


XXV. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  LEXINGTON 

The  principal  places  for  the  accumulation  of  patriot  mili- 
tary supplies  were  Concord  and  Worcester.  Concord  was  only 
twenty  miles  from  Boston,  and  from  the  8th  of  March  to  the 
14th  of  April  wagons  had  been  hauling  into  it  casks  of  balls, 
hogsheads  of  flints,  beef,  rice,  and  tow  cloth.  The  Massa- 
chusetts Provincial  Congress  was  also  holding  its  session  there ; 
and,  influenced  no  doubt  by  the  recent  news  from  England, 
Gage  resolved  to  seize  Hancock  and  Samuel  Adams  while  at- 
tending the  Congress  and  at  the  same  time  capture  the  military 
supplies. 

That  this  enterprise  failed  is  not  surprising.  It  would  have 
required  more  than  double  Gage's  whole  force  to  have  gone 
supply-hunting  such  a  distance  with  any  chance  of  safety  or 
success.  As  for  capturing  Hancock  or  Adams,  that  might  have 
been  done  by  a  quick  and  well-concealed  movement  of  a  small 
force ;  but  the  English  are  always  notoriously  deficient  in  such 
enterprises ;  and  were  now  so  carefully  watched  by  such  a  large 
patriot  population  that  it  would  have  required  a  secret  expedi- 
tion composed  of  only  two  or  three  men  to  reach  the  patriot 
leaders. 

Gage  tried  hard  to  conceal  his  purpose  and  defeat  the 
watchfulness  of  the  patriots.  He  sent  out  five  regiments  one 
morning  with  all  the  appearance  of  marching  on  the  Provincial 
Congress  at  Concord;  but  they  returned  within  a  few  hours; 
and  this  and  other  countermarching  were  regarded  by  the 
patriots  as  feints  to  put  them  off  their  guard.  They  were 
thoroughly  convinced  that  a  secret  or  sudden  expedition  of 
some  sort  was  preparing.  Paul  Revere  and  his  fellow- watchers 
patrolled  the  streets  of  Boston  every  night  noting  the  smallest 
indications  of  preparation  among  the  troops.  Adams  and 
Hancock  were  warned,  and  the  patriot  Committee  of  Safety 

300 


THE  MARCH  TO  LEXINGTON 

ordered  the  military  supplies  at  Concord  and  Worcester  to  be 
scattered  among  nine  towns,  so  that  Gage's  expedition  was  half 
defeated  before  it  started.1 

Meanwhile  the  meeting  of  the  Provincial  Congress  at  Con- 
cord had  adjourned.  But  Adams  and  Hancock  had  not  returned 
to  Boston,  and  were  staying  at  the  house  of  the  Rev.  Jonas 
Clark,  at  Lexington.  This  was  exactly  what  Gage  wanted ;  for 
the  seizure  of  the  two  patriots  could  be  made  much  more  quietly 
at  Clark's  than  at  a  meeting  of  the  Congress.  Accordingly  on 
the  18th  of  April  a  number  of  British  officers  went  out  to 
Cambridge,  where  they  dined,  and  towards  night  stationed 
themselves  along  the  roads  to  Lexington  and  Concord  so  as  to 
intercept  patriot  messengers  going  to  alarm  the  country. 

At  eleven  o'clock  that  night  eight  hundred  British  troops, 
under  command  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Smith,  with  Major 
Pitcairn,  of  the  marines,  in  the  advance,  crossed  in  boats  to  the 
Charlestown  shore  and  took  the  road  to  Concord.  They  had 
hoped  that  their  starting  was  sudden  and  unexpected,  but  the 
secret  had  leaked  out,  Paul  Revere  had  arranged  for  signal 
lanterns  in  the  North  Church  steeple  which  would  show  to 
certain  people  on  the  mainland  the  moment  the  British  started, 
and  the  alarm  could  then  be  carried  by  swift  messengers.  Dr. 
Warren  sent  William  Davies  early  in  the  evening  to  ride  express 
to  Lexington.  Revere  himself  started  a  little  later,  crossing 
over  to  Charlestown  and  borrowing  a  horse.  But  this  elaborate 
system  of  messengers  was  scarcely  necessary.  The  marching  of 
eight  hundred  infantry  along  the  roads  at  night,  passing  by 
farmhouses  and  setting  every  dog  to  barking,  was  in  itself  a 
sufficient  alarm.  Scores  of  active  young  farmers  could  run  or 
ride  ahead  of  the  troops  and  warn  the  whole  countryside.  It 
would  seem  as  if  Gage  might  have  better  accomplished  his 
purpose  by  a  sudden  dash  of  cavalry.     But  he  was  probably 


1  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  253,  362,  626 ;  Gordon, 
"American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  i,  p.  476;  Massachusetts 
Historical  Society  Collections,  vol.  v,  p.  106;  Bolton,  "  Private  Soldier 
under  Washington,"  p.  10. 

301 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

not  well  supplied  with  that  arm ;  and  it  now  made  no  difference, 
because  most  of  the  supplies  had  been  removed. 

Gordon  says  that  some  of  the  messengers  were  intercepted 
by  the  mounted  officers  who  had  gone  out  on  the  roads.  Revere 
was  nearly  caught  by  three  of  them  soon  after  he  started,  but 
he  had  a  good  horse  and  escaped.  He  describes  the  night  as 
very  pleasant,  and  with  his  love  of  horsemanship  we  can  readily 
believe  that  he  had  a  grand  ride.  He  reached  Lexington,  where 
he  stirred  Adams  and  Hancock  out  of  their  beds,  and  was 
pressing  on  to  Concord  through  the  exhilarating  night  air  when 
he  was  suddenly  surrounded  by  four  of  the  British  officers  and 
taken  prisoner.  They  turned  back  to  Lexington  with  him,  plied 
him  with  questions,  and  having  deprived  him  of  his  horse  let 
him  go.2 

It  was  afterwards  discovered  that  the  British  officers  who 
went  out  on  the  roads  gave  the  alarm  more  effectively  than  the 
messengers;  for  everybody  they  met  was  seized  and  treated  in 
such  a  rough  and  bullying  manner  that  people  quickly  inferred 
that  some  important  British  expedition  had  started.  In  a 
community  that  was  expecting  something  of  that  kind,  the 
alarm  once  given  spread  with  great  rapidity  by  the  ringing  of 
bells  and  firing  of  signal  guns.  Within  three  hours  after  the 
troops  started  the  alarm  had  reached  their  destination,  before 
they  had  travelled  half  the  distance.  Their  commander,  hearing 
the  ringing  of  bells  and  the  signal-guns,  sent  a  messenger  back 
to  Boston  for  reinforcements. 

At  two  o'clock  in  the  morning  a  company  of  about  one 
hundred  and  thirty  militia  assembled  on  the  green  in  front  of 
the  Congregational  church  at  Lexington.  They  appear  to  have 
got  the  alarm  by  being  told  that  British  officers  were  seizing 
and  stopping  people  on  the  road.  They  waited  for  some  time, 
but  seeing  no  enemy  and  the  night  being  cold,  they  were  dis- 
missed, some  going  to  their  homes  and  others  to  the  tavern  to 


2  Revere's  account  of  his  ride  can  be  read  in  Massachusetts  Histor- 
ical Collections,  vol.  v,  p.  106.  See,  also,  American  Archives,  fourth 
series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  359,  362,  487,  489,  626;  Stedman,  "American  War," 
edition  1794,  vol.  i,  p.  119. 

302 


THE  FIRST  SHOT  IMPORTANT 

wait  further  orders.  At  five  o'clock  they  were  called  and  told 
that  the  regulars  were  coming,  and  about  seventy  of  them 
assembled  in  rather  irregular  order  under  the  command  of  a 
veteran  of  the  French  War,  Captain  Parker,  the  grandfather 
of  the  famous  Unitarian  preacher,  Theodore  Parker.  The 
advance  guard  of  the  British,  under  Major  Pitcairn,  approached 
just  after  sunrise,  and  it  became  a  question  which  side  should 
begin ;  for  every  one  felt  that  this  was  the  break  with  England 
that  had  long  been  expected. 

In  any  large-minded  view  of  such  a  situation  it  made  no 
difference  who  fired  the  first  shot.  Every  one  knew  that  there 
was  to  be  war,  and  that  it  would  begin  at  some  locality  and  at 
some  hour  that  year.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  first  shots  had 
been  fired  and  the  first  blood  had  been  shed  when  the  British 
troops  five  years  before  killed  patriot  citizens  in  New  York  and 
in  Boston.  But  in  the  public  mind  those  events  were  not 
counted  as  a  beginning;  for  neither  side  had  been  ready  for 
actual  war.  Now,  however,  organized  troops  of  each  party 
faced  the  other  in  anger;  and  in  popular  estimation  it  is  a 
matter  of  much  sentimental  importance  which  side  strikes  the 
first  blow. 

In  modern  imperial  operations  it  is  usually  considered 
advisable  to  take  sufficient  time  to  irritate  the  people  to  be 
annexed  into  some  act  of  pronounced  aggression.  The  war  of 
conquest  can  then  be  given  a  stronger  moral  basis ;  can  be  called 
a  war  of  self-defence,  and  more  easily  upheld  among  liberals 
and  lovers  of  peace.  All  this  is  usually  easy  to  accomplish, 
because  the  weaker  people,  or  patriots,  are  apt  to  be  uneasy, 
indignant,  and  excitable,  while  the  imperial  power  is  already 
well-armed,  cool,  and  unimpulsive. 

If  England  had  had  her  modern  experience  she  would  have 
taken  such  cautious  action  that  there  would  have  been  no 
question  as  to  which  side  began  the  attack,  and  such  an 
aggressive  expedition  as  this  one  to  Concord  would  probably 
not  have  been  made.  Colonel  Smith,  however,  gave  repeated 
instructions  to  the  regulars  to  wait  till  they  were  fired  upon. 
The  patriots  on  their  side  had  been  equally  cautious,  and  for 

303 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

months  it  had  been  the  watchword  among  them  to  act  entirely 
on  the  defensive  and  let  England  begin. 

Under  these  circumstances  it  very  naturally  became  a 
subject  of  much  dispute  as  to  which  side  began  the  war  by 
firing  the  first  shot.  Captain  Parker  and  some  of  his  men  gave 
their  version  of  the  story  under  oath  within  a  week  after  the 
battle.  The  British,  they  said,  came  up  with  three  officers 
riding  ahead,  and  one  of  these  officers  waving  his  sword 
shouted,  "Disperse,  you  rebels,  immediately!"  or  according  to 
another  witness,  ' '  Throw  down  your  arms,  ye  villians ! ' ' 

The  militia  were  then  ordered  by  Parker,  their  captain,  to 
disperse,  and  immediately  began  to  retire.  This  seems  to  have 
been  in  accordance  with  the  policy  agreed  upon  among  the 
patriots,  to  do  nothing  whatever  to  withstand  the  British  or 
resist  by  organized  force  the  authority  of  the  King  until  the 
King's  soldiers  fired  the  first  shot.  In  all  their  arguments 
against  the  authority  of  Parliament  they  had  repeatedly 
admitted  that  they  owed  a  certain  allegiance  to  the  King  as  head 
of  the  empire  and  they  had  described  their  devotion  to  him  in 
the  most  glowing  language.  They  would  not,  therefore,  assume 
formal  independence  or  make  war  upon  the  King,  until  some 
act  had  been  done  by  him,  or  by  his  servants,  which  would  snap 
the  last  thread  of  allegiance  and  leave  them  free  to  do  as  they 
chose. 

Parker's  men  retired  in  accordance  with  this  principle;  but 
they  had  not  gone  far,  they  said,  when  one  or  two  pistol-shots 
were  fired  by  the  British  officers,  and  immediately  afterwards 
an  officer  ordered  the  soldiers  to  fire,  which  they  did  with  good 
effect,  killing  eight  and  wounding  ten  militiamen,  who,  the 
witnesses  said,  had  not  yet  fired  a  shot. 

On  the  British  side  Major  Pitcairn  gave  a  very  different 
story,  which  Gage  reported  to  the  British  Government  and  also 
published  in  the  colonies.  Two  miles  outside  of  Lexington, 
Major  Pitcairn  had  met,  he  said,  a  large  body  of  armed  patriots, 
one  of  whom  advanced  and  attempted  to  shoot,  but  his  musket 
flashed  in  the  pan.  On  this  the  Major  gave  instructions  to  the 
troops  to  move  forward,  but  on  no  account  to  fire  without 

304 


ADAMS  AND  HANCOCK  ESCAPE 

orders.  When  they  arrived  at  the  edge  of  the  village,  they 
observed  about  two  hundred  armed  men  drawn  up  on  the  green, 
and  when  the  regulars  came  within  one  hundred  yards  of  them, 
they  began  to  file  off  towards  some  stone  walls  on  their  right 
flank.  The  Light  Infantry,  observing  this,  ran  after  them. 
The  Major  instantly  called  to  the  soldiers  not  to  fire,  but  to 
surround  and  disarm  them.  Some  of  the  patriots  who  had 
jumped  over  a  wall  then  fired  four  or  five  shots  at  the  troops, 
wounding  a  man  of  the  Tenth  Regiment  and  the  Major's  horse, 
and  at  the  same  time  several  shots  were  fired  from  a  meeting- 
house on  the  left.  Upon  this,  without  any  order  or  regularity, 
the  Light  Infantry  began  a  scattering  fire  and  killed  several  of 
the  country  people,  but  the  fire  was  silenced  by  the  authority  of 
the  officers.3 

Meanwhile  Samuel  Adams  and  Hancock  had  quietly  waited 
at  the  house  of  the  Rev.  Jonas  Clark  until  the  British  reached 
Lexington,  and  then  made  their  escape  across  the  fields.  As  the 
reports  of  the  muskets  reached  their  ears  Adams  knew  that  the 
crowning  day  of  his  life  had  come,  the  formal  break  which 
would  put  an  end  to  plans  of  reconciliation  and  compromise. 
The  deepest  wish  of  his  heart  was  gratified,  and  he  is  said  to 
have  exclaimed, ' '  What  a  glorious  morning  is  this ! ' ' 

So  the  first  part  of  the  British  expedition  had  failed.  The 
two  patriots  who  were  to  be  taken  to  England  to  be  hung  had 
escaped.  But  the  chance  still  remained  of  securing  the  patriot 
military  stores  at  Concord ;  and  Colonel  Smith  coming  up  with 
the  main  body,  he  and  Pitcairn  pressed  on  to  accomplish  this 
purpose.  The  six  miles  to  Concord  were  soon  covered,  and  at 
seven  o'clock  the  militia  drawn  up  before  the  town  were  easily 


8  The  testimony  of  Parker  and  his  men  can  be  read  in  American 
Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  489-496.  One  of  the  wounded  regulars 
made  prisoner  by  the  militia  testified  that  the  British  fired  the  first  shot; 
another  one  testified  that  he  could  not  tell  which  side  fired  the  first  shot. 
Id.,  pp.  496,  501.  Sec,  also,  pp.  197,  742,  627,  434-436,  440,  945,  947, 
vol.  iii,  p.  1729;  Jones,  "New  York  in  the  Revolution,"  vol.  i,  p.  552; 
"Letters  of  Earl  Percy,"  p.  55;  Stedman,  "American  War,"  edition  1794, 
vol.  i,  pp.  116,  117. 

20  305 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

driven  back  over  the  north  bridge,  and  the  bridge  secured  by  a 
force  of  one  hundred  light  infantry.  The  main  body  at  once 
entered  the  town  and  seized  the  remains  of  the  patriot  military 
supplies — two  cannon,  which  they  disabled ;  500  pounds  of  ball, 
which  they  threw  into  the  river  and  wells,  and  sixty  barrels  of 
flour,  which  they  broke  up  and  scattered. 

This  small  plunder  was  all  that  was  accomplished,  and  to  do 
this  they  had  advanced  into  a  dangerous  position.  The  militia 
of  the  country  were  assembling  and  were  already,  it  is  supposed, 
three  hundred  in  number.  They  approached  the  British  force 
at  the  bridge,  waited,  as  they  afterwards  testified,  until  they 
were  fired  upon,  and  then  attacked  the  regulars,  driving  them 
across  the  bridge  into  the  town.  If  the  militia  had  followed  up 
this  advantage  and  held  the  bridge  they  might  possibly  have 
kept  Colonel  Smith  and  his  men  on  the  other  side  of  the  river. 
But  they  drew  off,  and  Smith  took  his  whole  force  out  of 
the  town,  crossed  the  bridge,  and  began  to  retreat  towards 
Lexington.4 

It  was  now  noon,  and  why  Smith  had  remained  five  hours  in 
the  town  has  never  been  explained.  The  delay  was  nearly  fatal 
to  his  command,  for  the  militia  had  collected  in  larger  numbers. 
They  pressed  on  both  sides  of  him  and  in  his  rear,  shooting 
down  his  men  from  behind  trees  and  the  low  stone  walls  which 
divide  New  England  fields.  His  retreat  was  rapidly  becoming 
a  rout  and  disaster,  and  long  before  he  could  reach  Boston  his 
force  would  be  annihilated. 

Fortunately  for  him  General  Gage  had  kept  himself  well 
informed  of  the  situation  and  responded  to  his  call  for  rein- 
forcements. By  eight  or  nine  o'clock  in  the  morning  he  had 
started  Earl  Percy  and  nine  hundred  men  to  the  rescue.  They 
marched  out  playing  the  new  tune,  "Yankee  Doodle,' '  which 
had  been  composed  in  derision  of  the  New  Englanders.  Percy 's 
name  suggested  memories  of  an  old  English  ballad,  and  as  he 
marched  through  Brookline  a  bright  patriot  boy  is  said  to  have 
shouted  at  him  that  he  would  soon  have  to  dance  to  Chevy 


*  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  497-501,  630,  674. 

306 


BRITISH  RESCUED  BY  PERCY 

Chase.  He  reached  Lexington  at  two  o'clock,  just  as  Colonel 
Smith's  men  were  passing  through  it  in  full  flight,  their 
ammunition  all  spent,  and  their  "tongues  hanging  out  of  their 
mouths, ' '  says  Stedman,  ' '  like  dogs  after  a  chase. ' ' 5 

Percy  had  now  the  task  of  getting  the  whole  force,  rescuers 
and  fugitives,  back  to  Boston  with  only  thirty-six  rounds  of 
ammunition.  It  was  a  mental  enlargement  for  him,  and  he  was 
very  much  surprised  to  find  that  his  seventeen  hundred  light 
infantry  and  grenadiers,  the  flower  of  the  British  army,  were 
on  the  eve  of  being  destroyed  by  the  people  whom  he  had 
described  as  psalm-singing,  cowardly  hypocrites.  He  was  ever 
afterwards  very  proud  of  the  rescue  and  of  the  skilful  and 
lucky  manner  in  which  he  retreated  for  fifteen  miles  to  Boston. 

He  put  the  fugitives  in  front  of  him,  covering  them  with 
his  own  brigade,  and  sending  out  strong  flanking  parties,  for 
' '  there  was  not  a  stone  wall  or  house,  though  before  in  appear- 
ance evacuated,  from  whence  the  rebels  did  not  fire  upon  us. ' ' 

"  As  soon  as  they  saw  us  begin  to  retire,  they  pressed  very  much 
upon  our  rear  guard,  which  for  that  reason  I  relieved  every  now  and  then. 
In  this  manner  we  retired  for  fifteen  miles  under  an  incessant  fire  all 
round  us  till  we  arrived  at  Charlestown,  between  seven  and  eight  in 
the  even,  very  much  fatigued  with  a  march  of  about  thirty  miles  and 
having  expended  almost  all  our  ammunition." — Letters,  p.  50. 

He  was  impressed  with  the  bushwhacking  method  of  the 
American  attack,  which  was  obviously  the  best  one  for  them. 
He  saw  that  they  evidently  knew  what  they  were  about,  and 
were  led  by  old  rangers  and  Indian  fighters.  Their  desperate 
courage  astonished  him,  for  many  of  them  concealed  themselves 
in  houses  and  advanced  within  ten  yards  to  fire  "at  me  and 
other  officers,  tho'  they  were  morally  certain  of  being  put  to 
death  themselves  in  an  instant. ' ' 


5  Stedman,  "American  War,"  vol.  i,  p.  118.  Gordon,  "American 
Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  i,  p.  481.  Mr.  Bolton  in  his  edition  of 
Earl  Percy's  Letters  (p.  49)  notes  that  Horace  Walpole  on  hearing  of 
the  battle  of  Lexington  was  struck  with  the  suggestiveness  of  Percy's 
name.  "  So  here  is  this  fatal  war  commenced.  '  The  child  that  is  unborn 
shall  rue  the  hunting  of  that  day.'  " 

307 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

The  numbers  against  him  have  not  been  ascertained.  They 
may  have  equalled  or  exceeded  his  own.  His  troops  plundered 
and  destroyed  as  many  houses  as  possible  upon  the  road,  and 
considerable  injury  of  this  sort  had  been  done  in  Lexington 
and  Concord.  Aged  and  sick  persons  and  women  who  had  just 
given  birth  to  children  are  said  to  have  been  shot  in  the  houses 
or  driven  out  into  the  fields ;  and  these  atrocities,  whether  true 
or  false,  were  quickly  used  by  the  patriots  to  make  the  British 
name  detestable  in  America. 

Percy  reached  Bunker  Hill,  just  across  the  water  from 
Boston,  a  little  after  sunset,  formed  his  men  in  a  strong  position 
which  the  militia  could  not  successfully  attack,  and  the  next 
morning  took  his  force  into  the  town.  He  had  lost  273  and  the 
patriots  only  88.6 


6  Contemporary  estimates  or  guesses  of  the  numbers  of  the  minute 
men  and  militia  that  drove  the  British  back  to  Boston  vary  from  250  to 
20,000.  The  last  number  of  20,000  is,  of  course,  impossible.  According 
to  an  estimate  of  the  militia  in  the  neighboring  towns  kindly  prepared 
for  me  by  Mr.  David  M.  Matteson  from  town  histories  and  the  Lexington 
alarm  rolls,  not  over  4000  lived  near  enough  to  reach  the  scene  of  action 
in  time  to  take  part.  We  can  hardly  assume  that  all  who  were  near 
enough  obeyed  the  call,  and  that  recorded  numbers  are  always  the  same 
as  actual  numbers.  After  making  this  allowance  a  thousand  seems  like 
a  liberal  estimate,  and  I  am  inclined  to  have  some  faith  in  that  contem- 
porary estimate  which  says  that  "  there  never  was  more  than  250  men 
engaged,"  although  others  may  have  been  coming  on  and  trying  to  get 
into  the  fight.  {American  Archives,  vol.  ii,  pp.  362,  440,  444,  472,  509; 
"  Letters  of  Hugh,  Earl  Percy,"  p.  54  note;  "  Life  of  Timothy  Pickering," 
pp.  69-75.) 


XXVI. 

THE  PATRIOTS  BESIEGE  BOSTON  AND 
TAKE  TICONDEROGA 

The  news  of  the  battle  of  Lexington  was  carried  through 
New  England  and  southward  to  the  Carolinas  by  express-riders, 
as  they  were  called,  employed  by  the  patriot  committees.  The 
riders  passed  from  committee  to  committee  and  had  each  com- 
mittee attest  by  signature  the  document  they  carried.  The 
news  was  sent  in  this  systematic  way  to  arouse  the  patriot  part}' 
in  other  provinces  to  rally  to  the  support  of  Boston;  and  it 
was  followed  up  by  letters  and  appeals  calling  for  militia  to 
come  to  Boston  and  render  it  impossible  for  Gage  to  send  out 
another  expedition.  They  even  went  farther  and  urged  the 
collection  of  an  army  that  would  compel  the  British  to  evacuate 
Boston  and  sail  away  in  their  ships.1 

Immediately  after  the  battle  the  patriot  leaders  had  taken 
the  sworn  testimony  of  Captain  Parker  and  his  men  as  to  what 
had  happened  at  Lexington  and  who  had  fired  the  first  shot. 
A  statement  was  made  up  from  this  evidence  and  sent  out  to 
all  the  colonies  to  draw  them  into  sympathy  and  alliance;  and 
the  same  statement  was  sent  to  England  to  strengthen  the 
hands  of  the  Whigs,  and  throw  the  odium  of  the  first  shot  on 
England.  Gage  in  a  similar  way  circulated  his  account  of 
the  battle.  Each  side  was  anxious  to  justify  its  conduct  in  an 
affair  which  obviously  marked  a  momentous  and  terrible  change 
in  the  conflict. 

Gage 's  side  of  the  story  was  sent  to  England  in  a  ship  called 
the  ' '  Sukey ;  ' '  and  four  days  afterwards,  on  the  29th  of  April, 


1  Bolton,  "  Private  Soldier  under  Washington,"  Pennsylvania  Maga- 
zine of  History,  vol.  27,  p.  257.  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  ii, 
pp.  446,  447,  472-474,  482,  506,  507,  780,  786,  787;  J.  J.  Boudinot, 
"  Life  of  Boudinot,"  vol.  i,  pp.  7,  8. 

309 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

the  Committee  of  Safety  started  their  version  in  a  fast  ship 
commanded  by  Captain  John  Darby,  who  was  instructed  to 
"  conceal  his  mission  from  every  person  on  earth  "  and  drive 
his  vessel  to  her  utmost  speed.  Darby  "  cracked ,  on, ' '  as  the 
sailors  say,  outstripped  everything  on  the  sea,  and  reached 
England  the  28th  of  May,  eleven  days  before  the  ' '  Sukey ; "  so 
that  the  American  version  of  the  first  shot  had  the  advantages  of 
nearly  two  weeks'  circulation  before  the  British  version  was 
heard  of.2 

The  appeal  of  Massachusetts  for  troops  was  promptly 
responded  to  in  New  England.  Many  of  us  used  to  read  in 
our  school-books  a  very  dramatic  account  of  how  Israel  Putnam, 
the  rough  and  ready  old  soldier  of  the  French  and  Indian  Wars, 
was  ploughing  on  his  farm  at  Pomfret,  Connecticut,  when  a 
messenger  told  him  of  the  fight  at  Lexington.  He  instantly 
mounted  his  horse — some  say  he  seized  one  of  the  horses  from 
the  plough — left  word  for  the  militia  to  follow  him,  and  rode 
one  hundred  miles  in  eighteen  hours  to  Cambridge. 

What  actually  happened  is  still  a  matter  of  dispute.  But 
the  most  probable  story  is  that  he  heard  the  news  at  eleven  in 
the  morning  while  building  a  stone  wall  on  his  land,  where  he 
had  a  tavern  and  a  farm.  He  went  to  the  house,  got  his  horse, 
and  rode  about  to  the  neighboring  towns  to  consult  with  the 
militia  officers.  On  his  return  he  found  several  hundred  militia 
assembled,  who  informed  him  that  they  had  elected  him  their 
general  and  that  they  wanted  to  march  immediately.  He  said 
he  was  not  ready  and  had  no  money.  They  supplied  him  from 
among  themselves ;  and  then  it  was  that,  after  giving  directions 
for  them  to  follow  him,  he  started  on  the  same  horse,  reached 
Concord  the  next  morning  at  sunrise,  and  soon  after  was  with 
the  troops  that  were  collecting  at  Cambridge  just  outside  of 
Boston.3 


2E.  E.  Hale,  "One  Hundred  Years  Ago,"  p.  21;  "Diary  and  Letters 
of  Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.  i,  pp.  455,  456,  461,  464,  465;  vol.  ii,  p.  118; 
Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  i,  p.  503. 

8  Tarbox,  "  Life  of  Putnam,"  pp.  83,  86 ;  Gordon,  "  American  Revolu- 
tion," edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  p.  2. 

310 


MILITIA  MARCH  TO  BOSTON 

John  Stark,  a  New  Hampshire  hunter  and  popular  leader, 
had  been  equally  prompt  and  reached  Cambridge  before 
Putnam.  Benedict  Arnold,  a  trader  and  shipmaster  of  New 
Haven,  had  been  chosen  captain  of  a  militia  company.  When 
the  news  of  Lexington  arrived  his  company  expressed  their 
willingness  to  march  the  next  morning,  and  he  paraded  them 
before  the  tavern  in  which  the  Committee  of  Safety  were  sitting 
and  demanded  a  supply  of  ammunition.  The  committee  refused 
it  on  the  ground  that  he  was  not  duly  authorized.  Whereupon, 
with  characteristic  impulse,  he  got  the  consent  of  his  men  to 
reply  that  he  would  take  the  ammunition  by  force.  The  com- 
mittee yielded  and  he  marched  for  Cambridge. 

But  his  little  company  did  not  reach  Cambridge  until  the 
29th  of  April,  more  than  a  week  after  the  battle,  and  during 
that  time  and  for  some  days  afterwards  it  is  probable  that  there 
were  very  few  militia  collected,  and  Gage  might  have  sent  a 
force  out  to  attack  them  with  some  prospect  of  success. 

The  day  after  the  battle  the  Massachusetts  Provincial  Con- 
gress had  placed  General  Artemas  Ward  in  command  of  all  the 
militia ;  but  he  was  a  very  inactive  officer  in  bad  health.  Possi- 
bly during  that  first  week  it  had  not  been  definitely  decided 
what  should  be  done.  Some  thought  that  there  was  no  danger 
of  Gage 's  attempting  to  send  out  another  expedition. 

The  assembly  and  governor  of  Connecticut  had  assumed  a 
sort  of  leadership  and  began  to  enter  into  negotiations  with 
Gage  for  a  cessation  of  hostilities  and  an  agreement  as  to  future 
conduct ;  but  this  course  was  strongly  disapproved  by  the  Massa- 
chusetts Committee  of  Safety.  They  denounced  it  as  a  serious 
blunder  which  would  be  encouraged  by  Gage  in  order  to  gain 
time  and  check  patriot  measures  until  his  reinforcements  should 
arrive  from  England.  They  professed  to  have  information 
that  Gage  intended  speedily  to  sally  out  and  wreak  vengeance 
for  his  defeat.  They  felt  it  their  duty  to  protect  their  people 
from  such  an  attack  and  take  aggressive  action  in  the  war 
which  had  evidently  begun. 

The  first  militia  began  to  arrive  in  the  neighborhood  of 

311 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

Boston  about  ten  days  after  the  battle,  and  all  through  the 
month  of  May  they  continued  to  arrive — rough,  ungainly  men, 
fresh  from  farm  labor,  without  much  order  or  discipline, 
joking  with  their  leaders  and  trailing  every  variety  of  old 
musket  and  shot-gun,  until  by  the  10th  of  June  they  were  7644 
strong  and  had  established  themselves  on  the  mainland  west 
of  Boston,  where  at  first  they  were  half -starved  and  shivered  in 
the  cold  nights  without  blankets.  They  kept  on  increasing 
until  by  midsummer  they  numbered  about  14,500  effectives 
rank  and  file,  which,  with  the  officers  added,  made  about 
17,000.4 

A  strong  force  was  placed  directly  in  front  of  the  narrow 
neck  of  land  leading  to  Boston,  so  as  to  prevent  Gage  break- 
ing out  at  that  point.  This  precaution  had  at  first  been 
neglected  and  caused  much  anxiety.  The  rest  of  the  motley 
patriots  were  distributed  in  a  large  half -circle  on  the  west  side 
of  Boston  from  the  Mystic  River  on  the  north,  through  Cam- 
bridge, which  became  the  patriot  headquarters,  round  to 
Roxbury  and  Dorchester  on  the  south,  shutting  in  Gage  and  his 
four  or  five  thousand  men,  who,  the  patriots  said,  must  now 
take  ship  and  leave  Boston  free. 

Members  of  this  volunteer  force  were  constantly  going  home 
to  attend  to  their  affairs  or  obtain  necessaries.  Some  of  them 
returned  or  others  came  to  take  their  place.  It  was  a  question 
whether  suoh  a  strange  sort  of  army  could  be  kept  in  sufficient 
numbers  for  any  length  of  time. 

Outside  of  New  England  no  troops  were  at  first  sent;  but 
resolutions  of  sympathy  were  adopted,  declaring  that  the  cause 
of  Boston  was  the  cause  of  the  whole  continent.    In  New  York 


4  The  sick  and  absent  were  very  numerous  and,  if  added,  ran  the 
numbers  up  to  20,000.  Gordon,  "  American  Revolution,"  edition  of  1788, 
vol.  ii,  pp.  27,  65;  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  1623,  1636, 
1735,  1736;  Journal  Provincial  Congress  of  Massachusetts,  p.  482; 
Sparks,  "  Writings  of  Washington,"  vol.  iii,  pp.  488,  493 ;  American 
Historical  Review,  vol.  i,  p.  292 ;  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iii, 
pp.  254,  853,  1165,  1404,  1611;  vol.  iv,  p.  491. 

312 


DUNMORE  IN  VIRGINIA 

the  patriots  were  strong  enough  to  seize  the  custom-house,  arm 
themselves  from  the  city  arsenal,  and  stop  all  vessels  going  to 
the  British  in  Boston,  and  also  vessels  going  to  Canada  and 
Georgia,  which  had  not  sent  representatives  to  the  Congress. 

The  same  plan  of  stopping  vessels  was  carried  out  in  Penn- 
sylvania and  Maryland,  and  recommended  by  the  Congress  to 
all  the  colonies.  The  New  Jersey  patriots  seized  the  treasury 
of  their  colony  and  secured  £20,000.  In  Maryland  they  seized 
the  arsenal  containing  1500  stand  of  arms ;  and  in  South  Caro- 
lina the  arsenal  was  seized.5 

In  Virginia  the  royal  governor,  Lord  Dunmore,  saved  some 
of  the  powder  in  the  arsenal  and  had  it  taken  on  board  a  British 
war- vessel.  The  patriots  never  forgave  him  for  this  clever 
trick,  and  if  county  resolutions  of  denunciation  are  of  any  avail 
the  soul  of  Dunmore  is  not  yet  at  rest.  Patrick  Henry,  at 
the  head  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  militia,  marched  on 
Williamsburg  to  seize  the  treasury.  But  messengers  from  the 
receiver-general  of  the  colony  met  him  and  offered  £330  as  a 
compensation  to  the  patriots  for  the  powder  that  had  been  taken 
from  the  arsenal.  This  compromise  was  accepted,  and  the 
militia  dispersed.  But  Dunmore  shut  himself  up  in  his  house, 
which  he  turned  into  a  garrison  surrounded  with  artillery,  and 
talked  of  destroying  the  town,  setting  the  negroes  free  and 
arming  them  against  their  masters,  with  other  threats  not 
calculated  to  soothe  the  minds  of  Southerners.6 

The  Massachusetts  Provincial  Congress  kept  pushing  the 
most  extreme  measures,  and  on  the  16th  of  May  they  sent  a 
letter  to  Philadelphia  offering  to  turn  over  to  the  Congress, 
just  assembled,  the  army  before  Boston  "for  the  general  defence 
of  the  rights  of  America ; ' '  and  the  Congress  was  urged  to  form 


6  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  154,  229,  1829,  1834; 
Gordon,  "  American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  p.  81. 

'Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  pp.  3-9,  85; 
American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  380,  441-444,  449,  460,  464, 
465,  477,  516,  525,  539-541,  578,  641.  681,  711,  1023,  1209;  Jones,  "New 
York  in  the  Revolution,"  vol.  i,  pp.  39,  40. 

313 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

a  civil  government  for  the  whole  country  to  which,  it  was 
assured,  Massachusetts  would  gladly  submit.7 

Gage  was  helpless  in  Boston.  He  could  hold  the  town,  but 
not  venture  out  of  it,  and  his  proclamations  offering  pardon  to 
all  rebels  except  Hancock  and  Adams,  if  they  would  lay  down 
their  arms,  were  rather  ridiculous.  But  the  patriots  were 
almost  as  helpless.  They  could  keep  Gage  in  the  town,  but  they 
had  not  enough  cannon  or  powder  to  attack  him.  Boston  was 
at  that  time  surrounded  by  water  except  at  the  narrow  neck 
which  Gage  had  strongly  fortified.  The  two  opposing  forces 
were  in  a  deadlock  position,  in  which  they  remained  nine 
months. 

They  exchanged  shots,  however,  quite  frequently.  The 
patriots  welcomed  to  their  ranks  deserters  from  the  British; 
and  made  use  of  the  wind  at  night  to  blow  into  the  British 
lines  hand-bills  encouraging  desertion  and  describing  the  right- 
eousness and  advantage  of  the  patriot  cause.  The  patriots  shut 
up  in  the  town  signalled  information  to  their  friends  outside 
by  means  of  gunpowder  at  night  and  during  the  day  from  the 
church  steeples.  There  were  numerous  skirmishes  for  the  pos- 
session of  the  hay  and  cattle  on  the  islands  in  Boston  harbor; 
and  for  this  work  and  their  scouting  and  reconnoitring  the 
patriots  collected  from  the  neighboring  coast  large  numbers  of 
whale-boats,  which  easily  outrowed  any  boats  of  the  British.8 

As  the  summer  wore  on  the  patriots  ran  intrenchments  close 
to  some  of  the  British  lines,  and  used  their  few  small  cannon. 
At  the  narrow  neck  of  land  leading  into  Boston,  the  opposing 
lines  were  very  close.  The  British  dug  across  the  neck  and  let 
the  water  through.  The  patriots  intrenched  close  up  to  them, 
burnt  their  outer  guard-house,  and  drove  the  guard  back  into 
the  lines. 


7  Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  pp.  22,  58; 
American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  378,  610,  611,  620,  621,  714, 
936,  937,  1842. 

8  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  516,  786,  969,  1636, 
1638,  1659,  1651.  1696,  1722,  1727,  1755;  Gordon,  "American  Revolu- 
tion," edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  pp.  127,  143,  147. 

314 


PUTNAM'S  AMBUSCADE 

This  close  investment  had  been  decided  upon  in  opposition 
to  a  suggestion  to  draw  off  a  little  way  and  leave  a  space  or 
neutral  zone  round  the  town.  The  close  investment  presented  a 
bolder  front  and  would  prevent  the  British  getting  a  start  in 
breaking  out  from  the  town.  The  British,  with  abundant 
supplies  of  ammunition,  were  continually  firing,  and  indulged 
in  some  very  heavy  cannonading,  but  with  infinitesimal  results. 
The  patriots  became  so  indifferent  to  the  shot  and  shell  that 
they  would  not  take  the  trouble  to  build  bomb-proofs. 

At  Gloucester  the  militia  successfully  protected  the  town 
from  the  British  war-ship  ' '  Falcon. ' '  At  Noddle 's  Island,  now 
East  Boston,  the  attempt  of  the  patriots  to  carry  off  the  cattle 
brought  on  a  somewhat  notable  engagement.  The  British  came 
to  save  the  cattle  with  a  schooner,  sloop  and  boats.  The  patriots 
were  led  by  Putnam,  eager  for  his  first  fight  in  this  new  war, 
and  with  characteristic  shrewdness  at  ambuscading  he  placed 
his  men  in  a  ditch  up  to  their  waists  in  water  and  covered  by 
the  bank  to  their  necks.  They  poured  a  destructive  fire  into  the 
unsuspecting  schooner  when  she  passed  within  sixty  yards  of 
them,  but  were  obliged  to  continue  the  fight  all  night  before  they 
had  the  satisfaction  of  burning  her.  Putnam  returned  to  camp 
covered  with  mud  and  delighted.  "  I  wish  we  could  have 
something  of  this  kind,"  he  said,  " every  day.  It  would  teach 
our  men  how  little  danger  there  is  from  cannon  balls. ' ' 9 

But  these  slight  skirmishes  used  up  nearly  all  the  patriot 
supply  of  powder.  They  were  scouring  the  country  and  the 
world  for  it.  Men  who  understood  its  manufacture  were 
eagerly  sought;  the  loam  in  the  floors  of  Virginia  tobacco- 
houses  was  dug  up  to  make  saltpetre ;  Franklin  was  consulted ; 
the  small  amount  in  other  colonies  was  hurried  to  Cambridge  by 
men  who  travelled  by  night  and  concealed  themselves  by  day. 
Vessels  visited  the  west  coast  of  Africa  and  had  procured 
powder  from  the  British  forts  in  exchange  for  rum  before  the 


9  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  719,  720,  874;  vol. 
iii,  p.  99.  Tarbox,  "  Life  of  Putnam,"  p.  96 ;  American  Archives,  fourth 
series,  vol.  ii,  p.  516. 

315 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

Ministry  could  stop  the  traffic.  Two  daring  American  captains 
landed  at  Bermuda  and  abstracted  a  hundred  barrels  of  powder 
from  the  government  magazine.  Twelve  men  from  South  Caro- 
lina surprised  a  British  vessel  at  St.  Augustine,  Florida,  and 
took  from  it  15,000  pounds  of  powder,  which  they  carried  safely 
to  Charleston.10 

The  loyalists  laughed  at  what  they  called  the  powderless 
militia  mob  who  fancied  they  could  win  independence  from  the 
British  empire;  and  loyalist  and  patriot  began  to  accuse  each 
other  of  lying,  treachery,  and  every  imaginable  outrage  of  the 
blackest  dye.  Parents  made  frantic  appeals  to  prevent  their 
sons  joining  the  rebels,  who,  they  said,  were  "more  savage  and 
cruel  than  heathens"  and  worse  than  devils; 1X  and  the  patriots 
in  their  turn  denounced  the  cowardice,  the  treachery  to  kith 
and  kin,  and  native  land,  or  the  hopeless  degradation  of  spirit, 
which  led  a  neighbor  or  friend  to  declare  his  acceptance  of 
alien  British  rule. 

Strange  stories  were  circulated  in  England  about  the  cruel- 
ties committed  by  the  farmers  on  the  dead  and  wounded 
regulars  at  Concord.  They  had  not  forgotten,  it  was  said,  their 
habits  in  the  French  and  Indian  War.  They  scalped  some  of 
the  wounded  British  soldiers,  leaving  them  to  drag  themselves 
about  in  torture  with  their  bleeding,  skinless  skulls;  and  they 
gouged  out  the  eyes  of  others  in  true  Virginia  fashion.  Lord 
Percy,  in  his  report  to  General  Gage,  had  complained  of  the 
"barbarity  of  the  rebels,  who  scalped  and  cut  off  the  ears  of 
some  of  the  wounded  men  who  fell  into  their  hands."  But 
Gordon,  who  made  a  careful  investigation  immediately  after  the 
battle,  refused  to  credit  any  of  these  stories  and  explained  that 
they  originated  in  one  wanton  act  by  a  boy  at  Concord,  who, 


10  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  908,  1035,  1037,  1062, 
1084,  1085,  1120,  1621,  1714,  1724;  vol.  iii,  pp.  36,  37,  38,  137,  180,  653, 
654,  682,  703,  1181;  vol.  iv,  pp.  370,  723,  1253,  1456,  1488,  1491;  Gordon, 
"  American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  pp.  84,  128. 

11  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  ii,  p.  508. 

316 


Hertford 


MAP    OF    THE    SIEGE    OF    BOSTON,    SHOWING    THE    IMPORTANCE    OF    BREED 
DORCHESTER  HEIGHTS,   AND  NOOK'S  HILL 


^©f  THE 


UNtVE 


RSlTY 


o< 


CALI' 


THE  STRATEGIC  POSITION 

following  after  the  militia,  attacked  a  wounded  regular  trying 
to  rise,  and  broke  open  his  skull  with  a  hatchet.12 

Not  satisfied  with  shutting  up  the  British  army  in  Boston, 
which  they  regarded  as  merely  defensive  warfare,  the  patriots 
planned  a  bolder  movement.  The  vital  strategic  position  at  that 
time  in  America  was  generally  believed  to  be  the  line  of  the 
Hudson  River  extended  to  Lakes  George  and  Champlain  and 
passing  northward  by  the  Richelieu  River  to  Canada.  This 
magnificent  chain  of  water  highways  cut  the  colonies  in  half 
and  would  be  of  vast  importance  to  Great  Britain.  If  con- 
trolled it  would  stop  communication  between  New  England  and 
the  Middle  States,  and  also  afford  an  easy  route  for  bringing 
into  the  rebellious  colonies  reinforcements  from  Canada,  which 
might  become  a  base  of  supplies  for  attacking  the  patriot 
movement  to  the  southward. 

The  province  of  New  York  consisted  at  that  time  of  nothing 
more  than  the  settlements  scattered  along  the  banks  of  the 
Hudson  and  its  tributary,  the  Mohawk.  The  interior  of  the 
province,  as  we  now  see  it  on  the  map,  was  totally  unsettled. 
The  important  water  highway  of  the  Hudson  and  the  lakes 
therefore  controlled  the  whole  province  of  New  York,  besides 
separating  New  England  from  the  middle  and  southern  colo- 
nies. It  had  always  been  the  bone  of  contention  in  the  war 
with  France ;  and  it  had  been  taken  for  granted  that  the  control 
of  that  highway  would  be  equivalent  to  the  conquest  of  New 
England,  New  Jersey,  and  Pennsylvania.  The  British  had 
always  established  their  military  headquarters  in  the  town  of 
New  York,  so  as  to  control  the  southern  end  of  the  line,  and 
a  great  deal  of  the  fighting  in  the  French  War  had  been  for  the 
control  of  Ticonderoga,  near  the  northern  end  of  the  line. 


12 "  Letters  of  Hugh,  Earl  Percy,"  p.  51 ;  "An  Answer  to  the  Declara- 
tion of  the  American  Congress,"  London,  1776,  p.  102.  "  The  Rights  of 
Great  Britain  Asserted,"  p.  57,  London,  1776.  "  View  of  the  Evidence 
Relative  to  the  Conduct  of  the  War  under  Sir  William  Howe,  with 
Fugitive  Pieces,"  etc.,  p.  72,  London,  1779;  Gordon,  "American  Revolu- 
tion," edition  1788,  vol.  i,  p.  480;  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol. 
ii,  pp.  436,  440,  517,  630,  674,  862,  863. 

317 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

Fort  Ticonderoga,  or  l '  Fort  Ty, ' '  as  the  colonists  sometimes 
called  it,  was  situated  on  a  point  of  land  where  the  waters  of 
Lake  George  join  the  waters  of  Lake  Champlain.  The  water 
highway  was  very  narrow  at  this  point;  the  guns  of  the  fort 
commanded  the  water  in  every  direction,  and  Ticonderoga  could 
dominate  the  navigation  between  Lake  George  and  Canada. 

The  seizure  of  Ticonderoga  and  the  subsidiary  fortresses  to 
the  north  of  it,  Crown  Point,  Chamblee,  and  St.  Johns,  very 
naturally  came  into  the  minds  of  the  patriots  as  a  capital  stroke 
against  the  mother-country.  There  was  a  strong  feeling  among 
them  that  the  British  would  collect  in  Canada  a  great  army  of 
regulars,  Canadians,  and  Indians,  to  invade  New  York  and 
New  England  and  hold  the  Hudson  valley.  But  if  the  northern 
forts  were  secured  before  this  expedition  started  its  purpose 
would  be  defeated  and  the  patriots  could  use  the  forts  as  a  base 
for  invading  Canada,  which  might  thus  be  persuaded  to  join  in 
the  Revolution.13 

This  idea  of  seizing  Ticonderoga  had  some  months  before 
been  suggested  to  the  Massachusetts  Committee  of  Safety  by 
their  secret  agent  in  Montreal;  and  Benedict  Arnold  the  day 
after  he  arrived  in  Cambridge  made  the  same  suggestion  to 
them.  In  the  country  at  large  there  was  some  opposition  to 
such  a  plan,  because  it  was  too  aggressive  and  would  be  a  break 
in  the  policy  of  acting  entirely  on  the  defensive.  This  feeling 
afterwards  found  expression  in  the  Congress.  But  the  Massa- 
chusetts Committee  of  Safety  did  not  share  it.  They  were 
already  engaged  with  patriots  in  Connecticut  in  maturing  a 
plan  for  taking  Ticonderoga;  and  without,  it  seems,  telling 
Arnold  of  this,  they  gave  him  a  colonel's  commission  on  the 
3rd  of  May,  with  instructions  to  raise  400  men  in  the  western 
part  of  Massachusetts  and  attack  Ticonderoga.14 

He  set  out  immediately,  and  on  the  9th  of  May,  before  he 
had  succeeded  in  recruiting  any  force,  he  was  at  Castleton,  in 


13  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  624,  668,  669,  706, 
733,  736,  892,  902,  944,  1042,  1066,  1539,  1540. 

14  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  450,  485. 

318 


TICONDEROGA  TAKEN 

what  is  now  Vermont.  Here  he  found  Ethan  Allen  in  com- 
mand of  150  men  of  the  Connecticut  expedition,  which  was  a 
private  enterprise  started  by  some  members  of  the  Connecticut 
legislature,  Parsons,  Deane,  Wooster,  and  Wyllys.  Parsons  had 
obtained  the  money  from  the  Connecticut  treasury  by  simply 
giving  a  receipt  signed  by  himself  and  four  associates,  and  there 
was  no  formal  or  legal  authority  from  the  Connecticut  gov- 
ernment. 

There  is  some  evidence  that  Arnold  in  passing  through 
Hartford  on  his  way  to  Boston  had  suggested  the  enterprise  to 
Parsons;  for  Parsons  afterwards  said  that  Arnold  gave  him  a 
description  of  Ticonderoga,  its  cannon  and  defenses.  But 
Arnold  now  found  himself  compelled  to  take  a  subordinate 
position  under  Allen,  who  was  a  rough  frontiersman,  with  an 
education  sufficient  to  induce  him  to  write  a  book  called 
' '  Keason  the  Only  Oracle  of  Man, ' '  a  very  tiresome  work  incul- 
cating deistical  doctrines.  He  was  able  to  assemble  his  men 
quickly  because  he  was  the  chief  leader  of  the  Green  Mountain 
Boys,  who  occupied  the  region  now  called  Vermont,  but  then 
usually  known  as  the  New  Hampshire  Grants,  and  claimed  by 
New  York.  Allen's  followers  had  resisted  by  force  the  New 
York  claim  of  sovereignty,  and  were  inclined  to  have  a  little 
revolution  of  their  own  and  become  an  independent  state.15 

Accounts  differ  as  to  the  manner  in  which  Allen  and  Arnold 
took  Ticonderoga  on  the  10th  of  May.  According  to  the  British 
account  Allen  borrowed  twenty  of  the  garrison  for  the  pre- 
tended peaceful  purpose  of  helping  to  transport  goods  across 
the  lake,  and  having  thus  weakened  the  fort  easily  took  it  by 
surprise  in  the  night.  By  the  American  account  Allen  and 
Arnold  marched  directly  towards  the  fort,  landing  alongside  of 


15  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  507,  550,  557,  558, 
707,  849 ;  "  Life  of  Arnold,"  p.  42 ;  Gordon,  "  American  Revolution," 
edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  p.  40;  Appleton,  National  Cyclopaedia  of  Biography, 
vol.  iv,  p.  663.  The  Connecticut  assembly  afterwards  approved  of  the 
transaction  and  discharged  Parsons  and  his  associates  from  liability  on 
their  receipt.     (Conn.  His.  Soc,  vol.  i,  pp.  182-185.) 

319 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

it  at  night  with  only  eighty-three  of  their  men.  Arnold  arro- 
gantly claimed  the  right  to  lead  and  be  the  first  to  enter  the 
fort,  which  Allen  was  not  the  sort  of  man  to  allow,  and  they 
settled  it  by  marching  side  by  side  at  the  head  .of  their 
men.  They  accomplished  a  complete  surprise  of  the  garrison, 
walking  quickly  into  one  of  the  entrances,  where  a  sentry 
snapped  his  gun  at  Allen  and  retreated.  The  next  moment 
the  Americans  were  all  inside,  and  the  forty-nine  British 
surrendered. 

The  commander,  De  la  Place,  is  said  to  have  been  surprised 
in  his  bed,  and  asked  by  what  authority  he  must  surrender.  It 
was  a  rather  puzzling  question  to  answer.  The  expedition  was 
a  private  enterprise  originating  among  Connecticut  people, 
without  any  sort  of  governmental  authority,  and  had  taken  a 
fort  within  the  boundaries  of  New  York.  But  Allen  was  equal 
to  the  occasion  and  in  grandiloquent  style  confidently  replied, 
"In  the  name  of  the  Great  Jehovah  and  the  Continental  Con- 
gress. ' ' 

It  was  a  magnificent  capture  for  the  patriots,  for  there  were 
over  a  hundred  large  cannon  of  the  kind  that  were  so  sorely 
needed  at  Cambridge,  besides  smaller  pieces,  swivels,  mortars, 
ten  tons  of  musket-balls,  three  cart-loads  of  flints,  shells,  small 
arms,  powder,  and  provisions. 

Arnold  was  at  once  sent  to  capture  Crown  Point,  which  he 
easily  accomplished,  because  it  was  garrisoned  by  a  sergeant 
and  only  twelve  men.  He  then  was  given  command  of  an  armed 
schooner,  which,  accompanied  by  Allen  in  charge  of  a  fleet  of 
bateaux,  started  to  capture  a  British  sloop-of-war,  lying  at  St. 
Johns,  at  the  lower  end  of  the  lake.  The  wind  being  fresh, 
Arnold 's  schooner  out-sailed  the  bateaux ;  and  he  easily  captured 
the  sloop  and  returned.  He  was  left  in  charge  of  Ticonderoga, 
and  this  interesting  little  expedition  which  destroyed  the  British 
power  on  Lake  Champlain,  was  completed. 

In  order  to  make  the  enterprise  a  part  of  the  general  patriot 
cause,  the  forts,  with  all  the  captured  cannon  and  supplies, 
were  turned  over  to  the  Continental  Congress  at  Philadelphia. 

320 


TICONDEROGA  RETAINED 

That  body  accepted  the  responsibility  and  committed  the 
custody  of  Ticonderoga  to  the  province  of  New  York.16 

The  expedition  was  a  great  surprise,  and  alarmed  the 
British,  for  it  left  Montreal  unprotected.  General  Carleton 
quickly  sent  two  regiments  from  Canada  which  retook  St. 
Johns,  at  the  foot  of  Lake  Champlain,  and  strongly  fortified 
it  to  protect  Montreal,  which  was  only  twelve  miles  distant. 
Gage  sent  two  ships  with  troops  from  Boston  to  Canada,  and 
Guy  Johnson,  the  British  agent  to  the  Six  Nations  of  Indians 
in  New  York,  went  to  the  assistance  of  Carleton  with  five 
hundred  warriors,  and  offered  to  retake  both  Ticonderoga  and 
Crown  Point.  But  nothing  was  done  except  to  garrison  St. 
Johns,  which  was  supposed  to  be  sufficient  to  protect  the 
entrance  to  Canada.17 

England  was  never  again  able  to  secure  a  permanent  foot- 
hold as  far  south  as  Ticonderoga.  It  is  true  Burgoyne  retook 
Ticonderoga  in  1777 ;  but  the  patriots  got  it  back  again  within 
a  few  weeks ;  and  from  the  time  Allen  and  Arnold  captured  it 
the  Americans  may  be  said  to  have  held  it  throughout  the  rest 
of  the  war.  This  was  a  great  gain,  and  the  importance  of  it  can 
hardly  be  overestimated,  for  it  gave  the  patriots  control  of  the 
upper  portion  of  the  strategic  line  on  which  it  was  generally 
believed  all  military  operations  depended.  They  afterwards 
secured  the  lower  portion  of  the  line  by  holding  West  Point  on 
the  Hudson. 


18  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  556,  584,  585,  606, 
618,  623,  624,  639,  645,  646,  668,  676,  686,  693,  698,  699,  705,  707,  715, 
716,  719,  722,  731-737,  808,  839,  840,  847,  1086;  Stedman,  "American 
War,"  edition  1794,  vol.  i,  p.  131;  Arnold,  "Life  of  Arnold,"  p.  37;  Jones, 
"  New  York  in  the  Revolution,"  vol.  i,  pp.  543-551. 

17  Stedman,  "  American  War,"  edition  1794,  vol.  i,  p.  133. 


21 


XXVII. 

THE  SECOND  CONTINENTAL  CONGRESS 

The  Continental  Congress  assembled  for  the  second  time  in 
Philadelphia  on  the  10th  of  May,  the  very  day  that  Allen  and 
Arnold  took  Ticonderoga.  Thomas  Jefferson  now  appeared  as 
a  new  delegate  from  Virginia.  Franklin  had  just  returned 
from  England  and  had  been  immediately  elected  to  the  Con- 
gress. He  had  sailed  almost  on  the  day  the  Fisheries  Bill  had 
passed,  wondering  whether  he  would  be  seized  before  he  could 
start  and  locked  up  in  the  Tower;  and  the  British  Govern- 
ment, it  seems,  had  serious  thoughts  of  this  measure,  which 
might  have  considerably  altered  some  interesting  episodes  in 
history.1  He  had  steadily  declared  his  belief  in  the  possibility 
of  a  compromise,  and  expected  to  go  back  to  England  in  a  few 
months  charged  with  the  mission  of  finally  settling  all  difficul- 
ties. But  when  he  reached  Philadelphia  and  heard  of  Lexing- 
ton he  quickly  abandoned  every  thought  of  a  peaceful  settle- 
ment and  took  his  place  among  the  extreme  patriots. 

Lexington,  the  unorganized  army  besieging  Boston,  the  final 
passage  of  the  Fisheries  Bill,  the  prompt  and  blunt  refusal  of 
all  colonial  suggestions  of  liberty,  and  fresh  troops  and  arma- 
ments sailing  for  America,  were  now  the  great  and  deplorable 
facts  of  the  day.     What  was  to  be  done  ? 

The  business  of  the  Congress  became  heavy  and  laborious. 
Those  who  engage  in  an  open  rebellion  against  the  British 
empire  have  no  time  to  lose.  Franklin  describes  how,  in  spite 
of  his  seventy  years,  he  toiled  in  debates  and  committee  work 
from  early  morning  until  far  into  the  night.  John  Adams' 
diary  contains  no  descriptions  of  the  wondrous  dinner-parties 
that  had  surprised  and  delighted  him  the  year  before,  when 


%u  Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.  i,  pp.  405,  414, 
421 ;  vol.  ii,  p.  238. 

322 


OPINIONS  OF  JOHN  ADAMS 

hope  was  high  and  buoyant.  Such  entertainments  were  not,  we 
may  suppose,  entirely  abandoned;  but  in  the  darkened  and 
serious  circumstances  they  had  become  comparatively  few.2 

There  was  great  difference  of  opinion  between  the  moderate 
and  the  extreme  patriots  as  to  what  course  should  be  pursued 
and  how  far  we  should  separate  ourselves  from  Great  Britain. 
John  Adams,  for  example,  was  advocating  most  extreme  meas- 
ures in  both  public  and  private.  He  was  proposing  to  recom- 
mend to  each  colony  to  seize  all  the  crown  officers  and  officials 
within  its  limits,  and  hold  them  as  hostages  for  the  safety  of  the 
patriots  shut  up  with  the  British  army  in  Boston.  That  done, 
the  colonies  were  to  be  declared  free  and  independent  states,  and 
then  Great  Britain  could  be  informed  that  they  would  negotiate 
for  a  settlement  of  all  difficulties  on  permanent  principles.  If 
she  refused  to  negotiate,  and  insisted  on  war,  she  was  to  be 
informed  that  the  colonies,  now  independent  states,  would  seek 
the  alliance  of  France,  Spain,  or  any  European  country  that 
would  assist  them.  Finally,  the  Congress  was  to  adopt  the 
unorganized  farmers  at  Cambridge  as  its  army,  and  appoint  a 
general  to  command  them.3 

Equally  extreme  with  John  Adams  were  the  people  of 
Mecklenburg  County,  North  Carolina.  They  were  largely 
Scotch-Irish  in  origin,  and  delegates  from  them  assembled  at 
Charlotte,  on  the  31st  of  May,  and  passed  certain  resolutions 
which  had  been  carefully  prepared.  Having  denied  all 
authority  of  Parliament  and  having  admitted  only  an  allegiance 
to  the  King,  the  patriots  all  over  the  country  were  very  anxious 
for  the  King  to  do  something  which  would  legally  break  the 
allegiance  to  him  and  leave  America  independent.  The  Meck- 
lenburgers  believed  that  they  had  found  such  an  act 4  by  the 

2 "Life  of  George  Read,"  p.   108. 

8  Adams,  Works,  vol.  iii,  p.  407. 

*  Individuals  were  constantly  looking  for  some  act  which  in  their 
minds  would  break  the  allegiance.  Johnson,  of  Maryland,  said,  "  The 
first  Hessian  soldier  that  puts  foot  on  the  American  shore  will  absolve 
me  from  all  allegiance  to  Great  Britain." — Scharf,  "  History  of  Mary- 
land," vol.  ii,  p.  218    note. 

323 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

King  in  his  address  to  Parliament  on  the  1st  of  February, 
declaring  the  American  colonies  in  a  state  of  rebellion. 

That  declaration  of  rebellion,  said  the  Mecklenburg  resolu- 
tions, necessarily  annulled  all  British  laws  in  America  and  sus- 
pended for  the  present  all  civil  government  derived  from  Great 
Britain.  The  people  of  each  colony  were  therefore  thrown  back 
on  their  natural  right  of  self-government ;  and  for  the  sake  of 
preserving  good  order,  at  least  in  Mecklenburg  County,  it  was 
necessary  to  establish  in  place  of  the  suspended  or  annulled 
British  authority  certain  rules  and  regulations,  which  were  set 
forth  at  length  in  the  resolutions. 

These  resolutions  were  in  effect  a  declaration  of  independ- 
ence, although  they  do  not  contain  a  formal  statement  of  such 
purpose.  They  were  sent  to  the  Congress  by  a  special  messen- 
ger, but  attracted  very  little  attention  there  or  in  the  rest  of 
the  country,  probably  for  the  reason  that  they  were  merely 
another  instance  of  that  extreme  patriot  opinion  which,  for 
the  present,  the  Congress  was  striving  to  keep  in  the  back- 
ground. Many  years  after  the  Revolution,  however,  it  was 
asserted  that  these  resolutions  were  not  passed.  They  were 
prepared  for  passage,  it  was  said,  at  a  meeting  on  the  19th  of 
May  when  word  was  received  of  the  battle  of  Lexington,  and 
amid  great  excitement  among  the  delegates  and  assembled 
multitude  and  shouts  of  "Let  us  be  independent!  Let  us 
declare  independence ! ' '  another  set  of  resolutions  were  adopted, 
in  which  it  was  announced  that  "We,  the  citizens  of  Mecklen- 
burg County,  do  hereby  declare  ourselves  a  free  and  inde- 
pendent people ;  ...  to  the  maintenance  of  which  independence 
we  solemnly  pledge  to  each  other  our  mutual  cooperation,  our 
lives,  our  fortunes,  and  our  most  sacred  honor. ' ' 

This  would  certainly  have  been  a  very  remarkable  outbreak 
of  extreme  patriot  opinion,  using  some  of  the  same  phrases 
which  more  than  a  year  afterwards  appeared  in  the  Declaration 
of  Independence  made  by  the  Congress.  It  was  a  great  surprise 
to  Jefferson  and  Adams  when  it  was  first  brought  to  their 
attention  in  1819,  and  they  declared  that  they  had  never  before 

324 


CONSERVATISM  OF  CONGRESS 

heard  of  this  Mecklenburg  document.  It  is  probably  spurious, 
a  mere  mistake  in  the  recollection  of  aged  men.  But  the  North 
Carolinians  will  not  give  it  up  and  the  controversy  shows  no 
signs  of  abating.5 

The  Congress  were  so  anxious  to  be  conservative  that  at  the 
time  these  Mecklenburg  resolutions  were  brought  to  them  they 
were  preparing  the  second  petition  to  the  King  expressing  the 
greatest  attachment  and  devotion  to  his  "Majesty's  person, 
family  and  government,"  and  imploring  him  to  deliver  them 
from  the  wicked  designs  of  the  ministry.  After  the  fall  of 
Ticonderoga  was  announced,  they  had  voted,  on  the  18th  of 
May,  that  an  exact  inventory  be  taken  of  the  captured  cannon 
and  supplies  in  order  that  they  might  be  safely  returned, ' '  when 
the  restoration  of  the  former  harmony  between  Great  Britain 
and  these  colonies,  so  ardently  wished  for  by  the  latter,  shall 
render  it  prudent  and  consistent. ' '  Three  days  before  that  the 
Congress  had  recommended  to  the  New  York  patriots  that  if 
British  troops  arrived  among  them,  they  should  act  strictly 
on  the  defensive,  so  long  as  consistent  with  safety;  that  the 
troops  should  be  permitted  to  occupy  the  barracks  so  long  as 
they  behaved  peaceably,  but  not  suffered  to  erect  fortifications 
or  cut  off  the  communication  between  town  and  country,  as 
Gage  had  done  in  Boston.0 

These  instructions  for  a  peaceful  reception  of  a  British 
army  in  New  York,  while  an  American  and  British  army  were 
in  a  deadlock  and  death-struggle  at  Boston,  were  certainly  a 
curious,  but  under  the  circumstances  a  very  necessary,  arrange- 
ment. When  Washington  arrived  in  New  York  on  his  way  to 
the  army  at  Cambridge,  he  was  received  with  cheering  and 


"Hoyt,  "The  Mecklenburg  Declaration  of  Independence;"  Graham, 
"  The  Mecklenburg  Declaration  of  Independence,"  American  Archives, 
fourth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  855,  1683.  American  Historical  Review,  vol.  xi, 
p.  548;  Magazine  of  American  History,  vol.  21,  pp.  31,  221;  Niles,  "  Prin- 
ciples and  Acts  of  the  Revolution,"  edition  1876,  pp.  313,  390;  Biblio- 
graphical Contributions  of  Library  of  Harvard  University,  No.  48,  pp.  34ff. 

c  Journals  of  Continental  Congress,  Ford  edition,  1905,  vol.  ii,  pp. 
52,  56. 

325 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

hearty  welcome  by  the  same  people  who,  a  few  hours  afterwards, 
gave  a  similar  welcome  to  Tryon,  the  royal  governor.7 

It  was  all  in  the  line  of  policy  that  had  been  adopted  by  the 
patriots.  They  were  willing  to  go  only  as  far  as  circumstances 
had  gone.  They  recognized  a  state  of  war  as  existing  only  in 
Massachusetts.  They  were  loth  to  quit  the  defensive  policy  too 
suddenly,  in  spite  of  the  aggressiveness  of  the  Ticonderoga 
expedition.  A  great  deal  of  their  action  for  the  next  year  was 
based  on  this  feeling,  and  on  the  assumption  of  a  possible 
reconciliation  with  England  or  restoration  of  harmony,  which 
would  stop  the  war.  Many  instances  could  be  cited  besides  the 
notable  one  of  the  New  Hampshire  constitution,  adopted  in 
January,  1776,  which  declared  that  it  was  to  continue  only 
' '  during  the  present  unhappy  and  unnatural  contest  with  Great 
Britain.' ' 

These  instances  have  been  sometimes  used  in  both  America 
and  England  to  show  that  our  people  were  always  perfectly 
willing  to  remain  colonies  "if  well  treated  by  the  mother- 
country,"  and  might  still  to  this  day  be  part  of  the  British 
empire.  But  the  only  reconciliation  which  the  patriot  party 
would  have  accepted  was  that  which  they  had  already  denned 
many  times,  namely,  that  Parliament  should  abandon  all 
authority  over  the  American  provinces,  which  should  be  inde- 
pendent states,  recognizing  the  British  King  as  head  of  an 
empire  not  united  or  held  together  by  any  sort  of  compulsion, 
and  that  the  King  should  have  no  authority  to  erect  fortifica- 
tions or  keep  troops  in  any  province  except  by  the  consent  of 
that  province.  That  was  their  idea  of  a  "restoration  of  har- 
mony;" and  under  such  a  plan  of  reconciliation  they  might 
have  been  called  colonies  in  the  old  Greek  meaning  of  the  word ; 
but  they  would  certainly  not  have  been  colonies  in  any  meaning 
of  the  word  as  used  in  England  in  either  ancient  or  modern 
times. 

The  expressions  about  loyalty  and  reconciliation  were 
merely  those  legal  fictions  which  Anglo-Saxon   lawyers  and 


Jones,  "  New  York  in  the  Revolution,"  vol.  i,  pp.  55-58,  555,  556. 

326 


A  TECHNICAL  FICTION 

statesmen  always  adopt  to  keep  the  record  technically  correct. 
The  technical  fiction  adopted  by  the  Congress  this  year  was 
that  they  were  rebelling  not  against  England  or  the  King,  but 
against  a  ministry  that  had  deceived  Parliament  into  extend- 
ing its  authority  to  the  colonies.  The  British  troops  were 
spoken  of  by  the  patriots  not  as  his  Majesty's  army  or  the 
English  army,  but  as  "the  ministerial  troops."  Under  this 
theory  the  Congress  were  compelled  to  speak  of  the  King  as 
the  good  man  and  their  friend  whom  the  wicked  Ministry  had 
deceived  into  approving  of  evil  and  tyrannical  measures.  They 
lived  in  hope,  they  said,  that  "he  will  at  length  be  undeceived, 
and  forbid  a  licentious  ministry  any  longer  to  riot  in  the  ruins 
of  the  rights  of  mankind. ' '  8 

It  was  the  same  fiction  or  principle  that  the  Cromwellian 
party  had  adopted  more  than  a  hundred  years  before.  They 
too  were  rebelling,  they  said,  not  against  the  king  or  against 
England,  but  against  a  wicked  ministry.  Under  this  same 
principle  the  Congress  adopted  and  sent  to  the  King  that 
second  "humble  and  dutiful  petition"  in  the  regulation  lan- 
guage of  "loyal  devotion,"  throwing  all  the  blame  upon  the 
Ministry. 

Every  one  knew,  of  course,  that  the  King  was  not  in  the 
least  deceived  and  that  he,  the  Ministry,  the  whole  Tory  party 
— in  short,  the  large  majority  of  Englishmen — were  all  agreed 
that  the  colonies  must  be  compelled  to  remain  in  the  empire 
under  the  full  authority  of  Parliament.  The  statements  so 
common  in  documents  and  letters  at  this  time  expressing  the 
hope  of  "  a  happy  and  honorable  accommodation  between  Great 
Britain  and  her  colonies,"  meant  that  the  colonies  as  inde- 
pendent communities  should  negotiate  a  treaty  or  a  compro- 
mise with  Great  Britain.  But  when  a  nation  is  at  war  with 
her  colonies  and  has  a  colonial  rebellion  to  put  down,  com- 
promise means  defeat,  because  a  compromise  or  accommodation 
would  in  itself  be  an  admission  on  the  part  of  the  mother- 
country  that  the  supposed  colonies  had  ceased  to  be  colonies 


8  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  1839,  1882. 

327 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

and  had  become  so  far  independent  as  to  make  a  treaty  or 
agreement  of  accommodation  like  an  independent  nation.9 

The  conservatism  of  the  Congress  and  the  patriot  party, 
their  gradual  development  of  revolutionary  principles  step  by 
step,  their  clinging  to  old  terms  and  old  forms,  and  old  ideas 
and  arguments,  and  their  postponement  of  the  first  blow  and 
all  aggressive  action  as  long  as  possible,  was  unquestionably 
commendable,  and  won  respect  for  their  cause  both  at  home 
and  abroad. 

With  all  their  careful  conservatism,  they  had  already 
adopted  enough  radical  and  daring  measures  to  shock  that 
numerous  class  who  mistrust  popular  rights  and  revolutions. 
The  loyalists  shrank  from  all  the  patriot  proceedings  with 
horror.  They  were  amazed  and  almost  dumb  with  indignation 
to  hear  that  the  Congress  was  proposing  to  ask  assistance  of 
France  and  Spain,  old  England's  bitterest  enemies.  They 
could  hardly  believe  the  news  that  Ethan  Allen  and  Benedict 
Arnold  had  had  the  temerity  to  take  the  two  British  forts  on 
Lake  Champlain,  Ticonderoga  and  Crown  Point,  and  send  the 
captured  British  flags  to  the  Congress,  which  had  used  them  to 
decorate  the  walls  of  the  halls  in  which  they  sat.  Would  not 
England 's  vengeance  for  this  be  swift  and  terrible  ? 10 

But  as  the  summer  wore  on  the  Congress  not  only  made 
more  vigorous  preparations  for  war,  but  began  to  create  a 
national  government  for  the  whole  country.  They  established  a 
general  post-office  system ;  they  created  a  Department  of  Indian 
Affairs;  they  organized  a  regular  army,  adopted  articles  of 
war,  and  inaugurated  a  hospital  service,  with  doctors  and 
nurses.  These  beginnings  of  nationality  are  now  profoundly 
interesting  to  us,  but  they  were  marks  of  Satan  to  the  loyalist 
and  the  Englishman. 

The  British  intercepted  two  letters  written  by  John  Adams, 
in  which  he  abused  Dickinson  for  his  conservative  views  and 


9  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  1836,  1882;    vol.  iv, 
p.  467. 

10  Jones,  "  New  York  in  the  Revolution,"  vol.  i,  p.  47. 

328 


THE  INTERCEPTED  LETTERS 

complained  with  self-conscious  pride  of  his  own  heavy  labors  in 
the  Congress  in  creating  a  new  nation.  He  had  a  constitution 
to  form,  ''millions  to  arm  and  train,  a  naval  power  to  an 
extensive  commerce  to  negotiate  with,  a  standing  army  of 
27,000  men  to  raise,  pay,  victual,  and  officer."  These  letters 
were  published  by  the  British  in  order  to  show  the  real  purpose 
of  the  Congress  and  the  emptiness  of  all  its  loyal  phrases  about 
reconciliation  and  allegiance  to  the  King.11 

Adams,  however,  as  an  extreme  patriot  was  delighted  with 
the  publication  of  the  letters  as  tending  to  force  a  breach  with 
England  and  encourage  the  idea  of  independence  among  Amer- 
icans. In  this  respect  he  characteristically  believed  that  they 
had  had  more  effect  than  Paine  's  famous  pamphlet,  ' '  Common 
Sense." 

"  They  thought  them  a  great  prize.  The  idea  of  independence,  to  be 
sure,  was  glaring  enough,  and  they  thought  they  should  produce  quarrels 
among  the  members  of  Congress  and  a  division  of  the  Colonies.  Me,  they 
expected  utterly  to  ruin,  because,  as  they  had  represented,  I  had  explicitly 
avowed  my  designs  of  independence.  I  cared  nothing  for  this.  I  had 
made  no  secret,  in  or  out  of  Congress,  of  my  opinion  that  independence 
was  become  indispensable,  and  I  was  perfectly  sure  that  in  a  little  time 
the  whole  continent  would  be  of  my  mind.  I  rather  rejoiced  in  this  as  a 
fortunate  circumstance,  that  the  idea  was  held  up  to  the  whole  world, 
and  that  the  people  could  not  avoid  contemplating  it  and  reasoning  about 
it.  Accordingly,  from  this  time  at  least,  if  not  earlier,  and  not  from 
the  publication  of  "  Common  Sense,"  did  the  people  in  all  parts  of  the 
continent  turn  their  attention  to  this  subject.  It  was,  I  know,  considered 
in  the  same  light  by  others.  1  met  Colonel  Reed,  soon  afterwards,  who 
was  then  General  Washington's  secretary,  who  mentioned  those  letters  to 
me,  and  said  that  Providence  seemed  to  have  thrown  those  letters  before 
the  public  for  our  good;  for  independence  was  certainly  inevitable,  and 
it  was  happy  that  the  whole  country  had  been  compelled  to  turn  their 
thoughts  upon  it,  that  it  might  not  come  upon  them  presently  by 
surprise." — Works,  vol.  ii,  p.  412. 

The  Congress  denounced  England's  methods  in  all  parts  of 
her  empire.     They  denounced  her  rule  in  India,  which  they 


11  John  Adams,  Works,  vol.  ii,  pp.  410-414,  423;  American  Archives, 
fourth  series,  vol.  ii,  p.  1717. 

329 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

described  as  the  sacrifice  of  millions  of  lives  to  gratify  her 
"insatiable  avarice  and  lust  of  power."  They  encouraged  the 
colony  of  Jamaica  to  rebel.  They  sent  an  address  to  the  people 
of  Ireland,  telling  them  that  they  were  well  aware  that  "the 
labors  and  manufactures  of  Ireland  were  of  little  moment  to 
herself,  but  served  only  to  give  luxury  to  those  who  neither  toil 
nor  spin. ' '  They  enlarged  on  the  wrongs  of  Ireland,  in  whose 
rich  pastures  "many  hungry  parricides  have  fed  and  grown 
strong  to  labor  in  its  destruction ; ' '  and  they  offered  the  whole 
region  of  America  as  a  safe  asylum  for  the  Irish  people. 

There  could  be  no  peace  with  a  Tory  ministry  after  such 
language  as  that.  The  Ministry  also,  it  is  said,  intercepted  a 
letter  from  Benjamin  Harrison,  one  of  the  Virginia  delegates, 
in  which  the  purpose  of  the  petition  to  the  King  is  described 
as  merely  to  enable  the  English  Whigs  to  keep  up  their  opposi- 
tion in  Parliament  by  showing  that  the  Americans  were  not 
bent  on  independence,  but  ready  for  reconciliation  and  com- 
promise.12 

The  Congress  published  a  Declaration  of  the  Causes  for 
Taking  up  Arms,  in  which,  to  the  astonishment  of  loyalists,  they 
defied  the  British  navy  and  the  destruction  it  could  work  on 
the  American  coast. 

"  Admit  that  your  fleets  could  destroy  our  towns,  and  ravage  our  sea 
coasts;  these  are  inconsiderable  objects,  things  of  no  moment  to  men 
whose  bosoms  glow  with  the  ardor  of  liberty.  We  can  retire  beyond  the 
reach  of  your  navy,  and  without  any  sensible  diminution  of  the  necessa- 
ries of  life,  enjoy  a  luxury,  which  from  that  period  you  will  want,  the 
luxury  of  being  free.  ...  Of  this  at  least,  we  are  assured,  that  our 
struggle  will  be  glorious,  our  success  certain;  since  even  in  death  we 
shall  find  that  freedom  which  in  life  you  forbid  us  to  enjoy." — American 
Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  1874,  1876. 

Rebellion  was  then  a  more  serious  thing  than  it  has  since 
become.  "The  naked  poles  on  Temple  Bar,"  said  a  London 
newspaper,  "will  soon  be  decorated  with  some  of  the  patriotic 


"  Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.  i,  p.  557. 

330 


FAILURES  OF  INDEPENDENCE 

noddles  of  the  Boston  saints. ' ' 13  Loyalists  lived  in  full 
expectation  of  witnessing  a  great  exiling,  hanging,  and  confisca- 
tion of  estates;  and  they  sent  to  England  lists  of  those  who 
should  suffer.  Samuel  Adams  was  well  aware  of  his  own 
danger,  as  well  as  of  the  danger  in  which  he  had  involved 
others;  and  his  cousin,  John  Adams,  has  described  him  in  his 
lodgings  at  Philadelphia,  carefully  destroying  the  evidence 
contained  in  letters,  which  would,  doubtless,  throw  a  flood  of 
light  on  the  Revolution  if  they  had  been  preserved. 

"  I  have  seen  him  at  Mrs.  Yard's  in  Philadelphia,  when  he  was  about 
to  leave  Congress,  cut  up  with  his  scissors  whole  bundles  of  letters  in 
atoms  that  could  never  be  reunited,  and  threw  them  out  of  the  window 
to  be  scattered  by  the  winds.  This  was  in  summer,  when  he  had  no 
fire.  As  we  were  on  terms  of  perfect  intimacy,  I  have  joked  him,  perhaps 
rudely,  upon  his  anxious  caution.  His  answer  was,  '  Whatever  becomes 
of  me,  my  friends  shall  never  suffer  by  my  negligence.' " — Wells,  "  Life  of 
Samuel  Adams,"  vol.  ii,  p.  391.     See,  also,  p.  250. 

The  recent  struggles  of  small  states  in  Europe  to  secure 
their  independence  were  not  encouraging.  Sweden  had  been 
very  unfortunate,  and  the  liberties  of  the  free  towns  of  Ger- 
many had  been  curtailed.  Within  the  last  two  or  three  years 
Austria,  Russia,  and  Prussia  had  joined  forces  in  conquering 
and  making  the  first  division  of  Poland's  territory.  In  fact, 
this  first  attempt  on  Poland  had  been  so  successful  that  many 
expected  soon  to  see  a  division  of  Switzerland  and  of  the 
United  Provinces. 

The  Corsicans  had  won  a  temporary  independence  by  the 
heroism  and  intelligence  of  their  leader,  General  Paoli,  who  was 
popular  in  America,  where  a  famous  inn  on  the  western  road 
from  Philadelphia  was  named  after  him.  "  Pascal  Paoli  and 
his  brave  Corsicans "  was  a  popular  toast  among  the  patriots. 
But  in  1769  France  had  completely  crushed  Corsican  inde- 
pendence. 

1  'Behold  your  fate  when  you  appeal  to  France,"  said  the 


18  Boston  Gazette,  October,  1774. 

331 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

loyalists.     "Do  you  suppose  that  the  power  which  destroyed 
the  independence  of  Corsica  will  give  you  independence  '1 " 14 

The  patriots  nerved  themselves  with  strong  appeals.  They 
would  risk  everything.  They  would  "die  or  be  free/'  Death 
was  far  preferable  to  political  slavery.15 

"  I  will  tell  you  what  I  have  done,"  writes  a  patriot  woman  to  an 
Englishman.  "  My  only  brother  I  have  sent  to  the  camp  with  my  prayers 
and  blessings;  I  hope  he  will  not  disgrace  me;  I  am  confident  he  will 
behave  with  honor,  and  emulate  the  great  examples  he  has  before  him; 
and  had  I  twenty  sons  and  brothers  they  should  go.  I  have  retrenched 
every  superfluous  expense  in  my  table  and  family;  tea  I  have  not  drank 
since  last  Christmas,  nor  bought  a  new  cap  or  gown  since  your  defeat  at 
Lexington,  and  what  I  never  did  before,  have  learnt  to  knit,  and  am  now 
making  stockings  of  American  wool  for  my  servants,  and  this  way  do  I 
throw  in  my  mite  to  the  public  good.  I  know  this,  that  as  free  I  can  die 
but  once,  but  as  a  slave  I  shall  not  be  worthy  of  life." — Niles,  "  Principles 
and  Acts  of  the  Revolution,"  edition  of  1876,  p.  117. 


14 "A  Letter  to  the  People  of  America,"  p.  29,  London,  17G8.  See, 
also,  Lecky,  "England  in  the  Eighteenth  Century,"  edition  of  1882,  vol. 
iii,  p.  223;  "The  Political  Family;  or,  a  Discourse,"  &c,  by  Isaac  Hunt, 
Philadelphia,  1773,  pp.  15-27;  Wells,  "Life  of  Samuel  Adams,"  vol.  i, 
p.  203;  Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  i,  p.  492; 
Curwen,  Journal  and  Letters,  pp.  207,  339,  344 ;  "  Life  of  Van  Schaack," 
p.  272;  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  i,  p.  1184. 

"Niles,  "Principles  and  Acts  of  the  Revolution,"  edition  of  187G, 
pp.  104,  106,  171,  193,  210,  305,  307;  Gordon,  "American  Revolution," 
edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  p.  82. 


XXVIII. 

BUNKER  HILL 

During  the  month  of  May,  1775,  while  the  Congress  was 
debating  whether  it  would  adopt  the  extreme  measures  which 
such  men  as  John  Adams  were  advocating,  General  Howe  was 
on  the  ocean  bound  for  America,  to  serve  in  a  subordinate 
capacity  for  a  few  months  and  then  supersede  Gage  as  com- 
mander-in-chief to  put  down  the  rebellion.  He  was  accom- 
panied by  Burgoyne  and  Clinton,  with  several  thousand  men, 
and  on  the  25th  of  May  they  sailed  into  Boston  harbor. 

The  patriots  greeted  them  with  derisive  congratulations, 
and  night  after  night  their  houses  were  placarded  with  mock 
proclamations  of  British  power  and  vengeance.1  The  troops 
they  brought  raised  Gage's  force  to  about  10,000,  so  that  it 
seemed  comparatively  easy  for  him  to  face  the  16,000  farmers 
who  shut  him  in  on  the  land  side.  The  British  troops  were 
camped  on  that  hill  where  we  now  follow  the  streets  called 
Beacon  and  Tremont.  From  the  hill  one  could  then  look  over 
the  houses  in  the  lower  part  of  the  town,  see  far  out  in  the 
harbor,  and  watch  the  approaching  ships  rise  up  out  of  the 
horizon. 

The  English  soldiers,  Lieutenant  Clarke  tells  us,  seemed 
shorter  in  stature  than  the  Americans.  There  were  regiments 
of  veterans,  famous  organizations,  such  as  the  Forty-seventh, 
"Wolfe's  Own,"  the  Thirty-eighth,  and  the  Welsh  Fusileers, 
who  had  distinguished  themselves  at  the  battle  of  Minden. 
There  were  Irishmen  in  the  ranks,  and  a  regiment  called  "The 


1  One  of  the  pasquinades  was  clever  enough : 

"  Behold  the  Cerberus  the  Atlantic  plough, 
Her  precious  cargo.  Burgoyne,  Clinton,  Howe. 
Bow,  wow,  wow!  " 
— Fonblanque,  Life  of  Burgoyne,  pp.  135  note,  136. 
333 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

Royal  Irish."  It  was  rather  curious  that  Irishmen  should  be 
fighting  to  destroy  the  ideas  and  principles  which  in  the  next 
century  saved  thousands  of  their  race  from  death  in  the  Irish 
famine,  and  gave  millions  more  a  refuge  and  a  home,  a  liberty 
and  prosperity  unattainable  for  them  under  Britain 's  rule. 

In  Boston,  however,  at  this  time,  Britain's  soldiery,  boister- 
ous and  boastful,  were  living  merrily  enough.  They  took  the 
Old  South  Church  for  the  cavalry,  or,  as  an  officer  described  it, 
"a  meeting-house  where  sedition  has  been  often  preached,  is 
clearing  out  to  be  a  riding-school  for  the  dragoons."2 

It  was  a  strange  position  for  ten  thousand  regulars  to  be 
shut  up  in  a  town  with  so  many  of  their  enemies,  the  patriots. 
Sentinels  were  perpetually  challenging  the  people,  and  quar- 
rels were  frequent  because  of  the  strained  relations.  The 
people  were  ready  to  believe  any  evil  of  the  soldiery,  and  the 
soldiery  were  anxious  to  find  evil  among  the  people.  The 
people  insisted  that  they  had  caught  Captain  Wilson,  of  the 
Fifty-ninth,  inciting  the  negro  slaves  of  the  town  to  attack 
their  masters,  and  the  army  believed  that  it  had  complete 
evidence  of  a  plot  among  the  townsfolk  to  massacre  all  the 
British  officers  who  were  quartered  in  dwelling-houses.3 

Most  of  the  patriot  townsfolk,  especially  the  prominent  ones, 
had  gone  away.  Hancock's  handsome  residence  was  closed. 
No  one  would  have  answered  a  knock  at  Samuel  Adams's 
rickety  dwelling.  But  many  of  the  ordinary  people,  who 
could  not  very  well  be  tried  for  treason,  remained.  Loyalists 
were  numerous,  and  Gage  had  a  citizens'  patrol  of  three 
hundred  of  them,  whom  he  made  very  proud  by  giving  them 
badges.  No  doubt  they  ridiculed  the  farmers'  army,  gave 
plenty  of  suggestions  for  suppressing  the  wicked  rebellion  as 
quickly  as  possible,  and  were  happy  in  their  confidence  that 
the  beneficence  of  British  rule  would  soon  be  reestablished. 

Soon,  however,  there  came  a  day,  a  Saturday  afternoon,  of 


3  Carter,  "  Genuine  Detail  of  the  Blockade  of  Boston,"  p.  8. 
*  Clarke,   "  Impartial    and   Authentic    Narrative    of    the    Battle   of 
Bunker  Hill,"  p.  25. 

334 


BREED'S  HILL  OCCUPIED 

the  greatest  possible  excitement,  when  all  the  inhabitants  then 
in  the  town,  loyalists,  patriots,  and  soldiers,  could  stand  on 
the  hill  or  climb  on  the  roofs  of  the  houses,  or  on  the  masts  of 
ships,  and,  looking  across  towards  Charlestown,  see  redcoats 
mowed  dowTi,  whole  ranks  at  a  time,  by  old  fowling-pieces  and 
Queen  Anne  muskets  in  the  hands  of  farmers;  see  the  blood 
staining  the  bright  June  grass,  and  wounded  men  rising  on 
their  elbows  to  vomit,  than  which,  after  a  bull-fight,  what  could 
be  a  grander  or  more  ennobling  sight ! 

It  is  not  often  that  a  battle  is  seen  with  perfect  distinctness 
by  non-combatant  spectators  who  outnumber  by  thousands 
the  forces  engaged  on  both  sides  of  the  fight.  But  Gage,  mili- 
tary governor  and  commander-in-chief  of  Massachusetts, 
insisted  on  giving  his  people  this  spectacle. 

It  had  been  for  a  long  time  quite  obvious  to  him  that  the 
hill  north  of  Boston  across  a  narrow  strip  of  water  should  be 
occupied  as  an  outpost,  because  if  the  farmers  seized  it  they 
could  cannonade  the  town.  So  now,  being  greatly  reinforced 
by  the  new  arrivals,  he  made  preparations  for  occupying  and 
fortifying  that  hill,  when  lo!  one  morning,  the  17th  of  June, 
1775,  he  beheld  the  farmers  in  full  possession  of  it.  They  had 
worked  like  beavers  all  night,  making  a  redoubt  of  earth,  and 
they  kept  working  away  all  morning,  adding  other  breastworks 
of  earth,  hay,  fence-rails,  and  stones,  in  spite  of  the  guns  fired 
at  them  from  the  men-of-war. 

The  hill  which  the  farmers  had  seized  was  Breed's  Hill,  on 
a  peninsula  connected  with  the  mainland  by  a  very  narrow 
passage.  The  patriot  army,  which  at  this  time  was  commanded 
by  General  Ward,  assisted  by  Putnam,  Stark,  Prescott,  and 
others,  had  learned  of  the  probability  of  the  British  seizing  the 
hill,  and  had  determined  to  forestall  them.  In  the  judgment 
of  military  critics  it  was  a  rather  desperate  undertaking, 
because  they  were  going  out  on  a  peninsula  where  the  British, 
by  seizing  the  narrow  passage  at  the  mainland,  might  catch 
them  like  sheep  in  a  pen. 

It  is  probable  that  they  were  led  to  take  this  risk  by  the 
feeling  that,  if  they  remained  inactive  and  avoided  fighting, 

335 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

the  patriot  cause  would  be  injured  and  discouraged.  This 
explanation  applies  to  several  battles  during  the  first  three 
years  of  the  Revolution  which  were  fought  under  great  dis- 
advantages, and  in  which  defeat  for  the  Americans  was  certain. 
But  certain  defeat  was  far  less  injurious  than  a  refusal  to  fight. 

The  first  intention  had  been  to  occupy  Bunker  Hill ;  but  the 
party  of  about  a  thousand  men,  that  went  out  under  Prescott  in 
the  night  to  seize  and  fortify  it,  found  Breed's  Hill  easier  to 
fortify  and  nearer  Boston.  After  they  had  built  the  earth 
redoubt  on  it  they  extended  a  breastwork  of  earth  on  their  left 
part  way  towards  the  Mystic  River.  In  the  morning  more 
troops  came  out,  Connecticut  regiments  under  Putnam  and  the 
New  Hampshire  regiments  under  Stark.  Prescott  took  com- 
mand in  the  redoubt;  the  Connecticut  troops,  under  Captain 
Knowlton,  were  on  the  left  of  the  redoubt,  and  extended  the 
earth  breastwork  more  towards  the  river  by  taking  up  two 
rail  fences,  putting  them  together  and  heaping  on  them  the  hay 
which  had  recently  been  cut  and  was  lying  in  windrows  on  the 
ground.  Still  farther  to  the  left  Stark  stationed  the  New 
Hampshire  men  and  extended  the  defences  to  the  river  by  a 
breastwork  of  loose  stones.  The  extreme  right  of  the  line  was 
protected  by  some  troops  placed  in  the  houses  of  Charlestown. 

There  are  said  to  have  been  about  fifteen  hundred  men 
behind  the  defences.  Nearly  as  many  more  were  in  the  rear 
on  Bunker  Hill,  and  never  took  part  in  the  fight.  Putnam 
rode  and  walked  up  and  down  the  whole  line,  encouraging  the 
men,  telling  them  to  shoot  officers,  to  wait  till  they  could  see 
the  whites  of  the  enemy's  eyes,  and  left  the  command  of  the 
Connecticut  troops  to  Knowlton.  But  in  the  controversy  that 
afterwards  arose,  some  of  the  survivors  of  the  battle  testified 
that  Putnam  was  not  on  the  fighting  line  at  all  but  remained 
on  Bunker  Hill  with  the  reserves,  whom  he  could  not  persuade 
to  enter  the  fight. 

The  patriot  troops  had  for  the  most  part  been  supplied  on 
setting  out  with  powder  for  their  horns,  some  buckshot  and 
about  fifteen  bullets  apiece,  which  they  put  into  their  pockets  or 
pouches.     The  Connecticut  men  had  each  a  pound  of  powder 

336 


Of  THE 

IIVERSI" 

or 


/ 


HOWE  MAKES  FRONT  ATTACK 

and  forty  or  fifty  bullets.  Some  made  up  their  ammunition 
into  paper  cartridges  and  others  loaded  it  loose.  As  their  shot- 
guns and  smooth-bore  muskets  were  their  own  weapons  and  of 
various  bores,  many  of  the  bullets  had  to  be  hammered  or  cut 
to  fit  the  muzzles. 

Gage  declined  to  take  the  obvious  course  of  sending  a  force 
behind  the  patriots  at  the  neck  of  the  peninsula.  He  said  he 
would  be  placing  such  a  force  in  a  dangerous  position  between 
the  patriots  on  Breed's  Hill  and  their  reinforcements  near 
Cambridge.  There  was  no  necessity,  he  thought,  for  taking  so 
much  risk  as  that,  because  two  or  three  thousand  of  his 
Majesty's  troops  could  easily  send  these  peasants  flying  by 
attacking  them  in  front  in  British  fashion.  This  force  he 
placed  in  command  of  Howe,  with  General  Pigot  to  assist  him. 

It  was  a  strange  position  for  Howe  to  lead  such  an  attack 
on  the  New  England  farmers,  who  had  fought  under  both  him 
and  his  brother  in  the  French  and  Indian  War.  One  wonders 
also  why  he  did  not  make  one  of  those  flanking  and  rear  move- 
ments with  which  afterwards,  whenever  compelled  to  fight,  he 
was  invariably  successful  against  Washington  without  a  great 
loss  of  life.  But  possibly  he  felt  himself  under  instructions  to 
make  a  front  attack,  or  considered  it  too  late  for  a  flank 
movement. 

In  all  the  controversy  over  Howe's  conduct  in  the  Revolu- 
tion, his  courage  was  never  questioned.  In  fact,  his  reputation 
for  rather  remarkable  courage  had  long  before  this  been  well 
established.  Sending  Pigot  up  against  the  redoubt,  Howe  led 
his  own  division  against  the  line  of  fence-rails  and  hay  which 
had  been  completed  to  the  waterside  in  time  to  prevent  the 
British  passing  round  to  the  rear  of  the  Americans. 

Howe  is  said  to  have  made  a  speech  to  his  men,  which  was, 
in  substance,  "You  must  drive  these  farmers  from  the  hill,  or  it 
will  be  impossible  for  us  to  remain  in  Boston.  But  I  shall  not 
desire  any  of  you  to  advance  a  single  step  beyond  where  I  am 
at  the  head  of  your  line."  4 


*  Clarke,    "  Impartial    and   Authentic    Narrative   of    the    Battle    of 
Bunker  Hill,"  p.  3. 

22  337 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

Howe  was  always  very  precise  on  the  battlefield.  When 
within  one  hundred  yards  of  the  hay  he  compelled  his  troops 
to  deploy  into  line.  For  this  he  was  afterwards  severely  criti- 
cised. He  should  have  taken  them  up,  it  was  said,  in  columns. 
But  in  columns  they  would  have  been  just  as  much  of  a  target. 
He  usually  knew  what  he  was  doing,  especially  in  sparing  the 
lives  of  his  men.  They  moved  up,  about  twelve  feet  apart  in 
front,  but  very  close  after  one  another,  in  deep,  long  files.  They 
were  beautiful,  brilliant,  their  red  coats,  white  knee-breeches, 
and  shining  musket-barrels  glittering  in  the  sun.  At  the 
distance  of  about  a  hundred  yards  they  began  firing  at  the  hay, 
from  which  there  was  an  occasional  shot  from  some  patriot  who 
could  not  be  restrained. 

No  doubt  they  joked  and  encouraged  one  another,  and 
shouted  at  the  mohairs  and  dunghill  tribe,  as  they  called  the 
colonists.  ''Let  us  take  the  bull  by  the  horns,"  some  of  them 
are  reported  to  have  said;  and  they  may  have  sung  snatches 
from  their  favorite  song,  ' '  Hot  Stuff : ' ' 

"  From  such  rascals  as  these  may  we  fear  a  rebuff? 
Advance,  grenadiers,  and  let  fly  your  hot  stuff." 

They  moved  up  to  within  fifty  steps  of  the  hay,  amazed  that 
there  was  so  little  reply  to  their  volleys.  Fifty  steps  seem  now 
a  very  short  range,  but  all  the  battles  of  that  time  were  fought 
at  about  that  distance,  because  the  smooth-bore  muskets  and 
shot-guns  that  were  used  were  inaccurate  beyond  fifty  yards, 
and  practically  useless  at  a  hundred. 

Suddenly,  when  the  front  line  of  the  regulars  had  moved  a 
few  steps  nearer,  the  faces  of  the  farmers  rose  above  the 
barrier  and  the  sweep  of  the  farmers'  scythe,  those  dreadful 
volleys  of  miscellaneous  missiles  that  had  been  crammed  into 
the  old  guns,  made  a  terrible  day  for  British  soldiers.5  Whole 
ranks  were  cut  down  to  a  man.     The  survivors  hesitated,  and 


BA  bullet  and  from  three  to  nine  buckshot  was  a  common  load  for  a 
musket,  and  this  practice  of  using  buckshot  in  addition  to  the  bullet 
prevailed  down  to  the  time  of  the  Mexican  War. — Codman,  "  Arnold's 
Expedition  to  Quebec,"  p.  241. 

338 


TERRIBLE  SLAUGHTER 

then  turned  down  the  hill  like  frightened  sheep,  to  halt  at  the 
bottom  and  stare  back  at  their  comrades,  struggling  and  dying 
on  the  grass. 

Pigot's  division  was  in  a  similar  plight. 

The  men-of-war  in  the  harbor  now  renewed  their  cannonade. 
The  balls  ricochetted  up  the  hill-side,  and  the  shells  burst  sav- 
agely overhead,  but  the  farmers  were  again  entirely  silent. 

Howe  rallied  his  men.  He  had  been  with  some  of  these 
regiments  in  Canada  in  the  French  War,  and  no  doubt 
addressed  to  them  stirring  words  which  have  not  been  recorded. 
He  led  them  up  again,  up  to  within  that  same  fifty  paces,  with- 
out a  shot  in  reply.  They  moved  nearer.  Could  it  be  that  they 
could  reach  the  breastwork  and  spring  over  it  unharmed? 
They  moved  on,  drew  closer;  they  were  within  thirty  yards  of 
the  hay,  which  suddenly,  at  a  word  from  the  old  trapper,  Stark, 
turned  into  a  spitting  flame  and  smoke,  and  Howe  must  have 
believed  that  this  was  the  last  fight  of  his  career.  They  stayed 
a  little  longer  this  time ;  they  had  come  so  far  that  they  tried  to 
move  up  closer;  they  saw  the  American  face  as  no  Englishmen 
had  ever  seen  it  before. 

1 '  Colonel  Abercrombie,  are  the  Yankees  cowards  ? "  a  farmer 
would  shout,  as  he  rested  his  piece  on  the  breastwork.  No 
doubt  also  terrible  curses  and  fierce  denunciations  of  British 
rakehells,  tyrants,  and  brutes  were  poured  over  with  the  bullets. 
It  was  something  new  for  a  British  officer  to  see  an  old  farmer 
let  a  young  redcoat  come  up  close  and  then,  levelling  his  rusty 
duck-gun  of  vast  bore,  draw  on  the  boy  the  deadly  aim  that  tore 
him  to  pieces  with  buckshot  and  slugs. 

The  English,  as  in  all  subsequent  battles  of  the  Revolution, 
aimed  too  high  and  overshot  their  enemy.  An  apple-tree  in  the 
rear  of  the  breastworks  had  its  limbs  cut  to  pieces  and  not  a 
bullet  in  its  trunk.  But  every  American  was  using  the  gun  he 
had  hunted  with  for  years  and  was  allowed  to  load  and  fire  in 
the  way  to  which  he  was  long  accustomed. 

"There,  there!"  they  would  cry;  "see  that  officer!  Shoot 
him!"  And  two  or  three  would  cover  him  with  their  guns, 
terrible  old  pieces,  loaded  with  all  manner  of  missiles.     They 

339 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

had  been  told  to  aim  for  the  belt,  and  nearly  every  soldier  was 
hit  in  the  thighs  Or  abdomen.  When  he  had  received  there  the 
discharge  from  an  old  duck-gun  he  was  a  horrible  sight  for 
the  surgeon. 

But  Howe,  though  resolved,  if  necessary,  to  make  that  day 
his  last,  could  not  hold  his  men  up  there  by  the  hay.  They 
fled  panic-stricken.  Some  even  rushed  into  their  boats  at  the 
shore;  and  Howe  soon  found  himself  at  the  bottom  of  the  hill, 
no  doubt  very  much  surprised  to  be  yet  alive.  His  white  silk 
knee-breeches  and  long  white  stockings  were  soaked  with  blood ; 
but  it  was  the  blood  of  his  men  among  whom  he  had  trampled. 
He  had  not  a  single  subordinate  officer  remaining;  they  were 
all  lying  on  the  hill-side. 

A  long  time  elapsed  while  he  consulted  with  Pigot  and  his 
officers,  who  were  for  giving  it  up  and  going  back.  But  Howe 
had  a  reputation  to  support,  and  was  determined  to  see  it  out. 

The  village  of  Charlestown,  along  the  right  of  the  patriot 
line,  was  now  on  fire.  The  thick,  black  smoke  that  comes  from 
burning  dwelling-houses  was  rolled  out  by  the  wind  in  a  vast 
cloud,  clear-cut  against  the  brilliant,  sunny  sky  of  that  June 
day.  Beneath  that  terrible  gloomy  canopy  that  was  moving 
through  the  glittering  sunlight  crouched  the  silent  Americans, 
looking  down  at  a  thousand  dead  and  dying  Englishmen  on 
the  hill-side,  while  all  around,  almost  as  close  as  in  a  theatre, 
the  thousands  of  spectators  in  windows,  and  perched  on  the 
tops  of  houses  and  chimneys  and  ship-masts,  watched  this 
wondrous  close  of  the  second  act. 

No  such  battle  with  such  a  large  audience  close  at  hand  can 
ever  be  fought  again,  unless  we  go  back  to  fire-arms  that  are 
useless  at  one  hundred  yards.  The  curtain  rose  on  the  third 
act  in  this  theatre,  this  drama  of  history  that  has  become  a  sign 
and  a  monument  to  the  world,  the  sneer  and  sarcasm  of  mon- 
archs,  conquerors,  and  lovers  of  dominion,  the  hope  of  the 
enthusiastic  and  the  oppressed.  Was  it  the  design  that  it  should 
be  enacted  like  a  gladiator's  show  in  a  little  natural  arena  with 
overwhelming   clouds   of   witnesses   that   it   might   become   a 

340 


THE  REDOUBT  TAKEN 

symbol,  an  example  to  keep  alive  the  endless  struggle,  the 
unsolvable  problem  of  the  world? 

Howe  sent  Pigot  up  again,  and  he  went  up  himself.  He 
ordered  the  men  to  free  themselves  of  their  heavy  knapsacks. 
He  concentrated  the  whole  British  force  on  the  redoubt,  and 
used  the  artillery  more  effectively.  Even  with  this  advantage 
the  first  volley  his  men  received  was  very  destructive.  But  the 
ammunition  of  the  patriots  was  exhausted.  They  were  hurling 
stones  over  the  breastwork  and  retreating.  The  regulars  sprang 
up  upon  the  redoubt.  They  saw  barefooted  countrymen  with 
trousers  rolled  up  to  their  knees  walking  away ;  and  there  were 
scarcely  any  dead  or  wounded  in  the  trenches.  But  only  a  few 
of  those  regulars  who  first  mounted  the  redoubt  lived  to  tell 
what  they  saw,  for  they  were  shot  down  almost  to  a  man  with 
the  remains  of  the  ammunition. 

Then  the  whole  British  force  swarmed  over  the  breastwork, 
and  for  a  time  there  was  confusion  and  hand-to-hand  conflicts 
as  the  Americans  retreated.  The  British  were  finally  able  to 
deliver  a  cross-fire,  which  caused  most  of  the  loss  of  the  patriots 
that  day. 

But  they  moved  off  in  good  order.  A  few  yards'  retreat 
easily  put  them  beyond  the  effective  range  of  the  muskets. 
Howe  ordered  no  pursuit,  although  Clinton  urged  him  to  do  it, 
and  the  helplessness  of  the  farmers  was  obvious.  He  had  been 
ordered  to  take  the  hill ;  he  would  do  no  more.  But  the  loyalists 
always  believed  that  he  could  have  inflicted  a  terrible  disaster, 
could  have  slaughtered  or  captured  three-fourths  of  the  patri- 
ots, and  seriously  crippled  the  rebellion. 

This  was  the  first  specimen  of  his  line  of  policy,  and  also 
the  beginning  of  the  serious  criticism  upon  him.  From  that 
time,  though  invariably  successful  in  any  battle  he  personally 
directed,  he  never  pursued,  never  followed  up  the  advantage  of 
a  victory  or  allowed  it  to  be  followed  up  by  others. 

The  farmers,  grouped  in  an  irregular  mass,  a  most  miscel- 
laneous, strangely  clad,  disorganized  body  to  soldiers'  eyes, 
withdrew  from  the  arena  on  which  they  had  played  their  part 
while  the  black  smoke  of  the  burning  town  was  still  rolling  high 

341 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

overhead.  They  had  represented  their  new  idea,  and  they 
returned  somewhat  leisurely  along  Charlestown  neck,  pelted, 
as  their  only  applause,  by  spent  and  random  balls  and  cannon- 
aded to  no  purpose  from  two  gunboats  or  floating  batteries. 

There  had  been  about  1500  or  1700  of  them,  and  they  had 
lost  in  dead  and  wounded  449.  Howe  took  out  from  Boston 
between  2500  and  3000  regulars,  and  he  left  1054,  more  than  a 
third,  on  the  hill-side.6 


6  Coffin's  "  History  of  the  Battle  of  Breed's  Hill,"  reprinted  in  Fel- 
lows' "The  Veil  Removed,"  113-138;  American  Historical  Review,  vol.  i, 
p.  401;  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  1018,  1101,  1373, 
1628;  Lieutenant  Clark's  "Narrative  of  the  Battle  of  Bunker  Hill;" 
Historical  Magazine,  vol.  vi,  pp.  321-442;  Swett,  "History  of  Bunker 
Hill,"  with  notes,  containing  testimony  of  survivors ;  Swett,  "  Historical 
and  Topographical  Sketch  of  Bunker  Hill ;  "  Swett,  "  Who  Was  the 
Commander  at  Bunker  Hill  ? " ;  Parker,  "  Colonel  William  Prescott  the 
Commander  at  Bunker  Hill ;  "  Dearborn,  "  Account  of  the  Battle  of 
Bunker  Hill;"  Daniel  Putnam's  "Letter  to  Major-General  Dearborn;" 
"  An  Enquiry  into  the  Conduct  of  General  Putnam ;  "  Richard  Frothing- 
ham,  "  Battle  Field  of  Bunker  Hill ;  "  Jones,  "  New  York  in  the  Revolu- 
tion," vol.  i,  p.  51;  Ashbel  Woodward,  "Memoir  of  Colonel  Thomas 
Knowlton;  "    Stedman,  "American  War,"  vol.  i,  pp.  125-129. 


XXIX. 

INCIDENTS  AND   RESULTS  OF   BUNKER  HILL 

For  the  rest  of  the  afternoon  and  far  into  the  night  carriages 
and  chaises,  furnished  by  loyalists,  were  streaming  back  and 
forth  from  the  waterside  in  Boston,  dragging  the  wounded 
British  soldiers  into  the  city  as  fast  as  they  could  be  brought 
from  the  battle-field  in  boats.  It  was  Sunday  morning  before 
the  task  was  finished.1 

When  the  British  finally  rushed  over  the  breastwork  at 
the  redoubt,  Major  Pitcairn,  who  had  led  the  advance  at  Lex- 
ington, was  killed,  and  his  body  carried  from  the  field  by  his 
son.  At  the  same  time  Dr.  Joseph  Warren,  hesitating  to  retreat, 
was  shot  down  in  the  trenches.  He  had  drawn  the  famous 
Suffolk  resolutions,  and  in  the  absence  of  Hancock  at  the  Con- 
gress of  Philadelphia,  had  become  temporary  president  of  the 
Massachusetts  Provincial  Congress.  In  the  absence  of  both 
Hancock  and  Samuel  Adams  at  Philadelphia,  he  may  be  said  to 
have  been  the  chief  political  manager  of  the  patriot  party,  as 
well  as  the  executive  head  of  the  patriot  government  of  Massa- 
chusetts. He  had  been  given  a  complimentary  commission  as 
major-general,  and  when  he  appeared  on  the  field  both  Putnam 
and  Prescott  offered  to  take  orders  from  him.  But  he  declined 
to  give  directions  to  veterans  of  the  French  War  and  insisted 
on  serving  as  a  volunteer  in  the  redoubt.  His  loss  was  serious, 
for  his  broad  ability  and  popularity  gave  promise  of  a  valuable 
career.  The  British  officers  boasted  that  his  death  was  "  better 
to  them  than  five  hundred  men. ' ' 2 

The  most  pathetic  incident  of  the  battle  was  the  appearance 
in  the  patriot  lines  of  James  Otis,  who  for  several  years  had 


1  Clark,  "  Narrative  of  the  Battle  of  Bunker  Hill." 

2  American   Archives,    fourth    series,    vol.    ii,    p.    1551;    Fonblanque, 
"Life  of  Burgoyne,"  p.  154. 

343 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

been  insane  and  living  quietly  with  his  sister,  Mercy  Warren, 
at  Watertown.  Hearing  of  the  preparations,  he  left  the  house 
to  follow  the  patriot  troops  and  is  supposed  to  have  borrowed 
a  musket  and  fought  in  the  trenches,  from  which  he  returned  to 
his  sister 's  faint  and  weary  at  midnight. 

Burgoyne,  in  his  description  of  the  battle,  said  that  the 
British  officers  were  heroic,  but  were  ill  seconded  by  the  rank 
and  file,  whom  he  accused  of  cowardice  and  lax  discipline. 
Some  of  them  were  so  excited  and  unskilled  in  shooting  that 
they  shot  their  own  officers  who  were  leading  them;  and  this, 
Burgoyne  said,  partly  accounted  for  the  large  number  of  officers 
killed  and  wounded.3 

He  labors  hard  to  prove  that  the  Americans  are  not  as  heroic 
as  might  be  supposed  from  this  battle.  They  are  good  shots,  it 
is  true,  like  Tartars,  Croats,  and  other  wild  people.  But  it  is 
as  preposterous,  he  says,  to  compare  them  in  point  of  courage  to 
the  Spartans  and  Athenians  as  it  is  to  suppose  them  inspired 
by  the  real  spirit  of  liberty  which  animated  those  ancient 
peoples.4 

Many  years  after  the  battle,  when  it  had  ceased  to  be  re- 
garded as  an  American  defeat  and  retrospect  increased  its 
importance,  a  great  controversy  arose  in  New  England  as  to 
whether  Putnam  or  Prescott  was  in  command  of  the  patriot 
troops.  Massachusetts  writers  naturally  favored  their  own  citi- 
zen, Colonel  Prescott,  who  had  served  with  merit  in  the  French 
War,  and  was  the  grandfather  of  Prescott,  the  historian ;  while 
the  Connecticut  people  naturally  favored  Putnam.  The  con- 
troversy took  on  a  political  bearing  and  raged  with  such 
intensity  that  some  people  succeeded  in  convincing  themselves 
that  Putnam  was  a  coward,  a  "swaggerer  and  blusterer,"  who 
was  not  in  the  fight  at  all,  and  inclined  to  play  traitor  and  go 
over  to  the  British. 

Prescott  was  a  colonel  who  never  rose  to  any  important  rank 
during  the  Revolution.    He  undoubtedly  took  the  troops  from 


3  Fonblanque,  "  Life  of  Burgoyne,"  p.  47. 

4  Fonblanque,  "  Life  of  Burgoyne,"  pp.  155,  159,  192,  193,  194. 

344 


By  an  Exprefs  arrived  at  Philadelphia  on  Saturday  evening 

hH  nvebave  tbejoihiciug  account  of  the  battle  at  Charlcftown,  en  Saturday  the  iZtbof 
Jm;,  Infant. 

OM  Friday  ni^ht,  the  17th  Inftant,  fifteen  hundred  of  the  Provincials  went  to 
Bunker's- Hill.,  in  order  to  intrench  there,  and  continued  intrenching  till  Sat U( day 
ten  a cbek,  wh:n  2000  Regulars  marched  ©&{  of  Bojlon,  landed  in  Charle/ftftoft,  and 
plundering  it  of  all  its  valuable  efteds,  fet  fire  to  it  in  ten  different  places  at  once  ;  then 
dividing  their  army,  part  of  it  marched  up  in  the  front  of  the  Provincial  intrer.chmenr, 
and  began  to  attack  the  Provincials  at  long  fhot  ;  the  other  pari  of  their  army  marched 
round  the  town  of  CbarUftoOon,  under  cover  of  the  fmoke  occafioned  by  the  tiro  of  the 
tnwn.  The  Provincial  ccntries  difcovered  the  Regulars  marching  upon  their  left  win<_r. 
Upon  notice  of  this  given  by  the  centry  to  the  Connecticut  forces  ported  upon  that  wing, 
Captain  Wo/ton,  of  djbftfd,  with  400  of  faid  forces,  immediately  repaired  to,  31  d 
balled  up  a  poft  and  rail-fence,  and  carried  the  pofts  and  rails  to  another  iencc,  put  them 
together  for  a  breaft  work.  Captain  Helton  gave  orders  to  the  men  not  to  fire  until  the 
enemy  were  got  within  fifteen  rods,  and  then  not  till  the  word  was  given.  At  the 
w>rds  being  given,  the  enemy  fell  furprifingly  ;  it  was  thought  by  fpectators  who  flood 
at  a  diflance,   that  our  men  did  great  execution.  * 

The  action  continued  about  two  hours,  when  the  Regulars  on  the  right  wing  were 
put  in  corrfiifion  and  gave  way  ;-— the  Connecticut  troops  clofely  purfued  them,  and  were 
on  the  point  of  pufhing  their,  bayonets,  when  orders  were  received  from  General  Pome- 
roy,  for  thofe  who  had. been  in  action  for  two  hcurs  to  fall  back,  and  their  places  to  be 
fupplied  by  frefh  trorps.— Thefe  orders  being  miftffktn  for  a  direction  to  retreat,  our 
troops  on  the  right  wing  began  a  general  reheat,  which  was  handed  to  the  left,  the 
principal  place  of  action,  where  Captains  Noltcn,  Chejier,  Clark  and  Putnam,  had 
forced  the  enemy  to  give  wav,  and  were  before  them  for  fome  confiderablediftance,  and 
being  warmly  perfuing  the  enemy,  were,  with  difficulty,  perfuaded  to  retire  ;  but  the 
right  wing,  by  mistaking  the  orders,  having  already  retreated,  the  left,  to  avoid  being 
enclrculed,  were  obliged  to  retreat  alfo  with  the  main  body.  They  retreated  with  pre- 
cipitation acrofs  the  canfeway  to  Winter 's-Wll,  in  which  they  were  expofed  to  the  fire 
of  the  enemy,  from  their  fhipping  and  floating  batteries.— -We  fuflained  our  principal 
lofs  in  paffing  the  caufeway,  The  enemy  purfued  our  troops  to  Winter 's-Wll,  where 
the  Provincials  being  reinforced  by  General  Putnam,  renewed  the  battle  with  great  fpi- 
rit,  repulfed  the  enemy  with  great  daughter,  and  purfued  them  until  they  got  under 
cover  of  their  cannon  frrm  the  fhipping.  When  the  enemy  returned  to  Bunker's- Hill, 
and  the  Provincials  to  Winter's-  Wll,  where  after  intrenching  and  erecting  batteries,  they 
on  Monday  began  to  fire  upon  the  Regulars  on  Bunier's-Wil,  and  on  the  (hips  and 
floating  batteries  in  the  harbour  when  the  Exprefs  came  away.  The  number  of  Pro- 
vincials killed  is  between  40  and  70;  140  are  wounded,  of  the  Connecticut  troops  16  were 
killed.— No  officer  among  them  was  either  killed  or  Wounded,  excepting  Lieutenant  Grof- 
vemr,  who  was  wounded  in  the  hand.  A  Colonel,  or  Lieutenant  Colonel  of  the 
Nei.-Ham0:ire  forces,  is  among  the  dead.  It  is  alfo  faid  that  Doctor  Warren  is  un- 
doubtedly armong  the  (lain. 

BROADSIDE  GIVING   THE   NEWS  OF  THE    BATTLE   OF    BUNKER    HILL 


WAS  PUTNAM  IN  COMMAND 

Cambridge  out  to  Bunker  Hill  on  the  night  they  made  the 
intrenchments,  and  during  the  battle  he  undoubtedly  had  com- 
mand of  the  redoubt.  From  these  facts  the  inference  is  drawn 
that  he  must  necessarily  be  considered  as  commander  of  the 
whole  field  during  the  battle.  But  he  appears  to  have  confined 
his  exertions  to  the  redoubt,  and  from  his  own  letter  describing 
the  battle  one  would  suppose  that  there  had  been  but  little 
fighting  anywhere  except  at  the  redoubt. 

Some  of  the  British  appear  to  have  thought  that  Warren 
was  in  general  command;  but  most  of  them  spoke  of  Putnam 
as  the  commander;  and  one  of  his  biographers  has  shown  that 
for  many  years  after  the  battle  he  was  represented  as  the 
commander  in  pictures  and  descriptions.5 

He  was  a  more  popular  and  better-known  character  than 
Prescott,  very  bustling  and  active ;  and  on  the  day  of  the  battle 
moved  about  a  good  deal.  But  the  controversy  will  never  be 
settled,  for  neither  Connecticut  nor  Massachusetts  will  give  up 
their  hero,  although  the  truth  is  that  the  patriot  military  organ- 
ization was  so  loose  and  irregular  that  no  one  was  in  general 
command.  Wilkinson,  who  went  over  the  field  with  Stark  a 
year  after  the  battle  was  fought,  says  "there  was  no  general 
command  exercised  on  the  field,"  and  this  is  in  agreement 
with  all  the  circumstances.  The  troops  were  volunteers  fight- 
ing with  a  common  purpose,  each  regiment  acting  on  its  own 
responsibility,  and  they  got  on  very  well  without  a  general 
commander.6 

Historians  and  Fourth  of  July  orators  have  described  the 
thrill  of  exultation  which  they  say  passed  like  a  wave  south- 
ward through  the  colonies  with  the  news  of  the  battle  of 
Bunker  Hill.  The  patriots  were  defeated,  lost  their  hill  and 
449  in  killed  and  wounded,  but  they  had  laid  low  1054  British 
regulars  in  resplendent  uniforms,  of  which  89  were  commis- 


6Tarbox,  "Life  of  Putnam,"  p.  216.  For  authorities  on  both  sides 
of  the  controversy  see  Winsor,  "  Handbook  of  the  American  Revolution," 
pp.  48-53. 

6  Coffin,  "  History  of  Battle  of  Breed's  Hill,"  p.  14. 

345 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

sioned  officers.  They  were  encouraged ;  they  could  afford  to  sell 
the  English  many  hills  at  the  same  price;  and  all  manner  of 
inferences  have  been  drawn  as  to  the  inspiring  effect  of  this 
battle  upon  the  patriot  colonists. 

This,  however,  is  largely  modern  rhetoric  and  supposition. 
Contemporary  patriot  opinion  expressed  no  elation;  but,  on 
the  contrary,  disappointment,  indignation,  and  severe  censure 
for  an  expedition  which  was  said  to  have  been  rash  in  concep- 
tion, discreditable  in  execution,  and  narrowly  escaped  over- 
whelming disaster.  The  patriots  abused  their  troops  for  going 
into  a  trap  on  the  peninsula  as  loudly  as  the  loyalists  abused  the 
regulars  for  not  closing  the  trap,  and  not  pursuing  when  they 
had  the  opportunity.  Colonel  Gerrish,  who  remained  in  the 
rear,  was  court-martialed  for  cowardice  and  cashiered.  Wash- 
ington considered  the  troops  in  the  battle  badly  officered,  and 
the  failure  of  the  reserves  to  assist  them  a  grave  error. 

In  contemporary  opinion,  Bunker  Hill  was  regarded  as 
having  given  neither  side  any  particular  advantage.  Looking 
back  through  the  long  perspective,  it  of  course  seems  most 
dramatic  and  interesting;  but  the  patriots  wanted  no  more 
Bunker  Hills.  They  knew  that  something  very  different  was 
required.7 

From  a  military  point  of  view,  both  sides  learned  a  lesson. 
It  was  the  first  notable  instance  of  the  American  use  of 
intrenching  which  since  then  has  become  a  national  trait.  The 
quickness  with  which  the  patriots  had  intrenched  themselves 
on  Bunker  Hill  was  a  surprise  to  the  British,  and  the  advan- 
tage of  this  intrenching  was  a  still  greater  surprise.  European 
soldiers  of  that  time  seem  to  have  placed  little  or  no  value  on 
this  method  of  defence,  which  the  American  troops  of  the 
Revolution  used  so  readily  and  at  which  they  became  so  skilful 
and  successful.  Burgoyne  reported  to  the  British  Government 
in  1777  that  the  Americans  were  expert  at  defence  by  intrench- 


7  Frothingham,  "  Siege  of  Boston,"  p.  154 ;  American  Historical 
Review,  vol.  i,  p.  404;  Writings  of  Washington,  Ford  edition,  vol.  14, 
p.  313;  Coffin,  "History  of  the  Battle  of  Breed's  Hill,"  pp.  13,  22,  26-30. 

346 


USE  OF  INTRENCHMENTS 

nient  beyond  any  other  nation.  They  would  throw  up  high 
intrenchments  of  earth  and  logs  sometimes  in  a  few  moments; 
and  this  method  was  universally  practised  by  both  sides  in  our 
Civil  War  of  1861.  But  in  Europe  it  was  very  little  used  for 
a  hundred  years  after  the  Revolution;  and  American  officers 
who  were  spectators  of  the  battles  of  the  Franco-Prussian  War 
of  1870  were  surprised  that  the  French  neither  used  it  nor 
appreciated  its  value.8 

At  the  time  of  the  Revolution,  such  intrenching  on  every 
possible  occasion  was  supposed  by  some  to  weaken  the  courage 
of  the  soldier  and  give  him  habits  of  timidity.  General  Putnam 
used  to  argue  against  this  superstition  in  his  rough  way  by 
saying  that  it  had  the  contrary  effect.  What  the  raw  militia- 
man is  afraid  of,  he  said,  is  his  shins.  Give  him  a  low  ridge  of 
earth  to  hide  his  shins  and  he  will  fight  to  the  death. 

One  reason  that  intrenching  was  of  such  value  to  the  Ameri- 
cans, and  of  less  value  to  the  British,  seems  to  have  been  that  it 
gave  the  Americans  a  chance  to  use  their  unerring  aim  with 
full  effect.  When  their  bodies  were  protected  until  the  enemy 
got  within  fair  range,  every  bullet  from  the  American  guns 
found  its  mark.  It  became  an  axiom  of  American  revolutionary 
tactics  that  they  must  avoid  level  regions  and  fight  among  the 
hills,  where  they  could  intrench  above  their  enemy.  They 
sometimes  carried  this  system  out  in  great  perfection,  intrench- 
ing themselves  from  hill  to  hill,  as  in  the  retreat  from  Harlem 
to  White  Plains. 

But  the  British  soldier  always  shot  wide,  no  matter  how 
close  he  was  or  how  well  protected.  Trenches  were  no  advan- 
tage to  him,  because  he  would  miss  the  enemy  and  they  would 
then  rush  over  the  trenches.  At  the  battle  of  Bennington, 
which  was  almost  the  only  occasion  in  the  Revolution  when  the 
British  intrenched  in  American   fashion,  the  patriot  militia 


8  Burgoyne,  "  State  of  the  Expedition  from  Canada ;  "  Gordon, 
"American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  p.  553;  American  Historical 
Review,  vol.  i,  pp.  411,  412;  Bolton,  "Private  Soldier  under  Washing- 
ton," p.  234. 

347 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

rushed  on  their  trenches  and  carried  them  with  comparatively 
little  loss.  But  the  frightful  loss  which  was  inflicted  on  the 
British  at  Bunker  Hill  made  them  shy  of  American  trenches 
for  all  the  rest  of  the  war. 

British  manoeuvres  were  always  directed  towards  getting  the 
Americans  in  level,  open  country  and  rushing  upon  them  with 
the  bayonet  after  their  first  fire  and  before  they  had  time  to 
reload.  Howe  never  made  another  front  attack  like  that  at 
Bunker  Hill.  Ever  after  that  his  front  attack  was  always  a 
feint  and  his  real  attack  was  delivered  on  the  flank  or  rear ;  and 
in  this  method  he  was  eminently  successful  in  both  of  his  battles 
with  Washington. 

The  British  officers  in  Boston  comforted  themselves  as  well 
as  they  could  with  the  thought  that  in  spite  of  their  heavy  loss 
they  had  won  an  important  hill ;  and  they  proceeded  to  fortify 
it  as  an  outpost  in  such  a  manner  that  the  patriots  never 
attempted  to  take  it.  Besieged  and  besiegers  settled  down  to 
comparative  quiet,  which  was  to  last  nearly  a  year.  British 
soldiers  were  quartered  at  Samuel  Adams'  abandoned  house, 
where  they  painted  caricatures  upon  the  walls,  and  cut  upon 
the  window  panes  coarse  witticisms  ridiculing  the  owner  and 
his  religion.9 


9  Wells,   Samuel   Adams,   vol.   ii,   p.   380;    Writings   of   Washington, 
Ford  edition,  vol.  14,  p.  313. 


XXX. 

WASHINGTON  IS  APPOINTED  COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 

On  the  16th  of  June,  the  day  before  the  battle  of  Bunker 
Hill,  the  Congress,  having  accepted  Massachusetts'  gift  of  the 
army  before  Boston,  gave  the  command  of  it  to  Colonel  George 
Washington,  of  Virginia,  and  made  him  a  general  and  com- 
mander-in-chief of  all  the  forces  of  the  patriot  cause. 

Hancock,  it  is  said,  had  ambitions  in  that  direction,  and  was 
somewhat  disappointed  at  the  choice.  But  the  fitness  of  Wash- 
ington for  the  office  was  generally  admitted  as  soon  as  John 
Adams  urged  his  appointment.  He  would  conciliate  the  mod- 
erate patriots,  for  he  had  clung  to  the  old  arguments  as  long 
as  possible,  and  refrained  from  forcing  events.  If  substantial 
independence  of  Parliament  and  the  Ministry  could  be  secured, 
he  was  willing  to  allow  the  King  a  vague  or  imaginary  headship 
until  in  the  course  of  years  that  excrescence  should  slough 
away.1 

Many  were  inclined  to  think  that  a  New  England  general 
should  command  the  New  England  army  that  was  gathered 
before  Boston ;  but  they  were  obliged  to  admit  that  the  appoint- 
ment of  a  general  from  Virginia,  the  most  populous  and  pros- 
perous of  the  colonies,  would  tend  to  draw  the  Southern  interest 
to  the  patriot  cause. 

Washington  was  forty-three  years  old,  which  was  the  right 
age  for  entering  upon  the  supreme  command  in  what  might  be  a 
long  war.  He  had  distinguished  himself  by  helping  to  rescue 
Braddock's  defeated  army  in  1755,  and  he  had  taken  a  more  or 
less  prominent  part  in  the  subsequent  campaigns  which  ended 
in  driving  the  French  out  of  Canada.  This  military  education 
and  experience  seemed  slight  and  not  equal  to  that  of  the 


1  John  Adams'  Works,  vol.  ii,  pp.  415-418;    Writings  of  Washington, 
Sparks  edition,  vol.  iii,  pp.  479-486. 

349 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

British  officers  who  would  be  opposed  to  him.  But  it  was 
American  experience,  no  colonist  was  any  better  equipped,  and 
he  was  of  a  larger  intelligence  than  Putnam,  Ward,  and  other 
Americans  who  had  served  in  the  French  War. 

His  strong  character  and  personality  had  impressed  them- 
selves upon  his  fellow  delegates  in  the  Congress.  It  was  this 
impressive  personality  which  made  his  career  and  brought  to 
him  grave  responsibility  without  effort  on  his  part  to  seek  office 
or  position.  When  he  was  only  twenty-one  the  governor  of 
Virginia  had  sent  him  through  the  wilderness  to  interview  the 
French  commander  near  Lake  Erie,  a  mission  which  required 
the  hardihood  of  the  hunter  and  some  of  the  shrewd  intelligence 
of  the  diplomat. 

But  much  to  the  surprise  of  travellers  and  visitors,  Wash- 
ington never  appeared  to  be  a  brilliant  man.  He  was  always  a 
trifle  reserved,  and  this  habit  grew  on  him  with  years.  His 
methods  of  work  were  homely  and  painstaking,  reminding  us 
somewhat  of  Lincoln;  and  the  laborious  carefulness  of  his 
military  plans  seemed  to  European  critics  to  imply  a  lack  of 
genius. 

But  it  was  difficult  to  judge  him  by  European  standards, 
because  the  conditions  of  the  warfare  he  conducted  were  totally 
unlike  anything  in  Europe.  He  never  commanded  a  real  army 
with  well-organized  departments  and  good  equipment.  His 
troops  were  usually  barefooted,  half -starved,  and  for  several 
years  incapable  of  performing  the  simplest  parade  manoeuvre. 
Brilliant  movements,  except  on  a  small  scale  as  at  Princeton, 
were  rarely  within  his  reach ;  and  large  complicated  movements 
were  impossible  because  he  had  not  the  equipment  of  officers 
and  organization  for  handling  large  bodies  of  men  spread  out 
over  a  great  extent  of  country.  He  was  obliged  to  adopt  the 
principle  of  concentration  and  avoid  making  detachments  or 
isolated  movements  that  could  be  cut  off  by  the  British.  To 
some  of  his  contemporaries  it  therefore  seemed  that  his  most 
striking  ability  lay  in  conciliating  local  habits  and  prejudices, 
harmonizing  discordant  opinions,  and  holding  together  an  army 
which  seemed  to  the  British  always  on  the  eve  of  disbanding. 

350 


LABORIOUS  METHODS 

He  reasoned  out,  however,  in  his  own  way  the  peculiar  needs 
of  every  military  position,  and  how  he  did  this  will  appear  more 
clearly  as  our  narrative  progresses.  He  often  spoke  of  his  own 
lack  of  military  experience,  as  well  as  of  the  lack  of  it  in  the 
officers  about  him;  and  this  seems  to  have  led  him  to  study 
every  situation  like  a  beginner,  with  exhaustive  care,  consult- 
ing with  everybody,  calling  councils  of  war  on  every  possible 
occasion,  and  reasoning  out  his  plans  with  minute  carefulness. 
This  method,  which  his  best  friends  sometimes  ridiculed,  was 
in  striking  contrast  to  the  method  of  one  of  his  own  officers, 
General  Greene,  and  also  to  the  method  of  Grant  in  the  Civil 
War.  Both  Greene  and  Grant  dispensed  altogether  with 
laborious  consultations  and  councils  of  war. 

But  the  laborious  method  was  well  suited  to  Washington, 
whose  mind  was  never  satisfied  unless  it  could  strike  a  balance 
among  a  great  mass  of  arguments  and  details  which  must  be 
obtained  from  others  and  not  through  his  own  imagination.  He 
liked  to  reserve  his  decision  until  the  last  moment,  and  this 
trait  was  sometimes  mistaken  for  weakness.  His  preparedness 
and  devotion  to  details  remind  us  of  Napoleon.  His  cautious, 
balancing,  weighing  habit,  developed  by  lifelong  practice,  runs 
through  all  his  letters  and  every  act  of  his  life,  appearing  in 
some  of  the  great  events  of  his  career  as  a  superb  and  masterful 
equipoise.  It  became  very  impressive  even  to  those  who  ridi- 
culed it;  it  could  inspire  confidence  through  years  of  disaster 
and  defeat;  and  it  enabled  him  to  grasp  the  general  strategy 
of  the  war  so  thoroughly  that  no  military  critic  has  ever 
detected  him  in  a  mistake. 

As  a  soldier  he  fought  against  distinguished  British  officers 
four  pitched  battles — Long  Island,  Brandywine,  Germantown, 
and  Monmouth ;  in  the  first  three  of  which  he  was  defeated  and 
the  last  was  a  draw.  He  conducted  two  sieges — Boston  and 
Yorktown — in  both  of  which  he  was  successful;  and  he  de- 
stroyed two  outposts — Trenton  and  Princeton — in  a  manner 
generally  regarded  as  so  brilliant  and  effective  that  he  saved 
the  patriot  cause  from  its  first  period  of  depression.  His 
characteristics  as  a  soldier  were  farseeing  judgment  and  cir- 
cumspection, a  certain  long-headedness,  as  it  might  be  called, 

351 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

and  astonishing  ability  to  recover  from  and  ignore  a  defeat. 
In  his  pitched  battles,  like  Long  Island  and  Brandywine,  he 
knew  that  defeat  was  probable  and  he  prepared  for  it. 

"  Limiting  by  his  foresight  the  extent  of  his  loss,  guarding  by  his 
disposition  security  of  retreat,  and  repairing  with  celerity  the  injury 
sustained,  his  relative  condition  was  often  meliorated  although  victory 
adorned  the  brow  of  his  adversary."— Lee,  Memoirs,  vol.  i,  p.  237. 

He  was  compelled  to  act  so  much  on  the  defensive,  and  the 
British  methods  were  so  slow,  that  his  activities  in  the  field  were 
not  numerous  when  we  consider  that  he  was  in  command  for 
seven  years.  The  greater  part  of  his  time  and  energy  were 
employed  in  building  up  the  cause  by  mild,  balanced,  but  won- 
derfully effective  arguments ;  reconciling  animosities  by  tactful 
precautions;  and  by  the  confidence  his  personality  inspired 
preventing  the  army  from  disbanding.  A  large  part  of  this 
labor  was  put  forth  in  writing  letters  of  wonderful  beauty  and 
perfection  in  the  literary  art,  when  we  consider  the  end  they 
were  to  accomplish.  Complete  editions  of  his  writings  of  this 
sort  usually  fill  a  dozen  or  more  large  volumes ;  and  there  have 
been  few  if  any  great  generals  of  the  world  who  have  accom- 
plished so  much  by  writing  or  who  have  been  such  consummate 
masters  of  language. 

Sufficient  care  has  not  always  been  taken  to  distinguish 
between  the  different  periods  of  his  life.  He  aged  rapidly  at 
the  close  of  the  Eevolution ;  his  reserved  manner  and  a  certain 
1 '  asperity  of  temper. ' '  as  Hamilton  called  it,  greatly  increased2 ; 
and  some  years  afterwards,  when  President,  he  had  become  a 
very  silent  and  stiffly  formal  man,  far  different  from  the  young 
soldier  who  in  the  prime  of  life  drew  his  sword  beneath  the 
old  elm  at  Cambridge  to  take  command  of  the  patriot  army. 

The  Virginians  of  his  time  appear  to  have  had  occupations 
and  social  intercourse  which  educated  them  in  a  way  we  are 
unable  to  imitate.  Washington  in  his  prime  was  a  social  and 
convivial  man,  fond  of  cards,  fine  horses,  and  fox-hunting. 


a  Writings  of  Washington,  Ford  edition,  vol.  10,  p.  167  note. 


352 


EFFECT  OF  PLANTATION  LIFE 

Although  not  usually  credited  with  book  learning,  his  letters 
and  conduct  in  the  Revolution  show  that  he  was  quite  familiar 
with  the  politics  of  foreign  countries  and  the  general  infor- 
mation of  his  time.  We  have  not  yet  learned  to  appreciate 
the  full  force  of  his  intellect  and  culture. 

He  had  always  kept  open  house  at  his  plantation.  That 
plantation,  with  its  three  hundred  slaves,  its  coopers,  brick- 
layers, carpenters,  and  shoemaker,  its  flour  mill  and  its 
schooner  for  carrying  products  to  market,  was  one  of  the 
large  enterprises  of  that  age,  in  which  our  organized  indus- 
tries were  unknown.  The  Southern  planter  and  the  Northern 
ship-owning  merchant,  Washington  and  Robert  Morris,  for 
example,  were  the  men  of  the  time  whose  occupations  gave 
them  the  broadest  training  and  experience.3 

Washington  was  a  product  of  conditions  in  Virginia  life 
which  have  long  since  passed  away.  A  man  of  such  exactness 
and  thoroughness  in  all  details  of  business,  of  such  wide  infor- 
mation, of  such  faultless  tact,  such  comprehension  of  every- 
body's point  of  view,  such  good  taste  in  all  matters  of  courtesy 
and  ceremony,  capable  of  French  delicacy  with  a  D'Estaing 
or  a  DeGrasse,  and  of  British  bluntness  with  a  Howe  or  a 
Clinton,  a  man  of  this  versatile  culture  we  now  usually  asso- 
ciate with  large  cities  or  universities,  because  for  three  or  four 
generations  our  lives  have  been  completely  absorbed  in  those 
modern  instrumentalities. 

But  there  were  no  cities  or  universities  in  Virginia  in  Wash- 
ington 's  time.  He  never  saw  a  town  until  he  grew  up  and 
travelled  nearly  a  week's  journey  on  horseback  to  Philadelphia. 
His  mind  and  character  and  the  minds  and  characters  of  Jef- 
ferson, Mason,  Patrick  Henry,  the  Lees,  the  Blands,  and  the 
Harrisons,  were  developed  on  large,  isolated  plantations  and 
in  country  life  which  is  now  believed  capable  of  producing 
nothing  but  awkwardness,  vulgarity,  and  ignorance. 


3  For  an  account  of  Washington's  plantation,  habits  of  life,  and 
personal  characteristics  as  shown  by  contemporary  evidence,  see  Ford's 
"  True  George  Washington." 

23  353 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

How  the  Virginians  created  such  a  world  of  high  practical 
intelligence  and  culture  out  of  country  life  that  is  now  the 
subject  of  newspaper  ridicule  and  contempt,  is  a  great  mystery 
to  modern  minds.  Our  city-bred  men  of  education  ride  along 
the  roads  near  Mount  Vernon,  visit  the  neighboring  region,  and 
read  the  dozen  volumes  of  Washington's  letters  in  amazement 
that  such  a  country  should  produce  such  a  man.  They  forget 
that  although  the  soil,  the  grass,  and  the  trees  are  the  same,  the 
old  life  which  he  lived  is  as  completely  gone  as  the  snow  of  the 
year  in  which  he  was  born;  and  they  also  forget  that  the 
standard  of  intelligence  and  culture  which  our  hot-bed  system 
strives  to  attain  was  created  long  before  our  modern  instru- 
mentalities were  heard  of.  The  men  who  set  the  pace  we  can 
scarcely  imitate  had  none  of  our  supposed  advantages. 

To  give  up  his  pleasant  and  prosperous  life,  to  deliver  his 
beloved  Mount  Vernon  to  the  chances  of  British  confiscation, 
and  to  take  the  chances  that  his  head  might  be  exhibited  to 
the  London  populace,  was  no  light  sacrifice  for  Washington.  It 
would  have  been  easier  to  be  a  loyalist,  easier  to  rely  upon  the 
British  Government  to  uphold  the  position  of  a  Southern  coun- 
try gentleman,  easier  to  accept  the  ready-made  civilization  of 
England  than  to  forge  one  of  his  own,  and  easier  to  apply  for  the 
high  rewards  that  an  empire  could  bestow  on  such  ability  as  his. 

When  his  appointment  was  announced  in  Congress  he  rose 
in  his  place  and  accepted  the  honor  with  a  certain  reluctance 
which  we  have  every  reason  to  believe  was  sincere ;  for  he  knew 
the  difficulties  of  open  war  with  Great  Britain  and  the  terrible 
sacrifice  he  was  making  of  his  happy  private  life. 

"  But,  lest  some  unlucky  event  should  happen,  unfavorable  to  my 
reputation,  I  beg  it  may  be  remembered,  by  every  gentleman  in  the 
room,  that  I  this  day  declare,  with  the  utmost  sincerity,  I  do  not  think 
myself  equal  to  the  command  I  am  honored  with." — American  Archives, 
fourth  series,  vol.  ii,  p.  1848. 

In  keeping  with  the  high  tone  of  the  Southern  planter,  and 
the  spirit  of  the  patriot  party,  he  would  accept  no  pay.  "I 
will  keep, ' '  he  said,  ' '  an  exact  account  of  my  expenses.  These, 
I  doubt  not,  you  will  discharge,  and  that  is  all  I  desire. ' ' 

354 


SUBORDINATE  OFFICERS 

Upon  the  same  day  that  he  accepted  the  command,  the 
Congress  established  a  full  set  of  subordinate  officers,  two 
major-generals,  eight  brigadiers,  adjutant-general,  commissary, 
paymaster,  quartermaster,  a  chief  engineer,  and  a  secretary  to 
the  commander-in-chief.  General  Artemas  Ward,  who  com- 
manded the  army  before  Boston,  was  made  the  first  major- 
general,  second  in  rank  to  Washington,  and  his  successor  in 
case  of  accident.  It  was  a  complimentary  appointment,  for 
Ward's  ill  health  soon  took  him  from  active  duties,  and  the 
officer  next  in  rank  to  Washington  was  General  Charles  Lee, 
like  Gates  and  Montgomery,  an  Englishman  who  had  seen 
service  in  the  British  army. 

For  his  military  secretary  Washington  appointed  Joseph 
Reed,  a  prosperous  young  patriot  lawyer  of  Philadelphia ;  and 
this  choice  was  another  instance  of  those  cautious,  painstaking 
methods  which  afterwards  caused  so  much  comment.  Reed 
was  to  be  his  confidential  adviser  on  the  phases  of  public 
opinion,  give  the  arguments  of  all  sides,  and  disclose  the 
intricacies  of  party  politics. 


XXXI. 

CHARACTER  AND  CONDITION  OF  THE 
PATRIOT  ARMY 

Washington  reached  Cambridge  on  the  2nd  of  July,  and 
spent  the  rest  of  the  year  trying  to  persuade  the  mob  of  dis- 
connected militia  to  become  an  army.  It  was  a  curious  collec- 
tion of  volunteer  fighting  men,  with  but  little  order  or  disci- 
pline ;  and  throughout  the  war  our  forces  were  always  so  irreg- 
ular and  destitute  that  English  statesmen  and  generals  expected 
that  every  campaign  would  surely  be  the  last. 

Our  pictures  of  handsome  Revolutionary  uniforms  are  very 
misleading.  It  is  pleasant,  of  course,  to  think  of  the  Revolu- 
tion as  a  great  spontaneous  uprising  of  all  the  people,  without 
doubt,  hesitation,  or  misgiving,  and  that  each  hero  put  on  his 
beautiful  buff-and-blue  uniform,  brought  to  him  presumably 
by  a  fairy,  and  marched,  with  a  few  picturesque  hardships,  to 
glorious  victory.  But  the  actual  conditions  were  very  different 
from  what  most  of  us  have  been  led  to  believe.  Some  com- 
panies and  regiments  tried  at  the  start  to  have  uniforms.  We 
find  uniforms  mentioned  here  and  there,  and  the  Congress 
directed  the  adoption  of  very  beautiful  uniforms,  of  which 
colored  fashion  plates  have  been  published.  But  there  is  many 
a  slip  between  a  fashion-plate  and  getting  the  beautiful  gar- 
ments on  a  patriot's  back.  Those  who  actually  saw  the  patriot 
troops  in  the  field  describe  them  as  without  uniforms,  very 
ragged,  many  of  them  bare-footed,  and  at  the  best  clothed  in 
home-made  hunting-shirts.  Many  regiments  stained  their  hunt- 
ing-shirts with  butternut,  which  was  used  for  a  similar  purpose 
by  the  Confederates  of  the  Civil  War.  The  hunting-shirts  were 
light  colored,  and  butternut  gave  at  once  the  color  that  the  linen 
cloth  would  assume  after  a  few  weeks  of  dirt  and  smoke  in 
camp. 

Washington,  in  an  order  of  the  24th  of  July,  1776,  recom- 

356 


WANT  OF  CLOTHES  AND  SHOES 

mended  the  hunting-shirt  for  all  the  troops ; 1  and  Lafayette 
has  described  in  his  memoirs  the  patriot  army  he  found  on 
his  arrival  in  the  summer  of  1777 : 

"About  eleven  thousand  men  ill-armed  and  still  worse  clothed, 
presented  a  strange  spectacle.  Their  clothes  were  parti-colored  and 
many  of  them  were  almost  naked.  The  best  clad  wore  hunting-shirts, 
large  gray  linen  coats  which  were  much  used  in  Carolina.  As  to  their 
military  tactics,  it  will  be  sufficient  to  say  that,  for  a  regiment  ranged 
in  battle  order  to  move  forward  on  the  right  of  its  line  it  was  necessary 
for  the  left  to  make  a  continued  counter-march.  They  were  always 
arranged  in  two  lines,  the  smallest  men  in  the  first  line." — Vol.  i,  p.  19, 
London,  1837. 

Great  efforts  were  made  to  import  clothes  from  France. 
Lafayette  interested  himself  to  obtain  supplies  of  cloth  from 
which  clothes  could  be  manufactured.  Some  of  these  may  have 
arrived.  The  Congress  appointed  a  clothier-general,  and  numer- 
ous resolutions  and  letters  on  the  subject  can  be  found,  leading 
one  at  first  to  infer  that  the  troops  must  have  been  well  supplied. 
But  it  seems  they  were  not;  for  the  contemporary  evidence 
of  the  actual  condition  of  the  troops  shows  that  they  were 
almost  destitute  of  shoes  and  clothes  all  through  the  contest; 
and  Washington  in  his  letters  constantly  complains  of  the  use- 
lessness  of  the  clothier-general's  office.  In  1778  he  reported 
"a  great  many  men  entirely  destitute  of  shirts  and  breeches, 
and  I  suppose  not  less  than  a  fourth  or  fifth  of  the  whole  are 
without  shoes. ' ' 2  He  at  times  had  difficulty  in  keeping  his 
own  bodyguard  and  servants  decently  clad. 

"  I  cannot  get  as  much  cloth  as  will  make  clothes  for  my  servants, 
notwithstanding  one  of  them  that  attends  my  person  and  table  is 
indecently  and  most  shamefully  naked." — Writings  of  Washington,  Ford's 
edition,  vol.  ii,  p.  469.  See,  also,  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol. 
v,  p.  207. 


1  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  i,  pp.  676,  677 ;  Writings  of 
Washington,  Ford  edition,  vol.  4,  p.  297 ;  See  also  Saffell,  Records  of  the 
Revolution,  p.  325;  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp. 
1738-1739;  Pontgibaud,  p.  125.  Niles,  "Principles  and  Acts  of  the 
Revolution,"  edition  1776,  p.  250;  Wilkinson's  Memoirs,  vol.  i,  pp.  19,  20. 

2  Writings  of  Washington,  Ford's  edition,  vol.  vii,  p.  143;  see  also 
vol.  vi,  p.  288  and  note. 

357 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

When  Sullivan's  men  returned  from  the  expedition  against 
the  Six  Nations  of  New  York,  in  1779,  the  remains  of  their 
clothes  were  "hanging  in  streamers  behind  them."  Yet  they 
insisted  on  putting  sprigs  of  evergreen  in  their  hats  and 
powdering  their  hair  with  flour.  The  patriot  troops,  it  seems, 
always  clung  to  that  custom  of  long  hair  done  into  a  queue 
and  powdered.  They  would  give  great  attention  to  their  hair 
and  shaving,  even  when  they  were  barefooted  and  in  rags ;  and 
everybody,  including  their  own  officers  and  chaplain,  was 
laughing  at  the  incongruity  of  their  appearance.3 

The  ragged  condition  of  the  troops  prevailed  down  to  the 
siege  of  Yorktown,  in  1781,  when  the  French  soldiers  cracked 
their  jokes  over  the  nakedness  of  the  Continentals.  Every- 
where the  evidence  is  the  same.  Barefooted,  coatless,  and 
blanketless,  shirts  hanging  in  strings,  standing  in  their  bare 
feet  as  sentinels  in  the  snow  of  the  northern  winter,  walking 
barefooted  on  the  snow  at  Quebec,  selling  their  blankets  and 
shirts  when  sick  in  order  to  get  bread,  begging  for  food  along 
the  roads,  lying  on  straw  or  the  cold  ground  while  dying  of 
pleurisy,  pneumonia,  and  the  small-pox,  "no  nation,"  said  a 
British  officer,  ' '  ever  saw  such  a  set  of  tatterdemalions. ' '  They 
often  deserted  to  the  British  to  get  a  suit  of  clothes  and  then 
deserted  back  to  the  patriot  army. 

The  so-called  hospitals  in  which  patient  after  patient  lay 
on  the  unchanged  straw,  became  the  terror  of  every  neighbor- 
hood in  which  they  were  placed,  especially  when  the  discharged 
invalids  emerged  from  them  penniless,  starving,  and  began 
begging  from  house  to  house.  The  misery  of  all  these  condi- 
tions undoubtedly  affected  enlistments,  and  partially  explains 
the  unexpectedly  small  numbers  of  the  patriot  armies.  We 
can  easily  understand  that  there  were  many  people  who  wished 
the  Revolution  every  success,  but  who  would  not  themselves 
endure  such  privations  and  misery  in  order  to  make  it  suc- 
cessful.4 


8  Bolton,  "  Private  Soldier  under  Washington,"  p.  237. 
4  Bolton,  Id.,  51-54,  103,  182,  183;  American  Archives,  fourth  series, 
vol.  iii,  p.  1006 ;  Codman,  "  Arnold's  Expedition  to  Quebec,"  p.  168. 

358 


GOOD  UNIFORMS  IN  PICTURES 

Dr.  Benjamin  Rush  explained  the  amazing  endurance  of  the 
patriot  soldiers  by  saying  that  they  were  upheld  by  the  passion 
for  independence.  Their  terrible  hardships  could  not  have 
been  endured  by  Europeans.  To  the  loyalist  the  disease,  rags, 
and  dirt  of  the  patriot  troops  was  another  proof  of  the 
absurdity  of  the  patriot  cause.  But  the  patriot  officers  learned 
to  love  "those  dear,  ragged  Continentals,"  whose  patience, 
said  young  Colonel  Laurens,  ' '  will  be  the  admiration  of  future 
ages,  and  I  glory  in  bleeding  with  them."  5 

In  1781  Claude  Blanchard  describes  the  absence  of  uniforms 
in  almost  the  same  language  that  Lafayette  used  in  1777. 
There  were  in  1781,  he  says,  children  of  twelve  or  thirteen 
years  old  serving  in  the  ranks,  and  the  men  were  thin  and 
worn.6  In  the  southern  campaigns  at  the  close  of  the  Revolu- 
tion, General  Greene's  troops  could  be  tracked  along  the  roads 
of  North  Carolina  by  the  blood  from  their  naked  feet,  and  had 
only  one  blanket  for  every  four  men. 

Many  of  us  have,  of  course,  seen  scores  of  portraits  of  Revo- 
lutionary officers  in  very  good  uniforms,  which  do  away  with 
all  appearance  of  rebellion.  Those  were  uniforms  for  a  picture 
in  order  that  our  officers  and  men  might  appear  as  smart- 
looking  as  European  troops;  but  they  were  not  the  garments 
worn  by  our  ancestors  in  the  war.  Good  uniforms  could  always 
be  painted  in  a  picture.  Who  would  have  an  ancestor  painted 
in  a  butternut  rifle-shirt  and  labelled  "Rebel,"  when  an  artist 
could  paint  a  portrait  clothed  in  a  uniform  from  the  fashion- 
plate  of  the  Board  of  War — such  a  uniform  as  our  ancestors 
would  have  worn  had  they  had  the  time  and  money  to  buy  one. 

There  has  for  a  long  time  been  a  general  impression  that 
the  regulation  uniform  of  all  the  Continental  troops  was  buff- 
and-blue,  and  people  frequently  speak  of  their  ancestors  who 
wore  the  buff-and-blue.  But  that  uniform  was  seldom  seen 
during  the  Revolution.    It  was  designed  for  the  New  York  and 


5 Bolton,  "Private  Soldier  under  Washington,"  p.  126. 

'Bolton,  "Private  Soldier  under  Washington,"  p.  237;  Claude 
Blanchard's  Journal,  p.  115;  New  York  Historical  Collections,  1873,  vol. 
iii,  p.  186. 

359 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

New  Jersey  troops  in  the  autumn  of  1779,  when  Washington, 
under  direction  of  the  Congress,  went  through  the  form  of 
adopting  a  regular  system  of  uniforms.  Blue  was  adopted  as 
the  color  for  the  coats  of  all  the  patriot  infantry;  the  New 
England  troops  to  be  distinguished  by  white  facings,  New  York 
and  New  Jersey  by  buff  facings,  Pennsylvania,  Delaware, 
Maryland,  and  Virginia  by  red  facings,  and  the  Carolinas  and 
Georgia  by  button-holes  edged  with  white.7 

It  is  from  the  descriptions  in  this  general  regulation  that 
the  portraits  of  revolutionary  characters  obtain  their  uniforms. 
The  buff-and-blue  was  the  most  beautiful  and  striking  of  all. 
Art  and  literature  have  seized  upon  it  for  their  purposes;  and 
it  has  been  seen  on  canvas  and  in  the  theatre  in  modern  times 
more  than  it  was  ever  seen  during  the  war  for  independence. 
The  New  York  and  New  Jersey  troops  could  seldom  get  the 
colored  cloth  of  which  to  make  it  even  for  parade;  and  when 
they  were  in  the  field  they  were  lucky  if  they  had  a  whole  shirt 
or  a  coat  of  any  color. 

There  were  many  muskets  and  other  smooth-bore  guns  in 
the  country  before  the  war  began,  and  some  cannon.  The 
various  iron  furnaces  could  at  times  cast  cannon.  But  cast-iron 
cannon  were  not  liked  by  military  men.  The  best  artillery  was 
made  of  brass,  shooting  balls  of  from  three  up  to  twenty-four 
pounds.  They  seldom  burst,  and  even  if  that  accident  happened, 
very  little  damage  was  done,  and  the  gun  could  be  cast  over 
again.  Probably  most  of  these  brass  pieces  were  imported 
from  Europe  or  captured  from  the  British. 

There  were  numerous  blacksmiths  and  other  mechanics  who 
could  make  the  barrels  and  stocks  for  the  sort  of  musket  used 
in  those  days,  and  also  some  who  could  make  the  locks.  These 
men  were  put  to  work  wherever  they  could  be  found ;  and  here 
and  there  in  country  districts  a  smith  would  every  few  months 
turn  out  some  muskets  for  the  neighboring  militia.  Particu- 
larly good  guns  were  said  to  be  made  in  New  Jersey.  A  Mary- 
land workman  in  Harford  County  describes  himself  as  strug- 


Bolton,  "  Private  Soldier  under  Washington,"  pp.  91,  95,  96. 

360 


MUSKETS  AND  CARTRIDGES 

gling  to  produce  a  couple  of  dozen  guns  in  spite  of  the  inter- 
ference of  harvesting  duties,  bursting  barrels,  and  sickness. 
He  tested  the  barrels  by  firing  them  with  a  load  of  two  ounces 
of  powder  and  a  ball.  As  Washington's  army  became  better 
organized,  an  armorer's  shop  for  repairing  and  making  guns 
became  part  of  its  regular  equipment,  and  at  least  one  soldier 
of  the  Revolution  prided  himself  upon  fighting  with  a  gun  he 
had  made  with  his  owTn  hands.8 

But  not  enough  muskets  could  be  obtained  in  this  way. 
There  was  a  great  lack  of  them  during  the  first  year  or  two; 
and  a  portion  of  the  troops  was  frequently  described  as  un- 
armed or  armed  with  weapons  that  were  almost  useless.  Our 
main  supply  came  from  France,  and  the  first  shipment  arrived 
in  llll.9 

The  powder  for  the  patriot  muskets  was  usually  put  up  in 
paper  cartridges,  which  the  troops  made  in  their  leisure  time  in 
camp.  When  loading  his  gun  the  soldier  bit  off  the  end  of  one 
of  these  cartridges,  shook  a  little  of  the  powder  into  the  pan 
of  the  lock,  and  poured  the  rest  down  the  barrel,  ramming  the 
paper  down  on  it  as  a  wad,  and  afterwards  ramming  down  the 
bullet  and  buckshot.  It  was  a  slow  process,  and  later  in  the 
war  the  British  learned  to  take  advantage  of  its  slowness. 
They  would  purposely  draw  the  fire  of  the  patriot  militia  at 
short  range  and  then  rush  upon  them  with  the  bayonet  before 
they  could  reload.10 


8  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  vi,  pp.  608,  758,  817,  1068, 
1147;  Id.,  fifth  series,  vol.  i,  pp.  363,  365,  400;  Writings  of  Washington, 
Ford  edition,  vol.  v,  p.  27.  There  seems  to  have  been  a  gun-lock  factory 
in  Philadelphia  and  another  at  Fredericktown,  Maryland;  two  lock- 
makers  were  discharged  from  jail  on  their  agreeing  to  work  in  the 
Philadelphia  factory.  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  27, 
678,  778,  833;  vol.  iii,  pp.  100,  1147;  Journals  of  Congress,  vol.  i,  p.  270. 

9  Writings  of  Washington,  Ford  edition,  vol.  v,  p.  262  note.  Gordon, 
"  American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  p.  424. 

10  Bolton,  "Private  Soldier  under  Washington,"  pp.  108,  121,  122; 
American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  v,  p.  1177;  fifth  series,  vol.  ii,  p. 
1385;  vol.  iii,  p.  532;  Codman,  "Arnold's  Expedition  to  Quebec,"  p.  241; 
American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  473,  532. 

361 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

The  patriot  army  consisted  for  the  most  part  of  mere 
squads  of  militia.  The  officers  were  elected  by  the  men  and 
commissioned  as  a  reward  for  recruiting  a  certain  number  of 
privates.  Any  one  who  raised  a  company  of  fifty-nine  privates 
was  commissioned  captain,  and  one  who  procured  ten  companies 
to  accept  him  and  serve  under  him  was  commissioned  colonel. 
The  system  encouraged  rapid  recruiting;  but  made  regular 
discipline  extremely  difficult.  Washington  and  even  their  own 
chosen  officers  had  very  little  authority  over  the  men,  except 
that  of  enthusiasm  and  persuasion.  The  army  often  melted 
away  before  their  eyes  without  any  power  on  their  part  to  stop 
the  disbanding.  In  1777  the  Continental  line  was  formed  of 
men  who  enlisted  for  three  years  or  for  the  war,  and  they  con- 
stituted a  small  but  somewhat  steady  nucleus  round  which  the 
militia  squads  could  rally.  The  militia  served  for  six  or  three 
months,  or  a  few  weeks.  It  was  a  "come-and-go"  army;  and 
Graydon  tells  us  that  the  officers  as  well  as  the  men  felt  that 
they  could  leave  with  impunity  when  they  were  dissatisfied.11 

The  army  besieging  Boston  had  at  first  been  composed 
exclusively  of  New  Englanders;  but  it  was  joined  during  the 
summer  by  a  few  troops  from  the  frontiers  of  Pennsylvania  and 
Virginia,  who  aroused  much  interest,  because  they  were 
expected  to  make  deadly  use  of  the  rifle  at  three  hundred  yards 
instead  of  using  the  smooth-bore  musket,  which  was  useless  at 
only  half  that  distance. 

Shortly  before  the  battle  of  Bunker  Hill  the  Congress 
passed  a  resolution  for  raising  six  companies  of  riflemen  in 
Pennsylvania,  two  in  Maryland,  and  two  in  Virginia.  Subse- 
quently, on  the  22nd  of  June,  they  increased  the  number  of 
Pennsylvania  rifle  companies  to  eight,  which  were  to  be  formed 
into  a  battalion  and  join  the  patriot  army  at  Boston.12 


11  Writings  of  Washington,  Ford  edition,  vol.  iii,  p.  487 ;  vol.  v,  p.  2 
note;  Graydon,  "Memoirs,"  edition  of  1840,  pp.  181,  184. 

12  The  rifle  is  supposed  to  have  been  introduced  in  the  colonies  pre- 
viously to  the  year  1730  from  the  Austrian  Tyrol.  We  find  it  manu- 
factured at  Philadelphia  and  at  Lancaster,  Pennsylvania,  about  that  time. 
Its  use  spread  rapidly  on  the  western  frontiers  of  Pennsylvania,  Mary- 

362 


s<* 


REVOLUTIONARY    WEAPONS    AND   AMMUNITION 


>   ^F  THE 

UNIVERSITY 


0'" 


calif 


THE  FRONTIER  RIFLEMEN 

During  July  these  eight  companies  were  rapidly  recruited 
in  the  interior  of  the  colony  among  the  Scotch-Irish  frontiers- 
men and  hunters.  No  money  had  to  be  appropriated  to  buy 
their  weapons,  for,  like  the  Boer  of  South  Africa,  each  one  of 
them  procured  his  rifle  by  taking  it  down  from  the  pegs  on 
which  it  rested  above  his  fireplace.  He  slung  his  own  powder- 
horn  across  his  shoulder  and  strapped  his  bullet-pouch  around 
his  waist. 

As  for  his  uniform,  it  consisted  of  a  round  hat,  which  could 
be  bought  for  a  trifle  at  any  country  store,  and  the  hunting- 
shirt,  already  described,  which  was  merely  a  shirt  worn  like  a 
coat,  belted  round  the  waist  instead  of  being  tucked  into  the 
trousers,  and  was  sometimes  ornamented  by  a  cape  with  fringe. 
It  could  be  made  at  home  by  any  man's  wife,  and  was  of  the 
coarse  linen  manufactured  from  the  flax  which  the  colonists 
raised  on  their  farms  and  plantations. 

The  rifle  companies  were  rapidly  recruited  in  Pennsylvania 
and  Virginia  during  July,  and  as  each  company  got  ready  it 
started  for  Boston,  and  for  several  weeks  these  hardy  fellows 
were  scattered  along  the  beautiful  route  through  the  mountain- 
ous region  of  Pennsylvania  and  New  York,  crossing  the  Hudson 
above  West  Point,  thence  through  another  mountainous  region 
by  Litchfield,  Connecticut,  and  on  through  Massachusetts. 
Their  first  destination  was  Reading,  in  Pennsylvania,  where 
they  received  their  blankets,  knapsacks,  and  ammunition. 
These  supplies  were  all  they  required  from  the  patriot  govern- 
ment, and  when  these  were  furnished  they  immediately  sought 
the  enemy. 

The  expectations  from  the  long  range  of  their  weapons  were 
fully  realized.  The  rifle  companies  did  good  service,  their 
numbers  were  increased,  and  we  hear  of  them  in  almost  every 


land,  Virginia,  and  the  Carolinas,  which  we  may  call  the  rifle  districts  at 
the  time  of  the  Revolution,  the  only  regions  where  riflemen  could  be 
recruited.  The  weapon  was  but  little  known  or  used  in  New  England. 
Magazine  of  American  History,  vol.  xxiv,  p.  179;  Harper's  Magazine, 
vol.  50,  p.  96l;The  Pennsylvania  German  Magazine,  vol,  7,  p.  355. 

363 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

battle.  Besides  those  already  mentioned,  there  was  a  corps  of 
them  under  McCall,  another  under  Wills,  and  there  were 
numerous  temporary  organizations.  The  British  also  had  a  few 
riflemen,  and  the  Hessian  Yagers,  as  they  were  called,  carried  a 
short  rifle,  used  with  very  little  skill. 

The  rifle  was  not  generally  adopted  by  the  military  profes- 
sion until  about  one  hundred  years  afterwards,  when  the 
breech-loader  came  into  use.  As  a  muzzle-loader  it  was  too  slow 
in  reloading,  and  required  more  care  and  skill  than  could  be 
had  from  the  ordinary  recruit.  To  insure  accurate  and  long 
range,  the  bullet  had  to  be  carefully  wrapped  in  a  leather 
patch  and  forced  with  difficulty  into  the  muzzle,  often  aided  by 
a  little  mallet.  The  weapon  was  easily  fouled  by  repeated 
firing.  It  would  then  lose  its  range  and  accuracy,  and  become 
almost  useless.13 

At  Boston  the  riflemen  seem  to  have  done  little  or  nothing 
except  to  pick  off  an  occasional  regular  who  incautiously 
showed  himself  above  the  line  of  fortifications  round  Bunker 
Hill.  For  the  rest  of  the  time  they  were  inactive  with  the 
others.  One  day  they  picked  off  an  officer  in  his  handsome 
uniform,  and  the  report  quickly  spread  that  this  man's  income 
had  been  £10,000  a  year.  On  the  4th  of  August  they  were 
reported  to  have  shot  three  captains.  On  another  occasion 
William  Simpson,  who  had  accompanied  the  rifleman  as  a  gen- 
tleman volunteer,  was  shot  in  the  foot  and  died  of  his  wound. 
They  had  a  grand  funeral  over  him,  and  eulogized  and  mourned 
for  him  as  though  he  had  been  a  statesman.  Incidents  were 
few  in  that  long  summer  and  autumn,  and  they  had  to  make 
the  most  of  anything  that  happened. 

It  must  have  been  a  rare  sight  to  see  that  patriot  army 
living  in  huts  made  of  field  stones  and  turf,  or  twisted  green 
boughs,  some  in  improvised  tents  made  of  sail-cloth  or  any  stuff 
they  could  stretch  over  poles;  some  quartered  in  friendly 
houses;    some    sleeping    in    Massachusetts    Hall    of    Harvard 


13  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  ii,  p.  1247 ;  Draper,  "  King's 
Mountain,"  p.  392. 

364 


HEAVY  CANNONADING 

College ;  and  all  the  sixteen  thousand  scattered  in  this  manner 
through  Cambridge  and  half  round  Boston,  with  the  patient 
Washington  and  the  humorous  Greene  trying  to  coax  them  to 
submit  to  discipline.14 

There  was  cannonading  almost  every  day  from  the  British. 
Thousands  of  balls  and  shells  were  fired  during  the  summer 
with  the  most  trifling  result.  The  ground  was  ploughed  up, 
the  apples  came  rattling  down  in  the  orchards  as  the  big  missiles 
thumped  the  trees  and  the  shells  spluttered  among  the  limbs. 
Occasionally  a  ball  would  pass  through  a  house,  filling  every 
room  and  the  plates  and  dishes  with  a  cloud  of  plaster-dust. 

McCurtin  tells  us  of  a  loyalist  who,  being,  one  evening,  the 
only  man  in  company  with  a  number  of  young  patriot  women, 
began  to  abuse  the  Congress.  The  girls  seized  him,  tore  off  his 
coat  and  shirt,  and,  instead  of  tar,  covered  him  to  the  waist 
with  molasses,  and  for  feathers  took  the  downy  tops  of  flags 
that  grew  in  the  garden. 

Patriots  deserted  to  the  British,  and  regulars  deserted  from 
the  army  in  Boston  and  came  into  the  Cambridge  camp  in  twos 
or  threes.  Sometimes  they  had  to  swim  the  water  which  sur- 
rounded Boston,  and  were  not  infrequently  drowned  in  the 
attempt.  McCurtin  kept  a  steady  record  of  their  arrivals,  and 
they  were  heartily  welcomed  to  the  patriot  ranks,  which  were 
believed  to  be  growing  to  such  stupendous  numbers  that  they 
would  soon  be  able  to  overwhelm  all  the  armies  that  could  be 
sent  from  England.15 


14  W.  G.  Greene,  "  Life  of  General  Greene ;  "  McCurtin,  Journal  in 
Papers  Relating  to  the  Maryland  line,  Seventy-six  Society,  1857;  Records 
of  the  Pennsylvania  Riflemen  in  Pennsylvania  Archives,  vol.  x;  American 
Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iii,  p.  28;  vol.  ii,  p.  1764. 

M  Some  of  the  patriot  pamphleteers,  for  the  sake  of  encouraging  their 
party,  made  most  extraordinary  statements  of  the  number  of  troops  that 
could  be  raised.  In  "The  Farmer  Refuted"  (Hamilton,  Works,  Lodge 
edition,  vol.  i,  p.  158)  it  is  said  that  America  would  have  at  least 
500,000  soldiers,  while  England  could  send  only  15,000.  Another  writer 
places  the  number  at  300.000  to  400,000. — "  Considerations  on  the 
Measures  carrying  on  with  Respect  to  the  British  Colonies,"  etc.,  fifth 

365 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

There  seems  to  have  been  a  systematic  exaggeration  of 
numbers  at  this  time,  as  well  as  later  on,  in  the  Revolution. 
It  could  not  be  very  well  prevented,  because  the  officers  were 
quite  willing  to  have  it  so.  There  was  much  coming  and  going, 
and  consequently  an  apparent  increase.  Some  of  the  men 
were  returning  to  their  farms,  and  others  were  coming  to 
take  their  places. 

It  was  an  army  in  which,  in  most  instances,  you  could  not 
distinguish  the  captain  or  the  colonel  from  his  men;  an  army 
in  which  there  were  applications  every  day  for  leave  to  go 
home  to  help  get  in  the  hay,  or  to  see  how  the  wife  was  getting 
on ;  and,  if  leave  were  granted,  the  fellow  always  took  his  allot- 
ment of  powder  with  him  to  shoot  squirrels,  and  he  seldom 
brought  any  of  the  powder  back.  Shaving  was  more  universal 
than  now,  and  great  importance  was  attached  to  it.  It  was 
believed  that  it  could  be  made  a  good  starting-point  for  regular 
discipline,  and  a  captain  was  sometimes  seen  shaving  one  of 
his  own  men. 

The  New  Englanders  of  that  time,  and  more  especially  the 
lower  classes,  were  full  of  what  the  colonists  farther  south 
called  ' '  the  levelling  spirit. ' '  Their  manners  were  very  shock- 
ing to  the  educated  and  conservative  people  of  that  day,  and 
are  described  by  Mrs.  Knight  in  her  diary  of  1704,  and  at  a 
much  later  date  in  Mrs.  Grant's  "Memoirs  of  an  American 
Lady."  The  rank,  crude,  and  unpleasant  side  of  democracy 
seems  to  have  had  its  first  foothold  in  New  England. 

Mrs.  Grant  describes  the  disgust  of  the  old  New  York 
aristocracy  about  Albany  when  they  were  first  invaded  by 
enterprising  Yankees  who  came  to  take  up  the  wild  land.  The 
rural    New    Englander    of    that    time    abounded    in    uncouth 


edition,  p.  25,  London,  1774.  See  also  Niles,  "  Principles  and  Acts  of  the 
Revolution,"  edition  1876,  pp.  212,  501;  American  Archives,  fourth  series, 
vol.  iii,  pp.  1740,  1742.  The  famous  loyalist  pamphlet,  "Plain  Truth," 
says  that,  after  deducting  Quakers,  Anabaptists,  and  loyalists,  the 
patriots  might  have  60,000  to  70,000  capable  of  bearing  arms.  As  it 
turned  out,  the  British  government  sent  Howe  over  50,000  men,  and 
Washington  never  had  25,000. 

366 


PREVALENCE  OF  LEVELLING 

phrases  and  slang,  abused  rank  and  titles  with  amazing 
audacity,  and  had  the  nasal  drawling  voice  which  afterwards 
became  notorious  and  now  fortunately  has  largely  passed  away. 
One  of  these  Yankees  was  certainly  a  terrible  fellow  when  he 
fastened  himself  upon  you,  pressing  you  with  drawling  ques- 
tions about  your  most  private  affairs,  railing  in  the  meantime 
against  aristocrats  and  haranguing  on  liberty  and  the  "eternal 
rights  of  man." 

They  were  the  beginning  of  a  class  which,  becoming  inflated 
by  the  success  of  independence,  spread  over  the  country  to  the 
horror  of  all  well-educated  people  and  in  fulfilment  of  loyalist 
prophecies.  They  gave  Grant  the  material  for  his  famous 
speech  in  Parliament,  and  many  years  afterwards  they  fur- 
nished the  stock  material  for  Dickens  and  other  Englishmen 
who  found  profit  in  ridiculing  the  Americans. 

The  extraordinary  prevalence  of  "  levelling "  reveals  to  us 
how  widespread  among  all  classes  had  been  the  discussion  of 
the  rights  of  man  and  equality  as  set  forth  in  the  works  of 
Burlamaqui,  Beccaria,  and  Locke,  described  in  a  previous 
chapter.  In  the  army  before  Boston  "levelling"  was  so  neces- 
sary that  the  officers,  instead  of  cultivating  the  usual  severity 
and  dignity  of  manner,  were  obliged  to  cultivate  the  most 
extreme  and  absurd  humility.  It  was  their  only  way  of  con- 
trolling their  men,  who  were  almost  out  of  their  minds  on  the 
subject  of  equality.  Gray  don  gives  us  some  amusing  glimpses 
of  this.  He  was  not  with  the  army  before  Boston,  but  he  saw 
the  New  Englanders  and  all  classes  of  patriot  troops  the  next 
year  at  New  York,  when  levelling  and  equality  were  so  rife 
among  them  that  Adjutant-General  Reed  resigned  his  office  in 
disgust.16 


""Life  of  Joseph  Reed,"  by  W.  B.  Reed,  vol.  i,  p.  243;  American 
Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  ii,  p.  905.  See,  also,  Wilkinson's  "  Memoirs," 
vol.  i,  p.  16;  Bolton,  "Private  Soldier  under  Washington,"  pp.  127-135; 
Writings  of  Washington,  Ford  edition,  vol.  v,  p.  189.  See,  also,  for 
conditions  in  the  camp  before  Boston,  Thacher,  Military  Journal;  Pro- 
ceedings of  Massachusetts  Historical  Society,  June,  1858,  and  Novem- 
ber, 1863. 

367 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

"  The  irregularity,  want  of  discipline,  bad  arms,  and  defective  equip- 
ment in  all  respects,  of  this  multitudinous  assemblage,  gave  no  favorable 
impression  of  its  prowess.  The  materials  of  which  the  eastern  battalions 
were  composed  were  apparently  the  same  as  those  of  which  I  had  seen 
so  unpromising  a  specimen  at  Lake  George.  I  speak  particularly  of  the 
officers  who  were  in  no  single  respect  distinguishable  from  the  men, 
other  than  in  the  colored  cockades,  which  for  this  very  purpose  had  been 
prescribed  in  general  orders;  a  different  color  being  assigned  to  the 
officers  of  each  grade.  So  far  from  aiming  at  a  deportment  which  might 
raise  them  above  their  privates  and  thence  prompt  them  to  due  respect 
and  obedience  to  their  commands,  the  object  was,  by  humility  to  preserve 
the  existing  blessing  of  equality,  an  illustrious  instance  of  which  was 
given  by  Colonel  Putnam,  the  chief  engineer  of  the  army,  and  no  less  a 
personage  than  the  nephew  of  the  major-general  of  that  name.  "  What!  " 
says  a  person  meeting  him  one  day  with  a  piece  of  meat  in  his  hand, 
"  carrying  home  your  rations  yourself,  colonel  ?  "  "  Yes,"  says  he,  "  and 
I  do  it  to  set  the  officers  a  good  example." — "  Memoirs,"  edition  of 
1846,  p.  147.  See,  also,  Stedman,  "  American  War,"  edition  of  1794, 
p.  206. 

A  colonel  often  made  drummers  and  fifers  of  his  sons  for 
the  sake  of  the  small  additional  revenue  to  his  family  chest; 
and  a  captain  was  known  to  have  made  money  by  stealing 
blankets.  Small  money-making,  pettiness,  and  pilfering  of 
every  kind  were  so  rife  as  to  cause  Washington  and  many 
others  the  greatest  discouragement  and  anxiety.  The  first 
outburst  of  the  rights  of  man  was  by  no  means  promising  or 
in  good  taste.  Many  of  the  New  England  regiments  had 
negroes  mixed  promiscuously  among  the  white  troops,  which, 
to  a  person  like  Graydon,  coming  from  farther  south,  had  a 
very  disagreeable  and  degrading  effect.17 

He  also  noticed  that  none  of  the  subordinate  officers  be- 
longed to  the  upper  classes  of  colonial  society.  Accustomed  to 
a  totally  different  state  of  things  farther  south,  he  inquired 
the  cause,  and  was  curtly  told  that  the  sons  of  such  people  had 
all  been  sent  to  Europe  to  be  educated  and  to  keep  them  out 


"In  the  Congress  at  Philadelphia,  Edward  Rutledge,  supported  by 
many  of  the  Southern  delegates,  moved  that  all  negroes,  bond  or  free,  be 
discharged  from  the  patriot  army.  American  Historical  Review,  vol.  i, 
page  292;  also,  Bolton,  "Private  Soldier  under  Washington,"  pp.  21,  22. 

368 


SERMONS  AND  GRANDFATHERS 

of  harm's  way.  Probably  the  real  reason  was  that  such  men 
could  not  have  controlled  the  troops  gone  mad  with  levelling. 

Taken  all  in  all,  that  army  must  have  been  one  of  the  most 
interesting  military  exhibitions  that  the  world  has  ever  seen. 
Neither  extreme  age  nor  extreme  youth  was  a  bar  to  service, 
and,  as  in  the  Boer  army  of  independence  in  South  Africa 
in  1900,  there  were  grandfathers  serving  with  their  grand- 
sons. 

Mingled  with  the  small  money-making,  the  "  dirty  mer- 
cenary spirit, ' '  as  Washington  called  it,  and  the  disorder  which 
nearly  drove  him  distracted,  there  was  the  Puritan  fondness 
for  long  sermons  and  elaborate  discussions  of  religion  which 
to  British  and  loyalist  observers,  and  even  to  some  Southern 
patriots,  was  very  bad  taste,  if  not  offensive  hypocrisy.  But, 
nevertheless,  there  was  behind  it  that  New  England  moral 
purpose  which  has  accomplished  wonderful  results;  and  all 
this  with  the  negroes  freely  associating  in  the  white  regiments 
was  a  strange  sight  for  a  Southerner.  "Such  sermons," 
exclaimed  one  of  the  riflemen,  "such  negroes,  such  colonels, 
such  boys,  such  great-great-grandfathers ! "  18 

It  is  always  very  easy,  however,  to  ridicule  a  patriot  army. 
No  army  of  freedom  or  independence  was  ever  well  dressed. 
There  was  more  in  these  troublesome  fellows  than  mere  "level- 
ling" or  disorder.  They  had  come  of  their  own  free  will  to 
accomplish  a  political  purpose,  and  many  of  them  afterwards 
proved  the  faith  that  was  in  them  by  years  of  suffering, 
poverty,  and  hardships.  They  may  have  been  opinionated, 
self-willed,  intolerant  of  discipline  and  order;  but  they  could 
fight  more  intelligently  and  persistently  than  the  English,  shoot 
truer,  march  farther  and  survive  disease,  exposure,  nakedness, 
and  hunger  that  would  have  annihilated  the  whole  British 
army. 

There  was  plenty  of  good  material  at  Cambridge.  Greene, 
Sullivan,  and  Gates,  names  afterwards  well  known  in  the  war, 
were  there.     Daniel  Morgan,  the  commander  of  the  Virginia 


18  Bolton,  "  Private  Soldier  under  Washington,"  p.  43. 
24  369 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

riflemen,  was  one  of  those  frontier  characters  of  superb  man- 
hood and  intelligence,  of  which  we  have,  fortunately,  had  many 
specimens  down  into  our  own  time;  but  with  another  genera- 
tion they  will  have  all  passed  away.  He  became  a  remarkably 
good  officer  in  the  Revolution,  and  although  unappreciated, 
and  in  a  measure  suppressed,  by  the  Congress,  he  was  the  victor 
in  a  very  important  battle. 

He  had  been  born  in  New  Jersey,  of  Welsh  parents  from 
Pennsylvania,  but  began  life  as  a  common  laborer  on  the  Vir- 
ginia frontier,  where  he  rose  to  be  a  waggoner,  which  was  a 
profitable  occupation.  He  hauled  supplies  for  Braddock's  army 
in  the  French  War  and  was  lucky  enough  to  escape  at  the  time 
of  that  general's  defeat.  Soon  he  plunged  into  a  wild  career 
of  gambling,  drinking,  and  fighting ;  but  his  enormous  strength 
and  courage  and  legitimate  fighting  with  the  Indians  made 
him  a  leader  among  frontiersmen.  He  reformed,  married,  and 
became  a  farmer.  But  the  first  news  of  war  brought  him  to 
Boston  with  ninety-six  riflemen,  who  covered  the  distance  of 
six  hundred  miles  on  foot  in  twenty-one  days. ' ' 19 

General  Putnam,  or  "Old  Put,"  as  they  called  him,  the 
hero  of  the  French  War,  was  the  life  of  the  camps.  In  his  shirt- 
sleeves, which  was  his  usual  summer  garb,  with  an  old  hanger 
slung  by  a  broad  strap  across  his  brawny  shoulders,  he  was  to 
be  seen  everywhere,  encouraging,  regulating,  talking.  People 
listened  by  the  hour  to  the  tales  of  his  cutting-out  expeditions 
and  adventures.  The  troops  who  believed  in  levelling  could 
have  no  objection  to  him  as  an  officer,  for  he  was  a  plain,  jovial 
farmer.  When  the  Boston  Port  Bill  went  into  effect  he  started 
from  his  farm  in  Connecticut  with  one  hundred  and  thirty 
sheep,  driving  them  before  him  to  Boston,  to  relieve  the  suffer- 
ing of  the  people.20 

He  was  well  acquainted  with  many  of  the  British  officers 
from  his  old  association  with  them  in  the  French  War.     They 


19  G.  W.  Greene,  "  Life  of  General  Greene,"  vol.  iii,  p.  94. 
^Tarbox,  "Life  of  Putnam,"  p.  118. 

370 


PUTNAM'S  CURIOUS  DUEL 

now  made  several  friendly  efforts  to  persuade  him  to  take  the 
safer  and  more  profitable  side,  and  the  loyalists  were  in  the 
habit  of  saying  that  he  was  at  first  inclined  to  accept  their 
overtures. 

In  the  French  War  the  regulars  had  usually  snubbed  and 
ignored  the  provincial  officers ;  but  they  had  found  great  diffi- 
culty in  suppressing  Putnam,  whose  natural  audacity  and 
exuberant  physique  walked  over  all  conventional  distinctions. 
He  was  one  of  those  popular  characters  about  whom  many  anec- 
dotes, true  and  false,  accumulate.  He  had  a  dispute  with  a 
British  officer,  was  told  he  must  fight  a  duel,  and  was  given  the 
choice  of  weapons.  He  chose  two  kegs  of  gunpowder  with 
lighted  slow-matches  in  them,  each  man  to  sit  on  a  keg  until  one 
of  them  exploded.  The  matches  burned  slowly,  and  the 
Englishman,  unable  to  endure  the  mental  strain,  got  up.  The 
kegs  were  then  opened  and  found  to  contain  nothing  but 
onions.21 


21  See,  also,  on  the  general  subject  of  this  chapter,  Frothingham, 
•'  Siege  of  Boston,"  p.  118;  "  Life  of  Joseph  Reed,"  by  W.  B.  Reed,  vol.  i, 
p  140;  Humphrey,  "Life  of  Putnam;"  Bolton.  "Private  Soldier  under 
Washington,"  p.  140;  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iv,  pp.  468, 
469;  vol.  v,  p.  471;  vol.  vi,  p.  420. 


XXXII. 

BRITISH  SOVEREIGNTY  EXTINGUISHED  IN  1775 

When  General  Howe  brought  5000  troops  to  reinforce  Gage 
in  Boston  in  May,  1775,  it  was  all  England  could  do  for  the 
present  in  the  way  of  sending  an  army  to  America.  The 
Ministry  contemplated  sending  out  a  great  force  of  thirty  or 
forty  thousand,  but  at  least  a  year  must  elapse  before  this  force 
could  be  collected  and  transported  across  the  Atlantic. 

England  had  not  a  large  standing  army,  and  the  troops  she 
had  were  very  much  scattered.  She  had  always  been  obliged  to 
hire  troops  from  other  nations,  and  she  must  now  negotiate  for 
a  considerable  number  of  these  hirelings  from  Germany,  and, 
if  possible,  from  Russia  and  Holland.  To  gather  together  all 
these  forces  and  transport  them  in  sailing  vessels  with  adequate 
supplies  across  three  thousand  miles  of  ocean,  which  was  often 
a  voyage  of  two  months  and  sometimes  of  three  or  four  months, 
and  have  them  arrive  in  sufficient  numbers  and  with  sufficient 
provisions  to  conquer  the  thousand  miles  of  sea  coast  from 
Maine  to  Florida,  was  a  stupendous  task. 

We  can  now  hardly  realize  the  difficulties  with  which 
England  had  to  contend  in  the  mere  matter  of  sending  fresh 
provisions  to  her  American  army  in  those  days  of  sailing 
vessels.  Her  troops  could  not  rely  on  living  on  the  country, 
because  they  were  often  surrounded  and  cut  off  from  supplies 
by  the  patriot  forces.  The  Ministry  were,  therefore,  at  the 
great  disadvantage  of  keeping  their  forces  close  to  some  harbor 
which  they  controlled  from  the  sea ;  and  even  then  the  expense 
and  hazard  of  sending  the  supplies  was  enormous. 

For  supplying  their  small  force  shut  up  in  Boston,  they 
had  collected  5000  cattle,  14,000  sheep,  vast  numbers  of  hogs, 
10,000  butts  of  beer,  and  large  quantities  of  hay,  oats,  and 
beans,  for  the  cavalry.  They  undertook  to  carry  out  the 
animals  alive ;  but  the  ships  were  beaten  back  and  forth  by  bad 

372 


THE  GOVERNORS  HELPLESS 

weather  until  most  of  the  live  stock  perished  almost  within 
sight  of  England,  and  the  channel  was  everywhere  strewn  with 
their  floating  carcasses,1 

During  the  year  from  June,  1775,  to  June,  1776,  in  which 
the  great  army  of  invasion  was  preparing,  nothing  was  done 
in  America  except  to  hold  Boston ;  and  Gage  was  informed  that 
no  reinforcements  need  be  expected  until  the  following  spring.2 
This  delay  seems  to  have  been  unavoidable,  but  it  was  very 
disastrous  to  England ;  for  outside  of  the  town  of  Boston  there 
was  no  force  of  any  kind  to  protect  British  sovereignty  from 
Maine  to  Florida.  That  sovereignty  was  now  represented  only 
by  the  governors ;  for  the  patriots  had  captured  the  legislatures 
in  all  the  provinces  or  had  a  provincial  congress  or  other  body 
which  rendered  the  legislature  powerless.  The  governors  were 
the  only  symbol  of  authority  that  stood  between  the  patriots 
and  independence;  and  during  the  year  1775  the  patriots 
proceeded  to  rid  themselves  of  the  governors  in  a  way  which 
was  very  characteristic  and  successful. 

The  governors  had  no  troops,  nothing  to  protect  them  except 
their  dignity  and  the  respect  with  which  their  office  had  always 
been  regarded.  They  could  have  been  made  the  easy  victims  of 
assassination,  but  nothing  of  that  sort  was  attempted.  In 
Massachusetts  Gage  was  the  governor;  but  he  was  already 
disposed  of  by  being  locked  up  with  his  British  troops  in 
Boston ;  and  the  patriots  had  already  organized  an  independent 
American  government  in  the  rest  of  the  province.  In  Connecti- 
cut the  governor  was  elected  by  the  people,  and  the  incumbent 
of  the  office  was  Jonathan  Trumbull,  a  staunch  patriot.  There 
was  practically  no  revolution  in  Connecticut.  The  people 
continued  to  live  and  govern  themselves  as  they  had  done  for 
over  a  hundred  years  and  as  they  have  done  ever  since. 

In  Rhode  Island,  where  the  governor  was  also  elected  by 
the  people,  there  was  some  little  trouble  with  the  incumbent, 


1  Gordon,  "  American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  p.  221. 
-American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  6,  8,  15,  94;  vol. 
p.  526. 

373 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

Joseph  Wanton,  who,  though  a  vigorous  patriot  in  the  early 
stages  of  the  contest,  now  suddenly  began  to  show  symptoms 
of  loyalism.  But  the  legislature  forbade  him  to  exercise  his 
functions  and  directed  the  lieutenant-governor,  Nicholas  Cooke, 
to  act  in  his  place.3 

In  Virginia  the  energetic  and  irascible  governor,  Lord 
Dunmore,  removed  the  locks  from  all  the  muskets  in  the  arsenal, 
buried  the  powder  where  it  was  injured  by  the  rain,  set  a 
spring-gun  in  the  building,  and  when  the  patriot  assembly 
demanded  admission,  gave  them  the  keys.  When  one  of  their 
servants  had  been  wounded  by  the  spring-gun,  and  they  had 
discovered  that  the  muskets  and  ammunition  were  ruined,  such 
a  large  assemblage  of  armed  patriots  began  gathering  in 
Williamsburg  that  Dunmore  and  his  family  took  refuge  on 
board  a  British  man-of-war  at  Yorktown.  He  demanded  that 
the  assembly  attend  him  on  board  the  ship  to  finish  their  busi- 
ness, which  they,  of  course,  refused  to  do.  When  they 
adjourned,  they  never  met  again.  The  people  elected  a  con- 
vention, which  became  the  revolutionary  government  of  the 
province,  and  British  authority  was  completely  extinct.  Dun- 
more had  to  remain  out  on  the  water,  and  Virginia  was  an 
independent  state. 

Dunmore  had  written  to  the  Ministry  in  May  that  with  a 
supply  of  arms  and  ammunition  which  he  might  be  able  to 
collect  from  negroes  and  Indians,  he  hoped  to  hold  Virginia  for 
the  crown.  This  was  certainly  a  pathetic  commentary  on  the 
weakness  of  England  in  America,  that  the  governor  of  her 
largest  and  most  prosperous  colony  had  no  hope  of  defending 
it  except  with  weapons  borrowed  from  slaves  and  Indians.4 

Sir  James  Wright,  the  governor  of  Georgia,  might  have 
been  expected  to  hold  his  own  because  the  patriot  party  was 
so  weak  in  that  province.     But  what  the  patriots  lacked  in 


8  American  Archives,  fourth,  series,  vol.  ii,  p.  662,  667,  967. 

4  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  v,  or  iii,  p.  6;  Gordon, 
"American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  pp.  85-91;  Stedman, 
"  American  War/'  vol.  i,  p.  14,5. 

374 


MARTIN  AND  CAMPBELL 

numbers  they  made  up  in  energy ;  and  when  British  men-of-war 
arrived  on  the  coast  in  June,  1775,  Joseph  Habersham  entered 
Wright's  house  and  took  him  prisoner  to  prevent  him  commu- 
nicating with  the  men-of-war.  Wright,  however,  quickly 
escaped  and  fled  to  the  war-ship,  "Scarborough,"  from  which 
he  addressed  a  letter  to  his  council  and  planned  an  attack  on 
Savannah,  but  soon  afterwards  sailed  for  England. 

Dunmore  and  Wright  were  the  first  governors  to  be  ejected ; 
and  Governor  Martin,  of  North  Carolina,  met  the  same  fate  in 
July.  He  attempted  to  fortify  himself  in  his  house,  as 
Dunmore  had  done;  but  when  he  began  to  move  some  cannon 
for  that  purpose  the  committee  of  safety  interfered  and  seized 
them.  He  fled  to  Fort  Johnson,  on  the  Cape  Fear  River,  where 
he  declared  himself  ready  to  arm  the  slaves;  and  he  would 
probably  have  secured  himself  in  the  fort  if  Colonel  Ashe  had 
not  quickly  collected  a  body  of  patriots  to  march  against  him. 
He  fled  again,  taking  with  him  the  cannon  and  stores  of  the 
fort,  and  retired  like  Dunmore  and  Wright  to  the  safety  of 
the  water  and  a  British  man-of-war.  He  went  through  the 
form  of  attempting  to  govern  from  the  water;  but  his  procla- 
mations were  so  magnificent  in  language  and  impotent  in  effect 
that  British  sovereignty  became  more  than  ever  a  laughing- 
stock in  America.5 

Lord  William  Campbell  had  only  just  been  appointed 
governor  of  South  Carolina,  where  he  was  received  with  all 
the  usual  demonstrations  of  loyalty.  But  finding  the  assembly 
opposed  to  him  he  dissolved  it,  and  never  called  another.  He 
began  to  organize  the  numerous  loyalists  of  the  province  so 
secretly  and  effectively,  and  was  so  successful  in  convincing 
them  that  it  was  useless  to  resist  the  power  of  Great  Britain, 
that  some  of  the  patriots  were  for  seizing  and  confining  him 
in  jail.  The  majority  disapproved  of  the  plan ;  but  there  were 
enough  in  favor  of  it  to  alarm  the  governor,  and  in  September 
he  also  fled  to  the  water  and  a  British  man-of-war.  The 
province  passed  into  the  control  of  the  patriots ;  but  the  loyal- 


American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  8,  9,  61,  75,  713,  773. 

375 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

ists  were  so  numerous  and  powerful  that  the  patriot  rule  was 
very  precarious.6 

Governor  Wentworth,  of  New  Hampshire,  was  a  tactful  and 
judicious  man  for  whom  the  patriots  had  much  respect;  but 
his  influence  waned  so  rapidly  during  the  summer  that  he  was 
obliged  to  take  refuge  in  Fort  "William  and  Mary. 

In  New  York,  Governor  Try  on,  of  North  Carolina  fame  at 
the  battle  of  the  Alamance,  had  returned  in  June  from  a  long 
visit  to  England  to  consult  with  the  ministry.7  The  strong 
loyalist  feeling  in  the  colony  and  his  own  prudent  determina- 
tion to  take  no  very  positive  action  for  the  present,  preserved 
him  from  trouble  during  the  summer.  But  he  was  so  obviously 
strengthening  and  organizing  the  loyalists,  that  it  was  proposed 
in  the  Continental  Congress  to  seize  and  imprison  him.  The 
motion  failed.  But  afterwards  a  general  resolution  was  passed 
recommending  the  patriot  conventions  and  committees  in  every 
colony  to  imprison  any  person  who  endangered  the  public 
safety.  Tryon  was  warned  by  a  swift  messenger  from  a  friend 
in  the  Congress  that  this  resolution  was  intended  to  accomplish 
his  arrest,  and  before  the  New  York  provincial  congress  could 
act  he  also  fled  out  on  the  water,  and  from  the  refuge  of  the 
ship  "Halifax"  attempted  in  vain  to  conduct  the  government 
of  his  province.8 

In  New  Jersey,  Franklin 's  wayward  son,  William,  an  ardent 
loyalist,  was  the  governor.  He  made  no  effort  to  conceal  his 
opinions  or  to  escape,  and  kept  up  appearances  during  the 
greater  part  of  the  year  1775.  But  his  authority  was  steadily 
undermined  and  a  patriot  provincial  congress  was  gradually 
assuming  control  of  the  province.  In  January,  1776,  we  find 
him  placed  under  guard  at  Perth  Amboy,  and  compelled  to 


6  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  in,  pp.  1606,  1607. 

7  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  508,  677;  Gordon, 
"American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  p.  94;  American  Archives, 
fourth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  834-838.  "Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas 
Hutchinson,"  vol.  i,  p.  433. 

8  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  1052,  1054;  vol.  v, 
p.  44;  Jones,  "  New  York  in  the  Revolution,"  vol.  i,  pp.  61,  559. 

376 


JOHN  PENN  AND  ROBERT  EDEN 

give  his  parole  not  to  leave  the  province.  But  in  the  following 
June  he  had  the  courage,  or  obstinacy,  to  issue  a  proclamation 
calling  a  meeting  of  the  defunct  legislature.  He  was  then 
arrested,  imprisoned  in  Burlington,  and  afterwards  in  East 
Windsor,  Connecticut,  until  exchanged  in  November,  1778.  He 
was  well  pensioned  and  rewarded  on  his  return  to  England. 
But  his  unpleasant  and  useless  experience  in  trying  to  hold 
his  post  shows  the  wisdom  of  those  governors  who  saw  that 
their  dignity  could  be  more  comfortably  maintained  on  the 
water  than  on  the  land.9 

Pennsylvania's  governor  was  John  Penn,  one  of  the  pro- 
prietary family,  who  had  owned  the  whole  province  and  still 
owned  a  large  part  of  it,  collecting  quit-rents  from  the  inhab- 
itants. He  seemed  more  than  half  inclined  to  sympathize  with 
the  patriots  and  never  attempted  to  check  any  of  their  proceed- 
ings.10 They  never  disturbed  or  annoyed  him,  and  as  the 
Revolution  advanced,  he  gradually  dropped  out  of  office;  but 
remained  quietly  in  the  province.  In  the  summer  of  1777,  when 
General  Howe's  army  was  expected  in  Philadelphia,  it  seemed 
so  incongruous  to  have  a  regularly-constituted  British  governor 
at  large,  that  Penn  was  put  under  arrest  and  sent  to  Con- 
necticut until  Howe's  army  was  about  to  evacuate  Philadelphia 
in  May,  1778.  The  people  appreciated  his  position  and  difficul- 
ties, and  after  the  Revolution  made  a  most  liberal  allowance 
to  his  family  for  the  confiscation  of  their  estates. 

Maryland  was  also  a  proprietary  province,  owned  by  the 
family  of  Lord  Baltimore,  and  the  governor  was  Robert  Eden, 
who  also  found  himself  in  a  position  of  conflicting  duties.  He 
represented  the  interest  and  estates  of  the  proprietary  family, 
and  also  the  interests  of  the  British  Government,  and  his  wife 
was  one  of  the  proprietary  family.  It  was  quite  difficult  to 
balance  among  these  responsibilities  and  know  exactly  what  to 


9  Title   "  Franklin  "   in   Index  of  American  Archives,   fourth  series, 
vol.  vi. 

10  One  of  his  letters  indicates  strong  sympathy  with  the  patriot  cause. 
(American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  vi,  p.  1116.) 

377 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

do  as  the  patriot  convention  usurped  more  and  more  the 
functions  of  the  colonial  legislature. 

Eden  made  no  serious  resistance  to  the  encroachments.  He 
expressed  moderate  views,  advocated  the  repeal  of  the  tea  tax, 
and  when  the  patriot  militia  demanded  the  arms  and  ammu- 
nition in  the  arsenal,  he  gave  them  up  without  protest  or 
question.  His  authority  was  steadily  undermined,  and  by  the 
autumn  of  1775  the  patriot  convention  and  the  committees  of 
safety  were  governing  the  province. 

Eden,  however,  remained  at  Annapolis  all  the  following 
winter  and  spring,  performing  some  of  the  social  functions  of 
the  governor's  office,  and  apparently  a  few  routine  executive 
duties.  He  held  meetings  of  his  council  and  as  the  assembly 
would  not  support  the  British  cause,  he  kept  it  perpetually 
prorogued.11  His  letters  were  all  examined  before  he  was 
allowed  to  receive  them;  but  otherwise  he  was  treated  by 
everybody  with  the  greatest  respect  and  consideration. 

He  appears  to  have  understood  the  Maryland  character 
and  was  evidently  a  very  convivial  man,  fond  of  entertaining 
and  well  suited  to  that  picturesque  and  jovial  high  living  which 
was  so  characteristic  of  Annapolis.  Before  the  Revolution 
Washington,  it  is  said,  frequently  rode  up  from  Mount  Vernon 
to  dine  with  this  very  genial  Maryland  governor  and  share  ' '  the 
hour  of  social  and  sentimental  discourse."12 

Those  were  the  closing  days  of  the  grand  old  times  in  the 
Maryland  capital,  and  it  is  possible  that  Eden  might  have 
remained  as  an  inhabitant  of  Maryland  throughout  the  Revolu- 
tion. But  in  April,  1776,  one  of  General  Charles  Lee's  officers 
intercepted  a  letter  to  him  from  the  British  Ministry,  thanking 
him  for  certain  confidential  information  and  directing  him  to 
assist  Lord  Dunmore  in  his  operations  against  Virginia.  Gen- 
eral Lee  thereupon  requested  the  Maryland  committee  of  safety 
to  arrest  Eden  and  the  Continental  Congress  made  the  same 


American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iii,  p.  1570. 
Eddis,  "Letters  from  America/'  pp.  236,  266. 

378 


NO  ASSASSINATION 

request.  The  committee,  however,  would  go  no  farther  than  to 
take  Eden's  parole,  and  this  very  liberal  treatment  aroused 
much  indignation  in  Virginia.  The  Marylanders  were  accused 
of  playing  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy  and  betraying  the 
common  cause.  But  a  considerable  number,  if  not  a  majority 
of  the  Maryland  patriots,  seem  to  have  heartily  approved  of 
this  generosity  to  Eden.  They  wanted  Eden  to  stay  as  long  as 
possible.  They  apparently  thought  that  his  remaining  would 
have  a  conservative  influence,  and  prevent  anarchy  and  con- 
fusion, while  the  province  gradually  became  patriotic  and 
independent.13 

There  was  a  strong  minority  in  favor  of  very  violent  meas- 
ures, and  one  of  them,  young  Samuel  Purviance,  undertook  to 
arrest  Eden  and  being  unsuccessful  was  brought  before  the 
patriot  convention  and  reprimanded  for  his  disrespect  to  the 
governor  of  the  province. 

These  two  attempts  by  individuals  to  arrest  a  governor,  one 
in  Maryland  and  the  other  in  Georgia,  would  in  many  coun- 
tries have  been  attempts  at  assassination.  We  were  unable  to 
finish  the  Civil  War  of  1861  without  an  official  assassination,  and 
since  then  we  have  had  two  Presidents  assassinated ;  but  there 
were  no  political  assassinations  of  high  officials  in  the  Revolu- 
tion in  spite  of  the  intense  bitterness  of  the  struggle  and  the 
violent  feelings  between  patriot  and  loyalist. 

Eden  remained  quietly  in  Annapolis  under  his  parole,  but 
was  told  that  he  had  better  arrange  to  have  a  British  war-ship 
come  for  him.  The  frigate  "Forney"  was  allowed  to  come  up 
to  the  town  under  a  flag  of  truce,  and  on  the  23rd  of  June,  1776, 
the  patriot  committee  of  safety  took  an  affectionate  leave  of 
Governor  Eden,  conducting  him  to  the  barge  with  every  mark  of 
respect.  It  was  a  rather  curious  incident  in  the  midst  of  a 
Revolution,  an  unusual  but  a  very  good-natured  way  of  abolish- 
ing  British   sovereignty,    very   kindly,    very    American,    and 


"American  Archives,  fourth  series,  toI.  v,  pp.  954,  960,  964,  970, 
983,  1222 ;  vol.  vi,  pp.  732,  739. 

379 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

very  like  the  typical  Marylander  and  the  good  old  days  of 
Annapolis.14 

His  departure  was  none  too  soon,  for  the  more  violent 
patriots  were  losing  patience.  Like  the  other  ejected  governors, 
he  was  well  rewarded  in  England  and  given  a  baronetcy.  He 
returned  to  Annapolis  after  the  Revolution  to  look  after  his 
wife's  estate,  and  died  there  in  1784. 

Thus  the  royal  governors  were  adroitly  removed  during 
that  lull  in  the  Revolution  while  Great  Britain  was  preparing 
for  a  heavy  blow.  The  colonies  had  become  independent  states ; 
and  the  Revolution  had  become  more  than  ever  what  Dean 
Tucker  always  had  said  it  was,  a  war  on  the  part  of  England  to 
recover  a  lost  sovereignty.15 

To  render  their  condition  as  independent  states  more  com- 
plete, the  Congress  in  November  of  this  same  year,  1775,  took 
measures  to  clear  away  the  colonial  forms  of  government  and 
the  old  charters,  round  which  lingered  a  certain  amount  of 
sentiment  which  encouraged  loyalism.  The  patriots  of  New 
Hampshire,  South  Carolina,  and  Virginia  were  advised  to 
"establish  such  a  form  of  government  as  in  their  judgment 
will  best  produce  the  happiness  of  the  people  and  most  effectu- 
ally secure  peace  and  good  order  during  the  continuance  of 
the  present  dispute  between  Great  Britain  and  the  colonies." 

The  language  of  the  recommendation  was  purposely  made 
very  moderate,  and  the  assumption  that  there  would  be  a 
reconciliation  with  England  was  put  in  to  satisfy  the  timid 
and  those  who  hesitated  as  to  the  advisability  of  the  step  to 
be  taken.  But  it  was  intended  that  each  of  the  provinces 
should  openly  adopt  a  new  government  independent  of  all 
authority  of  Great  Britain.  In  a  word,  they  were  to  become 
independent  "during  the  present  dispute. " 


14  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  vi,  p.  629 ;  Scharf,  "  History 
of  Maryland,"  vol.  ii,  pp.  216,  219;  Eddis,  "Letters  from  America,"  pp. 
207,  215,  234,  238,  241,  251,  266,  279,  283,  285,  290,  292,  303,  304,  311; 
American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  704,  1570;  vol.  v,  index  title 
"Samuel  Purviance;  "  vol.  vi,  pp.  682,  1044,  1046,  1505;  vol.  vii,  p.  629. 

15  "  Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.  ii,  pp.  55,  56. 

380 


AMERICAN  CONSTITUTIONS 

Out  of  this  very  cautious  recommendation  have  grown  all 
our  modern  state  constitutions.  The  New  Hampshire  patriots 
were  the  first  to  adopt  the  suggestion.  They  elected  a  conven- 
tion, calling  it  a  congress,  which  sat  from  the  21st  of  December, 
1775,  to  the  5th  of  January,  1776,  and  framed  the  first  Ameri- 
can Constitution,  with  a  legislature  of  two  branches  but  no 
governor.  The  recommendation  of  the  Congress  was  strictly 
complied  with,  and  this  constitution  was  to  continue  in  force 
only  ' '  during  the  present  unhappy  and  unnatural  contest  with 
Great  Britain." 

In  the  following  March  the  South  Carolina  patriots  followed 
suit  and  prepared  a  very  complete  constitution  for  their 
province,  provided  for  a  governor,  whom  they  called  "Presi- 
dent and  Commander  in  Chief,"  and  gave  him  a  veto  on  all 
laws  passed  by  the  legislature.  There  was  no  declaration  of 
independence  in  this  or  in  the  New  Hampshire  constitution, 
and  the  word  itself  was  not  used,  because,  as  Chief  Justice 
Drayton  said,  that  was  a  matter  which  must  be  left  to  the 
Congress.  It  would  require  the  united  strength  of  all  the 
colonies  to  give  stability  to  the  independence  of  any  one  of 
them.16 

The  patriots  of  Virginia  adopted  their  new  constitution  in 
June,  1776 ;  and  under  further  recommendation  from  the 
Congress  constitutions  for  New  Jersey,  Delaware,  Pennsyl- 
vania, Maryland,  and  North  Carolina  were  adopted  during 
that  year.  Constitutions  for  Georgia,  Vermont,  and  New  York 
were  prepared  in  1777.  The  Massachusetts  patriots  had 
adopted  an  independent  government  in  the  autumn  of  1774; 
but  framed  no  written  constitution  until  1780.  Rhode  Island 
and  Connecticut,  having  always  elected  their  own  governors 
and  never  submitted  their  laws  to  England  for  approval,  were 
already  independent  enough  for  all  practical  purposes  and 
continued  to  live  under  their  old  charters  for  several  genera- 
tions after  the  Revolution.17 


18  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  ii,  p.  1047. 
17  Fisher,  "  Evolution  of  the  Constitution,"  chapter  iii. 

381 


XXXIII. 

DESTRUCTION  OF  PORTLAND  AND  NORFOLK 

The  British  war-ships,  which  seem  to  have  been  rather 
numerous  along  the  whole  coast,  had  afforded  a  welcome  refuge 
for  the  governors;  and  every  one  wondered  why  they  had  not 
done  more.  A  loyalist  writing  from  Philadelphia  complains 
that  they  made  no  attempt  to  seize  the  armed  galleys  which  the 
patriots  were  building  before  their  eyes,  or  to  stop  the  importa- 
tion of  French  arms  and  ammunition;  and  they  certainly  did 
nothing  to  uphold  the  authority  of  the  governors  on  shore.1 

The  patriots  dreaded  the  British  navy  because  most  of  their 
towns  and  a  very  large  proportion  of  their  farms  and  planta- 
tions were  on  navigable  water,  and  they  expected  terrible 
devastation  from  the  war-ships  and  the  small  boats  which  could 
follow  up  the  creeks  and  shoal  rivers.  The  probability,  and  to 
some  minds  the  certainty,  of  this  destruction  was  one  of  the 
strongest  arguments  used  by  the  loyalists  when  they  were 
enlarging  on  the  hopelessness  of  a  contest  with  Great  Britain. 
Many  patriots  were  so  impressed  that  they  loaded  their  furni- 
ture on  wagons  and  moved  inland;  but  in  the  end  they  were 
agreeably  disappointed,  for  the  British  navy  was  strangely 
unaggressive  during  the  war. 

In  this  year,  1775,  however,  when  the  governors  were 
being  pushed  off  the  continent,  the  navy  displayed  not  a 
little  activity.  But  it  was  ill-directed  and  had  no  effect 
in  upholding  the  authority  of  the  governors.  Stonington,  in 
Connecticut,  was  shelled,  houses  shattered,  two  citizens  killed, 
and  a  schooner  taken.  Sailors  and  marines  landed  on  Canoni- 
cutt  Island,  in  Narragansett  Bay,  and  destroyed  houses  and 
barns.  In  New  York,  when  the  patriots  undertook  to  remove 
the  cannon  from  the  city  battery  at  night,  the  "Asia"  man- 


1  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iii,  p.  3. 

382 


PORTLAND  SHELLED 

of-war  fired  upon  them.  On  the  12th  of  October  a  British 
fleet  of  sixteen  vessels  ranged  themselves  in  line  before  the 
town  of  Bristol,  Rhode  Island,  and  bombarded  it  with  shells 
and  fire-carcasses  for  an  hour  and  a  half.  Colonel  Potter  in 
the  hottest  of  the  fire  went  out  on  the  end  of  the  wharf,  hailed 
the  frigate  "Rose"  and  went  on  aboard  of  her  to  expostulate. 
Captain  Wallace  agreed  to  spare  the  town  if  it  would  supply 
him  with  two  thousand  sheep  and  thirty  fat  cattle;  but  as  the 
people  had  driven  off  nearly  all  their  stock,  he  finally  com- 
promised on  forty  sheep,  which  was  surely  a  glorious  victory 
for  the  British  navy.2 

In  fact,  several  of  these  minor  naval  aggressions  seem  to 
have  been  inspired  by  the  mere  desire  to  obtain  fresh  provisions 
and  save  the  crews  from  the  scurvy.  There  were,  however,  two 
very  serious  aggressions,  the  burning  of  Portland  and  of 
Norfolk.  The  people  of  Portland  (then  Falmouth),  Maine,  had 
obstructed  the  loading  of  one  of  the  vessels  which  habitually 
came  to  that  coast  for  white-pine  trees  to  make  masts  and  spars 
for  the  British  navy.  The  admiral,  after  consultation  with 
General  Gage,  sent  the  "Canceau"  and  three  other  vessels  in 
command  of  Captain  Mowat,  who  some  time  before  had  been 
seized  and  detained  by  the  patriots  when  he  landed  in  the  town. 
The  expedition  was  intended  to  accomplish  the  destruction  of 
Cape  Ann  as  well  as  Portland;  but  the  attack  on  Cape  Ann 
was  abandoned.  On  the  18th  of  October  Mowat  wreaked  his 
vengeance  on  Portland  by  firing  into  the  town,  from  nine  in  the 
morning  until  sunset,  some  three  thousand  round  shot,  besides 
shells,  bombs,  fire-carcasses,  grape-shot,  and  musket-balls.  The 
people  fled  to  the  woods ;  but  five  hundred  houses,  constituting 
three-fourths   of  the   town,   every   store   and   warehouse,   the 


2  Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  pp.  122,  124; 
American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  250,  261,  990,  1108,  1145; 
vol.  iv,  p.  230.  Apparently  other  towns  on  the  coast  dreading  bombard- 
ment supplied  the  British  war-vessels  with  fresh  provisions.  Some 
refused.  (American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iv,  pp.  99,  175,  248,  367, 
592,  798,  799,  1128,  948,  980,  1227,  1237,  1256,  1279,  1287;  vol.  v,  pp. 
347,  796.) 

383 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

church,  the  new  court-house,  the  public  library,  and  fourteen 
vessels  were  completely  destroyed,  and  the  people  left  homeless 
for  the  winter. 

The  destruction  of  Norfolk,  in  Virginia,  was  accomplished 
by  Lord  Dunmore,  who,  after  he  had  been  driven  from  the 
governorship,  had  established  himself  on  a  flotilla  of  three  war- 
ships and  some  smaller  vessels  which  he  kept  close  to  Norfolk. 
He  offered  freedom  to  the  slaves  and  recruited  a  large  number 
of  them  together  with  loyalists,  who  were  numerous  in  the  town. 
He  conducted  some  notable  and  successful  raids  on  the  land; 
but  in  attempting  to  prevent  a  patriot  force  from  entering 
Norfolk  he  was  defeated  at  the  Great  Bridge  and  obliged  to 
retire  to  his  ships. 

No  longer  able  to  maintain  a  force  on  shore,  or  obtain 
supplies  from  Norfolk,  and  being  much  annoyed  by  the  fire 
of  the  patriots  from  that  part  of  the  town  which  lay  nearest 
the  water,  he  determined  to  dislodge  them  by  destroying  the 
town.  He  first  sent  a  flag  ashore  with  a  demand  that  the  people 
should  regularly  supply  his  Majesty's  ships  with  water  and 
provisions.  This  being  refused,  he  gave  notice  of  bombardment 
and  warned  the  inhabitants  to  seek  safety  in  flight.  On  the 
1st  of  January,  1776,  he  opened  a  cannonade  on  the  houses  and 
landed  parties  of  sailors  and  marines,  who  set  fire  to  the  nearest 
buildings,  and  the  whole  town  was  reduced  to  ashes.3 

This  destruction  of  Norfolk,  coupled  with  the  destruction  of 
Portland  in  the  previous  October,  were  never  forgotten  or 
forgiven  by  the  patriot  party.    For  years  afterwards  they  were 


3  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  923,  1067,  1103,  1137, 
1138,  1188,  1190,  1193,  1385,  1616,  1669,  1670,  1716,  1714,  1717;  vol.  iv, 
pp.  224,  228  note,  233,  292,  293,  344,  349,  352,  461,  540,  575,  335,  350, 
357,  465,  476,  538-541,  577,  579,  794,  819,  827,  819,  827,  830,  946,  947, 
1477;  Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  pp.  112, 
206,  207 ;  "  Life,  Correspondence  and  Speeches  of  Patrick  Henry,"  by 
W.  W.  Henry,  vol.  i,  p.  321;  Stedman,  "American  War,"  vol.  i,  pp. 
146-151;  Eddis,  "Letters  from  America,"  pp.  250,  255,  257,  309,  326. 
Dunmore's  account  of  the  fight  at  Great  Bridge  is  entirely  at  variance 
with  other  descriptions.     (American  Archives,  id.,  vol.  iii,  p.  1714.) 

384 


DEVASTATION  NOT  INTENDED 

used  to  inflame  the  patriot  imagination  and  rouse  the  desire 
for  war  and  vengeance.  They  furnished  much-needed  material 
for  breaking  up  a  certain  sentimental  attachment  to  the  old 
order  of  things,  and  the  hope  of  compromise.  They  were 
described  as  acts  of  wanton  barbarity  and  atrocious  cruelty  at 
a  time  when  the  patriots  were  abstaining  from  severe  acts  of 
warfare  in  the  hope  that  England  might  still  be  able  to  see 
her  way  to  accept  the  ultimatum  which  the  Congress  had 
offered. 

Pictures  of  these  two  towns  in  flames,  shelled  by  the  ships, 
and  the  women  and  children  flying  from  them,  were  among  the 
scenes  which  Franklin  intended  to  have  engraved  in  France 
so  that  they  could  be  put  in  children 's  books  and  burn  into  the 
American  mind  an  undying  hatred  of  England  and  her  govern- 
ment. Those  two  acts  of  devastation  undoubtedly  strengthened 
the  American  position,  and  won  over  to  the  idea  of  absolute 
independence  many  hesitating  patriots. 

It  is  extremely  probable  that  the  Ministry  never  intended 
that  either  Portland  or  Norfolk  should  be  destroyed.  It  was 
contrary  to  the  policy  they  had  adopted  of  beginning  the  war 
with  moderation ;  and  for  the  next  three  years  they  permitted 
no  more  of  this  sweeping  devastation.4 

Dunmore  had  shown  great  energy  and  persistence.  Wash- 
ington regarded  him  as  a  formidable  enemy  and  urged  the 
Virginians  to  suppress  him.  Before  he  was  defeated  at  Great 
Bridge  he  had  evidently  hoped  to  occupy  Norfolk  and  hold  it 
as  Howe  was  holding  Boston.  Meanwhile  through  John  Con- 
nelly, a  Pennsylvania  loyalist,  he  was  preparing  a  grand  plan 
for  enlisting  all  the  loyalists  of  the  Virginia  and  Maryland 
frontiers,  with  the  Indians  of  Ohio.  Connelly  visited  Gage  in 
Boston,  who  approved  of  the  undertaking ;  and  the  plans  were 
extended  so  as  to  include  the  Indians  of  Canada  as  far  west 
as  Detroit  and  Illinois.     The  whole  of  this  vast  force  was  to 


*  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iii,  p.  1927;  vol.  iv,  p.  577; 
vol.  v,  pp.  187,  961,  962,  1232;  Writings  of  Washington,  Ford  edition,  vol. 
v,  p.  294;   "Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.   i,  p.  583; 
Stanhope,  "  History  of  England,"  vol.  vi,  p.  75. 
25  385 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

march  through  Virginia  in  the  following  April  and  meet  Dun- 
more,  who,  by  that  time,  would  have  collected  a  British  fleet 
in  the  Potomac.  This  design  was  carefully  matured  during  the 
summer  and  autumn  of  1775.  But  late  in  November,  when 
Connelly  and  two  associates,  with  all  the  plans  in  their  pockets, 
were  on  their  way  to  Detroit,  they  were  suspected  and  seized  at 
Hagerstown,  Maryland,  by  one  of  those  watchful  patriot  com- 
mittees of  safety  without  which  the  Revolution  would  never 
have  been  successful.5 

Dunmore  maintained  his  floating  colony  of  negroes  and 
loyalists  until  the  summer  of  1776.  A  printing  press,  which  he 
had  seized  in  Norfolk,  he  used  on  his  ship  for  printing  a  little 
newspaper  called  the  Virginia  Gazette,  which  he  seems  to  have 
succeeded  in  distributing  on  shore  among  the  loyalists.  But 
the  hot  weather  of  the  summer  and  the  crowding  and  dirt 
in  his  colony  carried  off  most  of  his  negroes  with  malignant 
fevers.  There  was  not  a  ship  in  his  fleet  that  did  not  throw 
overboard  two  or  three  dead  every  night.  He  effected  a  landing 
on  Given 's  Island  and  built  some  intrenchments ;  but  in  a  short 
time  the  ground  was  covered  with  the  graves  of  his  dead,  and 
on  the  8th  of  July,  the  patriots  attacked  the  place  and  compelled 
him  to  escape  in  his  ships  after  a  heavy  loss.  In  August  he 
abandoned  all  hope  of  regaining  authority  over  Virginia;  and 
his  ships,  some  forty  or  fifty  in  number,  sailed  away  and 
scattered,  conquered  at  last  by  the  climate  and  natural  condi- 
tions, and  he  himself,  with  about  a  hundred  of  his  followers, 
joined  the  fleet  of  Admiral  Howe  at  New  York.6 


0  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  847,  923,  1047,  1543, 
1660;  vol.  iv,  pp.  201,  250,  342,  458,  508,  615,  616,  822,  781,  950;  vol.  vi, 
pp.  433-436;  and  the  title  "Connelly"  in  Index;  Scharf,  "History  of 
Maryland,"  vol.  ii,  p.  190;  Journals  of  Congress,  vol.  i,  pp.  300,  361; 
Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  p.  114;  Ohio  Arch, 
and  Hist.  Quar.,  vol.  ii,  pp.  167-197. 

8  Eddis,  "  Letters  from  America,"  p.  326 ;  Gordon,  "  American  Revo- 
lution," edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  pp.  298,  299;  "  Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas 
Hutchinson,"  vol.  ii,  pp.  87,  93;  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  i, 
pp.  949,  963,  1064;  vol.  ii,  pp.  158-166. 

386 


XXXIV. 

THE  AMERICAN  NAVY  AND  PRIVATEERING 

In  that  same  autumn  of  1775,  when  the  British  navy 
destroyed  Portland,  the  patriots  began  to  create  a  navy  of  their 
own.  Washington  from  the  camp  at  Cambridge  encouraged  the 
New  Englanders  to  fit  out  private  armed  schooners  to  capture 
the  supply  vessels  of  the  British  army.  One  of  the  first  of 
these,  the  "Lee,'?  of  Marblehead,  took  the  English  ordnance- 
ship  "Nancy,"  carrying  brass  cannon  and  a  mortar,  besides  a 
large  cargo  of  arms,  ammunition,  and  camp  equipment.  When 
this  spoil  was  brought  to  Cambridge,  there  was  great  rejoicing 
General  Putnam,  without  regard  to  dignity,  stood  on  the  great 
mortar,  with  a  bottle  of  rum  in  his  hand,  and  General  Mifflin 
stood  by  as  godfather  to  christen  it — ' '  The  Congress. ' ' 

Other  prizes  were  soon  taken  and  before  Christmas  there 
were  half  a  dozen  privateersmen  cruising  off  the  New  England 
coast.  Their  success  was  largely  due,  it  was  said,  to  the  incom- 
petence and  timidity  of  Admiral  Graves,  who,  instead  of 
sending  his  ships  to  cruise  outside,  kept  them  at  anchor  in 
Boston  harbor  surrounded  with  booms  to  prevent  their  being 
boarded  by  the  patriot  whale-boats.  The  patriots  did  what  they 
pleased  in  the  harbor,  burnt  the  light-house,  took  prizes  almost 
under  the  guns  of  Graves 's  ships,  and  supplied  themselves  with 
cattle  from  the  islands,  while  the  admiral  lay  protected  by  his 
booms  and  unwilling  even  to  furnish  Gage  with  ships  for  com- 
municating with  other  parts  of  the  coast.  He  was  finally  super- 
seded on  the  30th  of  December,  1775,  by  Admiral  Shuldham, 
who,  however,  was  only  a  trifle  more  active  than  Graves.1 


1  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iv,  pp.  376,  587 ;  Gordon, 
"American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  p.  168;  "Diary  and  Letters 
of  Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.  i,  pp.  499,  571,  581,  583;  vol.  ii,  pp.  3,  40,  85, 
136,  139;  Fonblanque,  "Life  of  Burgoyne,"  p.  197. 

387 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

The  American  privateers  were  instructed  to  avoid  any  con- 
test with  men-of-war  and  to  confine  their  captures  to  transports 
and  provision  ships.  Ordinary  traders  were  to  be  allowed  to 
pass  in  peace;  for  the  patriots,  in  conformity  with  their  con- 
servative policy,  were  not  yet  willing  to  admit  that  there  was 
war  with  Great  Britain  in  the  full  sense  of  the  word.  The 
privateers  were  not  turned  loose  on  all  British  commerce  until 
the  spring  of  1776. 2 

A  privateer  could  be  fitted  out  very  quickly  and  cheaply. 
Any  of  the  numerous  American  schooners,  with  a  reputation 
for  speed,  could  within  a  few  weeks  have  from  four  to  eight 
of  the  small  cannon  of  those  days  put  on  her  deck  and  be 
supplied  with  a  crew  of  from  eight  to  twenty  men  with  mus- 
kets and  cutlasses.  A  few  more  guns  and  men  would  put  her 
very  nearly  on  an  equality  with  the  smaller  class  of  British 
war-ships. 

The  profits  to  the  owners,  and  even  to  the  crews  of  privateers, 
were  enormous ;  and  the  hint  having  been  given  in  this  autumn 
of  1775,  privateersmen  were  fitted  out  all  down  the  coast, 
especially  in  Chesapeake  Bay,  and  there  were  soon  requests  for 
the  establishment  of  prize  courts.  The  privateering  service 
became  so  popular  that  it  seriously  interfered  with  recruiting 
for  the  army.  Those  who  enlisted  in  the  army  became  dissat- 
isfied. They  longed  for  the  expiration  of  their  time  that  they 
might  join  in  the  spoils  of  England's  ocean  commerce.  General 
Greene  lamented  that  he  could  not  share  that  golden  harvest 
so  as  to  provide  a  fortune  for  his  family.  At  the  close  of  1776, 
Dr.  Rush  estimated  that  there  were  at  least  10,000  New  Eng- 
enders on  board  the  privateers.3 

The  soldier  of  the  Revolution  was  usually  a  melancholy 
figure  of  suffering  and  poverty,  who,  even  if  he  escaped  disease, 
bullets,  and  the  horrors  of  a  British  prison,  found  in  the  end 


2  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  v,  pp.  472,  474,  1642,  1650; 
Journals  of  Congress,  Ford  edition,  vol.  iv,  p.  229. 

3  American   Archives,   fifth    series,   vol.    iii,   pp.    1072,    1513;    G.   W. 
Greene,  "  Life  of  Nathanael  Greene,"  vol.  i,  pp.  226,  227. 

388 


PROFITABLE  PRIVATEERING 

that  he  had  sacrificed  everything  for  his  country.  But  the 
privateersman  served  his  country  and  at  the  same  time  grew 
fat  and  rich;  and  so  lucrative  was  his  calling  that  French, 
Spanish,  and  Dutch  merchants  sent  out  money  to  Baltimore  to 
buy  shares  in  privateering  ventures. 

When  all  British  commerce  was  thrown  open  to  their  depre- 
dations, the  privateersmen  swarmed  from  every  port. 

"  Thousands  of  schemes  for  privateering,"  wrote  John  Adams,  "  are 
afloat  in  American  imaginations.  Some  are  for  taking  the  Hull  ships 
with  Woolens  for  Amsterdam,  and  Rotterdam;  some  are  for  the  tin 
ships;  some  for  the  Irish  linen  ships;  some  for  outward  bound  and 
others  for  inward  bound  East  Indiamen;  some  for  the  Hudson's  Bay 
ships;  and  many  for  West  India  sugar  ships." — American  Archives,  fifth 
series,  vol.  i,  p.  908. 

There  is  no  occupation  that  appeals  so  strongly  to  the  primi- 
tive instinct  of  adventure,  plunder,  and  fight;  and  we  shall 
never  become  so  civilized  that  we  shall  not  like  to  read  about 
privateering.  It  was  the  prosperous  side  of  the  Revolution; 
and  not  a  few  solid  and  permanent  fortunes  in  America  were 
begun  by  those  low  rakish  schooners  from  the  Chesapeake  that 
could  outsail  anything  on  the  sea.  During  the  six  years  from 
April,  1777,  to  March,  1783,  285  of  them  are  said  to  have  sailed 
from  the  Chesapeake  alone,  carrying  in  all  1810  guns  and  640 
swivels.4 

Complete  lists  of  all  the  captures  during  the  Revolution  do 
not  seem  to  be  obtainable;  but  there  are  a  few  during  certain 
periods  which  throw  considerable  light  on  this  species  of  war- 
fare. Up  to  the  spring  of  1777,  according  to  one  list,  the 
American  privateers  had  captured  342  British  vessels,  of  which 
44  were  retaken.  During  the  same  period  the  British  fleet  had 
taken  only  140  American  vessels,  of  which  26  were  recaptured.5 

The  British  war- vessels  and  privateers  were  slow  at  starting 
on  their  work;  but  once  fairly  under  way,  they  are  generally 
believed  to  have  done  more  damage  to  our  merchant  marine 


4  Scharf,  "History  of  Maryland,"  vol.  ii,  pp.  201,  210. 
6  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  1523-1530. 

389 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

than  we  did  to  theirs.  In  an  estimate  made  in  1778  the  honors 
were  rather  even,  with  the  advantage  just  beginning  to  turn  in 
favor  of  England.  But  a  modern  estimate  made  by  the  Secre- 
tary of  Lloyd's  seems  to  show  that  during  the  whole  war  our 
privateers  took  over  3000  English  merchant  ships,  while  barely 
1200  American  vessels  were  taken  by  the  British.  England, 
however,  could  stand  her  loss,  because  she  had  many  vessels  left, 
while  our  loss  was  nearly  the  whole  of  our  merchant  marine.6 

As  the  contest  progressed  this  disastrous  side  of  the  ocean 
warfare  became  very  serious  for  us,  and  assisted  in  bringing 
the  patriot  cause  to  a  very  low  ebb  in  the  years  1779  and  1780. 
The  British  cruisers  were  unable  to  restrict  the  operations  of 
our  privateersmen;  but  our  resources  were  being  exhausted 
and  in  the  long  run  England 's  superior  naval  power  would  tell 
against  us. 

Although  our  privateersmen  were  out  for  booty  rather  than 
fighting,  and  avoided  the  men-of-war,  there  must  nevertheless 
have  been  many  fierce  encounters  as  well  as  strange  adventures, 
which  have  not  been  recorded.  One  of  the  most  desperate  fights 
was  between  the  Yankee  "Hero"  and  the  British  frigate 
"Milford,"  in  June,  1776,  just  outside  of  Boston  harbor.  The 
1 '  Hero ' '  mistook  the  frigate  for  a  merchantman  and  learned  her 
mistake  too  late.  The  war-ship  overhauled  the  ' '  Hero, ' '  punish- 
ing her  terribly  with  her  bow  chasers ;  but  when  alongside  and 
overtopping  the  little  privateersman,  she  found  an  unexpected 
resistance.  For  several  hours,  Captain  Tracy,  of  the  "Hero," 
kept  up  the  unequal  contest,  lying  side  by  side  and  not  a 
hundred  feet  from  the  frigate,  while  they  poured  broadsides 
into  each  other  and  emptied  their  muskets  and  pistols.  He 
seems  to  have  actually  silenced  some  of  the  frigate's  forward 
guns,  and  at  last  broke  away  from  her  only  to  find  his  sails  cut 


•  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  v,  p.  1082;  vol.  ii,  pp.  717, 
979;  Hansard's  Debates,  vol.  19,  pp.  709,  717;  "The  Remembrancer," 
vol.  iv,  p.  312;  vol.  v,  pp.  108,  405,  513;  vol.  vi,  p.  39;  Gordon,  "Ameri- 
can Revolution,"  vol.  iii,  pp.  103,  104;  Clowes,  "Royal  Navy,"  vol.  iii, 
p.  396. 

390 


STRATAGEMS  OF  PRIVATEERS 

to  rags  and  his  yards  flying  about  without  braces.  While 
repairing  his  shattered  rigging  in  the  hope  of  escaping,  in  the 
darkness,  the  frigate  bore  down  on  him  again  and  renewed 
the  fight. 

In  this  second  attack  Tracy  was  badly  wounded;  and  tried 
to  keep  command  by  laying  himself  across  the  armchest.  He 
fainted  and  was  taken  below;  but  as  soon  as  he  recovered,  he 
insisted  on  being  carried  on  deck  in  a  chair.  He  became  again 
so  faint  that  his  voice  failed  him;  and  seeing  the  utter  hope- 
lessness of  the  situation,  he  allowed  his  men  to  surrender. 

The  British  are  said  to  have  exulted  over  this  fight  as  a 
great  victory ;  and  the  Americans  were  indignant  because  thirty 
American  prisoners  that  happened  to  be  on  the  "Milford" 
were  forced  at  the  forfeit  of  their  lives  to  fight  against  their 
countrymen  on  the  ' '  Hero. ' ' 7 

The  stratagems  of  the  privateersmen  were  innumerable  and 
ingenious.  At  dusk  one  evening  the  "Hancock"  came  up  with 
a  merchantman  whose  captain  mistook  the  American  for  a 
British  man-of-war,  was  delighted  to  fall  in  with  her,  and  kept 
along  in  company  all  night. 

"  At  daylight  the  next  morning,  the  vessels  being  near  together,  the 
captain  of  the  ship  invited  the  captain  of  the  '  Hancock '  to  come  on 
board  and  take  breakfast;  who  replied,  his  hands  were  so  few  and  sick, 
that  he  had  not  enough  to  man  his  boat  and  work  the  vessel,  and  in  his 
turn  invited  the  captain  of  the  ship  to  come  aboard  him,  which  he  readily 
complied  with,  by  ordering  his  boat  out,  when  he  and  about  a  dozen  of 
his  hands  went  on  board  the  '  Hancock,'  and  were  taken  as  good  care 
of  as  men  in  such  circumstances  could  allow.  The  '  Hancock '  then  sent 
an  equal  number  of  her  own  hands  on  board  the  ship,  when  she  fell  into 
the  hands  of  the  United  States  of  America." — American  Archives,  fifth 
series,  vol.  i,  p.  874. 

Paul  Jones,  in  his  little  sloop,  the  "  Providence, ' '  was  pur- 
sued and  overtaken  by  a  British  frigate,  both  vessels  beating  to 
windward.  He  prepared  all  his  light  sails  so  that  he  could  set 
them  quickly,  and  run  before  the  wind  before  the  frigate  could 
alter  her  canvas  for  that  course. 


American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  vi,  p.  746. 

391 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

"As  they  continued  firing  at  us  from  the  first  without  showing 
colors,  I  now  ordered  ours  to  be  hoisted  and  began  to  fire  at  them.  Upon 
this  they  also  hoisted  American  colors  and  fired  guns  to  leeward.  But 
the  bait  would  not  take;  for  having  everything  prepared,  I  bore  away 
before  the  wind  and  set  all  our  light  sail  at  once,  so  that  before  her  sails 
could  be  trimmed  and  steering  sails  set,  I  was  almost  out  of  reach  of 
grape  and  soon  after  out  of  reach  of  cannon-shot.  Our  hair  breadth 
escape  and  saucy  manner  of  making  it  must  have  mortified  him  not  a 
little.  Had  he  foreseen  this  motion,  and  been  prepared  to  counteract  it 
he  might  have  fired  several  broadsides  of  double  headed  and  grape  shot 
which  would  have  done  us  very  material  damage.  But  he  was  a  bad 
marksman,  and  though  within  pistol  shot,  did  not  touch  the  '  Provi- 
dence '  with  one  of  the  many  shot  he  fired." — American  Archives,  fifth 
series,  vol.  ii,  p.  171. 

The  prisoners  taken  out  of  prizes  not  infrequently  rose  on 
their  captors  and  took  the  ship.  The  British  offered  high 
rewards  to  crews  who  should  retake  their  own  vessel  or  their 
captor's  vessel,  and  these  rewards  were  very  much  complained 
of  in  America  as  encouraging  mutiny,  and  assassination  of 
officers.8 

At  the  same  time  that  privateering  began  in  the  autumn  of 
1775,  the  Congress  at  Philadelphia  ordered  thirteen  war  vessels 
to  be  built,  six  in  New  England,  two  in  New  York,  four  in 
Pennsylvania,  and  one  in  Maryland.  They  also  chartered 
several  vessels  for  immediate  service,  appointed  officers,  and 
placed  Ezekiel  Hopkins  at  the  head  of  this  first  American  navy. 
But  privateering  was  so  successful,  and  the  profits  so  high  for 
the  crews,  that  it  was  difficult  to  obtain  recruits  for  the  regular 
Continental  navy,  which  gave  only  a  small  share  of  prize 
money.  Some  of  the  ships  voted  by  the  Congress  were  never 
built ;  and  there  was  great  delay  caused  by  the  want  of  sea  coal 
for  the  smiths  who  forged  the  anchors,  and  also  by  the  difficulty 
in  having  cannon  cast  at  the  iron  furnaces.  It  was  of  course 
impossible  that  we  should  in  a  short  time  build  up  a  navy  that 
could  contend  on  anything  like  an  equal  footing  with  the  long- 


8 American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  811,  812.  "Memoirs 
and  Correspondence  of  Lafayette,"  London  edition,  1837,  vol.  i,  p.  66; 
American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  i,  p.  754. 

392 


A  NAVY  NOT  NECESSARY 

established  and  powerful  English  navy.  For  that  part  of  the 
warfare  we  must  rely  on  the  fleets  that  France  would  send  to 
our  aid.  So  far  as  our  own  efforts  were  concerned,  the  pri- 
vateers were  our  most  effective  navy  in  the  Revolution.  The 
regular  navy  created  by  the  Congress  accomplished  very  little, 
and  Hopkins  was  dismissed  from  his  command  in  1777.  It 
has  been  usual  to  blame  the  inefficiency  of  the  Congress  navy  on 
the  committees  and  boards  that  undertook  to  manage  it;  but 
the  real  cause  seems  to  have  been  the  want  of  money  and 
resources  and  the  superior  attractions  and  evident  efficiency 
of  privateering.  The  ships  ordered  by  the  Congress  were  equal 
in  force  only  to  the  small  British  cruisers,  and  were  hardly 
superior  to  the  better  class  of  privateers.  The  Congress  went 
bankrupt  in  trying  to  support  the  army.  Why  then  should 
it  have  attempted  to  support  a  navy  when  it  could  encourage 
privateering  without  expense  and  rely  on  France  for  fleets 
which  were  rapidly  becoming  a  match  for  those  of  England  ? 9 


9  Clowes,  "  Royal  Navy,"  vol.  iii,  p.  396;  Gordon,  "  American  Revolu- 
tion," edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  p.  155;  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol. 
iii,  pp.  1075,  1076,  1125,  1126,  1402,  1407,  1515,  1529-1540,  1687,  1722, 
1927;  vol.  iv,  pp.  180,  237,  256,  334,  379,  796,  964,  987;  fifth  series,  vol. 
ii,  pp.  282,  599,  1105;  vol.  iii,  pp.  609,  872,  1335;  and  title  "Vessels"  in 
index  of  the  various  volumes  of  the  Archives;  Bolton,  "  Private  Soldier 
under  Washington,"  pp.  45,  46,  163,  164;  "Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas 
Hutchinson,"  vol.  ii,  pp.  Ill,  129;  Cooper,  "History  of  the  American 
Navy,"  pp.  47-54. 


XXXV. 

THE  ATTACK  UPON  CANADA 

During  the  whole  summer  of  1775  while  the  patriot  army 
kept  up  its  inactive  siege  of  Boston,  Washington  and  the  patriot 
leaders  had  in  mind  the  importance  of  following  up  the  taking 
of  Ticonderoga  by  an  invasion  of  Canada.  Information  was 
constantly  received  which  led  the  patriots  to  think  that  General 
Guy  Carleton,  the  Canadian  governor  and  military  commander, 
was  planning  some  heavy  invasion  into  the  Hudson  Valley. 
He  would  set  out  as  soon  as  he  could  receive  reinforcements 
from  England  to  assist  the  horde  of  Indians  and  Canadians 
he  might  be  able  to  raise.  A  daring  and  sudden  attack  upon 
him  would,  it  was  thought,  break  up  these  plans  and  possibly 
bring  Canada  into  the  union.  Reports  were  constantly  re- 
ceived which  seemed  to  show  that  the  Canadians,  if  given  a 
chance,  would  join  the  patriot  cause.1 

The  importance  of  Canada  to  which  ever  side  should  hold  it 
seemed  to  be  obvious,  because  it  would  help  to  control  the  upper 
part  of  the  great  strategic  line  of  water  communication  through 
Lake  Champlain  and  down  into  the  Hudson  River  valley.  If 
Canada  were  secured  for  the  patriots,  it  would  be  more  difficult 
than  ever  for  England  to  control  the  line  of  the  Hudson,  cut 
the  colonies  in  half,  isolate  New  England  from  the  less  rebellious 
communities  to  the  south,  and  prevent  her  from  influencing 
them  and  receiving  supplies  from  them. 

The  attempt  to  take  Canada  was  the  most  aggressive  and 
daring  effort  that  the  patriots  made  during  the  war,  and  was 
characteristic  of  this  year  1775,  when  they  felt  that  everything 
was  going  in  their  favor.  It  was  an  invasion  of  British  terri- 
tory, an  invasion  of  a  colony  that  had  not  rebelled  or  joined 


1  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  1676,  1702,  1704,  1833, 
1855,  1868,  1892,  1026,  1027. 

394 


VIGOROUS  WAR  NECESSARY 

them,  and  in  that  respect  was  inconsistent  with  the  position 
they  had  assumed  of  acting  merely  on  the  defensive,  and  might 
be  thought  to  justify  England  in  acts  of  the  severest  retaliation. 
It  was  made  at  a  time  when,  as  the  loyalists  pointed  out, 
the  documents  of  the  Congress  and  the  patriot  party  were 
declaring  that  they  were  still  loyal  subjects  of  the  crown,  and 
wished  to  remain  in  the  empire.  Under  such  circumstances,  said 
the  loyalists,  every  invader  of  Canada  taken  prisoner  would  be 
doubly  liable  to  be  hanged  "as  a  traiter  to  his  king,  to  his 
country,  and  to  the  constitution  of  old  England."  2 

But  the  assertions  of  loyalty  in  the  patriot  documents  were 
well  known  to  be  mere  forms  and  political  fictions  of  conserva- 
tism. Every  child  knew  that  the  two  countries  were  at  war,  and 
had  broken  the  colonial  relationship,  although  the  breach  had 
not  yet  been  officially  announced.  As  war  had  begun,  the 
patriots  naturally  felt  that  the  more  vigorous  war  they  waged, 
the  better  would  be  their  chances  of  success.  They  had  captured 
one  by  one  so  many  of  the  colony  governments,  they  had  been 
so  successful  in  locking  up  the  British  army  in  Boston,  that  it 
seemed  as  if  they  would  be  able  to  drive  British  authority 
completely  off  the  continent,  make  Canada  an  American  state, 
and  punish  the  British  nation  for  passing  the  Quebec  Act 
establishing  Romanism  and  despotic  government  in  such  close 
proximity  to  New  England.3 

Two  expeditions  were  planned.  One,  in  command  of  Gen- 
eral Schuyler,  was  to  proceed  directly  to  Montreal  by  way  of 
Lake  Champlain,  and  the  other,  to  be  commanded  by  Benedict 
Arnold,  was  to  pass  through  the  wilderness  of  Maine  and  take 


3  Jones,  "New  York  in  the  Revolution,"  vol.  i,  pp.  310,  311. 

3  Nova  Scotia  was  not  included  in  the  invasion  of  Canada.  Wash- 
ington disapproved  of  any  attack  on  Nova  Scotia,  which  it  was  hoped 
would  of  its  own  accord  join  the  American  union.  If  Quebec  and 
Montreal  could  be  secured,  the  reduction  of  Nova  Scotia  would  easily 
follow.  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  90,  619,  1127, 
1184.  As  to  the  state  of  feeling  in  Nova  Scotia  during  the  Revolution 
see  American  Historical  Review,  October,  1904,  vol.  10,  p.  52;  American 
Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  v,  pp.  522-524,  936-939;  vol.  vi,  p.  484. 

395 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

Quebec.  This  method  of  two  expeditions,  one  to  take  Quebec 
and  the  other  to  take  Montreal,  was  the  natural  way  to  attack 
Canada,  and  had  been  successful  when  the  British  conquered 
the  country  in  the  French  War.  In  the  present  instance  it  was 
expected  that  General  Carleton,  whose  force  was  not  sufficient 
to  defend  both  Montreal  and  Quebec,  would  have  to  abandon 
either  one  or  the  other.  He  was  now  occupied  in  holding  St. 
Johns,  on  Lake  Champlain,  as  a  defence  to  Montreal.  If  he 
continued  to  defend  St.  Johns  and  Montreal,  Arnold  might 
take  Quebec.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  Carleton  rushed  to  the 
defence  of  Quebec,  Montreal  would  be  easily  taken  by  Schuyler. 
Montreal  was  without  fortifications  and  untenable.  But  Quebec, 
with  its  famous  citadel,  was  the  Gibraltar  of  America.  On 
the  river  side  the  steep  cliff  was  over  300  feet  high,  and  on  the 
land  side  the  bastions  and  curtains  were  twenty  feet  thick  and 
thirty  feet  high.  It  was  the  stronghold  of  Canada,  and  full  of 
valuable  military  supplies.  If  it  could  not  be  taken  the  con- 
quest of  Montreal  would  be  of  little  or  no  avail.  If,  however, 
the  patriots  secured  it,  the  conquest  of  the  rest  of  the  country 
would  be  comparatively  easy,  provided  a  British  fleet  did  not 
retake  Quebec. 

The  important  point  in  the  whole  plan  was  to  have  Carleton 
remain  with  his  whole  force  defending  Montreal  until  Arnold 
should  have  taken  Quebec.  Carleton  would  then  be  placed 
between  the  forces  of  Schuyler  and  Arnold,  his  refuge  would  be 
cut  off,  and  his  surrender  could  be  compelled.  But  to  bring  this 
delicately  turned  plan  to  a  conclusion,  with  badly  organized 
forces  of  militia  and  inadequate  means  of  communication, 
through  vast  tracts  of  wilderness,  was  a  great  deal  to  expect; 
and  the  patriots  were  seriously  handicapped  for  want  of  war- 
vessels  to  prevent  the  British  reinforcing  Quebec  from  the  sea 
with  troops  and  supplies  of  provisions.4 

Schuyler  spent  the  summer  at  Ticonderoga,  collecting  troops 
and  supplies  and  contending  with  the  overwhelming  difficulties 


4  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.   926,  927,  945,  947, 
1609,  1633,  1638,  1639,  1664. 

396 


SIEGE  OF  ST.  JOHNS 

of  a  total  lack  of  organization  and  preparedness.  He  was  given 
as  a  second  in  command,  General  Richard  Montgomery,  a 
British  soldier  of  Irish  birth  and  education,  who  had  served 
with  distinction  in  America  during  the  French  War,  and  had 
settled  in  New  York,  where  he  married  Miss  Janet  Livingston. 

In  September  Schuyler  and  Montgomery  started  with  about 
1000  men  to  move  upon  St.  Johns,  which,  with  its  outpost, 
Chamblee,  blocked  the  road  to  Montreal,  only  twelve  miles 
away.  Washington  had  thought  that  they  might  have  passed 
round  St.  Johns  and  leaving  it  in  their  rear  have  gone  direct  to 
Montreal.  There  might,  possibly,  have  been  an  advantage  in 
this  plan.  Montreal  had  no  defenses,  could  easily  have  been 
taken,  and  if  they  had  captured  Carleton  there  he  could  not 
have  reached  Quebec  before  Arnold  took  it  by  surprise,  and 
St.  Johns  could  have  been  reduced  at  their  leisure.  But 
Schuyler  and  Montgomery  were  unwilling  to  leave  a  strong 
fortified  place  like  St.  Johns  in  their  rear  to  cut  off  their  retreat 
or  attack  their  line  of  communication.  They  began  a  regular 
siege  of  it  which  lasted  all  the  rest  of  September  and  all.  of  Octo- 
ber; and  so  far  as  the  ability  of  Arnold's  expedition  to  take 
Quebec  was  concerned,  it  would  have  been  well  if  the  siege  of 
St.  Johns  had  lasted  longer.5 

Soon  after  the  siege  began,  Schuyler's  health  failed  and  he 
returned  to  Ticonderoga,  where  he  remained  for  the  rest  of 
the  autumn,  suffering  greatly  from  a  complication  of  disorders, 
but  working  with  unremitting  fidelity  to  organize  the  base  of 
supplies  and  keep  open  the  lines  of  communication  with  Mont- 
gomery. 

Schuyler,  who  had  served  in  the  French  war,  was  one  of  the 
great  landed  proprietors  of  New  York,  owning  vast  estates  near 
Albany,  which  were  worked  to  some  extent  by  negro  slaves  like 
a  southern  plantation.  The  patriarchical  life  on  his  great 
domain  where  his  family,  after  the  manner  of  those  times,  had 
created  a  little  world  of  intelligence,  culture,  and  refinement, 


5. American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.   1197,   1374;   Jones, 
New  York  in  the  Revolution,"  vol.  i,  p.  58. 

397 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

independent  of  city  life,  has  been  admirably  described  by  Mrs. 
Grant  in  her  "Memoirs  of  an  American  Lady."  Schuyler  was 
a  devoted  patriot  and  a  man  of  good  executive  ability,  with 
broad  ideas  of  philanthropy ;  but  he  was  much  disliked  by  the 
levelling  New  Englanders  for  what  they  considered  his  offensive 
aristocratic  tendencies. 

The  invasion  of  Canada  had  now  devolved  on  Montgomery ; 
and  on  the  1st  of  November  St.  Johns  surrendered.  Besides  the 
cannon  and  small  arms,  the  spoil  was  not  great ;  for  the  ammu- 
nition and  provisions  were  almost  exhausted.  But  the  way 
was  now  open  to  Montreal,  which  Montgomery  entered  on 
the  13th  of  November,  without  meeting  with  any  resistance. 
Carleton  and  his  whole  force  had  abandoned  the  town  the  day 
before,  and  tried  to  escape  in  their  ships  to  Quebec;  but 
Montgomery  had  sent  Colonel  Easton  with  some  troops  to  Sorel 
on  the  St.  Lawrence,  forty  miles  below  Montreal,  where  they 
intercepted  Carleton 's  fleet  and  compelled  its  surrender.6 

It  was  huge  spoil  of  flour,  beef,  muskets,  cartridges,  and 
powder  for  the  patriots ;  and  the  ships  could  be  used  for  trans- 
porting Montgomery 's  force  to  join  Arnold  at  Quebec.  But  the 
most  important  person  escaped.  Carleton  the  night  before  had 
disguised  himself  as  a  Canadian,  fled  down  the  river,  and 
reached  Quebec.  His  escape  was  probably  the  fatal  accident 
which  lost  Canada  for  the  patriots;  for  he  was  the  life  of  the 
resistance ;  there  was  no  one  to  take  his  place,  and  if  he  could 
have  been  captured  or  detained,  Montgomery  and  Arnold  might 
have  taken  Quebec. 

There  is,  of  course,  the  open  question  whether  the  Canadians 
were  sufficiently  in  our  favor  to  enable  the  small  patriot  force 
to  take  possession  of  the  country  and  hold  it  against  subsequent 
attacks  of  the  British  army  and  fleet;  and  on  this  point  the 
evidence  is  somewhat  conflicting.    The  letters  of  Schuyler  and 


°The  original  letters  of  Schuyler  and  Montgomery,  describing  the 
invasion  of  Canada,  can  be  found  in  American  Archives,  fourth  series, 
vol.  iii,  and  fifth  series,  vol.  i,  by  reference  to  their  names  in  the  index. 
See  also  Gordon,  "  American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  pp.  157, 
164. 

398 


ATTITUDE  OF  THE  CANADIANS 

romery  had  for  months  been  expressing  the  greatest  confi- 
dence in  the  Canadians.     Arnold  experienced  the  most  kindly 

mce  from  them  when  he  emerged  into  their  country  from 

I  aine  wilderness.    More  than  two  hundred  of  them  assisted 

Montgomery  to  take  St.  Johns ;  and  after  he  took  Montreal  he 

to  have  found  his  hopes  of  the  friendliness  of  the  people 

realized,  for  he  writes  from  there  on  the  19th  of  November, 
"the  inhabitants  are  our  friends  on  both  sides  of  the  river  to 
Quebec;  our  expresses  go  without  interruption  backwards  and 

.rds. ' ' 

it  the  French  priests  were  for  the  most  part  against  us,  and 
were  influencing  the  people  by  withholding  absolution.    Such  a 

e  influence  was  serious;  and  the  nobility  took  the  same 

as  the  priests ;  for  both  had  been  won  to  the  English  side 
by  the  Quebec  Act,  which  upheld  the  nobility,  gave  the  priests 
governmental  authority  for  their  religion  and  more  privileges 
than  they  could  hope  for  from  a  union  with  the  extreme 
protestantism  of  the  rebellious  colonies  on  the  south. 

Apparently,  however,  it  was  all  a  question  of  success  in 
arms ;  and  if  the  patriot  force  had  been  larger  and  its  conquest 
of  British  authority  assured,  there  would  have  been  no  difficulty 

the  majority  of  the  people ;  for  there  was  no  strong  senti- 
ment attaching  them  to  England,  which  only  a  few  years  before 
hajd  conquered  them  from  France.    Thus  far  Montgomery  had 

very  successful,  and  numerous  Canadians  were  joining  him 
aiid  learning  to  say  "Liberty  and  Bostonian;"  and  numerous 
Iiidi*ins  were  coming  in  who  would  smite  their  breasts  and  say, 

Yankee."7 
The  Continental  Congress  also  caught  the  spirit  of  success 
and  it  is  curious  now  to  read  of  their  preparations  to  organize 
the  Canadians  into  regiments,  establish  American  forms  of 
civil  government,  and  deal  with  the  serious  question  of  liberty 
of  conscience  among  French  Roman  Catholics.8 


7  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  973-74. 

8  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  1012,  1098,  1695;  vol. 
iv,  p.  220. 

399 


XXXVI. 

ARNOLD'S  MARCH  TO  QUEBEC 

On  the  success  of  Arnold  everything  depended.  If  he  ailed 
to  take  Quebec,  Montgomery 's  success  at  Montreal  was  useless ; 
and  the  situation  was  so  critical  and  delicate  that  a  very  slight 
change  of  circumstances  might  alter  the  course  of  history. 

Arnold  had  visited   Quebec,   traded  there   in   horses   and 
merchandise,  and  was  supposed  to  be  familiar  with  the  fortifica- 
tions.   His  acquaintance  with  the  people  was  not  altogeth 
advantage,  for  it  led  him  to  send  some  confidential  letters  which 
had  better  not  have  been  written. 

His  dash  through  the  wilderness  was  desperate,  rom 
and  very  American  in  its  character.    He  was  to  lead  his 
through   more    than    a   hundred    miles    of    unknown    fc 
swamps,   mountains,   lakes,   and   rivers,   impenetrable   b~\    the 
military  methods  of  Europe,  and  to  emerge  suddenly  from  these 
fastnesses  into  the  heart  of  the  enemy's  country,  and  by  sur- 
prise and  strategy  attack  his  great  citadel.    He  was  to  pr 
from  the  coast  of  Maine  up  the  Kennebec  as  far  as  its  waters* 
would  carry  him  and  then  cross  the  water-shed  as  be* 
could  to  the   Chaudiere,   which   would  bear  him  to  the 
Lawrence. 

He  took  with  him  about  1100  men,  most  of  them  ordL 
New  England  musketmen  from  the  army  at  Cambridge;  but 
to  complete  his  force  he  was  given  three  companies  of  the 
men,  selected  by  lot.    The  companies  on  which  the  lot  fell  were 
Daniel  Morgan's  Virginians  and  Matthew  Smith's  and  ] 
drick's  Pennsylvanians.    A  great  many  of  Arnold's  men  kept 
journals  of  their  experiences,  and  several   of  them,  notably 
those  by  Henry  and  Morrison,  are  most  graphic  and  vivid  in 
their  descriptions.1 


1  A  list  of  these  journals  is  annexed  to  "  Wild's  Diary,"  Cambridge, 
1886,  and  also  to  Mr.  Codman's  admirable  book,  "Arnold's  Expedition 
to  Quebec." 

400 


BOATING  UP  STREAM 

Towards  the  end  of  September  Arnold's  troops  marched 
from  Cambridge  to  Newburyport,  where  sloops  and  schooners 
took  them  across  the  Gulf  of  Maine  to  the  Kennebec,  and  very 
sea-sick  they  were  before  they  entered  the  river.  At  Fort 
Western,  where  Augusta  now  stands,  their  boats  were  ready 
for  them,  rough  bateaux,  built  of  common  boards,  two  hundred 
and  twenty  of  them,  very  badly  constructed  and  leaky. 

They  started  up  the  stream,  rowing  and  poling,  in  four 
divisions,  a  considerable  distance  apart,  with  the  indefatigable 
Daniel  Morgan  and  his  Virginians  at  the  head.  But  soon  they 
could  neither  pole  nor  row  in  the  rocky  stream.  The  men 
jumped  overboard  and  dragged  the  boats,  wading  in  the  cold 
water  all  day,  often  sinking  to  their  necks  or  over  their  heads 
in  the  deep  pools,  upsetting  the  leaky  boats,  losing  provisions 
and  often  guns.  They  reached  carrying  places  where  they  had 
to  transport  the  heavy  bateaux  and  cargoes  round  falls  and 
rapids.  The  black  soil  was  soaked  with  rain,  and  they  sank 
knee-deep,  stumbling  over  stones  and  roots  and  fallen  logs. 
With  the  heavy  bateau  grinding  into  their  shoulders,  or  almost 
dragging  their  arms  from  their  sockets,  as  they  carried  it  on 
handspikes,  a  misstep  of  one  man  in  the  mud  would  bring  the 
whole  party,  bateau  and  all,  to  the  ground.  They  would  rise, 
covered  with  black  mud,  cursing  and  laughing,  and  laugh  still 
louder  to  see  the  next  boat  crew  in  a  similar  plight. 

The  glory  and  enthusiasm  of  the  rights  of  man  was  heard 
on  every  side.  They  were  no  coerced  soldiery,  they  said,  and 
the  officers  were  given  to  understand  that  they  must  know  their 
place  and  keep  it.  The  men  had  taken  charge  of  the  expedition 
and  tolerated  the  officers  as  assistants.  They  bluntly  let  it  be 
understood  that  for  any  officer  to  attempt  compulsion  would  be 
fatal,  for  the  men  were  going  through  to  Quebec  of  themselves. 

Soon  they  were  amazed  at  the  sights  they  saw.  The  swamps, 
thickets,  and  hill-sides  were  covered  with  a  vast  network  of  the 
fallen  trees  of  centuries,  through  which  a  man  could  climb 
and  crawl  at  scarcely  a  mile  an  hour.  Their  most  violent  efforts 
with  the  bateaux  could  move  them  at  only  about  six  miles  a 
day.    The  character  of  the  country  through  which  they  passed 

26  401 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

has  been  greatly  changed  by  lumbering  operations  and  fires. 
The  woods  are  less  encumbered  and  dense;  there  is  less  water, 
and  the  Chaudiere  has  become  a  less  important  stream. 

They  saw  in  the  black  mud  the  great  hoof-marks  of  the 
moose.  Almost  every  day  they  would  rouse  some  of  these 
magnificent,  wild  creatures  from  their  lairs  to  see  them  dis- 
appear with  a  crash  into  thickets  that  seemed  impenetrable  to  a 
squirrel.  There  seem  to  have  been  few  if  any  deer;  and  the 
riflemen  killed  scarcely  any  game.  They  were  apparently  work- 
ing so  hard  with  the  boats  that  their  weapons  were  seldom 
ready;  and  the  necessity  of  pressing  forward  prevented  any 
delay  for  hunting.  It  would  have  required  a  great  deal  of 
hunting  and  consequent  delay  to  kill  enough  moose  to  feed  a 
thousand  men. 

Aaron  Burr,  the  son  of  the  president  of  Princeton  College, 
a  mere  lad,  and  an  adventurous  one,  accompanied  the  expedition 
in  the  capacity  of  what  was  called  a  gentleman  volunteer, 
uncommissioned  and  unenlisted.  He  found  a  pretty  Indian 
maiden,  Jacataqua,  of  a  romantic  disposition,  whom,  with  her 
dog,  he  persuaded  to  accompany  him  and  help  hunt.  He  took 
her  all  the  way  to  Canada,  where  it  is  supposed  the  nuns  near 
Quebec  befriended  her  and  her  child  that  was  born  there. 

They  reached  Dead  River,  which  was  to  connect  them  with 
the  head-waters  of  the  Chaudiere.  It  was  deep,  black,  and  still ; 
but  they  had  so  few  paddles  or  oars  that  they  could  take  but 
little  advantage  of  the  lack  of  current,  and  it  was  too  deep  for 
their  setting  poles.  Famine  had  set  in ;  provisions,  guns,  ammu- 
nition, and  the  money  for  wages  had  been  lost  from  the  leaky, 
overturning  boats.  Colonel  Enos  and  three  companies  of  mus- 
ketmen  in  the  rear,  appalled  at  the  difficulties,  had  abandoned 
the  expedition  and  returned  to  Massachusetts.  It  was  the  end 
of  October,  cold  and  snowing.  Torrents  of  rain  had  swollen  the 
streams,  overflowed  the  shores,  and  made  nearly  the  whole 
country  a  black  morass. 

To  send  the  sick  back  with  a  guard  and  press  on  was  the 
order  agreed  upon.  Arnold  and  a  small  party  started  ahead  to 
reach   the    Canadian   settlements    and   send   back   provisions. 

402 


FAMINE  AND  EXHAUSTION 

The  romance  was  fading,  and  even  the  rights  of  man  and 
equality  seemed  less  glorious. 

They  had  reached  the  Chaudiere  and  decided  to  abandon 
their  boats  with  the  exception  of  one  or  two  to  carry  some  of 
the  crippled  and  sick  who  would  not  give  up.  It  was  down  hill 
to  the  St.  Lawrence  on  the  rushing  Chaudiere.  But  the  river 
was  too  swift.  The  boats  narrowly  escaped  being  dashed  over 
falls,  and  all  took  to  the  land  along  the  shore. 

The  situation  had  become  alarming.  Jesting  and  good 
nature  had  ceased.  Wh<m  a  rifleman  fell  headlong  in  the  mud 
no  gay  voice  sang  out,  "Come  here  and  I'll  pick  you  up." 
Some  of  them  killed  and  ate  a  pet  dog — flesh,  skin,  and  entrails, 
and  then  boiled  the  bones.  They  dug  roots  out  of  the  half- 
frozen  mud  with  bleeding  hands.  They  boiled  and  ate  their 
extra  moose-skin  moccasins.  Some  six  hundred  men,  strung 
out  in  a  long  line  by  the  Chaudiere,  a  line  that  reeled,  stumbled, 
and  fell,  and  bent  up  and  down  over  the  high  wooded  hills; 
were  these  the  conquerors  of  Quebec? 

Dazed,  delirious,  half-blinded  by  famine  and  exhaustion, 
they  would  look  back  as  they  ascended  a  hill  to  see  others  falling 
over  one  another  and  rolling  down  the  opposite  slope.  On  the 
top  of  the  hill  they  would  halt  as  if  calculating  whether  their 
strength  would  take  them  down ;  then  they  would  start,  falling 
over  logs  and  stones  and  sending  their  guns  flying  into  the 
muddy  snow.  Then  up  the  next  slope  they  would  wearily  go, 
pulling  themselves  by  any  twig  and  bush  that  offered  assistance. 

"Every  man  for  himself,"  was  the  word  now  passed  along 
the  line;  and  there  were  loud  protests  against  it.  But  stern 
necessity  compelled  it.  The  strong  were  convinced  of  it,  and 
they  stopped  their  ears  as  they  left  a  companion  who  had  taken 
his  last  fall  over  a  log  and  could  rise  no  more. 

On  the  2nd  of  November,  the  day  Montgomery  took  St. 
Johns,  Morrison  emptied  the  bullets  out  of  his  leather  pouch 
and  boiled  it ;  and  soon  all  of  his  comrades  were  boiling  bullet- 
pouches.  Then  the  leather  breeches  were  cut  up.  A  mere 
twig  across  the  way  would  now  bring  the  strongest  man  to  the 
ground.     And  still  it  was  on  and  on,  while  from  every  hill 

403 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

they  could  see  a  thousand  more  monotonous  wooded  hill-tops 
stretching  away  forever  and  ever  like  a  bad  dream,  with  the 
rushing  Chaudiere  always  winding  in  and  out  among  them,  as 
if  it  too  could  never  escape. 

The  men  at  the  head  of  the  line  saw  cattle  driven  towards 
them,  and  men  leading  horses  with  great  sacks  laid  across  their 
backs,  and  they  sat  down  and  stared  at  one  another  as  if  this 
was  part  of  the  bad  dream.  But  it  was  true;  Arnold  had 
returned  from  the  Canadian  settlements  with  provisions;  and 
soon  great  fires  were  built  and  the  beef  and  potatoes  were 
cooking,  and  the  men  with  the  horses  were  going  back  along 
the  line  to  restore  the  dying.  Arnold  himself  arrived,  strong, 
enthusiastic,  and  jovial.  The  French  Canadians  were  on  their 
side,  he  said,  and  would  give  provisions ;  and  Montgomery  had 
already  beaten  the  British  in  Canada  and  taken  many  prisoners. 

So,  after  those  who  would  not  listen  to  reason  had  killed 
themselves  with  overeating,  all  that  was  left  of  the  expedition 
marched  down  among  the  French  Canadians;  and  truly  those 
simple-minded  people  looked  with  blank  amazement  at  the  pale 
ghosts  and  spectres  with  muskets  in  their  shadowy  hands, 
coming  out  of  the  impenetrable  winter  forest  to  drive  the 
English  from  the  continent. 

They  reached  the  shore  of  the  St.  Lawrence  at  Point  Levi. 
The  British  had  removed  all  the  small  boats,  and  the  Americans 
saw  the  strongly  fortified  Quebec,  twelve  hundred  yards  away 
across  the  water,  guarded  by  armed  merchantmen  and  two 
men-of-war.  They  caught  a  little  midshipman,  fifteen  years 
old,  who,  imprudently  venturing  ashore,  was  deserted  by  his 
boat 's  crew ;  and  his  good-natured  and  plucky  refusal  to  give 
information  amused  the  grim  hunters. 

They  had  set  out  with  1100  men.  Three  hundred  had  gone 
back  with  Colonel  Enos.  The  sick  that  returned  and  their 
guards  had  been  200.  The  wolves  were  gnawing  the  bones  of 
eighty  or  ninety  in  the  woods.  Those  who  stood  looking  at 
Quebec  half-armed  and  in  rags  were  about  510. 

The  expedition  had  already  failed.  The  dash  through  the 
Maine  wilderness  had  produced  nothing  but  a  tale  of  disaster 

404 


SUMMONS  OF  SURRENDER 

and  some  interesting  diaries  and  reminiscences.  The  1100  men 
would  have  been  as  efficiently  used  if  they  had  been  sent  with 
Montgomery  by  way  of  Lake  Champlain.  They  were  now  too 
late  to  take  Quebec  by  surprise,  as  they  might  have  done  a  few 
days  earlier.  Letters  sent  forward  by  Arnold,  as  he  supposed 
to  friends,  and  by  trusty  messengers,  had  fallen  into  the  hands 
of  Guy  Carleton,  who  a  few  days  afterwards  was  able  to  escape 
from  Montgomery  and  reach  the  garrison  of  Quebec. 

But  Arnold  and  his  men  were  as  hopeful  as  ever.  They 
collected  canoes  and  dugouts  from  great  distances,  and  on  the 
night  of  the  day  Montreal  was  taken,  the  13th  of  November,  by 
the  skilful  still  paddling  of  the  hunters,  they  dodged  the  mer- 
chant vessels  and  men-of-war  and  landed  before  Quebec  on  the 
Plains  of  Abraham.  Arnold  soon  after  sent  to  the  town  a 
summons  of  surrender,  but  his  flags  were  fired  upon  and  the 
summons  never  received.  Many  of  his  men  believed  that  they 
could  now  take  the  town  by  assault.  But  conservative  counsels 
prevailed ;  and  they  waited  to  be  joined  by  Montgomery. 

If  they  had  arrived  ten  days  sooner  it  has  been  supposed 
that  they  could  easily  have  taken  the  town.  But  meantime 
General  Carleton  had  entered  Quebec  and  his  forces  were  soon 
raised  to  some  1800  men.  He  felt  confident  of  holding  the  town 
and  making  it  a  base  from  which  to  save  Canada.2 

Sir  Guy  Carleton,  afterwards  Lord  Dorchester,  was  an 
accomplished  and  rather  interesting  man.  He  is  said  to  have 
suggested  the  Quebec  Act;  and  in  his  defence  of  Canada  he 
certainly  rendered  good  service  to  England.  He  is  described  as 
firm,  humane,  and  of  the  most  unvarying  courtesy  under  all 
circumstances.  He  was  troubled  with  no  Whig  principles  or 
doctrines  of  the  rights  of  man,  although  he  had  been  Wolfe's 
quartermaster-general.  He  believed  in  subduing  the  colonies  by 
the  most  overwhelming  severity  and  force;  but  that  all  rebel 
prisoners,  after  a  short  confinement,  should  be  allowed  to  return 
to  their  homes  on  parole,  to  be  afterwards,  if  necessary, 
exchanged. 


2  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iii,  p.  1696. 

405 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

Montgomery  soon  joined  Arnold,  and  they  began  a  mild 
siege  of  Quebec.  They  built  breastworks  of  snow  and  poured 
water  on  them  to  freeze  them  solid,  for  scarcely  any  earth  could 
be  scraped  from  the  frozen  soil.  Such  protections  were  easily 
shattered  by  the  enemy's  cannon;  and  the  American  artillery 
was  of  such  small  caliber  and  so  ineffective  that  the  women  came 
out  on  the  ramparts  of  Quebec  to  ridicule  it.  But  the  riflemen 
were  very  effective.  Creeping  close  to  the  walls  and  sheltering 
themselves  behind  houses,  or  any  object  that  presented  itself, 
they  dealt  destruction  with  their  tiny  bullets  to  any  incautious 
soldier  in  the  town. 

The  addition  of  Montgomery's  troops  raised  the  American 
force  to  about  eight  hundred  men,  hardly  enough  to  take  such  a 
stronghold  as  Quebec.  To  take  it  by  siege  seemed  impossible. 
An  assault  must  be  tried,  and  they  grimly  waited  for  their 
opportunity,  while  the  winter  snows  fell  deeper  and  deeper. 
The  signal  finally  agreed  upon  was  to  come  from  nature — a 
snow-storm  at  midnight. 

The  evening  of  the  31st  of  December,  1775,  was  an  intensely 
cold  one ;  the  men  were  scattered  among  the  farms  and  tippling- 
houses  enjoying  themselves  and  keeping  warm.  But  as  they 
started  to  return  to  their  huts  the  snow-storm  began.  Soon  it 
was  a  stinging  blast  carried  horizontally  along  the  ground  and 
cutting  the  face.  By  two  o'clock  in  the  morning  they  were 
hurrying  through  it,  every  man  holding  the  lapel  of  his  coat 
wrapped  over  the  flint-lock  of  his  gun,  stumbling  and  falling 
in  the  snow-drifts.  Montgomery,  with  his  aide,  McPherson,  of 
Philadelphia,  and  also,  it  is  said,  accompanied  by  Aaron  Burr,3 
led  the  attack  on  one  side  of  the  lower  town,  and  Arnold  on 
the  other. 

Arnold's  command  was  a  long  column,  almost  in  single  file, 
with  Daniel  Morgan  and  his  Virginians  in  front  and  the  Penn- 
sylvanians  closely  following.  Presently  were  heard  the  sharp 
reports  of  their  rifles  at  the  first  barrier.     The  riflemen  sent 


sCodman,    "Arnold's    Expedition    to    Quebec,"    p.    232;    with   which 
compare  Magazine  of  American  History,  vol.  xi,  p.  294,  note. 

406 


THE  ASSAULT  ON  QUEBEC 

their  little  bullets  through  the  port-holes  with  such  unerring 
aim  that  the  gunners  were  killed  or  driven  from  their  posts. 
Morgan  was  the  first  to  spring  upon  the  barrier  and  throw 
himself  down  among  the  enemy.  The  rest  of  the  column 
followed  and  swept  the  English  before  them.  Those  who  were 
not  riflemen  quickly  seized  the  excellent  English  muskets  from 
the  dead  and  wounded  in  place  of  their  own  inferior  weapons. 
Arnold  was  wounded  in  the  leg  before  the  barrier  was  taken  and 
had  to  be  supported  back  to  the  American  camp. 

The  taking  of  the  first  barrier  let  them  into  the  lower  town, 
and  they  rushed  through  it  up  a  street  to  another  barrier,  from 
which  the  cannon  and  the  muskets  of  the  Englishmen  were 
spitting  flame  through  the  dim  light  of  the  driving  snow.  The 
riflemen  again  tried  their  device  of  shooting  carefully  into  the 
port-holes,  but  it  failed.  The  cannoneers  and  musketmen  were 
too  well  settled  at  their  work.  Pennsylvanians  and  Virginians 
were  falling  on  every  side.  It  was  strange  that  they  were  not 
all  killed,  for  the  British  had  them  hemmed  within  the  narrow 
street.  As  the  wounded  rolled  over  into  the  deep  snow  they 
quickly  died  of  the  intense  cold  which  stiffened  their  limbs  into 
the  last  frantic  or  fantastic  attitude  of  their  death  agony. 

There  was  confused  fighting  in  the  streets  and  houses  for  a 
long  time.  Some  of  the  Americans  rushed  up  close  against  the 
barrier ;  they  crowded  under  it  in  a  mass ;  the  cannon  could  not 
be  sufficiently  depressed  to  reach  them,  and  they  could  inflict 
instant  death  on  a  musketman  who  showed  himself  at  a  port- 
hole. In  the  lull  they  called  out  to  the  English  to  come  out  and 
fight  in  the  open. 

1 '  Come  out  and  buy  our  rifles, ' '  they  shouted  ;  ' '  they  are  for 
sale  cheap." 

The  tall,  powerful  figures  of  Morgan  and  Hendricks  were 
conspicuous  in  every  part  of  the  fight  encouraging  the  men. 
The  stentorian  voice  of  Morgan  could  be  heard  above  all  the 
din.  He  fought  like  an  ancient  knight,  a  Coeur  de  Lion,  killing 
Englishmen  with  his  own  hands,  and  in  one  of  the  intervals 
disguising  himself  and  penetrating  into  the  town  to  learn  its 
condition. 

407 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

The  rear  of  Arnold's  column  arrived  with  scaling-ladders, 
which  they  threw  against  the  barrier.  But  the  neighboring 
houses  were  filled  with  English,  and  volleys  of  musketry  were 
poured  upon  the  assailants.  They  could  no  longer  crouch  under 
the  barrier  or  man  the  ladders. 

The  barrier  could  not  be  carried,  and  the  Americans  were 
ordered  into  the  houses.  They  battered  down  the  doors  with 
butts  of  guns  and  rushed  up  to  the  windows  in  the  full  belief 
that  they  could  shoot  all  the  gunners  in  the  barrier.  Pennsyl- 
vanians  and  Virginians  were  aiming  their  rifles  through  every 
opening.  It  was  at  one  of  these  windows  that  the  gallant 
Hendricks  was  shot.  He  staggered  back  into  the  room  and  fell 
across  a  bed  in  the  corner. 

There  was  now  a  short  time  when  the  Americans,  thor- 
oughly convinced  of  the  hopelessness  of  their  task,  might  have 
drawn  out  and  escaped.  Some  of  them  did  so,  especially  the 
few  Indians  and  Canadians  who  had  joined  them.  These 
hurried  down  to  St.  Charles  Bay  and  started  across  the  two 
miles  of  ice  heaped  up  by  the  tide  and  full  of  air-holes 
deceptively  covered  by  the  snow.  The  rest  were  presently 
caught  in  the  streets  and  houses  as  in  a  trap.  General  Carleton 
sent  Captain  Laws  on  a  sortie  out  of  the  Palace  gate,  and  he 
came  in  behind  the  Americans  in  the  street. 

On  the  other  side  of  the  town  Montgomery  broke  through 
the  palisades  by  the  aid  of  his  carpenters,  and  rushing  in, 
shouted  to  his  men,  "Push  on,  brave  boys;  Quebec  is  ours." 
He  was  met  by  the  discharge  of  a  cannon  from  a  barrier  which 
stretched  him  and  his  aide,  McPherson,  lifeless  on  the  snow.  It 
was  subsequently  learned  that  the  British  were  so  demoralized 
by  the  onset  that  they  were  retreating  from  the  barrier,  which 
could  easily  have  been  carried  and  the  town  entered.  But 
Colonel  Campbell,  who  succeeded  Montgomery  in  command, 
ordered  a  retreat. 

The  attack  on  Quebec,  whatever  may  have  been  its  possibili- 
ties, had  failed.  The  American  loss  has  been  variously  esti- 
mated; but  was  probably  300  prisoners  and  70  killed  and 
wounded.    It  was  a  sad  fate  for  so  many  of  Arnold's  column 

408 


TREATMENT  OF  PRISONERS 

to  have  to  surrender  after  such  a  gallant  struggle,  and  be 
ridiculed  for  the  piece  of  paper  pinned  on  their  hats  on  which 
was  written  "Liberty  or  Death."  Morgan,  weeping  with  vexa- 
tion, at  first  refused  to  surrender,  and,  placing  his  back  against 
a  wall,  with  his  drawn  sword  in  his  hand,  defied  the  enemy  to 
take  it  from  him ;  but  he  finally  consented  to  hand  it  to  a  priest 
whom  he  saw  in  the  crowd. 

The  officers  wrere  confined  in  what  was  called  the  seminary, 
and  the  privates  given  a  less  comfortable  jail.  The  English,  as 
afterwards  often  happened,  were  much  amused  at  finding  the 
officers  to  be  men  of  no  social  position.  "You  can  have  no 
conception,"  wrote  Major  Caldwell,  "what  kind  of  men  com- 
posed their  officers.  Of  those  we  took  one  major  was  a  black- 
smith, another  a  hatter;  of  their  captains,  there  was  a  butcher, 
a  tanner,  a  shoemaker,  a  tavern-keeper,  etc. ;  yet  they  pretended 
to  be  gentlemen. ' '  4 

Henry,  who  was  among  the  prisoners,  relates  the  extraordi- 
nary appearance  of  the  dead  whom  he  saw  hauled  through  the 
streets  in  carts.  They  were  frozen  as  stiff  as  marble  statues 
in  every  imaginable  attitude  of  agony  or  horror.  They  were 
tossed  into  the  carts  like  rigid  boards,  with  outstretched  arms, 
pointing  fingers,  and  contorted  legs  and  necks. 

Among  the  privates  who  were  prisoners,  those  who  admitted 
that  they  had  been  born  in  England,  Scotland,  or  Ireland  were 
told  that  they  had  their  choice  of  enlisting  in  the  British  army 
or  going  to  England  to  be  tried  for  treason.  Under  the  advice 
of  their  comrades,  and  in  the  belief  that  the  oath  of  allegiance 
under  those  circumstances  would  not  be  binding  on  any  con- 
science, about  ninety-five  of  these  men  enlisted,  and  took  their 
chances  of  an  opportunity  to  desert. 

Two  of  them,  Conners  and  Cavanaugh,  soon  made  an  oppor- 
tunity for  themselves.  They  walked  up  to  a  sentinel  guarding 
the  edge  of  the  high  precipice  that  surrounded  part  of  Quebec, 
and  offered  the  man  a  bottle  of  rum.  While  the  sentinel  hesi- 
tated they  wrenched  his  gun  from  him,  knocked  him  down  with 


Codman,  "  Arnold's  Expedition  to  Quebec,"  p.  265. 

409 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

the  butt  of  it,  and  then  ran  to  the  precipice  and  leaped  over.  It 
was  a  daring  leap,  but  in  some  respects  a  safe  one,  for  the  snow 
was  drifted  twenty  feet  deep  at  the  bottom.  They  nearly  suffo- 
cated in  the  drift,  but  managed  to  scramble  out  while  the 
British  were  shooting  at  them  from  above.  Cannon-balls  and 
grape-shot  were  fired  at  them  as  they  ran  over  the  snowy  roads ; 
but  they  escaped  out  into  the  country  where  the  remains  of 
Montgomery's  and  Arnold's  commands  still  maintained  an 
unconquered  and  sullen  siege  of  Quebec. 

The  privates  that  remained  in  the  jail  planned  a  most 
ingenious  method  of  escape,  which  failed  by  a  mere  accident. 
Most  of  them  were  heavily  ironed  and  looked  forward  to  a  hard 
fate,  from  which,  however,  they  were  unexpectedly  released  the 
following  summer.  Carleton,  with  the  greatest  kindness,  set 
them  all  free  on  parole,  and  a  year  or  so  afterwards  they  were 
regularly  exchanged.  This  treatment  was  in  striking  contrast 
to  the  cruelty  and  suffering  usually  inflicted  on  the  patriots  in 
English  prisons.  It  released  Morgan  and  saved  his  health  to 
win  the  battle  of  the  Cowpens.  The  prisoners  were  taken  in  a 
ship  to  New  York  Bay,  in  the  summer  of  1776,  and  turned  loose 
on  the  Jersey  shore  at  midnight.  Morgan  threw  himself  flat  on 
the  ground  and  kissed  it.  They  then  all  ran  a  race  to  Elizabeth, 
where  they  danced,  sang,  and  gave  the  Indian  war-whoop  for 
the  rest  of  the  night. 

There  was  great  consternation  in  the  American  camp  when 
it  was  known  that  the  assault  had  failed  with  such  heavy  loss, 
and  that  Montgomery  was  dead.  About  one  hundred  of  the 
troops  fled  to  Montreal.  Some  of  the  invalid  soldiers  in  the 
hospital  were  panic-stricken,  and  in  attempting  to  spring  from 
their  beds  and  escape  fell  helpless  on  the  floor.  But  Arnold, 
stretched  on  his  bed  with  a  painful  wound,  was  as  resolute  as 
ever.  When  told  that  the  enemy  were  sallying  he  would  not 
allow  himself  to  be  carried  to  a  place  of  safety,  but  ordered  his 
pistols  and  sword  to  be  placed  beside  him  so  that  he  could  fight 
to  the  last.  He  coolly  issued  orders  reorganizing  the  shattered 
forces,  which  now  numbered  only  700  men ;  and  he  wrote  letters 
to  the  South  calling  loudly  for  reinforcements.     He  resigned 

410 


USELESS  PIECE  OF  HEROISM 

the  command  in  favor  of  Colonel  Campbell;  but  the  officers 
would  not  permit  it.  In  spite  of  his  protests  and  wound,  and 
although  he  was  beginning  to  have  personal  quarrels  with  them, 
they  unanimously  elected  him  commander;  and  Congress  soon 
made  him  a  brigadier-general. 

"  I  have  no  thought  of  leaving  this  proud  town,"  he  wrote,  "  until 
I  first  enter  it  in  triumph.  My  wound  has  been  exceedingly  painful,  but 
it  is  now  easy,  and  the  surgeon  assures  me  that  it  will  be  well  in  eight 
weeks.  Providence,  which  has  carried  me  through  so  many  dangers,  is 
still  my  protector.  I  am  in  the  way  of  my  duty,  and  know  no  fear." 
(Codman,  "Arnold's  Expedition  to  Quebec,"  p.  256.) 

But  heroism  alone  will  not  win  wars  or  revolutions.  Wash- 
ington's opinion  of  the  assault  on  Quebec  was  that  it  was  a 
rash,  useless  piece  of  heroism,  and  that  Montgomery  had  been 
misled  into  making  it  by  the  feeling  that  he  might  soon  be  left 
without  any  troops  and  that  before  they  disappeared  some 
stroke  must  be  attempted.5 


5  Writings  of  Washington,  Ford  edition,  vol.  8,  p.  504.  The  numerous 
diaries  of  the  survivors,  Codman's  "  Arnold's  Expedition  to  Quebec," 
Justin  H.  Smith's  "  Arnold's  March  from  Cambridge  to  Quebec,"  and 
American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vols,  iii,  iv,  contain  very  full  and 
reliable  information  as  to  Arnold's  expedition  and  the  assault  on  Quebec. 
The  number  of  troops  which  Arnold  and  Montgomery  had  for  the  assault 
has  sometimes  been  stated  at  1200,  but  letters  from  Arnold  and  Mont- 
gomery show  it  to  have  been  less  than  900.  See  American  Archives, 
fourth  series,  vol.  iv,  pp.  190,  309 ;  Codman,  "  Arnold's  Expedition,"  p. 
182.  The  letters  of  Arnold,  Colonel  Campbell,  and  Carleton  describing 
the  assault  can  be  read  in  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iv,  pp. 
480,  481,  589,  656,  670,  836,  1652.  The  original  letters  of  Arnold  and 
Montgomery  can  be  found  under  their  names  in  the  index  of  the  Archives. 
See  also  Jones,  "  New  York  in  the  Revolution,"  vol.  i,  p.  729 ;  Graham, 
"  Life  of  General  Morgan."  Mr.  Justin  H.  Smith's  recent  work,  "  Our 
Struggle  for  the  Fourteenth  Colony,"  contains  in  footnotes  a  mass  of 
valuable  citations  of  the  original  evidence. 


XXXVII. 

THE  RETREAT  FROM  CANADA 

Although  the  assault  on  Quebec  had  failed,  the  Americans 
still  held  Canada  all  the  way  from  the  Quebec  ramparts  back 
to  Montreal,  where  General  Wooster  was  now  in  command  of  a 
few  patriot  troops.  The  Canadian  population  was  not  hostile ; 
they  were  inclined  to  be  passively  friendly ;  but  they  were  not 
enthusiastic  and  were  watching  events  to  see  if  the  Americans 
could  really  win  and  get  possession  of  the  country. 

Arnold  had  no  idea  of  retreating.  He  clung  to  his  position 
in  the  snow  before  Quebec  all  the  rest  of  the  winter,  keeping  up 
a  feeble  and  ineffective  blockade  of  the  old  town,  which  regu- 
larly received  its  most  important  supply,  firewood,  in  spite  of 
all  he  could  do  to  prevent  it.  The  garrison  of  the  town  out- 
numbered his  forces  three  to  one ;  but  they  made  no  attempt  to 
sally  out  and  attack  him.  They  were  content  to  wait  quietly 
until  spring,  when,  after  the  ice  had  melted,  British  war- 
vessels  and  transports  could  reach  them  with  reinforcements, 
which  they  felt  sure  would  drive  the  Americans  out  of  Canada. 

It  was  quite  clear  that  if  Canada  was  to  be  retained  Quebec 
must  be  taken  during  the  winter  before  navigation  opened. 
Washington  urged  Arnold  to  action,  assured  him  that  success 
would  crown  his  efforts  and  that  he  would  enter  Quebec  in 
triumph  with  his  brave  followers.  Washington  even  went  so 
far  as  to  say  that  the  whole  success  of  the  patriot  cause 
depended  on  the  capture  of  Quebec,  the  stronghold  of  America. 
Arnold  replied  with  equal  zeal  and  hopefulness,  but  asked  for  a 
reinforcement  of  5000  men,  which,  of  course,  could  not  be  sent.1 

Every  effort,  however,  was  made  in  New  England;  and 
during  the  winter  a  few  scattered  troops  worked  their  way 


American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iv,  p.  1513. 

412 


DEFECT  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN 

northward  on  snow-shoes  through  New  Hampshire  and  Ver- 
mont. One  company  cut  a  road  for  forty  miles  across  the  Green 
Mountains  to  the  Otter  River,  and  descended  that  stream  on 
rafts.  Arnold  supplemented  these  endeavors  by  trying  to 
recruit  Canadians,  pledging  his  own  credit  and  the  credit  of 
the  Congress.  But  the  Canadians  were  very  suspicious  of  paper 
money  and  credit.  The  heroic  Arnold  could  accomplish  very 
little  during  that  terrible  northern  winter  of  continuous  snow- 
storms, and  severe  cold,  while  gloom,  bad  food,  and  the  small- 
pox were  decimating  his  men. 

In  comparing  this  campaign  with  the  one  which  was  its 
model  conducted  by  Wolfe  and  Amherst,  in  the  old  French 
War,  one  cannot  but  notice  an  important  point  in  which  Arnold 
and  Montgomery  failed  to  follow  the  original.  In  the  attack 
upon  Canada  in  the  French  War,  England  had  complete  com- 
mand of  the  sea,  and  the  heaviest  forces  were  massed  against 
Quebec.  Wolfe  moved  upon  Quebec  with  a  fleet  and  12,000  men 
and  the  rest  of  the  forces,  consisting  of  about  11,000,  were  given 
to  Amherst  to  assail  Montreal  by  way  of  Lake  Champlain. 
Amherst's  slow  advance  on  Montreal  merely  served  to  hold 
Bourlamaque 's  3000  troops  in  that  place,  and  prevent  their 
going  to  the  rescue  of  Quebec.  Wolfe  was  successful  in  taking 
Quebec,  which  really  ended  the  war,  and  the  taking  of  Montreal 
afterwards  was  a  mere  formal  matter.2 

But  in  the  campaign  of  Arnold  and  Montgomery  the  patriots 
had  no  control  of  the  sea.  They  hoped  to  make  up  for  this 
disadvantage  by  attacking  Quebec  quickly  in  the  autumn,  before 
the  British  navy  could  arrive  in  force ;  and  they  relied  on  the 
ice  to  prevent  the  arrival  of  the  warships  until  the  following 
spring.  Moreover,  instead  of  the  heaviest  force  being  massed 
on  Quebec,  the  weakest  force  was  massed  on  it.  After  his 
hardship  in  the  Maine  wilderness  and  the  loss  of  Enos's  men, 
Arnold  arrived  before  Quebec  with  only  five  hundred  badly- 
armed  and  ragged  troops,  instead  of  with  a  thousand,  as  was 
hoped.    Even  a  thousand  would  have  been  little  enough.    But 


a  Wood,  "  The  Fight  for  Canada,"  chap,  vii,  pp.  147,  165,  166. 

413 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

it  was  expected  that  this  defect  would  be  made  up  by  his 
arriving  soon  and  suddenly  when  the  garrison  was  weak  and 
unprepared.  But  he  arrived  ten  days  too  late,  all  his  plans  had 
been  discovered,  and  Carleton  escaped  from  Montgomery  and 
got  into  Quebec  to  reorganize  and  animate  its  garrison. 

In  March,  1776,  the  efforts  to  send  troops  to  Arnold  began 
to  give  him  some  slight  assistance.  A  regiment  of  three  hundred 
and  forty  men  had  started  from  Pennsylvania  in  January. 
These  troops  are  said  to  have  had  regular  uniforms,  brown  with 
buff  facings,  and  knapsacks  of  Russian  duck.  They  had  to 
make  a  march  of  over  six  hundred  miles  in  the  dead  of  winter. 
The  patriots  in  the  country  through  which  they  passed  assisted 
them  at  times  with  sleds,  but  a  large  part  of  their  march  was 
made  on  foot.  They  travelled  the  length  of  Lake  George  and 
of  Lake  Chaplain  on  the  ice;  and  from  Ticonderoga  to 
Montreal,  having  no  sleds,  they  were  obliged  to  carry  all  their 
provisions  on  their  backs  through  that  wilderness  country. 
They  reached  their  destination  almost  as  exhausted  as  Arnold 's 
men  had  been  when  they  emerged  from  the  forests  of  Maine. 

Other  small  bodies  of  troops  from  New  York,  New  England, 
and  New  Jersey,  reached  Arnold;  but  at  first  these  accessions 
merely  made  up  for  the  losses  by  small-pox  and  hardships.  In 
April  General  Wooster  came  down  from  Montreal  bringing 
cannon  and  ammunition,  and  superseded  Arnold,  who  retired 
to  Montreal  in  disgust.  Wooster  had  now  about  two  thousand 
men,  and  he  began  to  bombard  the  fortifications  of  Quebec,  but 
to  the  great  surprise  of  the  patriots  the  shot  made  not  the 
slightest  impression,  and  the  return  fire  of  the  garrison  was  so 
continuous  and  accurate  that  the  bombardment  had  to  be 
abandoned. 

Meanwhile,  however,  patriot  reinforcements  were  moving 
up  through  New  York,  hurried  on  by  the  untiring  labors  of 
General  Schuyler,  who  was  still  in  command  of  the  transporta- 
tion and  supplies  on  Lake  Champlain.  The  British  evacuated 
Boston,  which  set  free  the  army  before  Cambridge,  and  regi- 
ment after  regiment  started  on  the  route  through  Lake  Cham- 

414 


ARRIVAL  OF  THE  ISIS 

plain.  At  the  same  time  the  British  Ministry  started  a  large 
force  on  transports  under  General  Burgoyne  to  enter  Quebec 
as  soon  as  the  opening  spring  melted  the  ice  of  the  St.  Lawrence. 

It  was  to  be  a  race  for  the  Gibraltar  of  America;  but 
unfortunately  nature  fought  against  the  Americans.  The  ice 
on  Lake  Champlain  was  so  rotten  that  the  troops  could  not 
march  on  it,  but  it  was  strong  enough  to  prevent  the  passage  of 
boats.  The  trails  and  roads  through  the  wilderness  on  either 
side  were  impassable  with  slush  and  mud,  so  that  patriot  troops 
were  blocked  and  held  inactive  at  Ticonderoga  and  Crown 
Point.  Nothing  shows  more  clearly  how  the  possession  of 
Quebec  and  Canada  depended  on  the  control  of  the  sea;  for 
during  the  first  week  of  May  the  British  war-ships  sailed 
through  the  floating  ice  of  the  St.  Lawrence  and  poured  a 
reinforcement  into  Carleton's  garrison.3 

The  first  vessel  to  arrive  in  the  mouth  of  the  St.  Lawrence 
was  the  "Isis,"  a  fifty-gun  ship,  which  had  sailed  from  England 
on  the  11th  of  March  and  spent  a  month  in  reaching  St.  Peters 
Island.  From  there  nearly  another  month  was  spent  in  driving 
the  ship  with  great  labor  and  hardship  scarcely  two  hundred 
miles  through  fields  of  thick  ice  to  Anticostie  Island.  When 
well  within  the  river  the  "Isis"  was  joined  by  two  other  British 
vessels,  which  had  likewise  spent  nearly  two  months  in  making 
their  way  from  England.  They  reached  Quebec  on  the  6th  of 
May,  followed  within  a  few  days  by  the  rest  of  the  fleet, 
bringing  about  10,000  men. 

General  John  Thomas,  of  Massachusetts,  had  been  appointed 
by  the  Congress  to  the  command  in  Canada  to  supersede  General 
"Wooster,  who  was  throwing  everything  into  confusion.  Thomas 
was  a  physician  by  profession,  and  had  served  in  the  French 
War.  In  the  recent  siege  of  Boston  he  had  had  charge  of  that 
part  of  the  line  which  faced  Boston  Neck,  and  had  commanded 
the  troops  which  seized  Dorchester  Heights  in  March,  1776. 
When  he  reached  the  patriot  forces  before  Quebec,  on  the  1st  of 
May,  he  found  there  1900  men,  of  whom  900  were  invalids  with 


8  Writings  of  Washington,  Ford  edition,  vol.  4,  pp.  8,  14. 

415 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

the  small-pox,  which  in  the  beginning  had  been  caught  from  a 
girl  who  came  out  from  Quebec  as  a  nurse.  The  disease  spread 
with  frightful  rapidity,  not  only  by  natural  contagion,  but  by 
the  inoculation  which  the  troops,  and  every  fresh  company  of 
reinforcements,  secretly  practised  to  save  themselves  from  the 
disease  itself.4 

The  thousand  effectives  had  to  support  scattered  forts,  some 
of  them  on  the  other  side  of  the  river.  The  enlistments  of  three 
hundred  of  them  were  about  expiring,  and  all  were  anxious  to 
return  home.  Thomas  began  preparations  for  removing  the 
invalids  and  the  supplies  further  up  the  river  to  a  place  of 
safety.  He  was  in  the  midst  of  these  preparations  when  the 
first  division  of  the  British  force  arrived,  on  the  6th  of  May. 
He  immediately  ordered  a  retreat,  and  his  decision  was  none  too 
soon,  for  the  troops  were  landed  and  a  sally  made  from  the 
city  at  one  o'clock  with  scarcely  a  moment's  delay.  Thomas's 
force  was  so  weak  and  demoralized  by  small-pox  and  hardships 
that  his  retreat  might  have  been  a  very  disastrous  rout  if  the 
British  had  had  the  courage  to  press  him  more  vigorously.  The 
desperate  character  of  Arnold's  and  Montgomery's  assault  on 
the  city  seems  to  have  inspired  Carleton  with  most  conservative 
caution. 

Thomas  was  obliged  to  leave  behind  him  two  hundred  sick 
and  several  detached  parties,  which,  with  his  cannon,  pro- 
visions, powder,  and  five  hundred  stand  of  arms,  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  enemy.  It  was  a  hurried  retreat  and  a  mortifying 
one  to  the  patriot  party ;  for  Thomas 's  men  hardly  had  time  to 
carry  off  anything  with  them  except  the  ragged  clothes  on  their 
backs.  Many  of  the  sick  who  had  the  small-pox  out  thick  on 
them  got  out  of  their  beds  and  followed  the  retreat,  exposed  to 
wet  and  cold  without  blankets  or  anything  to  cover  them.5 

There  was  danger  that  the  British  ships  would  pass  up  the 
river  and  cut  off  their  retreat ;   and  after  halting  for  a  time  at 


*  Gordon,    "American    Revolution,"    edition    1788,    vol.    ii,    p.    251 
Writings  of  Washington,  Ford  edition,  vol.  4,  pp.  2  note,  120  note. 
8  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  i,  p.  129. 

416 


DISASTER  AT  THE  CEDARS 

Deschambault  and  again  at  Three  Rivers,  the  main  body  crossed 
to  the  southern  side  of  the  St.  Lawrence  and  entrenched  them- 
selves at  Sorel,  which  was  the  beginning  of  their  line  of  com- 
munication back  to  New  York,  and  the  route  by  which  they 
obtained  supplies  and  reinforcements.6 

Arnold  now  left  Montreal  and  joined  the  army  at  Sorel 
with  the  intention  of  repossessing  Deschambault  and  checking 
the  British  advance;  for  to  remain  at  Sorel  was  to  abandon 
Canada.  Scattering  reinforcements  were  coming  on  through 
Lake  Champlain  now  that  the  ice  was  disappearing ;  and  there 
was  hope  that  Canada  might  yet  be  saved  for  the  patriots.  But 
just  at  this  moment  a  blow  was  struck  from  the  westward  which 
showed  the  essential  weakness  of  our  hold  on  Canada. 

The  British  in  Canada  had  outposts  and  forts  far  to  the 
westward  along  the  Great  Lakes,  even  so  far  as  Detroit.  There 
had  been  some  thought  among  the  patriots  of  securing  these  in 
the  beginning,  but  the  force  under  Schuyler  and  Montgomery 
had  not  been  sufficient.  One  post,  called  the  Cedars,  forty-five 
miles  southwest  of  Montreal,  was,  however,  occupied  by  a 
patriot  force  of  nearly  four  hundred  men  under  Colonel  Bedel. 
This  post  was  now  attacked  by  about  six  hundred  Indians  and 
Canadians  and  fifty  regulars,  under  Captain  Foster,  its  sur- 
render forced,  and  a  rescuing  party  of  patriots  from  Montreal 
cut  to  pieces  by  the  Indians.  The  expedition  had  been  cleverly 
planned  by  Carleton  to  strike  the  patriots  on  the  west  at  about 
the  same  time  that  Burgoyne's  force  from  Quebec  attacked 
them  on  the  east. 

Arnold  with  his  usual  promptness  and  intrepidity  collected 
eight  hundred  patriots  and  by  a  bold  advance  stopped  the 
further  progress  of  this  movement  from  the  west.  After  long 
negotiations  he  obtained  a  release  of  the  prisoners  who  had 
fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  Indians,  had  been  stripped  naked 
and  treated  with  great  barbarity.  It  must  have  been  some  satis- 


8  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  vi,  pp.  398,  430,  438,  448,  452, 
454,    458,    1089;    Codman,    "Arnold's    Expedition    to    Quebec,"    p.    300; 
Gordon,  "  American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  pp.  212,  251,  252. 
27  417 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

faction  to  them  to  reflect  that  many  of  the  Indians  contracted 
the  small-pox  from  stripping  the  prisoners  who  had  it.7 

When  General  Thomas  had  retreated  from  Quebec  not  a  few 
of  the  men  of  his  outlying  detachments,  unable  to  join  him,  had 
become  scattered  in  the  swamps  and  woods,  in  which  they  were 
still  hiding  and  were  making  their  way  out  with  difficulty.  On 
the  20th  of  May  Carleton  issued  a  remarkable  proclamation 
addressed  to  these  dispersed  Americans.  They  were  perishing, 
he  heard,  from  hunger  and  cold ;  ' '  and,  lest  a  consciousness  of 
past  offences  should  deter  such  miserable  wretches  from  receiv- 
ing that  assistance  which  their  distressed  condition  might 
require,"  he  promised  that,  if  they  would  surrender,  they 
should  be  cared  for  in  the  hospitals,  and,  when  restored,  should 
be  free  to  return  to  the  rebel  colonies.8 

This  policy  was  much  admired  by  some  of  the  loyalists,  who 
said  that  if  it  had  been  universally  carried  out  by  all  British 
commanders  it  would  quickly  have  ended  the  rebellion,  because 
there  would  soon  not  have  been  a  rebel  willing  to  fight  an  empire 
of  such  generous  liberality.  There  was  no  officer  in  the  British 
army,  it  was  said,  so  dangerous  to  the  cause  of  independence 
as  Carleton.9  But  it  is  not  reported  that  any  patriots  took 
advantage  of  his  proclamation.  Prisoners  whom  he  released,  of 
course,  spoke  highly  of  him.  But  the  independence  movement 
was  beyond  the  reach  of  kindness  and  conciliation,  as  the 
Ministry  soon  discovered. 


1  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  vi,  pp.  458,  469,  479,  480,  481, 
482,  560,  566,  576,  578,  579,  588,  589,  590,  596,  598,  600,  647,  838,  1083; 
fifth  series  vol.  i,  pp.  158,  169,  1571;  vol.  ii,  pp.  891,  893,  919;  Gordon, 
"American  Kevolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  p.  375;  Jones,  "New  York 
in  the  Revolution,"  vol.  i,  pp.  93,  94;  Writings  of  Washington,  Ford 
edition,  vol.  iv,  p.  357  note;  Wilkinson,  Memoirs,  vol.  i,  pp.  41-47; 
Stedman,  "American  War,"  vol.  i,  p.  171. 

8 American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  vi,  p.  418;  "Diary  and 
Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.  ii,  p.  115;  Fonblanque,  "Life  of 
Burgoyne,"  p.  222 ;  Lamb,  "  American  War,'  p.  89. 

9  Jones,  "  New  York  in  the  Revolution,"  vol.  i,  pp.  89,  90,  133,  181, 
182;  vol.  ii,  pp.  469,  470;  Pennsylvania  Magazine  of  History,  vol.  xx, 
p.  513;  Wilkinson,  Memoirs,  vol.  i,  p.  55  note. 

418 


COMMISSIONERS  TO  CANADA 

In  March,  1776,  a  committee  of  the  Congress,  composed  of 
Franklin,  Samuel  Chase,  and  Charles  Carroll,  of  Maryland, 
went  to  Canada  to  help  win  it  to  the  side  of  the  revolted  colonies. 
John  Carroll,  a  Roman  Catholic  priest,  accompanied  them  in  the 
hope  of  influencing  the  French  Canadian  clergy.  It  was  a 
terrible  journey  for  them  in  the  month  of  March,  and  nearly 
cost  Franklin  his  life.  They  found  only  defeat  and  disaster 
and  large  debts  contracted  by  Montgomery's  army  with  the 
Canadians,  which  could  not  be  paid. 

Franklin  and  John  Carroll,  the  priest,  had  now  returned  to 
New  York;  but  Chase  and  Charles  Carroll  were  still  in 
Montreal.  After  the  retreat  of  Thomas  from  Quebec  they  lost 
all  hope  of  retaining  Canada,  and  their  letters  and  reports 
reveal  the  deplorable  condition  of  our  troops,  who  were  heartily 
tired  of  the  service  and  believed  themselves  neglected  and  aban- 
doned by  Congress.  The  commissioners  regretted  that  rein- 
forcements were  arriving,  because  there  was  no  food  for  them 
except  what  they  could  get  by  plundering  our  supposed  friends, 
the  Canadians,  and  there  was  no  way  of  protecting  them  from 
the  small-pox.10 

"  We  cannot  find  words  strong  enough  to  describe  our  miserable 
situation.  You  will  have  a  faint  idea  of  it  if  you  figure  to  yourself  an 
army  broken  and  disheartened,  half  of  it  under  inoculation  or  under 
other  diseases;  soldiers  without  pay,  without  discipline,  and  altogether 
reduced  to  live  from  hand  to  mouth,  depending  on  the  scanty  and  preca- 
rious supplies  of  a  few  half-starved  cattle  and  trifling  quantities  of  flour, 
which  have  hitherto  been  picked  up  in  different  parts  of  the  country." 
{American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  vi,  p.  590;  see  also  pp.  592,  649.) 

The  small-pox  was  at  all  times  a  most  serious  problem  in 
the  patriot  army  and  in  almost  every  part  of  the  country.  In 
Canada  it  seems  to  have  got  entirely  beyond  control.  It  was 
difficult  to  tell  which  was  worse,  the  disease  itself  or  the  remedy 
of  inoculation.  The  officers  were  in  favor  of  inoculation,  pro- 
vided it  was  done  under  their  supervision  and  with  a  limited 


10  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  v,  pp.  412,  1166,  1167,  1237, 
1643-1645;  vol.  vi,  pp.  610,  649,  740. 

419 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

number.  But  the  men  so  dreaded  the  disease  that,  wishing  to 
become  immune,  they  would  inoculate  themselves,  or  bribe  the 
surgeons  to  do  it,  and  in  this  way  whole  regiments  would  some- 
times become  invalided  and  put  out  of  service.11 

General  Thomas  was  stricken  with  the  small-pox  about  two 
weeks  after  his  retreat  and  retired  to  Chamblee,  where  he  died. 
General  Wooster,  being  unequal  to  the  situation,  was  recalled. 
General  Thompson  arrived  with  a  few  reinforcements  and  took 
command  at  Sorel.  Arnold  returned  to  Montreal,  of  which 
he  remained  in  command;  and  General  Sullivan  was  rapidly 
coming  up  Lake  Champlain  with  several  thousand  reinforce- 
ments.12 

General  Schuyler,  in  spite  of  his  illness,  was  still  at  his  post 
at  Fort  George,  in  the  neighborhood  of  Ticonderoga,  where  he 
had  been  all  winter,  engaged  in  the  arduous  task  of  managing 
the  transportation  and  supplies  through  the  lakes  and  controll- 
ing the  New  York  Indians  and  loyalists.  He  was  still  working 
untiringly;  but  seemed  to  be  pursued  by  ill  fortune;  for  in 
spite  of  his  devotion  to  the  patriot  cause,  all  the  misfortunes 
in  Canada,  the  smallness  of  the  army,  the  shortness  of  supplies, 
the  retreat  from  Quebec,  and  the  disaster  at  the  Cedars,  were 
blamed  on  him,  and  the  charges  set  forth  in  a  formal  document 
prepared  by  some  of  the  patriots  of  Western  Massachusetts. 
He  was  accused  of  loyalism,  of  purposely  sending  provisions  to 
Canada  so  that  they  would  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy; 
and  a  party  of  patriots  were  said  to  be  plotting  to  seize  him.  It 
is  hard  to  account  for  these  unfounded  suspicions  against  a 
man  of  such  integrity  and  devotion,  unless  it  was  that  his 
reserved  manners  and  great  landed  interest  made  him  unpop- 
ular with  certain  extreme  enthusiasts  for  the  rights  of  man.13 

As  General  Sullivan  came  on  with  the  reinforcements  he 


11  American   Archives,   fourth   series,    vol.   vi,    pp.    589,    594,    635    et 
passim;  fifth  series,  vol.  i,  p.  129. 

12  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  vi,  pp.  679,  684,  740. 
^American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  vi,  pp.  610,  640,   641,  744, 

746,  758,  768. 

420 


SULLIVAN  VERY  HOPEFUL 

was  shocked  and  indignant  at  the  state  of  affairs  which  he 
found.  Our  troops,  he  said,  were  demoralized,  and  retreating 
from  a  phantom;  for  Carleton  had  as  yet  made  no  serious 
advance  with  either  ships  or  men  from  Quebec. 

"  I  am  extremely  sorry  to  inform  you  that  from  the  officers  whose 
business  it  was  to  give  Congress  the  true  state  of  matters,  Congress  has 
not,  as  I  believe,  received  anything  like  it.  This  1  conclude  from  the 
repeated  letters  sent  to  General  Washington  giving  the  most  favorable 
accounts  and  promising  a  speedy  reduction  of  Quebec;  when  there  was 
not  even  a  probability  of  it,  and  the  army  with  which  this  was  to  be 
done  had  dwindled  into  a  mob,  without  even  the  form  of  order  and 
regularity — the  consequences  of  which  we  have  experienced  by  the 
infamous  retreat  from  Quebec  and  the  still  more  scandalous  surrender 
of  the  fort  at  the  Cedars."  (American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  vi, 
p.  679.) 

Being  now  in  command,  Sullivan  sent  General  Thompson 
and  a  strong  force  to  stop  Carleton 's  army,  which  was  coming 
from  Quebec  up  the  left  bank  of  the  St.  Lawrence.  So  much 
energy  did  Sullivan  display  in  all  his  dispositions  that  the  Cana- 
dians thought  that  the  patriots  might  succeed,  and  they  came 
flocking  in  with  offers  of  assistance  and  provisions.  Full  of 
enthusiasm  and  confidence,  Sullivan  wrote  to  the  Congress  that 
he  hoped  to  drive  Carleton  back  below  Deschambault,  which, 
being  the  key  to  the  situation,  should  be  strongly  fortified  by 
the  patriots,  and  after  that  Quebec  might  be  taken  if  Congress 
continued  to  send  reinforcements  and  money. 

General  William  Thompson,  whom  Sullivan  had  sent  for- 
ward, had  commanded  the  rifle  companies  which  went  from 
Pennsylvania  to  the  siege  of  Boston.  On  the  8th  of  June  he 
attempted  to  surprise  Carleton 's  army  at  Three  Rivers  by  a 
sudden  attack  at  daybreak.  But  his  Canadian  guides  were 
teacherous ;  it  was  broad  daylight  when  he  reached  his  enemy ; 
his  little  army  was  defeated  and  scattered  and  he  himself 
taken  prisoner. 

Sullivan 's  high  hopes  were  now  shattered.  Carleton 's  army 
was  moving  towards  him,  and  there  was  nothing  for  him  to 
do  but  abandon  Canada  and  retreat  southward  through  Lake 
Champlain.     He  left   Sorel  only  two   days  before   Carleton 

421 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

arrived  there.  Arnold's  force  was  very  nearly  taken  in  Mon- 
treal, but  was  warned  in  time,  and  joined  Sullivan  in  the 
general  American  retreat  to  Chamblee,  St.  Johns,  and  Ticon- 
deroga.14 

Burgoyne  conducted  the  pursuit  and  followed  so  close  that 
he  entered  Chamblee  at  one  end  when  the  American  rear  guard 
quitted  it  at  the  other.  Sullivan  finally  halted  at  Isle  Aux  Noix, 
on  the  18th  of  June,  and  Burgoyne  gave  up  the  pursuit. 

But  Isle  Aux  Noix  was  low  and  damp,  and  crowding  the 
troops  on  it  added  dysentery  to  the  small-pox.  The  retreat 
began  again,  and  halted  at  Crown  Point  to  recruit  and  restore 
the  men,  who,  as  Sullivan  said,  were  "daily  dropping  off  like 
the  Israelites  of  old  before  the  destroying  angel."  St.  Clair 
describes  them  as  a  mob  rather  than  an  army,  "devoid  of 
discipline  or  subordination,  the  officers  as  well  as  men  of  one 
colony  insulting  and  quarrelling  with  those  of  another. ' ' 15 

Meantime  the  Congress  had  recalled  Sullivan  and  put  in  his 
place  General  Horatio  Gates,  who  was  very  much  disgusted  to 
find  himself  in  command  of  a  small-pox  hospital  and  pesthouse, 
with  no  opportunity  to  win  honor  or  glory.  He  and  Schuyler 
agreed  upon  a  further  retreat  to  Ticonderoga,  which  they  forti- 
fied, and  believed  it  would  stop  all  further  advance  of  the 
British  to  the  southward.16 


14  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  vi,  pp.  640,  684,  758,  770, 
795,  796,  826,  839,  921,  923,  937,  977,  1002,  1036,  1103,  1251;  fifth  series, 
vol.  i,  p.  1069.  Gordon,  "  American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  p. 
256;  St.  Clair  Papers,  vol.  i,  p.  21. 

w  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  vi,  pp.  925-30;  937-948,  975, 
997,  1002,  1009,  1028,  1035,  1038-1040,  1052,  1053,  1057,  1069,  1101-1108, 
1121,  1201,  1217,  1219,  1222;  fifth  series,  vol.  i,  p.  131.  Wilkinson, 
Memoirs,  vol.  i,  pp.  49,  55,  57.  St.  Clair  Papers,  vol.  ii,  p.  24;  Gordon, 
"American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  pp.  177,  178,  259-263. 

18  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  vi,  p.  1232;  fifth  series, 
vol.  i,  pp.  234,  232,  375,  389,  390,  445,  450,  259,  237,  260,  559,  747,  933, 
1032,  604,  606,  637,  649,  650,  651,  716,  826,  899,  1119,  1123,  1127;  Gordon, 
"American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  pp.  318,  319,  276;  Writings 
of  Washington,  Ford  edition,  vol.  iv,  p.  209  note;  Wilkinson,  Memoirs, 
vol.  i,  pp.  61,  63. 

422 


CANADIANS  PASSIVE 

Thus  the  enthusiastic  attack  on  Canada  came  to  an  ignomini- 
ous end.  The  small-pox,  the  terrible  winter,  and  inferior 
organization,  had  reduced  our  force  to  only  about  four  thousand 
effectives,  while  Carleton  had  some  twelve  thousand  regulars 
and  Canadians.  Canada  was  lost  to  the  American  union.  Its 
population  had  given  us  only  passive  assistance.  They  were 
friendly  in  a  way;  they  furnished  provisions;  they  wished  us 
well,  and  would  accept  us  if  we  won.  But  they  had  not  the 
heart  to  fight  losing  battles;  and  to  fight  such  a  power  as 
England  seemed  to  them  madness.  They  were  altogether  lack- 
ing in  what  Graydon  called  revolutionary  nerves.17 

"  The  Canadians,"  said  Montgomery,  "  will  be  our  friends  as  long  as 
we  are  able  to  maintain  our  ground;  but  they  must  not  be  depended  upon, 
especially  for  defensive  operations."  (American  Archives,  fourth  series, 
vol.  iv,  pp.  189,  310.) 

"  They  are  not  persevering  in  adversity,"  said  General  Wooster ; 
"  they  are  not  to  be  depended  upon ;  but  like  the  savages  are  extremely 
fond  of  choosing  the  strongest  party."  (American  Archives,  fourth 
series,  vol.  iv,  p.  588;  see,  also,  p.  1114,  and  vol.  v,  pp.  752-754,  869.) 

But  even  after  our  defeat  and  retreat  from  Canada  the 
desire  to  secure  that  country  for  our  union  remained;  and  the 
Congress  kept  looking  about  for  ways  and  means  to  organize 
another  invasion.  When  the  French  allied  themselves  with  us, 
their  generals  always  had  an  eye  on  Canada  and  issued  seduc- 
tive proclamations  to  the  French  Canadians.  In  January, 
1778,  Lafayette  was  commissioned  by  the  Congress  to  take 
command  of  such  a  Canadian  expedition,  and  he  went  to 
Albany,  to  collect  supplies  and  recruit  men.  The  plan  was 
apparently  part  of  the  cabal  against  Washington,  and  was  in- 
tended to  detach  from  him  the  support  of  Lafayette.     The 


17  Niles,  "  Principles  and  Acts  of  the  Revolution,"  edition  1876,  p. 
461;  "Quebec  and  the  American  Revolution,"  Bulletin  of  University  of 
Wisconsin,  vol.  i,  pp.  21,  22,  23;  Codman,  "Arnold's  Expedition  to 
Quebec,"  pp.  8,  296;  Bourdinot,  "The  Story  of  Canada,"  p.  281;  Writings 
of  Washington,  Ford  edition,  vol.  4,  p.  29  note;  Wilkinson,  Memoirs, 
vol.  i,  p.  41 ;  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  ii,  p.  532. 

423 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

difficulties  were  soon  seen  to  be  insuperable,  and  at  Lafayette's 
advice  the  Congress  abandoned  the  attempt. 

But  twelve  months  afterwards  they  were  again  considering 
the  advisability  of  ' '  the  emancipation  of  Canada  in  cooperation 
with  an  armament  from  France,"  and  Washington  was  called 
to  Philadelphia  for  consultation.  Again  the  plan  was  aban- 
doned, not  only  from  the  inherent  difficulties  of  it,  but  also,  it 
is  supposed,  because  if  successful  France  might  be  tempted  to 
claim  the  Lady  of  the  Snows  as  her  share  of  the  spoil  and  thus 
become  so  powerful  in  North  America  that  she  could  dictate  to 
the  United  States.  It  would  be  safer  to  leave  Canada  with  the 
British.18 


18  Memoirs  and  Correspondence  of  Lafayette,  London  edition,  1837, 
vol.  i,  pp.  38-44;  Pontgibaud,  "A  French  Volunteer  of  the  War  of 
Independence,"  p.  47;  Washington's  Writings,  Ford  edition,  vol.  vi, 
pp.  298  note,  361,  410,  432,  437  note;  vol.  8,  p.  142  note;  Gordon,  "  Ameri- 
can Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  iii,  pp.  179,  209,  210;  Smith,  "Our 
Struggle  for  the  Fourteenth  Colony,"  vol.  ii,  chap.  36. 


XXXVIII. 

THE  EVACUATION  OF  BOSTON 

In  October,  1775,  when  Arnold's  expedition  was  on  its 
perilous  march  through  the  Maine  woods,  General  Gage  retired, 
and  General  William  Howe  took  the  supreme  command  of  all 
the  British  military  operations  south  of  Canada  to  the  Gulf 
of  Mexico.  Carleton's  command  in  Canada  was  a  separate 
department. 

General  Howe  succeeded  no  better  at  Boston  than  Gage; 
and  a  candid  survey  of  all  the  circumstances  would  seem  to 
indicate  that  Gage  had  done  all  that  could  reasonably  be 
expected  with  his  small  force  opposed  to  a  whole  continent.  He 
understood  the  situation  as  well  as  anybody,  and  told  the  Min- 
istry from  the  beginning  that  there  was  no  hope  in  the  concilia- 
tory policy,  that  the  patriots  were  bent  on  independence,  and 
that  nothing  but  large  reinforcements  and  complete  subjugation 
would  save  the  colonies  to  the  empire.  His  ideas  of  the  proper 
strategy  and  methods  to  be  pursued,  the  occupation  of  New 
York  and  the  Hudson  Valley  as  a  base  of  operations,  were 
accepted  by  Howe  as  correct  and  do  not  appear  to  have  been 
disputed  or  doubted  by  any  of  the  military  authorities  of  that 
time.  Burgoyne  very  properly  said  of  him,  that  few  characters 
in  the  world  would  have  been  fit  for  his  task,  for  he  was  in  a 
situation  in  which  a  Ceesar  might  have  failed.1 

During  that  same  autumn  of  1775,  that  rather  colorless 
character,  Lord  Dartmouth,  ceased  to  be  colonial  secretary,  and 
Lord  George  Germain  for  the  rest  of  the  war  became  the  Min- 


1 "  Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.  i,  p.  497 ;  Gage's 
letters  to  the  ministry  can  be  read  indexed  under  his  name  in  the  first 
three  volumes  of  the  fourth  series  of  the  American  Archives;  American 
Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  927,  991,  1069;  Fonblanque,  "Life 
of  Burgoyne,"  pp.  129,  140,  144,  145,  149,  196. 

425 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

istry  's  means  of  communication  with  the  commanders  in  Amer- 
ica. Germain  was  an  extreme  Tory,  a  duellist,  a  man  of  fashion 
and  a  soldier,  who  some  years  before  had  been  dismissed  from 
the  army  and,  as  was  supposed,  forever  disgraced  for  refusal  to 
charge  when  ordered  at  the  battle  of  Minden.  The  King,  it  was 
said,  wanted  him  to  be  court-martialed  and  shot  for  cowardice ; 
but  family  influence  saved  his  life,  and  the  court  found  him 
guilty  only  of  disobedience  of  orders.  He  was  incapacitated 
from  military  but  not  from  civil  employments.  He  was 
described  by  his  contemporaries  as  having  many  contemptible 
traits  of  character ;  but  there  seems  to  have  been  no  question  of 
his  ability  and  talents.  In  spite  of  his  heavy  load  of  disgrace 
he  had  succeeded  in  politics  and  had  now  raised  himself  to  a 
very  important  position  in  the  Cabinet.2 

In  America  a  very  capable  young  officer  of  the  Massachu- 
setts militia  was  becoming  prominent.  Early  in  the  autumn 
he  had  appeared  before  Washington,  offered  to  go  to  Ticon- 
deroga  as  soon  as  snow  covered  the  ground,  and  bring  down  on 
sleds  the  large  cannon  which  Allen  and  Arnold  had  captured 
there  in  May.  This  was  Henry  Knox,  who  had  kept  a  little 
book-store  in  Boston,  read  all  the  works  he  could  collect  on 
artillery  practice,  joined  the  patriot  militia,  and  married, 
against  the  wishes  of  her  parents,  a  young  lady  who  often  came 
to  buy  books.  She  was  the  daughter  of  an  extreme  loyalist, 
Thomas  Flucker,  secretary  of  the  colony.  Knox  had  recently 
escaped  from  Boston  in  disguise,  accompanied  by  his  wife, 
who  had  quilted  his  sword  into  the  lining  of  her  cloak. 

Washington  was  a  good  judge  of  character.  Knox  was  given 
a  party  of  men,  and  he  returned  in  December  dragging  on  sleds 
thirteen  brass  cannon,  twenty-six  iron  cannon,  fourteen  mortars, 
two  howitzers,  2300  pounds  of  lead,  and  a  barrel  of  flints. 
There  was  great  rejoicing  in  the  camp  at  Cambridge,  and  the 
Congress  made  young  Knox  a  brigadier-general  of  artillery.3 

* "  Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.  i,  pp.  556,  567, 
575;  vol.  ii,  p.  11;  Fonblanque,  "Life  of  Burgoyne,"  p.  493. 

8  Drake,  "  Life  of  Henry  Knox ;  "  American  Archives,  fourth  series, 
vol.  v,  p.  169. 

426 


INACTIVITY  OF  HOWE 

Unfortunately  there  was  no  powder  to  use  in  these  cannon. 
For  months  together  they  had  not  thirty  rounds  per  man ;  and 
at  one  time  in  August  only  nine  rounds  per  man.  Gage,  it  is 
said,  refused  to  believe  that  his  enemy  was  so  destitute.  But  it 
is  difficult  to  believe  that  Howe  did  not  know  of  all  this  weak- 
ness with  the  frequent  intercourse  through  the  lines,  the  numer- 
ous desertions,  the  loyalists,  and  his  spies.  "Our  situation," 
wrote  Washington  in  November,  ' '  is  truly  alarming ;  and  of  this 
General  Howe  is  well  apprized,  it  being  the  common  topic  of 
conversation  when  the  people  left  Boston  last  Friday. ' ' 4 

The  patriot  force  of  16,000  in  the  summer  had  dwindled 
as  soon  as  winter  came  to  10,000,  but  Howe  had  evidently 
made  up  his  mind  to  do  nothing.  The  Ministry  had  suggested 
that  he  abandon  Boston  and  take  his  army  to  Long  Island,  a 
loyalist  community,  where  he  could  easily  obtain  supplies  and 
be  ready  to  take  New  York  the  following  summer  when  rein- 
forcements arrived.  But  he  declined  to  do  this  because  he  had 
not  sufficient  transports  to  carry  his  army,  and  he  remained 
locked  up  in  Boston  by  an  undisciplined  force  which  had 
scarcely  ammunition  enough  for  a  skirmish.  He  was  "cooped 
up, ' '  his  officers  complained,  "  by  a  set  of  dirty  ragamuffins. ' ' 5 
He  allowed  his  enemy's  force  to  be  disbanded  under  his  eyes 
and  sent  to  their  homes  while  others  came  to  take  their  places. 

"  Search  the  volumes  of  history  through  and  I  much  question 
whether  a  case  similar  to  ours  is  to  be  found — namely,  to  maintain  a  post 
against  the  flower  of  the  British  troops  for  six  months  together,  without 


4  Stedman,  "American  War,"  edition  1794,  p.  190;  American 
Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  558,  1672,  1698;  vol.  iv,  pp. 
458,  1203 ;  vol.  v,  p.  499 ;  Carter,  "  General  Detail  of  the  Blockade 
of  Boston,"  pp.  8,  14-16,  22,  23;  J.  J.  Boudinot,  "Life  of  Boudinot," 
vol.  i,  p.  11.  The  British  spy  system  was  very  thorough  and  com- 
plete. (Ford,  Writings  of  Washington,  vol.  iii,  pp.  319,  413;  "Life  of 
Joseph  Reed,"  by  W.  B.  Reed,  vol.  i,  p.  157;  Gordon,  "  American  Revolu- 
tion," edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  p.  68;  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol. 
iii,  pp.  36,  37,  38,  137;  "  Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,  vol.  ii, 
p.  64.) 

6  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iii,  p.  169. 

427 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

and  then  to  have  one  army  disbanded  and  another  to  be  raised 

within  the  same  distance  of  a  reinforced  enemy."      (Ford,  Writings  of 
Washington,  vol.  iii,  p.  318.) 

But  Howe 's  answer  to  all  criticisms  was  that  the  Americans 
were  too  numerous  and  strongly  fortified  to  be  attacked  with 
any  chance  of  permanent  advantage;  and  from  the  point  of 
view  of  a  man  like  Howe,  there  was  much  to  be  said  in  favor  of 
this  position.  Boston  was  to  be  evacuated  in  the  spring,  in  any 
event;  it  was  admitted  that  the  colonies  could  never  be  con- 
quered by  holding  Boston ;  so  what  would  be  the  use  of  a  raid 
into  the  country,  which  might  be  as  disastrous  to  his  Majesty's 
arms  as  Lexington  had  been,  and  even  if  not  disastrous,  could 
accomplish  no  permanent  advantage,  because  there  was  not 
force  enough  to  occupy  and  permanently  hold  any  point  out- 
side of  Boston.6 

In  Boston  that  winter  General  Howe  began  a  romantic 
attachment  for  a  loyalist  lady,  Mrs.  Loring,  who  accompanied 
his  army  through  the  three  years  of  his  campaigning,  and  was 
often  spoken  of  by  the  officers  as  the  sultana.  She  encouraged 
the  general  in  his  favorite  amusement,  for  she  was  passion- 
ately devoted  to  cards  and  capable  of  losing  three  hundred 
guineas  at  a  sitting.  Her  influence  secured  satisfactory  arrange- 
ments for  her  husband,  who  was  given  the  office  of  commissary 
of  prisoners,  which  was  an  opportunity  for  making  a  fortune.7 

Being  thus  provided  with  a  congenial  companion,  and 
abundant  leisure  for  card-playing,  it  is  difficult  to  tell  how  long 


6  Fonblanque,  "  Life  of  Burgoyne,"  p.  148.  American  Archives,  fourth 
series,  vol.  iii,  p.  1672.  General  Wilkinson  thought  that  the  patriot 
besieging  line  was  so  widely  extended  and  scattered  that  Howe  could 
have  beaten  it  in  detail,  by  concentrating  on  any  one  point.  (Wilkin- 
son's Memoirs,  vol.  i,  pp.  19,  20.) 

1  Jones,  "History  of  the  Revolution  in  New  York,"  vol.  i,  pp.  171, 
189,  253,  351;  vol.  ii,  pp.  57,  89,  423;  "A  View  of  the  Evidence  Relative 
to  the  Conduct  of  the  American  War  under  Sir  W.  Howe,"  p.  77 ;  Apple- 
ton's  "  Cyclopaedia  of  American  Biography,"  vol.  iv,  p.  28.  In  Hopkin- 
son's  "  Battle  of  the  Kegs  "  there  was  a  verse  about  Mrs.  Loring  which 
is  often  omitted  in  modern  editions. 

428 


DORCHESTER  HEIGHTS 

Howe  might  have  remained  in  Boston.  In  March  he  showed  no 
signs  of  moving ;  and  he  would  probably,  if  left  to  himself,  have 
remained  until  June,  when  his  reinforcements  were  expected 
to  arrive. 

Washington  had  always  been  anxious  to  make  an  assault 
on  Boston.  The  Congress  had  urged  it  in  the  autumn  of  1775. 
It  might  have  involved  the  burning  and  destruction  of  the 
town;  but  John  Hancock,  whose  large  fortune  was  invested 
there,  wrote  that  he  was  willing  to  sacrifice  every  penny  and 
become  a  pauper.  Washington's  officers  were  opposed  to  it  as 
hazardous.  In  February,  when  the  water  had  frozen  between 
Roxborough  and  Boston  Common,  Washington  thought  that  in 
spite  of  his  deficiency  in  powder  he  would  like  to  try  an 
assault  by  a  rush  across  the  ice ;  but  his  officers  again  advised 
against  it.  His  anxiety  to  risk  such  a  hazardous  enter- 
prise arose  from  his  knowledge  of  the  weak  condition  of  his 
army,  which  he  felt  might  melt  away  during  the  winter,  and 
the  ease  with  which  Howe  might  at  any  moment  break  up  the 
patriot  besieging  line.  He  had  not  yet  learned  how  completely 
he  could  trust  to  Howe 's  inactivity ;  and  he  abandoned  the  dash 
across  the  ice  with  great  reluctance  in  exchange  for  a  more 
cautious  plan  well  suited  to  the  British  general's  temperament, 
and  which  was  crowned  with  success.8 

Dorchester  Heights  and  Nook's  Hill  commanded  Boston  on 
the  south  as  effectually  as  did  Bunker  Hill  and  Breed's  Hill  on 
the  north;  and  these  southern  hills  at  Dorchester  had  the 
advantage  of  commanding  the  shipping  in  the  harbor.  Howe 
could  have  occupied  Dorchester  at  any  time  during  the  winter 
and  fortified  it  with  a  force  similar  to  that  with  which  he  held 
Bunker  and  Breed's  Hills.  In  fact,  when  Gage  in  June,  1775, 
decided  to  take  and  fortify  Bunker  Hill,  he  also  contemplated 
the  occupation  of  Dorchester  Heights ;  but  this  part  of  his  plan 
was  abandoned. 


8  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  6,  848,  927,  956,  991; 
vol.  iv,  pp.  1203,  1502,  1503,  1515;  vol.  v,  p.  91;  Wilkinson's  Memoirs, 
vol.  i,  pp.  21,  22,  24,  26,  28. 

429 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

Having  received  a  sufficient  supply  of  powder  to  use  in  the 
cannon  which  Knox  had  brought  down  from  Ticonderoga, 
Washington  decided  to  occupy  Dorchester  Heights,  and  when 
everything  was  ready,  on  the  night  of  the  4th  of  March,  1776, 
the  patriots  began  to  expend  their  precious  powder  in  a  heavy 
cannonade  all  round  their  lines,  to  which  the  British  promptly 
replied.  "It's  impossible,"  said  Curtin,  "I  could  describe  the 
situation.  This  night  you  could  see  shells,  sometimes  seven  at 
a  time,  in  the  air,  and  as  to  cannon,  the  continual  shaking  of 
the  earth  by  cannonading  dried  up  our  wells. ' ' 

Unfortunately  this  firing  burst  three  of  the  heaviest  patriot 
mortars  which  they  had  hoped  to  use  in  bombarding  Boston 
from  Dorchester  Heights.  But  the  noise  and  excitement  accom- 
plished the  purpose  intended;  for  under  cover  of  it,  General 
Thomas  and  a  couple  of  thousand  men  with  wagons,  cannon, 
and  bales  of  hay,  made  a  detour  far  inland  behind  the  hills, 
where  the  rumble  of  the  wheels  on  the  frozen  ground  could 
not  be  heard,  and  suddenly  descended  upon  Dorchester  Heights. 

The  earth  was  frozen  so  hard  that  they  could  not  dig 
intrenchments ;  but  they  made  breastworks  of  the  bales  of  hay. 
Howe  directed  Lord  Percy,  with  a  force  of  2400  men,  to  attack 
Dorchester ;  but  a  wind  and  rainstorm  coming  on  just  after  the 
expedition  started,  it  returned,  and  nothing  more  was 
attempted. 

If  this  attack  had  been  made  Washington  intended  to  make 
a  counter  assault  on  Boston,  and  had  4000  picked  men  ready 
under  Putnam,  assisted  by  Sullivan,  Greene,  and  Gates,  who 
on  a  given  signal  were  to  enter  boats,  row  across  the  water,  and 
make  a  dash  at  Beacon  Hill.  Washington  had  great  confidence 
in  this  plan,  for  the  defences  of  Boston  would  be  weakened  by 
the  troops  drawn  out  to  attack  Dorchester.  If  the  plan  had 
been  carried  out  there  would  have  been  some  desperate  fighting 
and  what  is  conventionally  called  a  brilliant  episode  in  the 
Revolution. 

One  can  readily  understand  that  Howe  might  not  want  to 
furnish  such  an  episode,  and  his  unwillingness  to  attack  Dor- 
chester was  now,  no  doubt,  the  part  of  prudence.     But  when 

430 


HOWE  ABANDONS  BOSTON 

we  find  by  one  of  his  letters  to  the  Ministry  that  he  knew  as 
early  as  the  13th  of  February  that  the  patriots  intended  to  take 
Dorchester,  his  utter  apathy  in  not  attempting  to  occupy  it,  so 
as  to  prevent  them,  is  most  extraordinary.9 

Washington  had  no  confidence  in  a  bombardment  of  Boston, 
and  was  hoping  every  day  that  the  British  would  come  out  to 
attack  him.  But  as  they  showed  no  signs  of  it,  he  kept  up  a 
bombardment,  which  was  continued  intermittently  by  both 
sides  for  two  weeks,  without  much  effect.  Washington  settled 
down  to  wait  results  and  sent  to  several  iron  furnaces  to  have 
heavy  thirteen-inch  mortars  cast.  On  the  16th  of  March  he 
occupied  Nook's  Hill,  somewhat  nearer  the  town.  But  mean- 
while, the  unambitious  and  apathetic  Howe  relieved  him  from 
all  further  anxiety  by  announcing  that  he  would  evacuate  the 
town  immediately  without  firing  another  shot. 

His  reasons,  in  his  letter  to  the  Ministry,  for  this  not  very 
glorious  move,  were  that  he  could  gain  nothing  by  remaining; 
he  could  not  attack  the  rebels  with  any  prospect  of  permanent 
success ;  and  they  might  soon  be  able  to  annoy  him.  He  feared, 
it  is  said,  that  they  might  occupy  Noddle 's  Island,  on  the  other 
side  of  Boston,  and  cannonade  the  town  from  two  sides.  He 
also  said  that  his  provisions  and  supplies  of  all  sorts  were 
running  very  low;  and  probably  another  of  his  reasons  was 
that  in  any  event  he  would  have  to  leave  the  town  within  two 
or  three  months  to  go  to  New  York.10 

He  made  a  very  peculiar  sort  of  informal  agreement  with 
Washington,  that  if  the  Americans  would  not  fire  on  the  British, 
the  British  would  evacuate  the  town  without  doing  it  any 
injury.     With  this  understanding,  Howe  withdrew  his  whole 


'American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  v,  p.  458;  Heath,  Mem.,  pp. 
31,  33. 

10  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  v,  pp.  458,  484,  499,  507,  559. 
(See  generally  American  Archives,  id.,  pp.  91,  106,  110,  165,  166,  177,  200, 
201,  205,  223,  224,  232,  233,  374,  399,  419,  420,  423-27,  458,  483,  499,  500; 
"  Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.  ii,  pp.  253,  292 :  Froth- 
ingham,  "  Siege  of  Boston,"  Stevens,  "  Fac-similes,"  vol.  9,  p.  855 ; 
Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  pp.  189,  196,  199. 

431 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

army  on  the  17th  of  March,  accompanied  by  some  two  thousand 
loyalists. 

There  had  been  not  a  little  discomfort  and  suffering  among 
the  troops  and  loyalists  in  Boston  for  want  of  fuel,  as  well  as 
of  fresh  meat  and  vegetables.  As  the  winter  advanced  the 
buildings  that  remained  from  the  fire  in  Charleston  had  been 
demolished.  Garden  fences,  old  houses,  even  the  steeples  of 
some  of  the  churches,  were  taken  for  fire-wood,  and  the  famous 
patriot  liberty-tree  yielded  fourteen  cords.  To  keep  up  the 
spirits  of  the  army,  amusements  of  all  sorts  were  encouraged, 
and  the  bells  were  not  allowed  to  be  tolled  for  the  dead. 

In  spite  of  all  their  suffering,  however,  neither  soldier  nor 
loyalist  cared  to  be  turned  out  of  the  town  and  crowded  into 
transports  in  the  month  of  March  for  a  dangerous  voyage  up 
the  coast.  But  the  order  was  given,  and  for  a  week  all  was 
uproar  and  confusion.  "  Carts,  trucks,  wheelbarrows,  hand- 
barrows,  coaches,  chaises,  driving  as  if  the  very  devil  was  after 
them"  to  and  from  the  waterside  to  load  the  vessels.  Criminals 
took  the  opportunity  to  plunder  right  and  left.  The  loyalists, 
frantic  with  fear  of  being  left  behind  to  the  vengeance  of  the 
patriots,  corrupted  the  sailors  to  load  merchandise  and  all  the 
property  they  could  scrape  together  on  the  transports.  There 
were  one  hundred  and  seventy  sail  of  transports,  mostly  small 
schooners,  crowded  to  their  utmost  capacity  with  goods,  soldiers, 
and  loyalists,  "men,  women  and  children,  servants,  masters 
and  mistresses,  obliged  to  pig  together  on  the  floor,  there  being 
no  berths."  If  a  great  storm  had  caught  the  overloaded  fleet 
it  would  have  been  one  of  the  most  shocking  disasters  in 
history.11 

Among  the  loyalists  who  departed  with  Howe  were  the  son, 
daughter  and  grandchildren  of  Governor  Hutchinson,  accom- 
panied by  Chief  Justice  Oliver,  who  had  incurred  so  much 
odium   among  the  patriots  by   accepting   a  salary   from  the 


11  Van  Tyne,  "  Loyalists  of  the  American  Revolution/'  pp.  53-59 ; 
American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iv,  p.  266;  vol.  vi,  pp.  362,  372; 
Gordon,  "  American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  pp.  180,  204. 

432 


HOWE  RETREATS  TO  HALIFAX 

crown.  The  chief  justice  left  an  interesting  description  of 
the  evacuation  as  well  as  of  the  voyage,  and  his  farewell  to 
America  had  the  true  loyalist  ring : 12 

"  And  here  I  bid  A  Dieu  to  that  shore  which  I  never  wish  to  tread 
again  till  that  greatest  of  social  blessings,  a  firm  established  British 
Government  accompanies  me  thither." 

Before  starting  the  British  blew  up  and  burnt  Castle 
William  in  the  harbor,  and  then  lay  for  over  a  week  in  Nan- 
tasket  Road,  arranging  their  cargoes  and  preparing  for  sea,  the 
patriots  meanwhile  anxiously  suspecting  them  of  intending  a 
sudden  return  to  attack  Boston. 

Finally,  on  the  27th  of  March,  they  sailed  out  into  the  ocean. 
Washington  thought  that  they  might  be  going  to  New  York,  and 
he  sent  the  riflemen  and  other  troops  to  that  town.  But  when 
Howe  put  to  sea  he  abandoned  the  rebellious  colonies  entirely 
and  took  his  whole  fleet  and  army  to  Halifax,  Nova  Scotia. 
There  he  awaited  the  arrival  of  the  supplies  and  the  enormous 
army  of  reinforcements  which  had  been  promised  him  by  the 
Ministry  for  the  coming  summer's  campaign.13 

His  conduct  was  approved  by  the  Ministry.  But  however 
advisable  it  may  have  been  under  all  the  circumstances,  it  was 
in  the  eyes  of  the  public  a  British  defeat.  It  was  a  retreat 
from  an  enemy  that  had  scarcely  any  ammunition.  It  was  an 
abandonment  of  the  patriot  country,  and  to  some  it  seemed 
like  an  abandonment  of  all  attempt  to  crush  the  rebellion. 

Loyalists  in  America  and  Tories  in  England  were  disgusted. 
Howe's  own  officers  felt  the  disgrace  and  had  to  exert  them- 
selves to  keep  up  appearances,  while  the  enlisted  men  were 
with  difficulty  restrained  from  plunder  and  drink.  Were  not 
the  British  regulars  to  drive  the  Yankees,  the  cowardly  Ameri- 
can poltroons,  the  fanatic,  praying,  psalm-singing  provincials 
all  through  their  country  like  a  flock  of  geese?     But  instead 


""Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson/'  vol.   ii,  pp.  41,  42, 
46-53. 

13  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  v,  pp.  458,  459,  485,  498,  500, 
522,  541,  785,  1081,  1086. 

28  433 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

of  that  the  conquerors  had  been  "cooped  up  like  inoffensive 
poultry, ' '  and  were  retreating  to  Halifax,  which  was  as  bad  as 
a  surrender  or  a  retreat  back  to  England.14 

What  greater  encouragement,  it  was  said,  could  Howe  have 
given  to  the  rebellion?  His  Whig  friends  in  Parliament  were 
delighted.  It  was  another  piece  of  strong  evidence  to  show 
that  the  war  was  impracticable;  and  the  thunders  of  Whig 
eloquence  again  resounded. 

In  evacuating  Boston  Howe  took  little  or  no  pains  to  follow 
the  usual  military  rule  of  destroying  the  ammunition  and 
supplies  which  he  was  compelled  to  leave  behind.  The  amount 
destroyed  was  very  trifling  compared  with  the  ships,  cannon, 
and  muskets,  the  large  quantities  of  powder,  lead,  and  miscel- 
laneous military  stores  which  he  left  in  Boston  in  such  a  way 
that  it  seemed  as  if  he  were  making  a  present  to  the  patriots. 
His  arrangements  for  protecting  the  supply-ships  which  would 
soon  arrive  were  very  inadequate ;  for,  although  he  left  Com- 
modore Banks  with  two  or  three  war-ships  for  this  purpose, 
Howe  was  hardly  clear  of  the  coast  when  a  patriot  privateersman 
captured  a  large  powder-ship  which  was  just  arriving.  From 
that  time  the  favorite  toast  in  the  patriot  camps  was  ' '  General 
Howe."15 

To  the  patriot  party  the  evacuation  of  Boston  was,  of  course, 
a  glorious  event.  It  was  Washington's  first  victory,  and  it  was 
a  long  time  before  he  had  another.  The  people  and  patriot 
troops  flocked  into  the  town  and  wandered  through  it,  full  of 
curiosity  to  note  the  desolation  and  ruin.  The  common  was 
disfigured  with  the  ditches  and  cellars  of  the  camps.  The  great 
trees  had  been  cut  down  for  fuel.  Dirt  and  squalor  were  to 
be  seen  on  every  hand.  The  pulpit  and  pews  of  the  Old  South 
Church  had  been  carried  out  and  burnt,  a  grog-shop  erected 


""The  Critical  Moment,"  London,  1776,  pp.  46,  47;  American 
Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  v,  p.  485. 

15  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  v,  pp.  523,  792,  934,  935; 
vol.  vi,  p.  495;  Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii, 
pp.  200,  201 ;  Niles,  "  Principles  and  Acts  of  the  Revolution,"  edition 
1876,  p.  486;  Stedman,  "  American  War,"  vol.  i,  p.  167. 

434 


COLLEGE  DEGREE 

in  the  gallery,  and  cart-loads  of  earth  and  gravel  spread  on  the 
floor  for  the  cavalry  training-school.  But  these  remnants  of 
an  enemy 's  occupation  could  soon  be  obliterated,  and  they  were 
not  allowed  to  check  the  rejoicing.  The  new  patriot  legislature 
thanked  and  congratulated  Washington  on  his  success,  which 
they  declared  to  have  exceeded  the  most  sanguine  expectations, 
and  the  President  and  Overseers  of  Harvard  College  voted  him 
the  degree  of  Doctor  of  Laws.16 


"Niles,  "Principles  and  Acts  of  the  Revolution,"  edition  1876,  pp. 
128,  130,  131. 


XXXIX. 

INDEPENDENCE   OPENLY  DISCUSSED 

During  the  winter  and  spring  of  1776,  there  was  a  decided 
change  in  the  methods  of  the  patriot  leaders.  They  openly 
discussed  the  question  of  absolute  independence,  and  advo- 
cated it  in  letters,  documents,  and  pamphlets.  The  events 
of  the  last  six  months  were  all  in  their  favor.  Their  ideas 
were  gaining  ground.  The  doubting  ones  were  being  con- 
verted. Had  not  all  the  royal  governors  been  driven  from 
the  country?  Was  not  British  authority  extinct  in  every 
colony?  Was  not  each  colony  governing  itself  by  committees 
of  safety  and  a  convention  or  other  body  acting  without  any 
dependence  on  British  authority?  Had  not  Howe  and  his 
army  been  driven  from  Boston  and  every  British  soldier  ex- 
pelled from  the  colonies  between  Canada  and  Florida? 

Was  there  not  also  a  general  government  for  all  the 
colonies,  called  the  Continental  Congress,  which  showed  no 
sign  of  dependence  on  Great  Britain?  This  Continental  Con- 
gress had  an  army  of  its  own,  and  also  had  a  navy.  The  little 
navy  of  two  brigs,  two  ships,  and  a  sloop,  under  command  of 
Commodore  Hopkins,  had  made  its  first  cruise  in  February 
and  March,  1776,  and,  in  spite  of  the  smallpox  on  board  four 
of  the  vessels  and  defective  equipment  and  organization,  had 
already  achieved  a  striking  success.  They  had  visited  the 
Bahama  Islands,  and  finding  New  Providence  unprotected 
had  seized  the  fort  there  and  carried  off  the  military  supplies 
as  well  as  the  governor,  lieutenant  governor,  and  other  officials. 
Returning  to  the  New  England  coast  they  had  fought  an  inde- 
cisive action  with  the  British  frigate  "Glasgow,"  and,  though 
they  were  blamed  for  not  destroying  her,  they  were  expected 
to  atone  for  this  failure  in  the  future.1 


1  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  v,  pp.   823,  846,  932,   1082, 
1156,    1168;    vol.   vi,    p.    765;    Gordon,    "American   Revolution,"   edition 

436 


EVIDENCES  OF  NATIONALITY 

The  patriot  party  were  enthusiastic  over  their  navy,  and 
at  Philadelphia,  where  new  frigates  were  building,  many 
patriots  who  were  prosperous  citizens  went  voluntarily  to 
the  shipyards  to  carry  heavy  deck-beams  and  assist  the  ship- 
wrights by  every  means  in  their  power  At  Cape  Henlopen, 
at  the  entrance  of  Delaware  Bay,  a  patriot  schooner  bringing 
in  powder,  was  run  on  the  beach  to  escape  the  tender  of  a 
British  man-of-war.  The  militia  of  the  neighborhood,  with 
muskets  and  swivels,  fought  off  the  tender  for  two  hours,  while 
they  unloaded  the  schooner.  Soon  afterwards  the  British 
frigates  "Liverpool"  and  " Roebuck "  sailed  up  the  Delaware 
as  far  as  Newcastle,  where  they  were  driven  back  by  armed 
row-galleys  manned  by  the  militia  of  the  neighborhood.2 

The  Continental  Congress  was  issuing  paper  money  and  cre- 
ating a  national  debt  like  a  sovereign  state.  It  had  sent  agents 
across  the  Atlantic  to  establish  diplomatic  relations  with  Euro- 
pean nations.  It  was  prepared  to  make  treaties  of  commerce 
and  alliance.  In  many  of  the  colonies  the  king's  name  was  now 
omitted  from  writs  and  all  legal  processes,  and  these  colonies 
were  adopting  new  forms  of  oaths  by  which  officials  swore 
allegiance  to  the  colony  instead  of  to  the  king. 

All  these  circumstances  were  surely  the  evidences  of  inde- 
pendent national  existence;  and  John  Adams  declared  that 
he  was  well  content  with  the  situation.3  The  other  leaders 
were  also  elated.  It  had  been  supposed,  they  said,  that  the 
British  would  have  the  advantage  in  the  beginning  of  the  war ; 
but  now  in  the  very  beginning  they  were  worsted  and  driven 
from  the  country.  The  Swiss  had  fought  sixty  battles  to 
defend  the  independence  of  their  little  state,  which  was  not 
larger  than  Massachusetts,  but  the  independence  of  the  great 
continent  of  America  seemed  already  secure.4 


1788,  vol.  ii,  pp.  214-217;  Writings  of  Washington,  Ford  edition,  vol.  iv, 
pp.  15,  16  note. 

a  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  v,  pp.  838-39,  965,  1145; 
"  Life  of  George  Read,  pp.  158-59;  vol.  vi,  pp.  408,  429,  810,  954,  1006. 

'American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  v,  p.  931. 

4  Niles,  "  Principles  and  Acts  of  the  Revolution,"  edition  1876,  p.  133. 

437 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

Why  then  should  the  word  itself  be  avoided  for  the  sake 
of  the  timid  and  doubting?  When  the  country  was  inde- 
pendent as  a  matter  of  fact,  had  been  independent  for  six 
months,  and  was  organizing  fleets,  armies,  and  diplomacy,  and 
making  war  as  an  independent  nation,  what  was  the  use  of 
keeping  up  any  longer  the  old  conservatism  about  reconcilia- 
tion with  England,  or  loyalty  to  the  king,  or  remaining  part 
of  the  empire?  Would  we  now  accept  reconciliation  if  it 
was  offered  us?  Would  we  not  spurn  it  as  the  most  contempt- 
ible subserviency? 

"  Some  people  among  us  seem  alarmed  at  the  name  Independence 
while  they  support  measures  and  propose  plans  that  comprehend  all  the 
spirit  of  it.  Have  we  not  made  laws,  erected  courts  of  judicature, 
established  magistrates,  made  money,  levied  war  and  regulated  com- 
merce, not  only  without  his  Majesty's  intervention,  but  absolutely 
against  his  will?  Are  we  not  as  criminal  in  the  eye  of  Britain  for  what 
we  have  done,  as  for  what  we  can  yet  do  ?  If  we  institute  any  government 
at  all,  for  God's  sake  let  it  be  the  best  we  can;  we  shall  as  certainly  be 
hanged  for  a  bad  as  a  good  one."  (American  Archives,  fourth  series, 
vol.  iv,  p.  1210.) 

The  situation  had  been  made  still  more  favorable  for  the 
patriots  by  the  passage  in  Parliament  of  a  new  bill,  which 
\J  became  a  law  on  the  21st  of  December,  1775,  and  was  known 
as  the  Prohibitory  Act.  It  was  intended  by  the  Ministry  to 
meet  the  increasing  difficulties  of  the  situation,  and  establish 
a  legal  and  legislative  basis  for  the  coercion  and  subjugation  of 
the  colonies. 

The  Prohibitory  Act  repealed  the  Port  Bill,  closing  the 
harbor  of  Boston,  because  that  bill  was  of  no  further  use,  as 
all  the  colonial  harbors  were  now  to  be  closed.  The  Pro- 
hibitory Act  also  repealed  the  Fisheries  Acts  prohibiting  the 
colonies  from  fishing  on  the  Grand  Banks  and  prohibiting  them 
from  trading  with  one  another  and  with  the  rest  of  the  world. 
These  special  prohibitions  were  no  longer  necessary,  because 
they  were  now  included  in  the  general  provisions  of  the  Pro- 
hibitory Act,  which  in  due  formality  declared  war  against  the 
colonies  and  established  a  general  blockade. 

438 


THE  PROHIBITORY  ACT 

All  nations  were  prohibited  from  trading  with  the  revolted 
colonies;  and  all  ships  belonging  to  the  inhabitants  of  the 
colonies,  or  belonging  to  the  inhabitants  of  other  nations  which 
should  be  found  trading  with  the  colonies,  would  be  forfeited 
with  their  cargoes  and  become  lawful  prize  for  the  officers  and 
crews  of  the  British  navy.  But  if  any  colony,  county,  town, 
port  or  district,  should  return  to  loyalty  and  obedience  it 
would  be  lawful  for  any  of  the  persons  appointed  by  his 
Majesty  to  grant  pardons  in  America,  to  declare  such  colony, 
county,  or  town  to  be  in  the  peace  of  the  King  and  exempt  from 
the  provisions  of  the  act.5 

The  Ministry  had,  of  course,  thought  that  it  was  necessary 
to  pass  some  such  act  legalizing  the  warfare  which  was  to  bet 
waged  against  the  colonies  and  notifying  all  nations  that  a 
state  of  war  existed.  But  they  were  hardly  prepared  for  the 
construction  which  the  patriots  put  upon  it,  or  for  the 
delight  with  which  it  was  received  by  the  whole  patriot  party. 
It  was  the  very  thing  they  wanted.  Parliament  and  the  King 
by  thus  declaring  war  upon  the  colonies  were  voluntarily 
giving  them  the  legal  status  of  a  foreign  nation,  and  declaring 
them  independent.  If  war  had  to  be  formally  declared  against 
them  they  must  be  already  independent,  and  were  not  rebels. 
It  is  not  usual  to  declare  war  against  a  rebellion;  for  if  it 
is  a  rebellion  it  can  be  put  down  as  a  violation  of  existing  law 
and  allegiance. 

Never  before  or  since  has  the  British  Parliament  passed  an 
act  which  has  been  more  thoroughly  satisfactory  in  every 
respect  to  all  true  Americans.  They  hailed  it  as  the  first  recog- 
nition of  their  independence,  and  it  supplied  them  with  an 
invaluable  argument.     It  was  almost  as  valuable  to  them  as 


5  The  act  can  be  read  in  the  British  statutes  at  large  and  is  reprinted 
in  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  v,  p.  1667.  See,  also,  vol.  vi, 
p.  1,  for  the  address  from  the  throne  and  debate  on  the  Prohibitory  Act; 
also  pp.  186,  191,  237;  Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788, 
vol.  ii,  pp.  235-237;  Annual  Register,  1776,  chap.  vi. 

439 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

the  treaty  of  peace  of  1783   which  formally  acknowledged 
independence. 

"  I  know  not,"  said  John  Adams,  "  whether  you  have  seen  the  act 
of  Parliament  called  the  Restraining  Act,  or  Prohibitory  Act,  or  Piratical 
Act,  or  Plundering  Act,  or  Act  of  Independency — for  by  all  these  titles  is 
it  called.  I  think  the  most  apposite  is  the  Act  of  Independency;  for 
King,  Lords,  and  Commons,  have  united  in  sundering  this  country  from 
that,  I  think,  forever.  It  is  a  complete  dismemberment  of  the  British 
Empire.  It  throws  thirteen  Colonies  out  of  the  Royal  protection,  levels 
all  distinctions,  and  makes  us  independent  in  spite  of  our  supplications 
and  entreaties. 

"  It  may  be  fortunate  that  the  Act  of  Independency  should  come 
from  the  British  Parliament  rather  than  the  American  Congress;  but  it 
is  very  odd  that  Americans  should  hesitate  at  accepting  such  a  gift  from 
them."     (American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  v,  p.  472.) 

We  have  already  seen  how  the  patriots  denied  all  allegiance 
to  Parliament,  but  admitted  a  slight  allegiance  to  the  King, 
and  we  have  seen  how  eagerly  and  patiently  they  waited  for 
acts  by  the  British  King  or  his  agents  which  would  absolve 
them  from  that  slight  allegiance.  For  this  reason  they  had 
waited  for  the  British  to  fire  the  first  shot  at  Lexington  and 
at  Concord.  For  this  reason  the  patriots  of  Mecklenburg 
County  in  North  Carolina  had  in  May,  1775,  put  forth  the  idea 
that  Parliament  having  declared  the  colonies  in  rebellion,  and 
the  King  having  accepted  that  declaration  and  acted  upon  it, 
all  British  charters  and  laws  in  America  were  annulled  and  the 
colonists  left  free  to  govern  themselves  as  they  pleased. 

But  the  Prohibitory  Act  gave  the  best  excuse  of  all.  It  had 
been  preceded  by  the  address  from  the  throne  on  the  opening 
of  Parliament,  in  which  the  King  formally  announced  that 
the  colonies  were  in  rebellion  and  that  it  was  his  purpose  to 
conquer  and  subdue  them;  and  this  followed  by  his  assent 
to  the  passage  of  the  Prohibitory  Act,  necessarily,  said  the 
patriots,  put  the  colonies  out  of  the  protection  of  the  Crown. 
Protection  and  allegiance  were  reciprocal.  There  could  be 
no  allegiance  where  there  was  no  protection.  The  allegiance  to 
the  King  had  been  given  in  exchange  for  his  protection;  and 

440 


ALLEGIANCE  DISSOLVED 

when  his  protection  was  withdrawn  by  a  declaration  of  war, 
the  allegiance  was  annulled. 

"  It  is,"  said  Chief  Justice  Drayton,  of  South  Carolina,  "  the  volun- 
tary and  joint  act  of  the  whole  British  Legislature  .  .  .  releasing  the 
faith,  allegiance  and  subjection  of  America  to  the  British  crown  by 
solemnly  declaring  the  former  out  of  the  protection  of  the  latter;  and 
thereby,  agreeable  to  every  principle  of  law,  actually  dissolving  the 
original  contract  between  king  and  people."  (American  Archives,  fifth 
series,  vol.  ii,  p.  1049.) 

"  By  an  Act  of  Parliament,"  said  John  Adams,  "  we  are  put  out 
of  the  royal  protection  and  consequently  discharged  from  our  allegiance 
and  it  has  become  necessary  to  assume  government  for  our  immediate 
security."  {American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iv,  p.  1138.  See,  also, 
"  Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.  i,  pp.  265,  266. ) 

Elias  Boudinot  tells  us  that,  having  at  one  time  as  a  colonial 
official  taken  the  British  oath  of  allegiance,  he  hardly  knew 
what  course  to  pursue  in  the  Revolution  until  the  Prohibitory 
Act  relieved  him  of  all  scruples  of  conscience.  Doubtless  there 
were  hundreds  of  others  who,  seeing  protection  and  allegiance 
destroyed  by  act  of  Parliament,  reasoned  that  there  could  be  no 
binding  oath  to  support  an  allegiance  which  no  longer  existed. 
For  these  timid  ones  the  date  of  the  Prohibitory  Act,  the  21st 
of  December,  1775,  was  independence  day ;  and  accordingly  as 
soon  as  the  news  of  the  address  from  the  throne,  and  the  prob- 
able passage  of  the  Act,  reached  America,  the  open  discussion 
of  independence  began.6 

The  argument  so  common  the  year  before  that  America 
was  waging  war  merely  for  the  sake  of  returning  to  the  old 
semi-independent  condition  that  prevailed  before  the  year 
1763,  was  now  abandoned.  The  utmost  contempt  was  ex- 
pressed for  those  who  preached  the  old  doctrine,  and  the  con- 
dition of  affairs  before   1763,  instead  of  being  looked  back 


6  Elias  Boudinot's  Journal,  pp.  22,  23.  The  Whigs  in  Parliament 
foresaw  very  clearly  the  effect  of  the  Prohibitory  Act  in  America  and 
foretold  that  it  would  have  a  "  direct  tendency  to  effect  an  entire  and 
permanent  separation."  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  vi,  p.  225; 
fifth  series,  vol.  iii,  p.  996;  fourth  series,  vol.  v,  p.  804;  vol.  iv,  pp.  1210, 
1220. 

441 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

upon  as  the  golden  age,  was  described  as  abject  slavery,  to 
which  it  would  be  madness  to  return.7 

All  this  feeling  was  greatly  encouraged  and  intensified  by 
the  appearance  of  a  remarkable  pamphlet  called  "Common 
Sense,"  which  circulated  in  thousands  of  copies  from  one  end 
of  the  country  to  the  other  and  the  phrases  of  which  became 
household  words  on  the  lips  of  every  man  in  the  patriot  party. 
The  author  of  this  firebrand,  Thomas  Paine,  was  a  young 
Englishman,  a  stay-maker  by  trade,  with  something  of  an  edu- 
cation, and  inclined  to  write  essays  and  take  an  interest  in 
the  popular  and  democratic  side  of  public  questions.  He  had, 
of  course,  never  prospered  in  England,  and  had  come  out  to 
Philadelphia  upon  the  recommendation  of  Franklin. 

We  owe  Paine  a  debt  of  gratitude  for  his  services  to  our 
cause  and  our  people  have  always  wished  to  think  well  of 
him.  He  had  little  or  no  respect  for  conventional  forms  of 
religion,  and  his  habits  and  manners  were  not,  it  seems,  all 
that  could  be  desired.  But  he  had  undoubted  talent  in  writ- 
ing, and  there  must  have  been  a  certain  amount  of  attraction 
or  promise  in  him.8 

He  had  the  boldness  to  assail  in  unmeasured  terms  of  ridi- 
cule the  lingering  sentiment  about  England,  and  that  con- 
servatism among  hesitating  patriots  which  had  led  them  to 
masquerade  under  schemes  of  reconciliation.  He  appeared  at 
the  psychological  moment,  as  we  would  now  say,  when  a 
literary  man  of  desperate  fortunes  was  needed  who  rather 
enjoyed  violating  all  the  proprieties  and  conventionalities  of 
the  age.  The  patriots  had  persisted  for  so  many  years  in 
their  cautious  plan  of  disavowing  the  real  passion  of  their 


1  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iv,  p.  1508;  vol.  v,  pp.  88, 
226.  See,  also,  id.,  vol.  iv,  pp.  377,  368,  472,  529,  839,  1204,  1478,  1496; 
vol.  v,  pp.  48,  50,  96,  129,  130,  187,  188,  786,  972,  959,  992,  1011-1015, 
1020,  1078,  1133,  1163,  1168,  1169,  1180,  1215;  vol.  vi,  p.  488,  and  title 
"  Independence  "  in  the  index  of  the  American  Archives;  Gordon,  "  Amer- 
ican Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  p.  269. 

8  Conway,  "  Life  of  Paine ;  "  "  Life  of  John  Jay,"  p.  97 ;  Gordon, 
"  American  Revolution,"  edition  of  1788,  vol.  ii,  p.  275. 

442 


THOMAS  PAINE 

hearts,  that  they  had  got  into  a  rut  from  which  they  had  to 
be  jostled  by  very  rough  and  plain  language  from  a  man  of  the 
people  whose  low  estate  in  the  world  brought  him  closer  to 
real  democracy  than  the  Adamses,  the  Jeffersons,  or  the 
Hamiltons. 

"  But  Britain  is  the  parent  country,  say  some.  Then  the  more  shame 
upon  her  conduct.  Even  brutes  do  not  devour  their  young,  nor  savages 
make  war  upon  their  families;  wherefore  the  assertion  if  true  turns  to 
her  reproach." 

In  this  way,  at  every  opportunity,  Paine  sneered  at  this 
artificial  relation  which  had  been  assumed  to  be  that  of  mother 
and  daughter;  and  also  at  that  habit  among  many  of  the 
colonists  which  led  them  to  speak  of  England  as  home.  It 
certainly  was  a  rather  curious  habit  when  we  consider  that 
they  had  been  born  in  America,  were  identified  with  American 
interests,  had  never  seen  England,  and  were  unfitted  for  any 
form  of  English  life. 

This  opened  to  him  a  large  field  for  satire  which  he  worked 
to  perfection.  The  provincial  sentimentality  about  "tender 
and  brotherly  affection  for  our  fellow  subjects  at  home"  had 
;  always  been  a  great  absurdity  to  any  one  who  knew  the  real 
Englishman  with  his  arrogant  contempt  for.  the  colonists  as 
social  inferiors,  convicts,  and  cowards.  The  sentimentality  had 
now  become  a  still  more  extraordinary  spectacle  when  Amer- 
icans were  talking  about  reconciliation  and  union  with  a  nation 
that  was  burning  their  towns  over  the  heads  of  women  and 
children,  and  torturing  prisoners.  America  must  strike  for 
something  higher  and  nobler  than  mere  compromise  or  she  was 
a  ruined  land.  A  return  to  the  conditions  before  1763  was 
impossible,  for  the  old  feeling  which  held  the  relations  of  that 
time  sacred  was  gone  and  could  never  be  restored. 

Paine  had  much  to  say  about  the  "Royal  Brute  of  Great 
Britain,"  as  he  called  the  King;  and  this  was  a  lucky,  catch- 
ing phrase  for  the  times.  It  ran  through  the  country  and  ex- 
pressed with  the  utmost  exactness  the  feelings  of  thousands 
of  patriots,  who  were  furious  at  the  treatment  of  the  prisoners, 

443 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

the  irons  on  the  limbs  of  their  hero  Allen,  and  the  sufferings 
of  women  and  children  .when  Portland  and  Norfolk  were 
shelled  by  the  British  ships. 

"  In  England  a  king  hath  little  more  to  do  than  to  make  war  and 
give  away  places,  which  in  plain  terms  is  to  impoverish  the  nation  and 
set  it  together  by  the  ears.  A  pretty  business  indeed  for  a  man  to  be 
allowed  eight  hundred  thousand  sterling  a  year  for,  and  worshipped  into 
the  bargain!  Of  more  worth  is  one  honest  man  to  society  and  in  the 
sight  of  God,  than  all  the  crowned  ruffians  that  ever  lived." 

It  has  been  sometimes  supposed  that  Paine  had  peculiar 
or  original  theories  of  government.  But  a  close  examination 
of  his  first  pamphlet,  and  the  rest  of  the  series  which  he  kept 
going  for  several  years,  shows  that  his  political  philosophy  was 
merely  a  restatement  or  application  in  a  very  popular  and 
modern  manner  of  the  doctrines  of  the  rights  of  man,  which 
had  already  had  such  influence  on  the  colonists.  He  was  a 
student  of  Locke,  Burlamaqui,  Beccaria,  and  Montesquieu, 
amplified  their  ideas,  applied  them  in  unexpected  ways,  and 
expressed  them  with  homely  vividness.  Burlamaqui  had  stated 
those  ideas  in  the  most  attractive  form  for  the  comprehension 
of  Americans  of  education  and  position.  Paine  expressed  them 
for  the  masses;  and  from  poverty  and  obscurity  he  suddenly 
became  known  to  the  whole  civilized  world,  and  was  eulogized, 
vilified  and  caricatured  in  both  America  and  Europe. 


XL. 

A  COMPREHENSIVE  PLAN  TO  SUBJUGATE  THE 
SOUTHERN  COLONIES 

The  great  army  which  was  to  subdue  New  York,  Pennsyl- 
vania, and  New  England  would  not  reach  America  until  the 
late  spring  or  summer  of  1776.  But  meanwhile  there  seemed 
to  the  Ministry  a  good  opportunity  to  employ  a  moderate  force 
of  regulars  and  war-vessels  in  occupying  the  seaboard  of  the 
Carolinas  or  Georgia.  At  the  same  time  the  loyalist  popula- 
tion of  the  interior,  supposed  to  be  overwhelmingly  large,  was 
to  be  encouraged  to  rise;  and  the  Indian  tribes,  the  Creeks 
and  Cherokees  to  the  westward,  were  to  fall  upon  the  frontier 
and  press  eastward  as  far  as  possible.1 

It  was  a  most  comprehensive  and  sweeping  plan  as  orig- 
inally conceived,  and  seemed  as  if  it  must  surely  crush  the 
South,  and  if  it  were  followed  by  the  subjugation  of  New 
England,  New  York,  and  Pennsylvania,  the  British  empire 
would  remain  intact.  In  any  event  it  seemed  as  if  a  foothold, 
the  occupation  of  at  least  one  or  two  important  posts  or  centres, 
would  be  gained  in  the  South;  and  at  that  time  the  southern 
colonies  were  regarded  as  more  commercially  valuable  than  the 
north,  and  Virginia  was  the  most  populous  province  in 
America.2 

Martin,  the  banished  royal  governor  of  North  Carolina, 
was  particularly  active  in  forwarding  the  plan,  and  though  on 
board  ship  seems  to  have  been  able  to  communicate  with  the 
loyalists  far  inland  and  arrange  a  plan  with  them  for  support- 
ing the  British  army  when  it  should  arrive.  The  British 
Government  was  given  to  understand  that  thousands  of  loyal- 


1  Correspondence  of  Henry  Laurens,   pp.  25-28 ;    Kirke,   "  The  Rear 
Guard  of  the  Revolution,"  p.  106. 

3  "  Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.  i,  p.  555. 

445 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

ists  were  ready  to  rise  and  that  four  thousand  were  already 
armed  in  North  Carolina. 

The  Creeks,  Chickasaw  and  Cherokee  Indians  were  at  that 
time  living  under  their  chieftains  Oconostota  and  Dragging 
Canoe  in  what  is  now  the  eastern  end  of  Tennessee ;  and  among 
them  were  two  British  agents,  Stuart  and  Cameron,  who  organ- 
ized them  for  the  invasion,  and  seem  to  have  remained  among 
them  throughout  the  greater  part  of  the  Revolution,  keeping 
them  steadily  in  the  English  interest.  The  British  Govern- 
ment seems  to  have  had  very  complete  and  accurate  means  of 
communication  throughout  all  the  vast  distances  in  America.3 

General  Howe  was  instructed  to  send  southward  from 
Boston  a  force  which  should  wait  at  the  Cape  Fear  River  in 
North  Carolina  until  joined  by  a  larger  force  from  England, 
and  then  act  with  the  loyalists  as  circumstances  should  indi- 
cate. Howe  selected  General  Clinton,  a  son  of  a  former  gov- 
ernor of  New  York,  and  a  very  capable  officer,  to  take  com- 
mand of  the  military  forces  of  the  expedition. 

Clinton  left  Boston  with  a  few  troops  in  the  frigate 
"Mercury"  on  the  20th  of  January,  1776,  and  as  the  prepara- 
tions for  his  departure  became  known  in  the  patriot  army, 
Washington  supposed  that  he  might  intend  an  attack  on  New 
York.  General  Charles  Lee  was  accordingly  sent  to  New  York 
to  take  every  possible  measure  for  its  defence.4 

Lee,  a  man  by  turns  brilliant  or  contemptible,  and  the 
most  extraordinary  and  inexplicable  character  in  the  Revolu- 
tion, was  an  English  officer  who  had  served  in  America  in 
the  French  War  and  had  been  at  Braddock's  defeat.  He  was 
as  eccentric  in  appearance  as  in  character,  and  is  described  as 
tall,  gaunt,  and  extremely  thin,  with  an  ugly  face  and  an 
aquiline  nose  of  enormous  proportions.  His  tone  is  said  to 
have   been  very   distinguished  and  impressive;   he   had  seen 


'Correspondence  of  George  III  with  Lord  North,  vol.  i,  p.  276. 

*  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  1135,  1400  vol.  iv, 
pp.  604-624,  629,  699,  812,  942,  943,  955,  1145,  1506,  1507;  Journals  of 
Congress,  vol.  i,  p.  220;  Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788, 
vol.  ii,  pp.  173,  208,  210. 

446 


CHARLES  LEE 

much  of  the  world,  and  something  of  the  armies  and  courts 
of  Europe;  he  certainly  was  well  read  in  military  science; 
familiar  with  light  literature  and  history;  and  was 
master  of  such  a  clever  and  sarcastic  style  of  writing  that  he 
had  been  suspected  of  being  the  author  of  the  Letters  of  Junius. 

The  Indians  in  the  French  War  gave  him  the  very  appro- 
priate name  of  Boiling  Water.  After  that  war  he  served  with 
considerable  distinction  under  Burgoyne  in  Portugal;  but  was 
in  effect  dismissed  from  the  army  and  put  on  half-pay  with 
the  rank  of  major  for  writing  a  pungent  essay  against  the 
Ministry  on  the  subject  of  Pontiac's  Conspiracy.  After  that 
he  roamed  about  Europe  serving  in  Russia  and  in  Poland, 
where  he  was  given  the  rank  of  Major  General.  He  applied 
for  further  service  in  the  British  army,  but  was  refused;  and 
irritated  by  this  refusal  he  came  to  America  in  1772  and 
threw  in  his  lot  with  the  patriot  party.  He  travelled  about  the 
country  to  make  the  acquaintance  of  the  leaders  and  wrote 
a  political  essay,  "Strictures  on  a  Pamphlet  Entitled  'A 
Friendly  Address  to  All  Reasonable  Americans, '  "  which  had 
great  vogue  in  its  day  and  went  through  many  editions. 

His  natural  brightness  and  fervor  won  the  hearts  of  the 
patriots;  and  they  forgave  him  even  his  bad  manners.  His 
most  amiable  trait  was  his  fondness  for  dogs;  but  with  that 
rudeness  and  indifference  which  Englishmen  were  fond  of 
showing  toward  colonials,  he  brought  the  dogs  into  ladies '  draw- 
ing-rooms, where  with  his  magnificent  airs  of  a  man  of  the 
world  he  appears  to  have  considered  himself  a  privileged 
character  not  bound  by  the  usual  rules  of  good  breeding  or  even 
of  decency.5 


5  New  York  Historical  Society  Collections,  1874,  vol.  iv,  p.  322.  See 
a  very  coarse  letter  he  wrote  to  Miss  Franks,  of  Philadelphia,  for  which 
he  had  to  apologize.  Id.,  1873,  vol.  iii,  pp.  278-280,  302.  Several 
biographies  of  Lee  are  collected  in  New  York  Historical  Society  Collec- 
tions, 1874.  Lee  Papers,  vol.  iv.  See  Wilkinson,  Memoirs,  vol.  i,  p.  65. 
There  is  a  life  of  him  in  Appleton's  Cyclopaedia  of  American  Biography, 
reprinted  with  a  few  changes  in  the  British  Dictionary  of  National 
Biography.    Stedman,  "  American  War,"  vol.  i,  p.  100. 

447 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

But  our  people  were  so  impressed  by  what  they  believed 
to  be  his  great  military  genius  and  experience,  that  the  Con- 
gress readily  voted  him  $30,000  to  replace  in  part  his  estate 
in  England  which  would  probably  be  confiscated.  Burgoyne 
had  recently  carried  on  a  correspondence  with  him  which  on 
Burgoyne 's  part  was  intended  to  draw  Lee  into  a  conspiracy 
and  treason  to  America  similar  to  that  into  which  Clinton 
afterwards  drew  Arnold.  Lee  showed  the  letters  to  members 
of  the  Congress  and  appeared  to  reject  Burgoyne 's  treacherous 
suggestions,  but  is  believed  to  have  sent  a  secret  letter  to 
Burgoyne  not  shown  to  any  of  the  patriot  party.6 

He  had,  however,  no  opportunity  to  defend  New  York,  for 
Clinton's  ship  merely  touched  at  Sandy  Hook  for  a  few  days, 
for  no  other  purpose  it  appears  than  to  consult  with  Governor 
Tryon  in  his  refuge  on  a  British  war-ship;  and  Clinton  as  he 
passed  down  the  coast  paid  a  similar  visit  to  Lord  Dunmore 
in  his  floating  loyalist  and  negro  colony  near  Norfolk,  Virginia. 

Early  in  February  some  of  the  loyalists  of  North  Carolina 
had  embodied  and  armed  themselves,  and  Governor  Martin 
from  his  retreat  on  the  British  war-ship  appointed  one  of 
their  number,  Donald  McDonald,  a  brigadier  general  to  com- 
mand them.  Many  of  them  were  Scotch  highlanders,  armed 
with  the  famous  broad  sword,  and  others  were  the  regulators, 
so  called,  who  had  taken  part  in  the  battle  of  the  Alamance  a 
few  years  before.  Their  commander,  McDonald,  though  eighty 
years  old,  was  a  most  ardent  monarchist  and  loyalist.  Some 
fifteen  hundred  of  them  began  their  march  through  the  country 
about  the  9th  of  February.  But  their  movement  was  very 
premature,  for  Clinton's  force  was  not  yet  collected  at  the  Cape 
Fear  River  to  support  them. 

The  patriot  militia  rapidly  assembled  to  oppose  them  and 
were  commanded  by  General  James  Moore,  ably  supported 
by  Colonels  Caswell  and  Lillington.     More's  force  of  about  a 


8  Fonblanque,  "Life  of  Burgoyne,"  pp.  173,  177;  see,  also,  pp.  160, 
161,  174;  New  York  Historical  Society  Collections,  1874,  vol.  iv,  pp. 
414,  415. 

448 


DEFEAT  OF  McDONALD 

thousand  finally  camped  near  the  loyalists  on  the  north  side 
of  Moore's  Creek  bridge,  about  twenty  miles  above  Wilming- 
ton. Finding  his  position  a  weak  one,  Moore  left  his  fires  burn- 
ing all  the  night  and  crossed  to  the  south  side  of  the  bridge, 
entrenching  himself  after  having  taken  up  the  planks  and 
greased  the  sleepers.  The  loyalists  must  cross  at  this  point 
if  they  wished  to  reach  the  coast  and  effect  a  junction  with 
Governor  Martin  and  the  British.  The  next  morning,  the  27th 
of  February,  they  appeared  sixteen  hundred  strong,  flushed 
with  confidence  because  the  patriots  seemed  to  have  retreated 
before  their  terrible  broadswords.  But  those  who  attempted 
to  cross  on  the  slippery  timbers  were  shot  down  and  the  rest 
scattered  in  every  direction.  The  battle  lasted  only  three 
minutes  and  the  patriot  loss  was  only  two  wounded.  McDon- 
ald fled  ingloriously,  and  with  about  twenty  others  was  taken 
prisoner. 

He  had  conducted  a  most  ill-judged  movement  long  before 
there  was  any  force  on  the  coast  to  help  him.  Clinton  had 
hardly  reached  the  coast  and  the  main  body  of  the  British 
troops  from  England  under  Sir  Peter  Parker  did  not  arrive 
until  April  and  May.7 

About  two  weeks  after  the  defeat  of  McDonald,  the  British 
sloop-of-war  " Otter"  and  two  tenders  sailed  up  Chesapeake 
Bay,  taking  some  prizes,  but  doing  little  or  no  other  damage; 
and  a  few  British  ships  lying  at  Savannah,  Georgia,  made  an 
unsuccessful  attack  on  the  town,  which  was  protected  by  a 
few  patriot  militia.8  These  movements  may  have  been  intended 
to  assist  in  the  general  plan  of  securing  a  foothold  in  all  the 
southern  colonies;  but  they  were  so  weak  and  ill-timed  that 
they  had  no  effect,  and  Clinton  was  obliged  to  wait  for  weeks 
at  the  Cape  Fear  River  for  the  arrival  of  Sir  Peter  Parker  and 
the  main  body  of  troops  from  England. 


7  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  v,  pp.  61-64,  140,  170,  473, 
496 ;  vol.  vi,  pp.  404,  405 ;  Jones,  "  New  York  in  the  Revolution,"  vol.  i, 
p.  95;  Stedman,  "American  War,"  vol.  i,  pp.  179-183. 

"American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  v,  pp.  119,  143-146. 
29  449 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

The  first  of  Sir  Peter  Parker's  fleet  arrived  at  Cape  Fear 
River  on  the  17th  of  April,  and  between  that  date  and  May 
3d,  some  thirty  odd  sail  of  transports  brought  the  rest  of  the 
troops,  numbering  about  three  thousand,  which,  with  the 
sailors  and  marines  of  the  seven  war- vessels,  might  be  supposed 
capable  of  some  very  serious  invasion  of  the  South.  But  they 
had  arrived  in  May  instead  of  in  February,  as  was  planned; 
and  the  whole  purpose  of  the  expedition  had  been  learned 
early  in  April  from  a  British  letter  describing  its  objects  and 
methods,  intercepted  by  a  patriot  naval  captain,  James 
Barron.9 

General  Charles  Lee,  who  after  fortifying  New  York 
against  Clinton's  expected  attack  had  been  intended  for  the 
command  in  Canada,  was  now  hurried  to  the  South  to  organize 
the  whole  southern  militia  and  ward  off  the  efforts  of  Clinton 
and  Sir  Peter  Parker  at  whatever  point  they  might  be  directed. 
It  was  also  hoped  that  the  little  patriot  fleet  under  Commodore 
Hopkins  would  be  able  to  intercept  Sir  Peter  Parker's  trans- 
ports. That  would,  indeed,  have  been  a  signal  patriot  victory; 
but  it  was  never  accomplished,  and  Hopkins  was  at  this  time 
the  subject  of  much  censure  for  want  of  enterprise  and 
activity.10 

The  Ministry,  learning  how  much  the  expedition  had  been 
delayed,  sent  the  sloop  "Ranger"  with  orders  to  Clinton  not 
to  make  any  attack  unless  favored  by  extraordinary  circum- 
stances; but  this  message  was  not  received.  Clinton  himself 
had  doubts  about  proceeding  with  such  a  bungling  expedition, 
but  was  encouraged  by  some  reconnoitering  southward,  and 
after  wasting  the  month  of  May  and  making  a  couple  of  unim- 
portant raids  on  shore  he  and  Parker  left  the  Cape  Fear  River 
and  took  the  whole  British  force  to  sea.11 


8  Gordon,    "  American   Revolution,"    edition    1788,    vol.    ii,    pp.    239, 
278-280. 

10  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  v,  pp.  50,  51,  52,   106;   vol. 
vi,  pp.  885,  886. 

11 "  Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.  ii,  pp.  92,  95,  96 ; 
American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  vi,  pp.  432,  712,  713. 

450 


DEFENCE  OF  CHARLESTON 

Lee  was  in  great  doubt  where  they  intended  to  strike.  The 
probability  was  that  they  had  gone  to  South  Carolina; 
although  they  might  intend  to  draw  all  the  patriot  forces  in 
that  direction  and  then  attack  Virginia.  But  on  the  4th  of 
June,  they  appeared  at  the  entrance  of  Charleston  harbor  with 
ten  war-vessels  and  thirty  transports,  and  the  patriots  under 
Lee  concentrated  every  effort  on  the  defence  of  the  town. 

The  patriots,  however,  need  not  have  been  in  haste,  for 
from  the  4th  until  the  28th  of  June  the  British  again  remained 
inactive,  making  pottering  investigations  of  the  depth  of  the 
water,  getting  one  of  their  ships  over  the  bar  by  removing 
her  guns,  and  sending  out  one  of  the  regulation  proclama- 
tions offering  his  Majesty's  gracious  pardon  to  all  who  would 
lay  down  their  arms.  They  lost  their  best  opportunity  of 
taking  the  town  and  permitted  the  patriots  to  complete  all 
their  preparations  for  defence.  Lord  Cornwallis  was  said 
to  have  urged  more  activity  and  complained  of  Sir  Peter 
Parker's  tardiness.  Sir  Peter  replied  that  Cornwallis  might 
attack  with  the  land  forces  if  he  choose;  but  that  ships  must 
wait  for  a  favorable  wind. 

The  channel  approaching  Charleston  harbor  is  protected  by 
Sullivan's  Island,  and  on  this  island  the  patriots  had  erected 
a  fort  of  those  spongy  palmetto  logs  which  were  very  effective 
in  stopping  the  cannon-shot  and  musket-bullets  of  that  time. 
General  Lee's  efforts  had  collected  about  five  thousand  patriot 
troops.  A  few  of  these  were  placed  on  James  Island,  which 
also  commanded  the  channel;  others  were  placed  along  the 
bay  in  front  of  the  town ;  and  the  streets  near  the  water  were 
heavily  barricaded;  but  the  main  defence  was  the  fort  on 
Sullivan's  Island. 

All  the  troops  and  also  the  patriot  citizens  were  animated 
by  a  most  enthusiastic  spirit.  Patriot  gentlemen  of  inde- 
pendent fortune  labored  with  hoe  and  spade;  and  every  one 
had  the  highest  respect  for  Lee  and  full  confidence  that  his 
European  military  training  would  enable  them  to  drive  off 
the  enemy.  It  was  the  best  hour  of  Lee's  life.  He  made  no 
mistakes;  his  eccentricities  were  in  the  background;  and  his 

451 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

letters  and  reports  of  this  period  are  free  from  his  usual 
extravagance  of  statement. 

On  the  28th  of  June  at  eleven  o'clock  in  the  morning  two 
British  war-ships,  having  passed  inside  the  bar,  began  a  furious 
cannonade  on  Sullivan's  Island,  which  Lee  had  placed  in  com- 
mand of  Colonel  Moultrie.  There  was  no  bridge  for  retreat 
from  the  island  and  the  creek  which  separated  it  from  the  main- 
land was  a  mile  wide. 

Lee  always  had  a  poor  opinion  of  American  soldiers.  He 
never  became  an  American  and  was  always  in  awe  of  his  own 
people.  He  now  believed  that  the  garrison  whom  he  described 
as  raw  recruits  officered  by  boys,  would  never  endure  the 
violence  of  such  a  cannonade ;  and  he  had  thoughts  of  sending 
word  to  them  to  spike  their  guns  as  soon  as  their  ammunition 
ran  low,  and  retreat  with  as  little  loss  as  possible.  But  first 
of  all,  he  made  an  effort  to  get  them  more  ammunition,  and 
he  sent  his  aid  to  report  on  their  courage  and  condition. 

The  report  of  the  aid  was  so  favorable  that  Lee  crossed 
the  creek  in  a  small  boat  to  animate  the  garrison  to  greater 
exertions. 

"  But  I  found,"  he  said,  "  they  had  no  occasion  for  such  encourage- 
ment. They  were  pleased  with  my  visit,  and  assured  me  they  never  would 
abandon  the  post,  but  with  their  lives.  The  cool  courage  they  displayed 
astonished  and  enraptured  me;  for  I  do  assure  you,  my  dear  General,  I 
never  experienced  a  hotter  fire — twelve  hours  it  was  continued  without 
intermission.  The  noble  fellows  who  were  mortally  wounded  conjured 
their  brethren  never  to  abandon  the  standard  of  liberty.  Those  who  lost 
their  limbs  deserted  not  their  posts."  (American  Archives,  fourth  series, 
vol.  vi,  p.  1184.) 

When  the  flagstaff  was  shot  away,  Sergeant  Jasper  leaped 
over  the  rampart  and  fastened  the  flag  to  a  sponge-staff,  which 
he  planted  in  the  breastwork  during  the  hottest  fire  from  the 
ships.  For  more  than  an  hour  at  one  time  the  fort  was  silenced 
while  waiting  for  a  fresh  supply  of  ammunition.  At  best  there 
were  only  twelve  cannon  that  could  be  used  and  three  hundred 
men  with  which  to  withstand  the  shot  and  shell  from  the 
ten  British  ships,  which  were  supposed  to  have  fired  at  least 
twelve  thousand  times;    and  yet  the  garrison  suffered  only 

452 


FAILURE  OF  THE  ATTACK 

the  comparatively  trifling  loss  of  ten  killed  and  twenty-two 
wounded. 

They  aimed  their  guns  carefully;  and  this  cool,  skilful 
marksmanship,  characteristic  of  Americans,  won  the  day.  On 
the  British  ships  there  were  sixty-four  killed  and  one  hundred 
and  forty-one  wounded.  The  "Sphinx"  had  her  bow-sprit 
shot  away  and  fell  out  of  the  firing  line;  the  "Bristol"  had 
the  spring  of  her  cable  shot  away  and  drifted  end  on  to  the 
fort  which  was  able  to  rake  her  with  shot  from  stem  to  stern; 
the  "Acteon"  was  driven  ashore,  abandoned  and  burnt,  while 
the  other  vessels  suffered  severely  in  their  hulls  and  rigging. 
Lord  William  Campbell,  the  royal  governor  of  South  Carolina, 
whom  the  patriots  had  deposed  and  banished  the  year  before, 
volunteered  to  fight  on  one  of  the  ships,  and  was  given  charge 
of  some  guns  on  the  lower  deck,  where  he  received  a  mortal 
wound. 

The  rear  of  the  fort  was  so  unfinished  as  to  afford  a  very 
imperfect  protection ;  but  the  ships  failed  to  get  up  far  enough 
to  take  advantage  of  this  weakness.  Their  cannonade  was 
largely  fritended  as  a  support  to  the  land  attack  which  Clinton 
was  to  make  with  his  regulars  from  Long  Island.  It  was 
supposed  that  he  could  wade  across  to  the  fort  at  low  tide ;  but 
several  days  before  he  had  warned  Sir  Peter  Parker  that 
there  was  no  ford  at  low  tide.  He  offered  to  place  some  of 
his  troops  on  Parker 's  ships  to  be  landed  on  Sullivan 's  Island ; 
but  this  was  not  taken  advantage  of  by  Parker,  who  appears 
to  have  been  sick  part  of  the  time,  besides  being  generally 
incompetent.  When  the  fort  was  evacuated  for  an  hour  or 
more,  he  had  a  grand  opportunity  to  land  and  occupy  it,  es- 
pecially if  he  had  accepted  Clinton's  offer  of  troops  to  go  on 
board  his  ships.  But  Parker  was  one  of  those  British  officers 
who  were  a  great  boon  to  the  patriots,  and  some  years  after- 
wards he  materially  assisted  in  bringing  the  Revolution  to  a 
close.12 


12  Clinton,  "  Observations  on  Mr.  Stedman's  History  of  the  American 
War,"  London,  1794,  p.  3. 

453 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

Clinton  appears  to  have  made  several  attempts  to  cross  to 
Sullivan's  Island;  but  was  easily  repulsed  by  Colonel  Thomp- 
son with  the  North  Carolina  and  South  Carolina  rangers.  The 
British  land  and  sea  forces  being  thus  separated  their  attack 
was  a  failure;  and  after  keeping  up  the  cannonade  until 
nearly  midnight  Parker's  ships  retired  to  their  former  station 
just  inside  the  bar.  Soon  afterwards  the  whole  expedition, 
men-of-war  and  transports,  sailed  away  northward  to  join 
General  Howe  in  his  attack  on  New  York. 

The  contemporary  criticisms  on  this  attempt  at  Charleston 
describe  it  as  a  most  blundering  undertaking;  and  there  must 
have  been  gross  mismanagement  or  some  misunderstanding 
between  the  admiral  and  the  general.  Not  only  was  there 
great  delay,  which  gave  the  patriots  time  to  prepare;  but  the 
mistake  was  made  of  stopping  to  fight  Sullivan's  Island  when 
the  ships  might  have  passed  it  and  successfully  attacked  the 
town,  which  was  weakly  defended.  Pour  years  after,  in  1780, 
the  British  under  Admiral  Arbuthnot  sailed  by  Sullivan's 
Island  with  comparatively  little  damage  and  took  possession  of 
the  harbor.13 

The  attack  by  the  western  Indians  in  support  of  Clinton 
and  Sir  Peter  Parker  was  better  timed  than  the  rising  of  the 
loyalists.  The  Shawnees,  Mingoes  and  Delawares  were  to 
attack  the  Virginia  frontiers,  some  of  the  Cherokees  were  given 
the  new  settlements  in  eastern  Tennessee,  and  the  rest  of  the 
Cherokees,  with  Creeks  and  Chickasaws,  were  to  descend  upon 
Georgia.  But  no  movement  was  to  be  made  until  Clinton  and 
Parker  had  begun  their  assault  on  Charleston. 

The  first  attack  was  made  in  Tennessee  by  about  seven 
hundred  Cherokees,  who  divided  themselves  into  two  bands, 
one  attacking  Port  Henry  at  the  forks  of  the  Holston  River, 
and  the  other  Port  Lee  at  Watauga,  farther  south.  The 
defenders  of  Port  Henry,  under  the  leadership  of  Isaac  Shelby, 
went  out  to  meet  the  Indians  and  defeated  them  before  they 
reached  the  fort.    Fort  Lee,  commanded  by  John  Sevier,  was 


15  Jones,  "  New  York  in  the  Revolution,"  vol.  i,  p.  99. 

454 


REPULSE  OF  THE  INDIANS 

besieged  for  twenty  days,  but  the  Indians  were  compelled  to 
retire  with  heavy  loss. 

These  Tennessee  settlers  had  only  recently  crossed  the 
mountains  from  North  Carolina  and  were  a  hardy  race  of 
hunters  and  farmers  armed  with  Deckard  rifles,  a  favorite 
weapon  manufactured  at  Lancaster,  in  Pennsylvania.  Their 
numbers  were  very  few  and  they  had  been  able  to  assemble 
only  a  little  over  two  hundred  armed  men  with  whom  they 
had  repulsed  the  seven  hundred  Indians  at  Fort  Henry  and 
Fort  Lee. 

These  two  repulses  ended  the  great  Indian  raids  from  which 
so  much  had  been  expected.  Raven,  the  chief  who  started  to 
attack  Virginia,  came  back  without  striking  a  blow  when  he 
heard  of  the  ill  success  in  Tennessee.  The  Indians  and  loyalists 
who  started  to  raid  South  Carolina  and  Georgia  were  driven 
back  in  August  by  the  patriot  settlers  and  militia  of  those 
states.  Thirty  or  forty  Indian  villages  were  burned,  their 
cattle  killed,  and  their  crops  destroyed.14 

The  British  plan  had  aimed  to  cover  distances  which  would 
be  considered  enormous  even  in  modern  times,  and  the  whole 
plan  had  been  defeated  by  comparatively  small  bodies  of 
patriot  Americans  at  three  or  four  points.  The  result  revealed 
certain  essential  weaknesses  on  the  British  side.  The  loyalists, 
in  spite  of  their  numbers,  seemed  incapable  of  either  organizing 
or  fighting  with  any  effect;  the  Indians  were  equally  useless; 
and  there  was  evident  incompetency  in  the  British  navy 
and  a  lack  of  cooperation  between  it  and  the  army.  This 
jealousy  or  inability  to  cooperate  with  the  army  continued 
throughout  the  war  and  is  described  by  Clinton  at  various 
times  with  bitter  resentment. 

The  whole  campaign  and  plan  was  an  unfortunate  fiasco 
for  the  British  Government.  It  would  have  been  better  left  un- 
attempted,  for  it  no  doubt,  raised  the  spirits  of  the  patriots, 
filled  them  with  confidence  in  their  power,  and  encouraged 


"Kirke,  "The  Rear  Guard  of  the  Revolution,"  106,  110,  121,  123, 
125,  127.    Ramsey,  "  Annals  of  Tennessee." 

455 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

their  union.  It  was  the  first  exhibition  to  Europeans  of  the 
fighting  qualities  of  the  Southerner.  Lee  was  universally 
praised  for  his  rapid  organization  and  his  skilful  disposition 
of  his  forces  at  every  available  point,  which  it  was  believed  would 
have  defeated  the  British  even  if  they  had  displayed  better 
generalship  and  persistence.  He  had  found  Charleston  a  help- 
less, undefended  town,  and  he  had  made  it  a  stronghold  which 
repelled  a  British  fleet  and  army.  He  was  now  the  American 
palladium,  and  still  greater  success  was  expected  from  him.15 


"  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  vi,  pp.  720,  721,  948,  1128, 
1129,  1183-1192,  1205-1208;  fifth  series,  vol.  i,  pp.  435-440;  Gordon, 
"American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  pp.  280-288;  Niles,  "Prin- 
ciples and  Acts  of  the  Revolution,"  edition  1876,  p.  393. 


XLI. 

THE  ADOPTION  OF  THE  DECLARATION 
OF  INDEPENDENCE 

The  Continental  Congress  had,  on  the  23rd  of  March,  1776, 
replied  to  Parliament's  Prohibitory  Act  by  resolutions  de- 
claring that  the  American  ports  were  open  to  the  trade  of  all 
nations  and  countries,  except  those  subject  to  Great  Britain; 
and  that  all  British  commerce  was  now  the  lawful  prey  of 
American  privateers.  By  a  resolution  of  the  15th  of  May,  they 
declared  that  all  forms  of  British  authority  in  the  colonies 
should  be  totally  abolished,  and  that  those  colonies  which  had 
not  yet  framed  constitutions  in  place  of  their  old  charters  or 
other  British  form  of  government  should  do  so  without  delay.1 

As  the  whole  country  between  Canada  and  Florida  was 
independent  and  had  been  independent  for  a  year,  the  royal 
governors  banished,  and  the  British  army  driven  to  Nova 
Scotia,  the  question  naturally  arose  whether  it  was  not  a  suit- 
able time  to  announce  formally  to  all  the  world  that  the 
colonies  were  independent,  entirely  separated  from  Great 
Britain,  and  would  from  henceforth  claim  a  place  among 
nations,  with  all  the  rights  and  privileges  of  that  position. 

The  patriots  in  various  parts  of  the  country  had  begun  to 
instruct  their  delegates  in  the  Congress  to  move  for  an  imme- 
diate declaration.  The  comparatively  small  patriot  party  of 
North  Carolina  had  been  the  first  to  give  these  instructions, 
on  the  12th  of  April,  1776,  followed  by  Virginia  on  the  22nd 
of  May ;  and  on  the  7th  of  June  Richard  Henry  Lee  moved  in 
the  Congress  the  famous  resolution  ' '  That  these  United  Colonies 
are  and  of  right  ought  to  be  free  and  independent  States ;  that 
they  are  absolved  from  all  allegiance  to  the  British  Crown,  and 


1  Journals  of   Congress,    Ford    edition,    vol.    iv,   pp.    159,    229,   357; 
Gordon,  "  American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  pp.  271,  272. 

457 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

that  all  political  connection  between  them  and  the  State  of 
Great  Britain  is,  and  ought  to  be,  totally  dissolved. '  '2 

The  resolution,  it  will  be  observed,  described  independence 
as  already  existing.  The  Congress  assumed  to  itself  no  author- 
ity to  create  independence.  All  that  it  undertook  to  do  by  the 
Lee  resolution,  and  the  subsequent  formal  document  which  it 
adopted,  was  to  announce  to  the  world  an  existing  state  of 
fact  in  thirteen  of  the  colonies  and  give  reasons  to  show  that 
that  condition  had  been  brought  about  rightfully  and  that  it 
was  right  that  it  should  be  continued. 

There  was,  however,  serious  disagreement  in  the  Congress 
as  to  the  advisability  of  formally  announcing  independence 
so  soon.  The  argument  against  an  immediate  declaration 
seems  to  have  been  that  we  had  not  been  sufficiently  successful 
in  arms,  and  nothing  but  real  success  in  arms  would  make  the 
declaration  respectable  and  save  it  from  the  ridicule  of  the 
nations.  "We  must  wait  till  we  had  secured  the  alliance  of 
France;  or,  as  Patrick  Henry  is  said  to  have  put  it,  at  least 
wait  until  it  should  be  known  what  course  France  and  Spain 
would  take.  England  would  soon  send  out  a  great  invading 
force,  and  a  reverse  in  battle  in  our  weak  state  would  make 
the  declaration  seem  contemptible,  and  destroy  the  possibility 
of  help  from  France.  We  were  not  yet  sufficiently  united,  and 
the  declaration  would  alienate  many  who  had  not  grown  accus- 
tomed to  the  thought  of  complete  independence.3 

At  first,  when  the  question  was  debated,  in  June,  the 
colonies  stood  seven  in  favor  of  an  immediate  declaration, 
namely,  the  four  New  England  colonies,  Virginia,  North 
Carolina,  and  Georgia.  The  conservative  minority,  led  by 
Dickinson,  was  made  up  of  Pennsylvania,  South  Carolina, 
New  York,  New  Jersey,  Maryland,  and  Delaware.  It  was  very 
important,  however,  to  have  a  unamimous  vote.  The  question 
was  accordingly  postponed  until  July  and  meantime  great 
exertions  were  made  to  have  the  patriot  party  in  every  prov- 


8  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  vi,  1699,  1728,  1729. 
3  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  i,  pp.  95,  96. 

458 


THE  DECLARATION  ADOPTED 

ince  instruct  its  delegates  to  vote  for  an  immediate 
declaration.4 

An  attack  was  organized  upon  those  British  ships  under 
Commodore  Banks  which  Howe  had  left  at  the  entrance  of 
Boston  harbor  to  protect  supply-vessels  which  might  arrive 
without  knowing  that  the  town  had  been  evacuated.  Commo- 
dore Banks  had  just  saved  from  the  patriot  privateers  seven 
transports  loaded  with  Highland  troops.  But  so  effective  was 
the  attack  upon  him  that  he  was  obliged  to  leave  the  coast 
altogether;  and  a  few  days  after  he  had  gone  two  British 
transports  loaded  with  highlanders  arrived.  They  succeeded 
in  beating  off  four  patriot  privateers  which  attacked  them 
outside;  but  ignorant  of  the  evacuation  of  Boston  they  sailed 
on  into  the  harbor,  where  they  were  cut  off  by  the  patriots 
and  after  some  desperate  fighting  the  two  hundred  and  fifty- 
seven   Highlanders   surrendered.5 

It  could  now  be  said  that  another  victory  in  arms  had  been 
won.  As  a  matter  of  fact  there  was  the  still  more  important 
victory  of  the  repulse  of  Clinton  and  Parker  at  Charleston, 
although  the  news  of  this  did  not  arrive  in  time  to  influence 
opinion  as  to  the  advisability  of  a  declaration. 

When  July  came  four  colonies  were  still  in  opposition. 
Of  these,  the  vote  of  the  Pennsylvania  delegation  was  carried 
for  the  Declaration  by  Dickinson  and  Robert  Morris  absenting 
themselves.  Delaware,  whose  vote  had  been  evenly  divided, 
was  brought  over  by  the  arrival  of  Caesar  Rodney;  and  South 
Carolina  was  also  persuaded.  The  New  York  delegation,  being 
without  fresh  instruction,  declined  to  vote.  But  the  final 
vote,  on  the  2nd  of  July,  was  almost  unanimous,  and  on  the  4th 
of  July  the  formal  paper  prepared  by  Jefferson  and  his  com- 
mittee was  adopted. 

Such  men  as  Dickinson  and  Robert  Morris  still  held  to 
their  opinion  that  the  Declaration  was  premature.    ' l  It  was  an 


*  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  vi,  pp.  813,  814,  917,  931. 
8  American   Archives,    fourth    series,    vol.    vi,    pp.    917,    1035,    1127 
Gordon,  "  American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  pp.  266,  267. 

459 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

improper  time, ' '  said  Morris,  ' '  and  it  will  neither  promote  the 
interest  nor  redound  to  the  honor  of  America,  for  it  has 
caused  division  when  we  wanted  union."  Morris  was  very 
conservative  at  this  time;  and  had  opposed  the  plan  of 
encouraging  the  colonies  to  form  new  governments  and  consti- 
tutions for  themselves  independent  of  all  British  authority. 
But  Morris  signed  the  declaration  after  it  had  been  adopted.6 

It  is  highly  probable  that  the  adoption  of  the  Declaration 
alienated  many  people  who  were  hesitating  and  increased  the 
number  of  the  loyalists.  There  was  a  whole  class  of  loyalists 
who  appear  to  have  been  willing  to  act  with  the  patriots  and 
even  to  make  war  upon  England ;  but  only  for  the  sake  of  com- 
promise and  reconciliation  and  not  for  independence.  All 
these  people  were,  of  course,  lost  to  the  patriot  party  by  the 
Declaration  of  the  4th  of  July.  Men  like  Morris  and  Dickinson 
were  also  afterwards  able  to  say  that  terrible  military  disasters 
followed  the  Declaration,  and  that  within  six  months  after 
its  adoption  the  patriot  cause  had  sunk  to  its  lowest  ebb,  and 
that  the  Declaration  did  not  apparently  bring  us  the  alliance 
of  Prance,  which  came  nearly  two  years  afterwards  only  as 
a  result  of  a  great  patriot  victory  in  the  field. 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Declaration  gave  the  real 
patriots  a  rallying  point.  It  showed  their  purpose,  interested 
the  French  King,  and  was  a  basis  for  his  action  when  a  victory 
convinced  him  of  the  advisability  of  an  alliance.  A  foreign 
power  could  not  very  well  make  a  treaty  of  alliance  with 
mere  rebels;  or  with  people  who  were  still  the  subjects  of  the 
King  of  England.  It  was  probably  well  to  declare  independ- 
ence as  soon  as  possible  after  what  seemed  to  be  our  first 
distinct  success,  because  it  was  a  long  time  before  we  had 
another,  and  we  never  had  one  which  at  once  put  all  the 
British  troops  out  of  the  country. 


9  Oberholtzer,  "  Life  of  Robert  Morris,"  pp.  20,  22 ;  "  Life  of  George 
Read,"  pp.  162-166,  226;  "Life  of  Joseph  Reed,"  by  W.  B.  Reed,  vol.  i, 
p.  201;  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  vi,  pp.  1212,  1232;  W.  H. 
Michael,  "  Story  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence." 

460 


CELEBRATING  INDEPENDENCE 

Many  patriots  were,  no  doubt,  inclined  to  agree  with 
Carter  Braxton,  who  thought  the  Declaration  had  strengthened 
the  patriot  party,  given  the  Congress  something  to  stand  by, 
and  prevented  that  body  disbanding.  The  patriot  party  may 
have  lost  certain  adherents  by  the  Declaration,  but  it  gained 
others  and  gained  in  animation  and  vigor.7 

In  New  York  as  soon  as  the  patriots  heard  of  the  Declara- 
tion they  dragged  down  the  gilt  statue  of  the  king  on  the 
Bowling  Green  and  cut  off  its  head.  In  Savannah,  Georgia, 
the  Declaration  is  said  to  have  been  read  to  a  great  concourse 
of  people,  followed  by  a  parade  of  the  militia,  with  platoon 
firing  and  cannonading.  In  the  evening  there  was  one  of 
those  curious  ceremonies  which  the  people  of  that  time 
were  very  clever  at  improvising.  They  held  a  funeral  over 
the  remains  of  George  III,  who  was  interred  before  the  court- 
house in  the  "sure  and  certain  hope  that  he  will  never  obtain 
a  resurrection  to  rule  again  over  these  United  States  of 
America. ' ' 

In  Boston  there  was  a  formal  military  celebration  of  the 
reading.  In  Philadelphia,  Mrs.  Deborah  Logan,  sitting  at  the 
window  of  her  house  at  the  corner  of  Fifth  and  Library 
Streets,  heard  the  formal  reading  before  what  is  now  Inde- 
pendence Hall,  and  records  in  her  diary  that  few  people  were 
present  except  some  of  the  lower  orders. 

Wherever  there  were  patriot  troops  they  were  paraded 
and  the  Declaration  read  to  them  by  an  officer.  Captain 
Graydon,  who  was  with  part  of  the  patriot  army,  tells  us 
that  the  troops  took  the  announcement  very  quietly.  They 
regarded  it  as  a  wise  step,  though  closing  the  door  to  accom- 
modation or  compromise. 

We  also  find  some  of  the  troops  expressing  their  feelings 
in  words  which  sum  up  the  whole  doctrine  of  independence. 


T  Pennsylvania  Magazine  of  History,  vol.  27,  p.  145 ;  Wells,  "  Life 
of  Samuel  Adams,"  vol.  ii,  p.  399;  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol. 
vi,  p.  505;  fifth  series,  vol.  i,  pp.  139,  230. 

461 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

1 '  Now, ' '  they  said,  ' '  we  are  a  people.  We  have  a  name  among 
the  states  of  the  world. ' ' 8 

After  the  Declaration  had  been  accepted  by  the  Congress, 
a  committee  was  appointed  to  prepare  a  form  of  league  or 
general  government  for  the  colonies  which  were  now  inde- 
pendent, and  several  years  afterwards  the  efforts  of  this  com- 
mittee resulted  in  what  became  known  as  the  Articles  of  Con- 
federation. Another  committee  was  appointed  to  prepare  a 
plan  for  treaties  with  foreign  nations,  with  which  independent 
America  could  now  assume  to  deal  as  an  equal. 

The  Declaration  was  a  remarkable  document.  There  had 
been  nothing  exactly  like  it  in  the  history  of  the  world.  Its 
opening  paragraphs,  setting  forth  the  doctrine  of  political 
equality,  the  right  of  revolution,  the  right  of  every  naturally 
separated  people  to  independence,  have  become  so  familiar 
to  us  that  we  can  hardly  appreciate  the  interest  they  at  first 
aroused.  It  is  true  those  doctrines  were  merely  the  natural 
and  logical  result  of  the  writings  of  Locke,  Burlamaqui, 
Grotius,  Hooker,  and  others  whose  principles  had  been  known 
in  Europe  ever  since  the  Reformation.  But  to  see  those  prin- 
ciples set  forth  in  such  a  bold,  striking  and  practical  way  by 
colonial  insurgents  who  were  prepared  to  fight  for  them  was 
a  great  surprise  to  Europeans,  and  the  doctrines  themselves 
have  not  yet  been  entirely  accepted  in  Europe. 

English  Tories  and  American  loyalists  became,  of  course, 
more  than  ever  denunciatory  of  what  they  called  American 
perfidy,  ingratitude,  and  treason.  America  had  been  orig- 
inally settled,  they  said,  by  the  scum  of  England, — round- 
heads, Puritans,  Presbyterians,  and  other  rebellious  sects; 
followers  of  Cromwell,  who  hated  the  noble  British  Consti- 
tution, and  who  took  with  them  to  America  the  seeds  of 
sedition,  which  they  had  been  "as  assiduous  in  sowing  in  the 
hearts  of  their  children  as  they  had  been  in  cultivating  their 


8 American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  i,  p.  882;  "Life  and  Corre- 
spondence of  President  Reed,"  vol.  i,  p.  195;  American  Archives,  fifth 
series,  vol.  i,  p.  630;  see,  also,  pp.  230,  810,  972;  Hazelton,  "The  Declara- 
tion of  Independence,"  p.  265. 

462 


ENGLISH  OPINIONS 

lands."  England  had  been  fortunate  in  being  delivered  from 
''their  venomous  fanatic  principles"  at  home;  and  now  in 
the  colonies  they  had  turned  with  malevolence  and  spite  to 
sting  her.9 

To  the  Tories  the  principle  that  all  men  were  politically 
equal  was  as  absurd  as  to  assert  that  all  men  were  equal  in 
height,  fortune,  or  talents.  They  pointed  with  jeers  and  sar- 
casm to  the  thousands  of  black  slaves  held  by  the  very  men 
who  had  signed  this  declaration  of  universal  liberty;  and  to 
modern  Englishmen  with  an  aristocracy  to  support  and 
290,000,000  East  Indians  to  hold  in  profitable  subjection,  even 
to  English  liberals,  the  doctrines  of  political  equality  and 
self-government  of  the  Declaration  are  still  as  unacceptable  as 
ever.10 

The  opening  paragraphs  of  the  Declaration,  dealing  with 
the  doctrines  of  the  rights  of  man,  are  very  brief.  The  greater 
part  of  the  document  is  taken  up  with  a  somewhat  detailed 
description  of  the  specific  acts  of  the  King,  which  had  com- 
pelled the  American  patriots  to  fall  back  on  the  principle  or 
right  of  revolution.  Most  people  in  reading  the  Declaration 
are  interested,  in  the  short  and  rather  eloquent  passage  on 
the  rights  of  man,  but  soon  become  weary  of  the  subsequent 
dry  details  referring  to  matters  long  since  forgotten,  and 
stated  in  such  a  brief  and  general  way  that  they  cannot  appeal 
to  the  present  generation.  But  these  dry  details  were  the 
important  part  of  the  Declaration  at  the  time  of  its  adoption, 
and  they  involved  the  whole  history  of  the  controversy  with 
Great  Britain. 

They   consisted   of   twenty-eight   charges    or   reasons    for 


•Reflections  on  the  State  of  Parties,"  London,  1776,  pp.  56,  57; 
"  Remarks  on  the  Different  Principles  Relative  to  the  American  Colo- 
nies," London,  1776,  p.  11,  etc.;  "  A  Letter  from  an  Officer  in  New  York," 
London,  1777,  p.  11  etc.  Some  Whigs  in  England  like  Dr.  Richard  Price 
defended  the  Declaration.  Numerous  pamphlets  attacking  him  for  this 
defence  can  be  found  in  the  Carter-Brown  collection  in  Providence,  Rhode 
Island. 

10  Goldwin  Smith,  "  The  United  States,"  pp.  87,  88. 

463 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

breaking  the  allegiance  to  the  King.  Each  charge  described 
a  distinct  offence  or  act  which  had  been  committed,  and  all 
these  acts  which  are  complained  of  are  charged  upon  the 
King  and  not  upon  Parliament.  Even  where  the  laws  of 
Parliament  are  complained  of  the  word  parliament  is  not 
used;  but  the  King  is  charged  with  combining  with  others  to 
procure  the  laws  and  with  "giving  his  assent  to  their  acts  of 
pretended  legislation."  Indeed  although  the  whole  contest 
for  twelve  years  had  been  with  Parliament,  and  the  taxation 
and  other  acts  passed  by  it,  yet  one  would  not  infer  from  read- 
ing the  Declaration  that  there  had  been  any  contest  with 
Parliament  at  all. 

This  method,  however,  was  entirely  consistent  with  the 
patriot  position.  They  had  some  time  before  brought  their 
argument  to  the  point  where  they  not  only  denied  the  power 
of  Parliament  to  tax  them,  but  denied  its  power  to  control 
them  or  legislate  for  them  in  any  case  whatsoever.  They  would 
not,  therefore,  in  their  Declaration  complain  of  Parliament. 
They  had  held  that  all  its  acts  with  reference  to  them  were 
void,  and  of  no  effect ;  and  Jefferson  had  always  been  a  strong 
advocate  of  this  view.  They  would  not  declare  independence 
of  Parliament  because  they  had  held  that,  under  the  true 
view  of  the  English  Constitution,  they  had  never  been  subject 
to  Parliament.  They  had  always  been  independent  of  it.  The 
only  part  of  the  British  Government  on  which  they  had 
acknowledged  themselves  dependent  had  been  the  king;  and 
now  that  the  King  Had  declared  war  against  them,  and  was 
sending  armies  and  fleets  to  subjugate  them  and  bring  them 
under  the  control  of  Parliament,  they  had,  they  believed,  good 
grounds  and  cause  for  breaking  their  slight  allegiance  to  him 
and  declaring  themselves  absolutely  independent.11 

Accepting  the  King  as  the  formal  head  of  the  empire,  not 
only  representative,  but  responsible  for  all  acts  of  government, 
they  included  in  their  indictment  of  him  everything  unpleasant 


"  See  the  twenty-eight  charges  discussed  in  detail  in  Pennsylvania 
Magazine  of  History,  vol.  31,  p.  257. 

464 


THE  TWENTY-EIGHT  CHARGES 

or  unpopular  which  Parliament,  the  Ministry  or  any  depart- 
ment of  the  home  government  had  done  since  the  present  King, 
George  III,  came  to  the  throne  in  1760,  and  the  reorganization 
of  the  colonies  began.  In  this  way  they  snapped  the  only 
thread  of  British  allegiance  which  they  recognized. 

Their  attack  had  to  be  directed  against  the  King;  but  it 
was  in  reality,  of  course,  an  arraignment  of  colonialism,  an 
attack  upon  the  entire  system  of  outside  alien  control,  as  it 
appeared  to  the  eyes  of  the  patriots.  It  was  most  ably  and 
well  done.  The  felicity  of  expression  in  any  one  of  the  twenty- 
eight  charges  seems  more  and  more  admirable  the  more  we 
study  the  circumstances  it  was  intended  to  meet  and  the  point 
of  view  of  its  signers.  This  felicity  we  owe  principally  to 
Jefferson,  who  was  a  master  of  that  sort  of  language  which 
expresses  legal  or  political  principles  in  the  most  effective  and 
popular  form. 

To  consider  each  one  of  the  twenty-eight  charges  separately 
would  be  to  rewrite  the  history  of  the  Revolution.  They  were 
separately  considered  and  most  exhaustively  analyzed  in  two 
political  pamphlets  which  appeared  in  England.  One  of  these, 
"An  Answer  to  the  Declaration  of  the  Congress,"  by  an 
English  barrister,  John  Lind,  was  generally  regarded  as  pre- 
pared at  the  request  of  the  Ministry  and  as  an  expression  of 
their  views.  The  other,  called  "Strictures  on  the  Declaration 
of  the  Congress, "  was  written  by  Governor  Hutchinson,  and 
though  less  complete  than  Lind's,  is  of  .great  value  and  im- 
portance. The  two  together  afford  one  of  the  most  interesting 
discussions  that  can  be  found  of  the  British  point  of  view.12 


12  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  iii,  p.  1009  note;  Freedenwald, 
"  The  Declaration  of  Independence,"  reprinted  from  the  International 
Monthly  for  July,  1901;  Hazleton,  "The  Declaration  of  Independence;  " 
John  Adams,  Works,  vol.  ii,  p.  514. 


30 


XLII. 

MILITARY  CONDITIONS  AND  GENERAL  STRATEGY 

While  the  British  are  preparing  a  grand  army  to  deliver 
a  crushing  blow  and  regain  control  of  the  thirteen  independent 
provinces,  it  may  be  well  to  consider  the  general  military 
theories  on  which  our  army  and  theirs  acted  during  the  war; 
and  this  brief  view  will  help  to  a  better  understanding  of  the 
future  military  movements. 

In  conquering  the  Boer  Republics  of  South  Africa  in  the 
beginning  of  the  twentieth  century,  England  is  said  to  have 
had  in  the  field  at  one  time  over  250,000  troops.  If  she  had 
had  half  that  number  in  1776  one  would  suppose  that  the 
conquest  of  America  would  have  been  a  comparatively  easy 
task.  With  125,000  men,  a  thousand  sailing  vessels  for  carry- 
ing them  with  their  supplies  to  America,  and  sufficient  money 
in  the  treasury  to  send  their  food  across  the  Atlantic  for  two 
or  three  years,  there  could  have  been  a  very  complete  occu- 
pation of  the  country.  Boston  could  have  been  taken  as  the 
most  northern  point  and  the  control  continued  on  down  the 
coast  by  the  occupation  of  every  important  place,  Newport 
in  Rhode  Island,  New  London  in  Connecticut,  the  City  of 
New  York,  New  Brunswick  in  New  Jersey,  and  so  on  down 
through  Philadelphia,  Annapolis,  Alexandria,  and  Charleston, 
to  Savannah  in  Georgia.  Such  an  occupation,  with  the  addi- 
tion of  a  force  to  hold  the  valley  of  the  Hudson  River  up  to 
Lake  Champlain,  would  seem  as  if  it  must  have  overwhelmed 
the  patriot  cause;  and  driven  its  radical  followers  to  take 
refuge  among  the  Indians  beyond  the  Allegheny  Mountains. 

But  England  had  not  a  hundred  and  twenty-five  thousand 
troops  to  send  to  America.  It  was  with  the  greatest  difficulty 
that  she  sent  out  60,000,  all  told,  during  the  first  three  years  of 
the  war.  Her  population  and  her  army  were  small  in  those 
days ;   and  in  all  her  wars  she  had  been  obliged  to  hire  troops 

466 


FOREIGN  TROOPS 

from  other  nations.  She  expected  help  from  the  Indians,  but 
it  was  comparatively  slight.  She  also  expected  help  from  the 
loyalists,  and  some  thousands  of  them  enlisted  in  her  service. 
But  they  did  not  organize  themselves  so  as  to  occupy  large 
districts  or  provinces  or  control  the  political  government  of 
certain  states  as  was  expected. 

She  applied  for  troops  to  the  Netherlands  and  also  to 
Catherine  of  Russia,  "Sister  Kitty"  as  Walpole  irreverently 
called  her;  but  in  both  instances  was  refused.  Many,  how- 
ever, were  obtained  from  Germany,  and  in  1777  there  were 
said  to  have  been  23,762  of  them  in  the  British  army.  Of 
these  about  12,000  Hessians  and  5,000  Brunswickers  were  sent 
out  to  America.1 

The  largest  single  army  England  sent  to  America  was  the 
one  of  34,000  given  to  Howe  in  1776;  and  during  his  three 
years  of  command  the  total  sent  to  him  is  said  to  have  been 
60,000 ;  with  a  fleet  at  his  disposal  of  over  fifty  large  war-ships, 
twenty-five  armed  sloops  and  cutters,  and  four  hundred  trans- 
ports. After  the  French  alliance,  in  1778,  the  British  Govern- 
ment was  obliged  to  reduce  the  number  of  troops  in  America. 
Clinton  never  had  over  20,000  troops  in  all  his  positions  north 
and  south,  and  seldom  as  many  as  twenty-five  war-ships. 

Looking  back  at  all  the  events  of  the  Revolution,  it  seems 
as  if  all  these  land  and  sea  forces  of  Great  Britain  would  have 
been  sufficient  to  conquer  the  seaboard  colonies  and  drive  the 
desperate  patriots  into  the  interior,  if  the  patriots  had  not 
been  assisted  by  France,  and  Spain.  The  whole  question  hinged 
on  the  aid  France  might  give.  It  was  taken  for  granted  that 
she  would  give  it,  because  it  was  so  obviously  her  best  policy. 
The  patriots  looked  forward  to  it  from  the  beginning;  and 
the    English    regarded    it    with    such    dread    and    uneasiness 


1  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iv,  pp.  205,  369;  vol.  vi,  p. 
356;  Fonblanque,  "Life  of  Burgoyne,"  pp.  153,  213-217;  Duval,  Letters 
of  George  III,  vol.  i,  pp.  293,  297.  Parliamentary  Register  House  of 
Commons  1779,  vol.  xi,  p.  320.  See,  also,  as  to  British  disadvantages, 
American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  iii,  p.  687. 

467 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

that  they  exhausted  every  method  of  conciliation.  The  doubt 
as  to  the  possibility  of  conquering  America  under  such  circum- 
stances was  the  underlying  motive  of  many  a  debate  in  Par- 
liament. It  was  one  of  the  foundations  of  the  Whig  position 
that  the  war  was  useless,  impractical  and  dangerous,  because 
England  in  her  weak  and  bankrupt  condition  would  become 
involved  in  a  European  war;  and  certainly  if  in  trying  to 
save  America  she  should  lose  her  much  more  valuable  interest 
in  India,  it  would  be  a  great  misfortune. 

Not  being  able  to  occupy  our  whole  sea  front  and  settle 
the  war  by  an  overwhelming  force,  the  British  Ministry  and 
generals  had  to  decide  upon  the  best  way  of  using  the  thirty  or 
forty  thousand  troops  which  they  could  send  to  America. 
There  was  no  use  in  keeping  a  force  in  Boston,  because  it  was 
of  no  general  strategic  importance.  It  might  be  held  for 
years  while  the  patriots  in  the  rest  of  the  country  created 
an  independent  nation  and  became  self-sustaining.  The  impor- 
tant place  to  seize  and  occupy  was  the  strategical  centre  of 
the  country.  It  was  generally  admitted  that  the  strategical 
centre  was  the  town  of  New  York  and  the  line  of  the  Hudson 
River  valley  up  to  Lake  Champlain  and  Canada. 

This  strategical  line  had  been  the  bone  of  contention  in 
the  French  and  Indian  Wars  and  was  still  looked  upon  by 
almost  everybody  on  both  sides  as  the  key  to  America.  The 
town  of  New  York,  easily  defended,  because  on  an  island,  had 
the  best  harbor  on  the  coast,  of  comparatively  easy  entrance 
from  the  sea,  and  could  not  be  equalled  as  a  safe  headquarters 
and  base  for  collecting  supplies.  The  Hudson  River  stretching 
northward  from  it  formed  with  Lake  George,  Lake  Champlain, 
and  the  Richelieu  River,  the  only  highway  of  the  time  to  Can- 
ada. This  highway  also  had  the  advantage  of  cutting  the  colo- 
nies in  half.  It  was  an  obstacle  rather  difficult  to  cross,  and  sep- 
arated New  England  from  the  middle  and  southern  colonies. 
If  held  by  troops  with  the  British  fleet  controlling  the  ocean, 
New  England,  "the  hot-bed  of  sedition,"  would  be  completely 
isolated  from  intercourse  with  the  other  colonies.  She  would 
be  cut  off  not  only  from  the  interchange  of  ideas,  encourage- 

468 


THE  CHESAPEAKE 

ment  and  reinforcement  of  troops,  but  also  from  the  provisions 
and  supplies  which  she  drew  from  the  more  fertile  agricul- 
tural regions  to  the  south. 

In  New  England  itself  it  seemed  well  for  the  British  to  hold 
only  Newport,  because  it  was  an  easy  harbor  for  sailing 
vessels  to  enter  and  take  shelter.  They  could  easily  beat  into 
it  in  almost  any  wind,  while  at  New  York  in  spite  of  the  many 
great  advantages  there  was  some  difficulty  in  beating  in  and 
the  water  on  the  bar,  except  at  very  high  tides,  was  rather 
shoal  for  deep  draft  men-of-war  to  cross.  This  shoalness, 
however,  proved  afterwards  to  be  a  protection  to  New  York, 
for  it  prevented  the  large  French  war-ships  from  entering  to 
attack  the  town.2 

The  next  strategic  point  was  Chesapeake  Bay,  with  strong 
positions  in  Virginia  and  Maryland,  as  at  Annapolis,  Alex- 
andria, and  Norfolk.  The  line  might  be  extended  northward 
along  the  Susquehanna  River,  which  would  separate  the  middle 
from  the  southern  colonies.  But  this  position  was  never  seri- 
ously attempted  except  at  Norfolk,  because  it  required  a  larger 
force  than  England  could  spare.  The  important  part  of  it  was 
at  Norfolk,  from  which  as  a  base  great  devastation  could  be 
wrought  in  Virginia,  at  that  time  the  richest  and  most  popu- 
lous province  and  as  much  a  source  of  patriot  ideas  and  energy 
as  Massachusetts.  Clinton  during  the  last  three  years  of  the 
war  accomplished  some  of  his  most  effective  work  from  Nor- 
folk, and  seriously  reduced  Virginia's  value  to  the  patriot 
cause. 

As  for  the  Carolinas  and  Georgia,  they  offered  a  compara- 
tively easy  conquest  because  of  their  sparse  and  scattered  pop- 
ulation with  a  large  proportion  of  loyalists.  The  natural  way 
to  take  them  was  by  occupying  their  three  seaports,  Wilming- 
ton in  North  Carolina,  Charleston  in  South  Carolina,  and 
Savannah  in  Georgia.  This  could  be  easily  done,  and  was  done 
towards  the  close  of  the  war  with  a  rather  small  force,  which, 


a"A   Short   History   of   Last    Session   of   Parliament,"   pp.    18,    19, 
London,  1780;  Pennsylvania  Magazine  of  History,  vol.  22,  p.  151. 

469 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

with  the  English  having  control  of  the  ocean,  was  readily  sent 
in  ships,  while  the  northern  patriots  in  order  to  help  their 
southern  brothers  had  to  send  reinforcements  by  the  long 
expensive  and  wasteful  land  route  through  Virginia.3 

To  hold  the  main  strategic  centre  at  New  York  and  up  the 
Hudson,  and  occupy  the  Carolinas  and  Georgia,  with  a  side 
post  at  Newport  in  Ehode  Island,  and  a  raiding  base  at  Nor- 
folk in  Virginia,  was  believed  to  be  about  all  the  British  land 
forces  could  accomplish;  and  the  navy  was  expected  to  com- 
plete the  work  of  subjugation.  The  patriot  colonists  had  con- 
siderable confidence  in  their  ability  to  deal  with  the  British 
land  forces;  but  they  were  in  despair  about  the  navy;  and  it 
is  probable  that  none  of  them  had  in  their  hearts  much  hope 
of  maintaining  themselves  unless  France  or  Spain  protected 
them  by  sea.  The  Revolution  in  the  end  turned  out  to  be 
altogether  a  question  of  sea  power,  and  it  would  be  difficult 
to  find  a  better  instance  of  the  importance  of  that  sort  of 
power,  especially  to  a  nation  that  seeks  its  profit  by  controlling 
subject  peoples. 

The  British  navy,  the  glorious  British  navy,  the  hearts  of 
oak,  was  supposed  to  furnish  the  most  convincing  argument 
for  loyalism.  Loyalists  would  admit  the  validity  of  all  the 
patriot  arguments  and  then  with  calm  assurance  waive  them 
aside  by  saying,  "But  how  can  you  withstand  the  navy;  what 
will  your  boasted  independence  amount  to  before  the  wooden 
walls  of  England,  which  now  protect  your  commerce  and  will 
utterly  destroy  you  in  your  disobedience  and  rebellion  ? ' '  4 

For  the  last  hundred  years  the  people  of  England  had  been 


3  There  is  a  curious  article  by  a  German  officer  on  the  way  to  conquer 
the  United  States  in  modern  times  by  holding  the  principal  Atlantic 
seaport  towns.    See  Literary  Digest,  vol.  30,  p.  635. 

4  "  The  idea  of  aiming  at  independence  at  present  affords  the  most 
frightful  of  all  prospects,  while  the  mother  country  has  such  power  on 
the  ocean."  {American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  ii,  p.  872;  Durand, 
"  New  Materials  for  History  of  American  Revolution,"  pp.  iii,  6,  46, 
47,  54.) 

470 


j  Cape  Hatteras 


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MAP  SHOWING  THE  GENERAL  STRATEGY   OF  THE   WAR 


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DREAD  OF  THE  BRITISH  NAVY 

in  the  habit  of  congratulating  themselves  that  their  American 
settlements,  though  far  away  and  scattered  along  twelve  hun- 
dred miles  of  coast,  had  nevertheless  in  nearly  all  instances 
followed  the  lines  of  water  communication  and  remained 
nearer  to  the  mouths  than  to  the  sources  of  rivers.  The 
colonists  had  settled  and  remained  upon  the  navigable  rivers, 
natural  harbors,  bays  and  sounds  which  are  so  numerous  and 
convenient  on  the  Atlantic  coast.  The  Kennebec  in  Maine, 
the  Merrimac  in  New  Hampshire,  the  harbor  and  bays  of 
Massachusetts,  the  Connecticut,  the  Hudson,  the  Delaware, 
Chesapeake  Bay  and  its  tributary  rivers,  and  the  tributary 
rivers  of  the  sounds  of  the  Carolinas  and  Georgia,  were  at 
first  the  reason  and  means  of  settlement  and  afterwards  the 
support  and  fountain  of  existence  of  all  the  American  colonies. 
Canada  was  merely  the  settlements  on  the  St.  Lawrence.  New 
York  was  merely  the  people  living  along  the  Hudson  and 
Mohawk  Rivers,  and  the  vast  areas  of  the  province  away  from 
the  shores  of  those  rivers  were  unpeopled  save  by  Indians. 
Most  of  the  Pennsylvanians  lived  along  the  Delaware;  and 
nearly  every  Virginia  plantation  could  be  reached  from  the 
tributaries  of  Chesapeake  Bay. 

The  ease  with  which  nearly  all  the  people  and  property  of 
the  colonies  could  be  brought  under  the  guns  of  men-of-war, 
or  reached  by  their  cutters  and  small  boats,  had  already  been 
exemplified  in  the  destruction  of  Portland  and  Norfolk  and 
the  shelling  of  Bristol.  Many  families  living  on  navigable 
waters  had  alreay  moved  inland  to  escape  the  frightful  devas- 
tation and  slaughter  which  they  thought  was  sure  to  come; 
and  it  certainly  seemed  as  if  America,  without  a  navy  of  her 
own,  was  wide  open  to  attack  by  such  a  great  maritime  power 
as  England.5 


6 Joshua  Gee,  "Trade  and  Navigation  of  Great  Britain,"  sixth 
edition,  p.  71;  Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  i,  pp. 
431,  432;  vol.  ii,  p.  20;  Journal  of  Congress,  vol.  i.  p.  56;  American 
Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  872,  873;  vol.  iii,  p.  3;  "  Life  of  Colonel 
Hanger,"  p.  187;  Eddis,  "Letters  from  America,"  pp.  194,  241,  242,  248, 
257,  362,  420. 

471 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

But  the  expected  seldom  happens.  The  sea-power  problem 
was  worked  out  not  quite  in  the  way  that  was  foretold.  The 
dread  of  universal  devastation  proved  to  be  largely  a  mere 
scare,  encouraged  very  likely  by  the  bluster  of  the  captains  and 
sailors  who  had  long  been  stationed  on  the  coast  and  posed  as 
the  typical  and  terrible  British  sea-dogs.  In  the  early  part  of 
the  war  the  ministry  abstained  from  devastation  in  the  hope  of 
encouraging  the  patriot  party  to  compromise  before  France 
could  interfere ;  and  except  for  the  destruction  of  Portland 
and  Norfolk,  already  described,  the  British  navy  during  the 
Revolution  was  in  some  respects  a  very  harmless  collection  of 
men,  guns,  and  ships.  No  where  did  it  keep  up  a  really  effect- 
ive blockade.  De  Grasse  repulsed  Graves  at  the  Chesapeake. 
In  the  West  Indies  the  British  were  inferior  to  the  French 
fleets  until  Rodney  took  command  at  the  close  of  the  war.  Ex- 
cept for  his  famous  victory  over  De  Grasse  the  British  navy 
did  very  little  more  than  convoy  transports  or  the  mere  priva- 
teersman's  work  of  seizing  defenceless  merchant  vessels.  It 
could  be  aroused  to  action  at  times  by  extreme  hunger  for  fresh 
provisions  and  under  this  incentive  Bristol  was  shelled  and 
some  notable  raids  committed  for  mutton  and  beef  on  the  coast 
of  New  England.  It  fought  no  great  naval  battles  and  won  no 
victories  until  Rodney  chanced  on  his  in  the  West  Indies  in 
1782.6 

This  inefficiency  was  partly  caused  by  the  bad  adminis- 
tration of  Lord  Sandwich,  who  was  at  the  head  of  the  navy, 
and  whose  profligate  character  and  partisan  methods  of  political 
jobbery  and  corruption  demoralized  the  service.  Very  in- 
ferior officers  were  sent  to  the  American  coast;  ships  were 
badly  equipped;  and  the  method  of  handling  fleets  in  battle 
was  obsolete  and  a  great  hindrance  to  success.  It  was  for- 
tunate that  our  Revolution  took  place  during  a  period  of  de- 


6  The  scurvy  was  no  doubt  a  somewhat  serious  matter  for  the 
British  war-ships  unless  they  could  make  raids  for  fresh  provisions. 
American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  v,  p.  1330. 

472 


CONTROL  OF  THE  OCEAN 

pression  in  the  British  navy  and  of  improvement  in  the  navy 
of  France.7 

Our  naval  attacks  on  Great  Britain  were  confined  almost 
exclusively  to  privateering  on  her  commerce.  Our  small  navy 
created  by  the  Congress  was  also  of  some  value  for  this  priva- 
teering work,  but  unable  as  a  rule  to  meet  the  British  war- 
vessels,  which  retained  complete  control  of  the  ocean  so  far 
as  to  make  it  perfectly  safe  for  England  to  send  troops  to 
America  and  up  and  down  our  coast  between  New  York  and 
the  Carolinas.  This  was  England's  strong  point  in  the  contest. 
So  long  as  she  had  unobstructed  ocean  transportation  for 
troops  and  their  supplies  she  had  a  good  chance  to  conquer 
America.  But  it  was  also  her  weak  point ;  for  if  the  Americans 
could  persuade  the  two  great  naval  powers,  France  and  Spain, 
to  combine  their  fleets  so  as  to  cut  off  England's  access  to 
our  coast,  our  people  could  be  as  independent  as  they  pleased. 

Receiving  less  assistance  from  their  navy  than  was  ex- 
pected, and  prevented  by  complications  between  Howe  and 
Burgoyne  from  taking  possession  of  the  Hudson  River  valley, 
and  Lake  Champlain,  the  British  Ministry  were  much  disap- 
pointed in  the  outcome  of  their  general  plans.  They  held  the 
town  of  New  York  all  through  the  war  as  the  English  head- 
quarters in  America.  They  held  Newport  for  several  years; 
they  held  Philadelphia  for  nine  months;  and  met  with  their 
greatest  success  in  the  South,  where  they  conquered  Georgia 
and  South  Carolina,  and  devastated  Virginia. 

Independently  of  these  strategic  positions  and  theories,  the 
important  thing  for  them  was  to  defeat  the  American  armies 
in  battle,  compel  them  to  surrender  or  scatter  and  demoralize 
them,  so  that  they  could  not  be  reorganized.  The  occupation 
of  cities  and  important  points,  so  effective  on  the  continent  of 
Europe,  would  have  little  effect  upon  Americans  so  long  as 
they  could  keep  an  army  in  the  field;  and  their  army  must 
not  be  merely  out-generaled  in  two  or  three  battles,  but  prac- 
tically annihilated  before  they  would  acknowledge  the  fall  of 


English  Dictionary  Nat.  Biog.,  vol.  38,  pp.  256,  257;  vol.  39,  p.  83. 

473 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

the  patriot  cause.  "It  is  a  matter  worthy  of  observation," 
said  General  Knox,  "that  in  most  countries  which  have  been 
invaded  one  or  two  battles  have  decided  their  fate ;  but  Amer- 
ica rises  after  a  defeat. ' ' 8 

During  the  first  three  years  of  the  war  General  Howe  de- 
feated our  army  under  Washington  in  the  only  two  pitched 
battles  fought,  Long  Island  and  Brandywine ;  but  no  surrender 
was  forced,  and  there  was  no  relentless  or  effective  pursuit. 
Washington,  being  undisturbed  after  each  battle,  was  always 
able  to  reorganize  his  defeated  army  and  again  take  the  field. 

Besides  holding  strategic  positions  and  defeating  the 
enemy's  army,  the  third  most  effective  means  of  warfare  is  to 
devastate  the  country,  destroy  the  food  supplies,  burn  towns 
and  farm-houses,  imprison  the  non-combatant  men  and  the 
women  and  children,  if  they  are  of  the  white  race,  and  if  they 
are  dark-skinned  put  large  numbers  of  them  to  the  sword.  If 
during  the  first  three  years  of  the  war  General  Howe  had  con- 
ducted a  systematic  devastation  of  the  country,  backed  by 
devastation  by  the  British  fleet,  it  might  have  broken  up  the 
patriot  party  and  their  army.  But  he  refrained  from  any- 
thing of  the  sort,  and  it  was  at  first  the  intention  of  the  Min- 
istry that  he  should  refrain.  They  intended  to  begin  by  con- 
ducting a  very  mild  war,  to  send  out  to  America  an  olive 
branch,  along  with  the  sword;  so  that  the  injury  done  to  the 
country  during  Howe's  command  was  merely  the  ordinary 
damage  and  pillage  incident  to  the  presence  of  a  hostile  army. 
After  the  French  alliance,  when  General  Clinton  took  com- 
mand, the  olive  branch  was  withdrawn.  But  Clinton's  force 
was  so  small  that  he  could  not  make  the  devastation  as  effective 
as  he  wished. 

As  the  Americans  were  acting  on  the  defensive  their 
strategy  largely  depended  on  what  the  British  attempted  to  do. 
Our  numbers  were  small.  For  particular  occasions  we  could 
sometimes  raise  a  good  sized  army,  as,  for  example,  the  14,000 
effectives  for  the  battle  of  Long  Island,  the  11,000  for  Brandy- 


8 Drake,  "Life  of  General  Knox/'  p.  53. 

474 


TICONDEROGA  AND  WEST  POINT 

wine,  and  the  11,000  at  Saratoga.  But  these  numbers  were 
largely  militia,  who  could  be  held  together  only  for  the  par- 
ticular occasion  and  then  quickly  disappeared.  The  number 
that  could  be  steadily  maintained  in  our  main  army  under 
Washington,  was,  according  to  his  own  statement,  hardly 
5000.9 

Our  general  policy  was  to  follow  the  British  attack  from 
place  to  place,  with  such  numbers  as  could  be  raised.  Our 
main  reliance  all  through  the  war  was  to  prevent  the  British 
from  securing  control  of  the  line  of  the  Hudson  Valley.  This 
was  the  great  contention  and  controlling  motive,  and  almost 
every  military  move  in  the  Revolution,  except  those  in  the 
South,  was  connected  with  the  control  of  the  Hudson. 

In  the  great  line  of  water  communication  up  the  Hudson 
and  through  Lake  Champlain,  there  were  two  strategic  points 
which  completely  commanded  the  navigation.  The  northern 
one  was  Ticonderoga,  at  the  southern  end  of  Lake  Champlain, 
where,  as  already  described,  the  water  was  narrow  and  two 
points  jutting  out  from  both  sides  could  be  fortified  so  as 
to  command  a  long  stretch  of  water  in  every  direction  and  at 
the  same  time  be  easily  protected  from  the  land  side.  This 
was  the  northern  gateway  of  the  great  strategic  line;  and  the 
patriots  tried  to  fortify  it  as  strongly  as  possible,  and  rein- 
forced it  by  outlying  forts  at  Crown  Point,  Chamblee  and 
St.  Johns,  commanding  the  approaches  from  Canada. 

The  southern  gateway  was  at  West  Point,  forty  miles 
above  the  town  of  New  York,  where  there  was  a  similar  con- 
formation of  two  points,  which,  owing  to  the  mountainous  char- 
acter of  the  shores  of  the  Hudson,  could  be  made  almost  im- 
pregnable. As  Ticonderoga  was  strengthened  by  outlying 
forts  so  West  Point  was  intended  to  be  strengthened  by  forts 
lower  down  the  river,  like  Montgomery  and  Stony  Point,  com- 
manding the  approaches  from  the  town  of  New  York. 

The  patriots  were  never  able  to  drive  the  British  from 
the  town  of  New  York ;  or  from  Charleston,  in  South  Carolina ; 


"Writings  of  Washington,  Ford  edition,  vol.  7,  p.  242. 

475 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

nor  could  they  prevent  the  British  from  occupying  Canada 
as  a  stronghold.  But  so  long  as  the  patriots  could  hold  Ticon- 
deroga  and  "West  Point,  they  felt  that  the  holding  of  New 
York  and  Canada  was  in  one  sense  useless  to  the  British.  The 
town  of  New  York  was  valuable  largely  as  a  basis  from  which 
to  take  West  Point;  and  Canada  was  valuable  as  a  basis  from 
which  to  take  Ticonderoga.  But  with  West  Point  and  Ticon- 
deroga  untaken,  the  middle  section  of  the  Hudson  Valley  was 
in  the  control  of  the  patriots;  the  colonies  could  not  be  cut  in 
half ;  and  might  remain  unconquered  for  an  undefinite  period. 

We  have  already  seen  how  the  patriots  in  the  very  begin- 
ning saw  the  importance  of  Ticonderoga  and  captured  it  at 
the  first  opportunity;  and  although  it  might  have  been  better 
fortified  and  protected,  yet  they  managed  to  hold  it  all  through 
the  war,  except  for  a  few  weeks  during  Burgoyne's  invasion 
from  Canada  in  the  autumn  of  1777.  In  the  same  way  they 
saw  the  importance  of  West  Point.  General  Schuyler,  who 
was  familiar  with  the  whole  Hudson  Valley,  was  very  anxious 
for  the  rapid  fortification  of  the  Hudson  Highlands,  as  the 
region  about  West  Point  was  called.  He  urged  the  importance 
of  it  on  the  Congress  in  May,  1775,  about  the  same  time  that 
Ticonderoga  was  taken.  He  feared  that  the  British  would 
see  the  opportunity  and  by  quickly  sending  a  large  force  to 
seize  West  Point  and  by  establishing  a  line  of  vessels  to  keep 
up  the  communication  with  New  York,  ruin  the  patriot  cause.10 

A  really  enterprising  enemy  might  have  made  a  rush  in 
force  for  West  Point.  But  the  British  let  the  opportunity  pass, 
and  the  patriots,  though  moving  too  slowly  to  suit  Schuyler, 
began  at  last  to  protect  this  vital  spot  in  the  most  elaborate 
manner.  West  Point  and  every  approach  to  it  soon  bristled 
with  fortifications,  constructed  at  enormous  expense  by  the 
Congress.  A  great  chain,  the  remains  of  which  are  still 
shown  at  the  Military  Academy,  was  stretched  across  the  river 
to  stop  ships.  All  these  constructions  were  under  the  direction 
of  two  French  officers,  Du  Portail  and  De  Gouvion,  supple- 


10  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  1065,  1108. 

476 


THE  RAIDING  METHOD 

mented  afterwards  by  the  more  practical  and  effective  work 
of  American  engineering.  It  was  this  position  which  Arnold 
intended  to  surrender  to  the  British  so  as  to  end  the  war  at 
one  stroke,  retain  the  colonies  for  the  British  empire  and 
prevent  their  falling  into  the  hands  of  France.11 

Galloway,  the  loyalist,  used  to  complain  that  the  military 
mistakes  of  the  British  in  the  early  part  of  the  Revolution  were 
childish,  that  their  errors  could  have  been  corrected  by  school 
boys ; 12  and  it  seemed  quite  extraordinary  to  many  people, 
when  the  English  had  an  army  of  over  30,000  men  at  New 
York  in  1776,  assisted  by  a  large  fleet  of  war-vessels,  that  they 
did  not  mass  it  on  West  Point's  uncompleted  defences  and 
secure  a  permanent  foothold  there  with  an  impregnable  line  of 
communication  over  the  short  water  distance  to  New  York 
harbor. 

In  the  last  years  of  our  Revolution,  when  the  British  held 
South  Carolina,  Georgia  and  the  town  of  New  York,  and  had 
no  hope  of  securing  the  line  of  the  Hudson  Valley,  they 
changed  their  methods,  and  adopted  a  plan  of  conquest  which 
disregarded  the  strategical  position  on  the  Hudson  and  sought 
to  wear  out  the  patriots  by  conducting  heavy  devastating  raids 
at  every  point  that  could  be  reached  by  sailing  vessels  from 
their  position  in  New  York.  As  their  vessels  could  move  to 
almost  any  point  of  the  coast  without  interference  from  a 
patriot  navy  these  raids  were  very  severe,  and  finally  were  on 
the  eve  of  wearing  out  the  patriot  party  and  compelling  the 
collapse  of  their  cause  in  spite  of  their  holding  the  strategical 
position  on  the  Hudson.  This  was  the  most  serious  period  for 
the  patriots  and  a  time  of  high  hope  in  England ;  for  even  with 
the  assistance  of  France  and  Spain  the  American  cause  seemed 
lost. 

It    has    accordingly    been    suggested    that    perhaps    the 


11  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  735,  1912 ;  vol.  vi, 
pp.  672,  792,  and  title  "  Highlands  "  in  index  of  volumes  of  American 
Archives;  Boynton,  "West  Point";    Heath,  Memoirs,  pp.  207,  243. 

ia"  Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.  ii,  p.  371. 

477 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

strategical  value  of  West  Point  and  the  Hudson  Valley  was 
exaggerated.  Du  Portail,  the  French  engineer,  who  served 
with  much  credit  through  the  war,  thought  it  a  mere  "cabinet 
idea"  and  not  of  as  much  practical  value  as  was  supposed. 
But  the  weight  of  the  contemporary  opinion  of  the  time  was 
overwhelmingly  the  other  way;  and  no  one  believed  in  the 
importance  of  West  Point  more  thoroughly  than  Washington. 
From  the  summer  of  1778  to  the  summer  of  1781  he  fought 
no  battle,  sought  no  advantage  or  distinction  in  the  field;  but 
devoted  his  whole  energy  during  that  gloomy  period  to  holding 
fast  to  West  Point.  He  often  said  that  its  loss  would  be  fatal, 
that  the  cause  would  never  survive  the  cutting  of  the  com- 
munication between  New  England  and  the  middle  states;  and 
the  day  when  he  saw  how  nearly  Arnold  had  turned  it  over  to 
the  British  was  probably  the  darkest  hour  of  his  life.13 


18  Jones,  "  New  York  in  the  Revolution,"  vol.  i,  p.  209 ;  American 
Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  332,  1468;  Writings  of  Washington, 
Ford  edition,  vol.  v,  p.  492;  vol.  vii,  pp.  45,  212;  vol.  viii,  p.  95;  G.  W. 
Greene,  "  Life  of  General  Greene,"  vol.  i,  p.  369 ;  Lee,  Memoirs,  vol.  i, 
p.  11  note;  Mahan,  "Influence  of  Sea  Power,"  p.  342. 


XLIII. 

THE  GREAT  ARMADA  AND  ITS  PROPOSALS  OF  PEACE 

While  the  Congress  was  debating  in  June  the  question  of 
announcing  independence,  several  divisions  of  the  great 
British  army  of  invasion  were  on  the  ocean  making  their  way 
towards  New  York. 

General  Howe  left  Halifax,  and  on  the  25th  of  June,  a 
week  before  the  final  vote  on  independence,  he  arrived  in  the 
"Greyhound"  off  Staten  Island,  opposite  New  York,  followed 
four  days  later  by  one  hundred  and  thirty  sail  of  transports 
with  his  Halifax  troops,  which  immediately  took  possession 
of  Staten  Island. 

At  Sandy  Hook  he  had  found  Governor  Tryon  living  on 
a  British  war-ship,  where  he  had  been  ever  since  the  patriots 
expelled  him  from  New  York.  With  the  assistance  of  loyalists 
and  his  former  officers,  he  was  trying  to  keep  up  a  continuance 
of  gubernatorial  dignity  upon  the  water  until  the  British  army 
should  restore  him  to  authority  upon  the  land.1 

On  the  12th  of  July  Admiral  Howe  reached  the  coast  with 
war-vessels  and  transports  deep  laden  with  troops  and  supplies. 
From  the  high  ground  of  the  Narrows  below  New  York  and 
from  Red  Hook,  the  anxious  eyes  of  patriots  and  loyalists  were 
every  day  scanning  the  horizon  for  new  arrivals  of  this  great 
English  Armada  that  was  to  establish  Anglo-Saxon  toryism 
in  America.  All  through  July  ships  were  arriving,  twenty 
or  thirty  at  a  time.  On  the  30th  of  July  Clinton  came  up  from 
the  south  with  the  troops  he  had  used  in  his  fruitless  attack  on 
Charleston.  On  the  12th  of  August  two  fleets  of  transports 
convoyed  by  Commodore  Hotham,  brought  a  large  number  of 
troops,  including  some  8,000  Hessians,  the  first  of  the  12,000 


1  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  i,  p.  122 ;  vol.  ii,  pp.  493,  494. 

479 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

of  these  troops  which  had  been  hired  for  service  in  America. 
On  the  14th  of  August,  Sir  Peter  Parker,  who  had  assisted 
Clinton  at  Charleston,  arrived  with  twenty-five  sail,  bringing 
Lord  William  Campbell,  who  had  been  governor  of  South  Caro- 
lina, and  also  Lord  Dunmore,  with  about  one  hundred  of  the 
sickly  black  and  white  troops  which  he  had  had  on  the  coast  of 
Virginia.2 

Thus  every  available  force  was  collected,  and  this  great 
armament  now  concentrated  on  New  York  had  for  the  last 
six  months  been  the  talk  and  wonder  of  everyone  in  England. 
It  was  the  largest  army  that  up  to  that  time  had  ever  been  sent 
out  of  England,  far  larger  than  any  army  Spain  had  sent  to 
conquer  South  America;  and  was  within  two  thousand  of 
equalling  the  army  which  Wellington  had  at  Waterloo  in  1815. 
The  credit  of  preparing  and  sending  it  appears  to  have  been 
due  to  the  activity  and  persistence  of  that  much-abused  mem- 
ber of  the  Ministry  and  secretary  for  the  colonies,  Lord 
George  Germain.3 

The  size  of  the  army  has  been  variously  stated ;  but  accord- 
ing to  the  best  sources  of  information,  without  counting  the 
sailors  and  marines  in  the  fleet,  General  Howe  had  there  before 
New  York,  34,614  men  in  good  health  and  perfectly  armed 
and  disciplined.  The  fleet  included  fifty-two  large  war-vessels, 
twenty-seven  armed  sloops  and  cutters,  and  four  hundred 
transports.     This  vast  fleet  of  nearly  five  hundred  sail  must 


2  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  i,  pp.  105,  193,  949,  963,  1064, 
1077,  1109;  W.  B.  Reed,  "Life  of  Joseph  Reed,"  vol.  i,  p.  213;  vol.  iii, 
p.  1029;  Writings  of  Washington,  vol.  iv,  p.  325,  326  and  note;  G.  W. 
Greene,  "Life  of  Gen.  Greene,"  vol.  i,  pp.  195,  196,  198,  199,  200,  202; 
Gordon,  "  American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  pp.  301,  304,  305, 
1073.  The  last  of  the  Hessian  contingent  with  1000  Waldeckers,  some 
English  troops  and  2000  baggage  animals  in  72  transports,  did  not 
arrive  in  New  York  until  October  15.  (Gordon,  "American  Revolution," 
edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  p.  337.) 

3  Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.  i,  pp.  497,  505,  514; 
vol.  ii,  pp.  11,  16,  40,  41;  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  vi,  p. 
766;  "Reflections  on  the  Present  State  of  the  American  War,"  London, 
1776,  p.  7. 

480 


SWORD  AND  OLIVE  BRANCH 

have  been  an  interesting  and  beautiful  sight  as  it  lay  off 
Staten  Island  disembarking  the  troops  in  their  scarlet 
uniforms.4 

The  plan  of  the  Ministry  had  been  to  send  a  force  of  such 
overwhelming  size  that  peace  would  be  compelled  at  the  mere 
sight  of  it.  There  would  be  no  necessity  for  devastation  and 
destruction;  and  in  any  event,  one  or  two  battles  would  be 
enough  when  accompanied  by  the  very  conciliatory  proposals, 
pardon  for  all  who  would  lay  down  their  arms,  and  the  fullest 
assurances  of  the  mildest  and  most  liberal  sort  of  colonial 
government  in  the  future.  The  olive  branch  was  to  be  ex- 
tended to  the  erring  colonists  and  to  make  it  seem  more 
effective  it  was  twined  round  a  most  stupendous  sword. 

A  London  pamphlet 5  of  the  time  ridicules  the  olive  branch 
and  all  thought  of  compromise  and  recommends  what,  with 
England's  accumulated  experience,  would  undoubtedly  now 
be  her  policy,  namely,  to  use  Howe's  great  army  in  the  most 
merciless  and  destructive  manner  until  every  trace  of  inde- 
pendence or  rebellion  was  blotted  out.  But  Howe  would  not 
have  used  his  army  in  that  way,  even  if  he  had  been  ordered 
to  do  so.  He  did  not  consider  it  large  enough  even  for  the 
very  mild  and  moderate  plan  of  warfare  he  adopted.  He  was 
continually  calling  for  reinforcements  and  in  his  " Narrative" 
he  complains  that  they  were  not  sent.  During  the  three  years 
of  his  command  in  America  they  sent  him,  according  to  Gallo- 
way, over  50,000  men,  and  Lord  North  told  Parliament  that 
it  was  over  60,000,  with  which  to  destroy  a  ragged  patriot 


4  Beaston,  "  Naval  and  Military  Memoirs  of  Great  Britain,"  vol.  vi, 
pp.  44,  53;  Collier,  "Naval  Chronicle,"  vol.  xxxii,  p.  269.  The  number 
34,614  agrees  with  the  statement  of  a  spy,  who  reported  the  British  force 
as  over  35,000,  and  also  with  Howe's  letter  to  his  wife,  in  which  he  says 
his  army  is  35,000.  Force,  fifth  series,  vol.  i,  pp.  1110,  1531,  1532, 
Jones,  "New  York  in  the  Revolution,"  vol.  i,  p.  602;  American  Archives, 
fourth  series,  vol.  iv,  p.  1127;  fifth  series,  vol.  i,  p.  27;  vol.  ii,  p.  1318; 
"  Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,  vol.  ii,  pp.  70,  71,  98. 

6 "  Reflections  on  the  Present  State  of  the  American  War,"  London, 
1776. 

31  481 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

army  that  only  once  reached  14,000  effectives  and  usually  varied 
between  4000  and  10,000. 6 

General  William  Howe,  who,  for  the  next  two  years,  had 
in  his  hands  more  power  in  the  great  controversy  than  any 
other  person,  was  a  Whig  member  of  Parliament,  and  had 
served  in  the  House  of  Commons  for  some  fifteen  years,  repre- 
senting the  town  of  Nottingham.  His  father  had  been  Vis- 
count Howe,  of  the  Irish  peerage.  On  the  other  side  he  was 
the  first  cousin  once  removed  of  the  King;  for  his  mother 
was  the  illegitimate  daughter  of  George  I,  by  his  mistress,  the 
Hanoverian  Baroness  Kilmansegge. 

His  elder  living  brother,  Lord  Richard  Howe,  was  an 
admiral  in  the  British  navy,  and  commanded  the  fleet  which 
now  lay  off  Staten  Island.  There  had  been  a  still  older 
brother,  George  Howe,  who  had  served  as  an  officer  in  the 
colonies  during  the  war  with  France,  and  was  killed  at  Ticon- 
deroga  in  1758.  This  brother  had  been  one  of  the  few  British 
officers  whom  the  colonists  had  really  liked.  The  Massachusetts 
Assembly  had  erected  a  monument  to  him  in  Westminster 
Abbey.  Wolfe  and  Bouquet  they  had  admired,  but  they  were 
particularly  fond  of  George  Howe,  because  he  understood  them 
and  adopted  their  mode  of  life.  He  dismissed  his  retinue, 
equipage,  and  display  of  wines  and  high  living,  ate  the  colonists ' 
plain  fare,  and  drank  their  home  brew,  their  punch,  and  their 
whiskey.  He  carried  provisions  on  his  back,  went  scouting 
with  rangers,  and  slept  on  a  bearskin  and  a  blanket.7 

His  brother,  General  William  Howe,  now  in  command  of 
the  army  of  invasion,  had  none  of  this  personal  attractiveness. 
He  had  served  in  the  colonies  in  the  French  War,  and  knew 
the  people,  but  they  never  showed  any  particular  regard  or 
liking  for  him.  He  was,  however,  always  popular  with  his 
soldiers  and  subordinate  officers.  Although  continually  indulg- 
ing  himself  in  his  passion  for  gambling,  wherever  he  was, 


6  Cobbett,  Parliamentary  History,  vol.  29,  p.  766. 
'Mrs.   Grant's  "Memoirs  of  an  American  Lady,"  Munsell  edition, 
1876,  p.  223. 

482 


GENERAL  HOWE 


CHARACTER  OF  HOWE 

whether  in  England  or  America,  he  was  strong  and  shrewd 
enough  not  to  allow  himself  to  be  ruined  by  it,  as  Charles  Pox 
and  so  many  others  were  at  that  time;  and  he  was  generally 
believed  to  have  increased  rather  than  diminished  his  fortune 
by  the  American  war. 

In  the  introduction  to  his  "Orderly  Book,"  which  has  been 
published,  it  is  said  that  he  and  others  of  his  family  were 
sullen,  hard,  and  cruel.  But  this  charge  cannot  be  sustained. 
The  only  evidence  that  might  sustain  it  is  that  his  commis- 
saries allowed  American  prisoners  to  be  starved  and  very 
severely  treated.  But  other  commanders,  and  the  British 
Government  itself,  allowed  this  sort  of  treatment.  Galloway, 
who  was  by  no  means  his  friend,  admits  that  he  was  a  liberal 
man  and  not  corrupt  in  money  matters,  except  that  he  allowed 
illegitimate  opportunities  to  his  subordinates.  He  was,  like 
the  admiral  and  the  rest  of  the  family,  quite  easy-going  and 
generous.  His  most  conspicuous  characteristics  were  great 
personal  courage,  and  a  certain  contemptuous  indifference, 
which  enabled  him  to  bear  himself  with  great  dignity  and 
defend  himself  with  great  adroitness  in  the  storm  of  criticism 
which  came  upon  him  for  his  conduct  of  the  war.  He  is 
described  as  a  large  man,  of  dark  complexion  like  all  his  family, 
with  heavy  features,  and  very  defective  teeth.8 

His  brother,  the  admiral,  was  so  swarthy  that  the  sailors 
called  him  Black  Dick.  He  was,  apparently,  fond  of  business 
and  details,  never  gambled  or  dissipated,  and  his  face  in  his 
portraits  is  rather  refined  and  scholarly.  He,  too,  was  of  an 
extremely  liberal  and  generous  disposition.  Although  he  com- 
manded a  fleet  to  put  down  the  American  rebellion,  he  is  known 
in  the  Revolution  chiefly  for  his  peace  negotiations. 

That  General  Howe  should  take  command  if  there  was 
any  serious  war  in  America  was  inevitable.  He  was  of  suitable 
age  and  had  at  that  time  seen  more  successful  service  in  actual 
warfare  than  any  other  officer  of  high  rank  in  England,  except 


8 Galloway,  "A  Reply  to  the  Observations  of  General  Howe,"  p.  Ill; 
"  Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.  ii,  p.  336. 

483 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

possibly  Amherst,  the  conqueror  of  Canada,  who  was  growing 
old  and  does  not  seem  to  have  been  seriously  thought  of  for 
the  American  command.  Howe  had  been  a  great  deal  in  Amer- 
ica and  had  a  most  brilliant  record  of  service.  He  had  served 
as  a  lieutenant  in  the  regiment  of  Wolfe,  who  had  spoken 
highly  of  him.  At  the  siege  of  Louisburg  he  had  com- 
manded a  regiment.  At  the  attack  on  Quebec  he  was  again 
with  Wolfe  and  led  in  person  the  forlorn  hope  up  the 
intrenched  path.  In  the  expedition  against  Montreal  the  next 
year  he  commanded  a  brigade.  He  had  another  large  com- 
mand at  the  siege  of  Belle  Isle,  on  the  coast  of  Brittany,  and 
was  adjutant-general  of  the  army  at  the  conquest  of  Havana. 
For  these  services  at  the  close  of  those  wars  he  had  been  given 
the  honorary  position  of  governor  of  the  Isle  of  Wight,  and  he 
was  now  a  major-general,  with  a  high  reputation  for  efficiency 
and  general  knowledge  of  his  profession.  He  had  recently 
added  to  British  army  methods  the  improvement  of  light- 
equipped  companies  selected  from  the  line  regiments  and 
drilled  in  quick  movements.9 

He  did  not  at  once  attack  and  take  New  York,  as  he  might 
possibly  have  done  while  the  patriot  forces  were  weak  and 
unprepared.  He  remained  quietly  on  Staten  Island  for  nearly 
two  months  waiting  for  the  last  of  the  reinforcements,  and 
hoping,  no  doubt,  that  his  forbearance  and  the  olive  branch 
proposals  which  had  been  sent  ashore  would  have  their  effect 
and  bring  about  some  sort  of  peace  or  compromise. 

The  Prohibitory  Act  passed  by  Parliament  in  the  previous 
December  had  mentioned  peace  commissioners  who  should  be 
empowered  to  exempt  from  the  terrors  of  war  and  the  opera- 
tion of  the  Prohibitory  Act  any  colony,  district,  or  even  a 
county  or  town,  which  should  return  to  loyalty  and  obedience. 
There  had  been  a  great  deal  of  discussion  in  America  about 


9  The  best  biography  of  Howe  is  in  the  "  English  National  Cyclopaedia 
of  Biography."  His  own  narrative  reveals  a  great  deal;  and  there  is,  of 
course,  much  to  be  learned  in  the  accounts  and  criticisms  of  his  cam- 
paigns by  Galloway,  Van  Schaack,  Jones,  and  others. 

484 


LETTERS  FOR  GOVERNORS 

these  commissioners,  and  many  conservative  and  hesitating 
patriots  had  been  hopeful  that  England  intended  to  send  out 
a  great  peace  commission  which  would  hold  formal  sessions, 
make  a  treaty  with  the  Congress,  and  give  a  material  body  and 
definite  proportions  to  that  phantom  of  many  meanings,  called 
reconciliation.  But,  as  John  Adams  shrewdly  suspected,  these 
wonderful  commissioners  proved  to  be  in  the  end  no  more  than 
the  regular  military  and  naval  commanders,  and  their  powers 
for  peace,  when  stripped  of  the  cumbersome  phrases  in  which 
they  were  concealed,  were  nothing  more  than  the  ordinary 
power  to  grant  pardons  for  laying  down  arms.10 

Immediately  after  his  arrival,  Admiral  Howe  prepared 
letters  to  the  governors  of  all  the  colonies,  accompanied  by 
copies  of  a  proclamation  announcing  that  he  and  General 
Howe  had  been  appointed  commissioners  under  the  Prohibitory 
Act,  and  were  ready  to  issue  pardons  to  the  people  of  any 
town,  county,  or  colony,  who  should  return  to  British 
allegiance. 

The  British  governors  having  been  expelled  from  all  the 
colonies  there  were  no  officials  but  patriot  governors  as  in 
Connecticut  and  Rhode  Island,  or  chairmen  of  revolutionary 
conventions  or  committees,  to  whom  these  letters  could  be 
delivered.  The  admiral  appears  to  have  been  aware  of  this; 
but  nevertheless  expected  that  his  proclamation  would  be  widely 
circulated  through  the  country. 

The  packet  containing  the  letters  for  the  colonies  south  of 
New  York  was  sent  ashore  at  Amboy,  New  Jersey,  and  fell 
into  the  hands  of  General  Mercer,  who  sent  it  to  General 
AYashington,  and  by  him  it  was  sent  to  the  Congress.  The 
packet  for  the  New  England  colonies  was  sent  by  the  ' '  Merlin ' ' 
sloop-of-war.  to  Newport,  Rhode  Island.  One  of  her  officers 
landed  under  a  flag  and  seems  to  have  delivered  the  packet 
in  person  to  the  patriot  governor  of  the  state,  who  sent  back 
a  polite  note,  saying  that  he  had  received  the  letter  and  procla- 


10  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  v,  pp.  931,  942,  943,  1009. 

485 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

mation  and  laid  them  before  the  assembly,  and  that  the 
assembly  had  ordered  them  sent  to  the  Congress  at 
Philadelphia.11 

The  loyalists  had  great  expectations  from  these  documents ; 
and  doubtless  many  moderate  patriots,  who  saw  the  stupen- 
dous force  assembled  with  so  much  pomp  and  display  of  power, 
had  hopes  that  some  honorable  compromise  might  be  arranged 
before  the  impending  blow  was  struck.  It  was  a  critical  time ; 
and  there  must  have  been  many  a  violent  or  bitter  discussion 
between  patriot  and  loyalist  of  which  no  record  has  reached 
us. 

The  documents,  however,  were  a  mere  repetition  of  the 
Prohibitory  Act,  which  was  already  an  old  story.  The  Congress 
thought  that  they  showed  so  clearly  the  warlike  and  merciless 
intentions  of  Great  Britain  that  they  ordered  them  to  be  pub- 
lished in  the  newspapers,  so  that  all  classes  of  patriots  could 
see  for  themselves  the  futility  of  any  discussion  about 
reconciliation. 

But  the  Admiral  evidently  intended  to  effect  a  settlement 
outside  of  the  Prohibitory  Act  and  his  formal  poAvers  of  par- 
don. He  immediately  began  to  send  out  hints  that  he  had 
other  powers  in  reserve  and  that  if  the  Americans  were  willing, 
he  could  bring  about  a  compromise.  He  sent  a  familiar  and 
very  friendly  note  to  Franklin,  accompanied  by  books,  letters 
and  parcels  which  Franklin 's  friends  in  England  had  taken  the 
opportunity  of  sending  out  by  the  admiral,  who,  to  show  his 
general  friendly  feeling,  sent  all  these  packages  ashore  with- 
out the  usual  military  precaution  of  examining  their  contents. 

The  Congress  allowed  Franklin  to  reply  to  the  admiral,  and 
Franklin  wrote  one  of  his  masterful  letters,  full  of  excellent 
feeling,  quaint  and  telling  humor  and  keen  satire  on  Britain's 
"lust  of  dominion,"  which  is  as  applicable  to-day  at  it  was  in 
1776.  The  letter  became  very  famous,  especially  the  sentence: 
"Long  did  I  endeavor  with  unfeigned  and  unwearied  zeal  to 


American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  i,  pp.  605,  608,  895,  896. 

486 


QUESTION  OF  TITLE 

preserve  from  breaking  that  fine  and  noble  porcelain  vase — the 
British  empire. ' ' 12 

On  the  17th  of  July,  Admiral  Howe  addressed  a  letter  to 
"George  Washington,  Esq.,"  and  sent  it  ashore  under  a  flag. 
When  the  flag  was  seen  approaching  Washington  suspected 
that  the  letter  would  be  addressed  very  much  as  it  was,  because 
there  had,  it  seems,  been  considerable  public  discussion  on  this 
subject,  and  he  consulted  with  some  of  his  officers  as  to  how 
such  a  letter  should  be  received.  They  were  unanimous  in 
their  opinion;  and  General  Reed,  who  was  sent  to  meet  the 
flag,  refused  to  receive  the  letter.  The  British  officer  who 
brought  it  expressed  great  regret,  said  that  the  letter  was 
civil  rather  than  military,  and  that  Admiral  Howe  had  been 
given  large  powers  for  negotiation. 

Soon  afterwards  General  Howe,  having  received  a  letter 
from  General  Washington  about  some  transactions  in  Canada, 
addressed  his  reply  to  "George  Washington,  Esq.,  &c,  &c, 
&c."  This  also  was  refused;  and  then  General  Howe  sent 
one  of  his  officers  of  high  rank,  General  Patterson,  to  remon- 
strate and  discuss  some  questions  relative  to  the  treatment 
and  exchange  of  prisoners.  General  Patterson  took  with  him 
the  last  letter,  but  did  not  show  it  until  he  got  into  Washing- 
ton's presence.  Washington  received  him  with  great  formality 
and  distinction.  They  had  a  pleasant  but  meaningless  con- 
versation on  general  topics  of  the  war  and  the  treatment  of 
prisoners,  the  British  general  meanwhile  making  the  most 
diplomatic  efforts  to  induce  Washington  to  accept  the  letter; 
and  finally  laying  it  on  the  table  in  the  hope  that  Washington 
would  pick  it  up.13 

It  was  a  small  matter  on  which  to  waste  so  much  time; 
but  no  doubt  the  Howes  had  been  instructed  by  the  Ministry 


12  See  the  Admiral's  reply  to  this  letter,  American  Archives,  fifth 
series,  vol.  i,  p.  979. 

n  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  i,  pp.  329,  330,  352,  353,  471, 
472,  500,  502,  789 ;  vol.  iii,  pp.  1000,  1001 ;  Writings  of  Washington,  Ford 
edition,  vol.  iv,  pp.  249,  258,  263,  264,  284-286. 

487 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

to  press  as  far  as  possible  the  point  of  not  recognizing  rebel 
titles.  After  Patterson's  failure  the  attempt  was  entirely 
abandoned.  The  admiral  expressed  great  regret  that  he  had 
not  arrived  before  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  which 
had,  he  said,  made  his  mission  of  peace  more  difficult.  But  he 
continued  his  efforts  in  furtherance  of  that  mission. 

The  reinforcements  had  pretty  much  all  arrived  by  the 
12th  of  August,  and  it  seemed  as  if  he  could  not  delay  much 
longer  the  taking  of  New  York;  but  nevertheless,  he  sent  Lord 
Drummond  ashore  under  a  flag  on  the  17th  of  August  to  wait 
upon  Washington  with  some  documents  and  letters  which  had 
passed  between  Drummond  and  the  admiral.  One  of  these 
documents  was  a  sketch  of  propositions  for  a  compromise,  in 
which  the  colonies  of  their  own  free  will  were  to  vote  supplies 
for  the  general  welfare  of  the  empire,  in  return  for  which  "a 
formal  relinquishment  shall  be  made,  on  the  part  of  Great 
Britain,  of  all  future  claim  to  taxation  over  these  her 
colonies. ' ' 14 

This  was  apparently  in  accordance  with  instructions  the 
admiral  had  received  to  carry  out  the  resolution  of  Parliament 
of  the  20th  of  February,  1775,  which  promised  to  relieve  any 
colony  from  parliamentary  taxation,  except  duties  for  the 
regulation  of  commerce,  so  long  as  the  colony  should  volun- 
tarily contribute  a  fund  for  the  common  defence  of  the  empire 
and  its  own  civil  government.  Lord  Drummond 's  proposition 
was  rather  broader  than  the  resolution  of  Parliament ;  and  this 
broadening  was  probably  intended  to  feel  the  way  and  see  if 
the  Americans  were  in  any  humor  at  all  for  compromise. 

The  patriot  party  had  the  year  before  rejected  the  resolu- 
tion of  Parliament  of  the  20th  of  February,  1775,  and  they  were 
not  now  deceived  by  Drummond 's  broader  way  of  stating  it. 
They  questioned  the  sincerity  of  his  mission  and  rejected  his 
offer.     Was  it  a  mere  military  stratagem  to  gain  time,  or  a 


u  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  i,  pp.  226,  227,  1135,  1158, 
1159,  1179;  Writings  of  Washington,  Ford  edition,  vol.  iv,  p.  350; 
vol.  v,  p.  464  note,  465  note. 

488 


THE  DRUMMOND  MISSION 

device  to  shake  the  patriots  loose  from  their  devotion  to  absolute 
independence,  lead  them  into  negotiation  and  compromise, 
which  would  give  England  a  foothold  in  the  country  to  be 
afterward  improved  as  opportunity  should  offer? 

"  I  am  exceedingly  at  a  loss,"  wrote  Washington  to  the  Congress, 
"  to  know  the  motives  and  causes  inducing  a  proceeding  of  such  a  nature 
at  this  time,  and  why  Lord  Howe  has  not  attempted  some  plan  of 
negotiation  before,  as  he  seems  so  desirous  of  it.  If  I  may  be  allowed  to 
conjecture  and  guess  at  the  cause,  it  may  be  that  part  of  the  Hessians 
have  not  arrived  as  mentioned  in  the  examination  transmitted  yesterday; 
or,  that  General  Burgoyne  has  not  made  such  progress  as  was  expected 
to  form  a  junction  of  their  two  armies;  or  (what  I  think  equally 
probable),  they  mean  to  procrastinate  their  operations  for  some  time, 
trusting  that  the  Militia  who  have  come  to  our  succour  will  soon  become 
tired  and  return  home,  as  is  but  too  usual  with  them."  (American 
Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  i,  p.  1026.) 

Thus  the  Drummond  mission  came  to  naught;  and  there 
was  nothing  left  for  the  Howe  brothers  to  do  but  take  New 
York  and  see  what  effect  that  would  have  in  bringing  about 
a  satisfactory  compromise. 


XLIV. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  LONG  ISLAND 

The  town  of  New  York  at  that  time  extended  from  the 
Battery  only  to  Chatham  Street,  and  the  point  of  land  on  which 
it  stood  was  much  narrower  than  at  present.  Breastworks  and 
redoubts,  planned  by  General  Charles  Lee  and  a  couple  of 
committees,  had  been  thrown  up  along  the  shores  of  both 
rivers  and  cannon  planted  in  them.  Two  of  the  lighter 
British  war-ships,  the  "Phoenix"  and  the  "Rose,"  sailed  by 
these  defences,  without  receiving  any  serious  damage  from  a 
heavy  cannonade,  and  after  proceeding  as  far  up  as  Tarry- 
town  returned  with  equal  safety. 

But  the  Howes  had  no  intention  of  testing  these  batteries 
by  attempting  to  shell  New  York.  It  was  full  of  loyalist  prop- 
erty; it  was  part  of  the  empire;  why  should  Englishmen 
destroy  an  English  town  which  they  intended  to  make  the  head- 
quarters of  their  army  in  America.1 

The  patriot  military  forces  when  General  Howe  first  arrived 
were  only  about  nine  thousand,  of  whom  two  thousand  were 
destitute  of  arms,  and  the  weapons  of  half  the  others  were 
in  such  bad  condition  that  they  were  scarcely  fit  to  use.  What 
chance  was  there  that  such  a  ragged  half-armed  force  could 
maintain  the  newly  declared  independence  or  offer  the  slightest 
resistance  to  the  superb  armament  from  England?  It  was  a 
most  dispiriting  and  hopeless  condition.  "Had  I  known  the 
true  position  of  affairs,"  wrote  Colonel  Reed,2  "no  considera- 

1  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  i,  pp.  223,  230,  231,  255,  356, 
509,  751,  762,  766,  1029,  1066,  1120,  1143;  vol.  ii,  p.  237;  G.  W.  Greene, 
"  Life  of  General  Greene,"  vol.  i,  p.  181;  Flick,  "  Loyalism  in  New  York," 
pp.  107,  118;  Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii, 
p.  304. 

2 American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  vi,  p.  1124;  Gordon,  "Ameri- 
can Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  pp.  277,  278 ;  Niles,  "  Principles  and 
Acts  of  the  Revolution,"  edition  1876,  pp.  191,  192. 

490 


THE  PATRIOT  FORCES 

tion  would  have  tempted  me  to  have  taken  an  active  part  in 
this  scene;   and  this  sentiment  is  universal." 

There  must  have  been  high  confidence  and  spirit  in  the 
patriot  party  to  have  rejected  without  question  the  admiral's 
proposals  of  compromise,  which  he  very  naturally  supposed 
would  be  most  acceptable  to  people  in  their  condition.  Wash- 
ington and  his  officers  never  faltered  and  the  Congress  never 
hesitated  although  as  individuals  they  were  evidently  very 
uneasy.  They  made  most  earnest  efforts  and  appeals  in  all 
the  neighboring  colonies  and  as  far  to  the  south  as  Delaware 
and  Maryland  to  collect  every  man  and  every  old  musket  and 
shot-gun  that  would  resist  this  attack  on  New  York.  It  would 
be  the  decisive  and  final  campaign  of  the  war ;  neither  side,  it 
was  said,  could  endure  a  defeat  at  this  vital  point ;  and  if  our 
people  should  be  able  to  stop  the  British  at  New  York  as  they 
had  stopped  them  at  Charleston,  it  surely  would  be  a  wonder- 
ful victory  that  would  in  all  probability  bring  immediate 
foreign  recognition  of  independence. 

During  July  and  August,  while  General  Howe  waited  for 
the  last  of  his  reinforcements,  the  strenuous  efforts  of  the 
patriots  to  obtain  some  on  their  side  began  to  meet  with  suc- 
cess. Hundreds  of  pounds  of  lead  were  stripped  from  the 
windows  of  the  old  Dutch  houses  in  New  York  and  molded  into 
bullets.  The  gilt  statue  of  the  king,  erected  on  the  Bowling 
Green  after  the  repeal  of  the  Stamp  Act,  had  been  dragged 
down  as  soon  as  independence  was  proclaimed,  and  the  head 
cut  off.  The  body  now  furnished  eight  hundred  pounds  of 
lead,  " melted  majesty,"  it  was  said,  to  be  fired  at  the  king's 
troops.  Enthusiasm  and  rumors  raised  the  numbers  of  the 
patriot  troops  to  50,000.  It  had  seemed  to  them  as  if  before 
long  they  must  surely  have  that  number,  and  many  expected 
more.  These  exaggerations  were  valuable  and  were  no  doubt 
encouraged  by  the  officers  to  increase  confidence  and 
enlistments.3 


s"Life  of  Joseph  Reed,"  vol.  i,  p.  212;  American  Archives,  fifth 
series,  vol.  i,  pp.  369,  370.  The  gilt  head  of  the  king,  said  to  be  a  good 
likeness,   was  taken   to  Fort   Washington,   north   of   New   York,   to   be 

491 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

But  by  the  actual  returns  made  by  Washington,  his  forces, 
all  told,  were  only  20,275.  Of  these  the  sick  were  so  numerous 
that  those  fit  for  duty  were  only  about  fourteen  thousand. 
The  large  sick-list  was  apparently  the  result  of  shocking  un- 
sanitary conditions,  which  for  long  afterwards  were  charac- 
teristic of  the  patriot  camps;  and  in  winter  they  were  always 
afflicted  with  the  small-pox.  Besides  disease,  which  was  so 
prevalent  among  them,  they  were  a  most  undisciplined,  dis- 
orderly rabble,  marauding  on  the  inhabitants  and  committing 
all  kinds  of  irregularities.  Except  a  few  troops,  like  Small- 
wood's  Marylanders,  they  were  for  the  most  part  merely  a 
collection  of  squads  of  farmers  and  militia  bringing  with 
them  the  guns  they  had  had  in  their  houses.4 

It  was  no  longer  exclusively  a  New  England  army.  It 
contained  numerous  troops  from  the  middle  and  southern 
colonies,  and  its  size  may  be  said  to  have  indicated  the  high- 
water  mark  of  patriotism,  under  the  influence  of  the  Declara- 
tion of  Independence,  and  the  belief  that  a  great  victory  had 
been  gained  some  months  before  by  compelling  Howe  to 
evacuate  Boston.  It  was  the  largest  number  of  patriots  that 
were  collected  in  one  army  during  the  whole  war.  To  handle 
such  a  disorganized  mob  so  as  to  offer  any  respectable  resist- 
ance to  Howe's  disciplined  troops  was  a  task  requiring  quali- 
ties of  mind  and  character  which  few  men  besides  Washington 


erected  on  a  pole,  and  when  the  fort  was  taken  it  fell  into  the  hands  of 
the  British  engineer,  Montressor,  who  gave  it  to  Lord  Townsend.  (Bolton. 
"Private  Soldier  under  Washington,"  p.  115;  "Life  of  John  Jay,"  p.  44; 
"Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.  ii,  pp.  167,  168;  Ameri- 
can Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  i,  pp.  144,  228,  368,  443.) 

4  DeLancey's  note  to  Jones'  "  New  York  in  the  Be  volution,"  vol.  iv, 
pp.  599-603;  Irving,  "Life  of  Washington,"  edition  of  1861,  vol.  ii,  chap. 
xxx,  p.  283;  Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  p.  304; 
American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  i,  p.  835.  A  committee  of  Congress 
which  visted  the  army  at  New  York  somewhat  later  reported  a  total  of 
25,373,  of  which  16,905  were  fit  for  duty.  This  total  included  3,649  men 
taken  from  the  Flying  Camp  in  New  Jersey.  (American  Archives,  fifth 
series,  vol.  ii,  p.  1385;  Writings  of  Washington,  Ford  edition,  vol.  iv, 
p.  326  note.) 

492 


BROOKLYN  HEIGHTS 

possessed.  John  Jay,  General  Charles  Lee,  and  others  believed 
that  no  attempt  should  be  made  to  hold  New  York.  The  risk 
of  an  overwhelming  defeat  was  too  great;  and  the  general 
patriot  plan  for  that  summer  of  1776  should  be  to  wear  it 
away  with  as  little  loss  as  possible. 

It  was  a  delicate  question  to  decide,  and  no  doubt  a  great 
deal  could  be  said  in  favor  of  making  a  present  of  New  York 
to  the  British  without  a  battle;  allowing  them  to  lock  them- 
selves up  there,  and  reserving  the  patriot  force  to  check  their 
subsequent  expeditions.  But  Washington  seems  to  have  been 
influenced  by  a  principle  of  conduct  on  which  he  frequently 
acted.  He  must  make  some  sort  of  resistance  to  Howe's 
entering  New  York  if  the  patriot  cause  and  its  army  were  to 
retain  any  reputation.  He  also  wished  to  delay  Howe  so  that 
after  settling  in  New  York  he  could  make  but  few  expeditions 
into  the  country  before  winter. 

Washington  was  obliged  to  use  nearly  half  of  his  effective 
force  in  the  fortifications  and  in  guarding  various  points  in 
the  town.  The  most  important  place  to  defend  seemed  to  be 
Brooklyn  Heights,  on  the  Long  Island  side  of  the  East  River 
directly  opposite  New  York,  and  commanding  it  very  much  as 
Bunker  Hill  or  Dorchester  Heights  commanded  Boston.  If 
Howe  should  land  on  Long  Island  and  take  Brooklyn  Heights, 
he  could  cross  the  East  River  and  enter  New  York.  Fortifi- 
cations of  fallen  trees  and  trenches  on  Brooklyn  Heights  had 
been  suggested  by  General  Lee,  and  constructed  by  General 
Greene.  But  a  bad  attack  of  malarial  fever  prevented  Greene 
from  continuing  the  command.  He  was  superseded  by  Sullivan, 
who  in  his  turn  was  superseded  by  Putnam.5 

Putnam's  eight  thousand  men  at  Brooklyn  Heights  were 
in  some  respects  in  a  trap,  for  if  Howe  attacked  them  in  front, 
their  chance  of  escaping  across  the  river  was  doubtful,  and  he 
could  absolutely  prevent  it  by  sending  the  fleet  into  the  river 
behind  them.     Military  critics  have  commented  on  this  risk, 


DG.  W.  Greene,  "  Life  of  General  Greene,"  vol.  i,  pp.  157,  158;  Ameri- 
can Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  i,  pp.  1231,  916. 

493 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

and  the  only  answer  seems  to  be  that,  under  all  the  circum- 
stances, Washington  thought  himself  justified  in  taking  the 
chances  rather  than  abandon  New  York  without  a  blow. 

General  Howe  proceeded  to  dispose  of  the  patriots  on 
Brooklyn  Heights,  and  he  showed  the  same  thorough  knowl- 
edge of  the  ground  and  of  the  enemy  opposed  to  him  which 
he  afterwards  displayed  at  Brandywine.  He  also  showed  his 
skill  in  winning  easily  so  far  as  it  suited  his  purpose  to  win. 
He  had  remained  on  Staten  Island  from  his  arrival  on  the 
30th  of  June  until  the  22d  of  August,  when  he  took  across  to 
Long  Island  about  twenty  thousand  of  his  men,  a  force  which 
was  certainly  ample  for  defeating  the  eight  thousand  Amer- 
icans on  Brooklyn  Heights. 

Between  Brooklyn  Heights  and  the  place  where  Howe  had 
landed  on  Long  Island  there  was  a  wooded  ridge,  and  a  large 
part  of  the  patriot  force,  leaving  their  breastworks  at  Brooklyn 
Heights,  were  sent  out  on  this  ridge  by  Putnam,  to  check  the 
advance  of  Howe's  army.  Their  right  was  commanded  by 
William  Alexander,  of  New  Jersey, — or  Lord  Stirling,  as  he 
was  called  from  a  lapsed  Scotch  title  which  he  had  ineffectu- 
ally claimed, — and  their  left  was  commanded  by  Sullivan,  of 
New  Hampshire;  while  Putnam,  after  making  this  disposi- 
tion, remained  in  command  of  the  troops  which  were  left 
within  the  defences  at  Brooklyn.  This  movement  in  force  to 
the  ridge  has  been  criticized  as  risking  too  much,  because  the 
army  was  not  well  organized  or  officered,  and  had  not  the  sort 
of  troops  necessary  for  advanced  positions.6 

Several  roads  led  directly  from  Howe's  position  to  the  ridge 
and  to  Brooklyn  Heights.  On  the  night  of  the  26th  of  August, 
he  sent  nearly  half  his  force  by  these  roads,  under  command  of 
Generals  Grant  and  De  Heister,  with  orders  to  make  a  direct 
attack  on  the  Heights.  Grant,  who  had  command  of  the  left 
of  these  troops,  was  the  same  blustering  Grant  who  had  deliv- 
ered the  speech  in  Parliament  on  American  vulgarity  and 
cowardice:    and  De  Heister  was  one  of  the  Hessian  officers. 


6  American  Historical  Review,  vol.  i,  p.  650. 

494 


MAP  OF   THE   BATTLE  OF   LONG   ISLAND 


HOWE'S  FLANK  MOVEMENT 

The  design  of  this  front  attack  was  to  conceal  the  more 
important  movement  made  by  Howe  himself,  who,  taking  the 
rest  of  his  force  with  Clinton  and  Cornwallis,  went  by  another 
road  far  to  the  eastward  to  make  a  long  detour  and  come  upon 
the  American  flank  and  rear  just  as  the  battle  was  beginning 
with  Grant  and  Heister.  Sullivan  afterwards  said  that  he 
had  suspected  this  flanking  movement  by  Howe,  but  could  not 
convince  any  one  of  the  importance  of  guarding  against  it. 
He  had  paid  horsemen  $50  to  patrol  in  that  direction,  but 
they  proved  of  no  avail,  and  this  incident  is  evidence  of  the 
disorganized  condition  of  the  patriot  army.7 

The  Hessians  under  De  Heister  began  their  attack  soon 
after  daybreak  and  had  little  difficulty  in  driving  back  the 
Americans  in  front  of  them.  At  the  same  time  General  Grant, 
commanding  the  British  left,  met  with  a  more  stubborn  re- 
sistance from  the  Maryland  and  Delaware  troops,  which  com- 
posed the  American  right.  These  attacks  by  Grant  and  De 
Heister  were,  however,  mere  feints  to  draw  attention  from 
Howe's  flanking  movement,  which  had  now  at  daybreak  com- 
pletely circled  the  American  left,  and  even  penetrated  to 
their  rear.  The  timing  of  this  movement,  as  was  usual  with 
Howe's  manoeuvres,  was  most  exact  and  successful.  Perfect 
secrecy  was  observed.  The  American  patrols  he  met  during 
the  night  march  were  all  captured;  and  guided  by  a  loyalist 
he  struck  the  American  flank  and  rear  early  in  the  morning 
just  as  the  attack  by  De  Heister  and  Grant  began. 

Some  of  the  Americans  of  Sullivan's  division,  being  caught 
by  Howe's  forces  behind  them,  were  driven  to  and  fro  between 
him  and  the  Hessians  and  cut  to  pieces. 

"The  Hessians  and  our  brave  Highlanders  gave  no  quarter;  and  it 
was  a  fine  sight  to  see  with  what  alacrity  they  dispatched  the  rebels 
with  their  bayonets  after  we  had  surrounded  them  so  they  could  not 
resist.  We  took  care  to  tell  the  Hessians  that  the  rebels  had  resolved  to 
give  no  quarter — to  them  in  particular — which  made  them  fight  desper- 


7Onderdonk,   "Revolutionary   Incidents   of  Long  Island,"   pp.    140, 
142;  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  iii,  p.  9. 

495 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

ately,  and  put  to  death  all  who  came  into  their  hands."      (Onderdonk, 
"  Revolutionary  Incidents  of  Suffolk  and  Kings  Counties,"  p.  138. ) 

Sullivan's  division,  which  had  Howe  on  its  flank  and  rear, 
and  the  Hessians  in  front,  after  fighting  for  two  hours  were 
nearly  all  killed  or  taken  prisoner;  and  Sullivan  himself  was 
captured  while  trying  to  escape  through  a  cornfield.  But  as 
Howe's  flanking  column  pressed  on  to  crush  the  American 
right,  which  was  attacked  by  Grant  in  front,  a  more  obstinate 
resistance  was  encountered.  The  patriots  in  this  part  of  the 
field  were  Lord  Stirling's  division,  composed  of  Haslett's 
Delaware  troops,  Smallwood's  Marylanders,  Atlee's  regiment 
and  Kirkline's  Pennsylvania  riflemen. 

This  was  the  first  appearance  in  the  Revolution  of  these 
southern  troops,  some  of  whom  afterwards  became  so  famous 
for  their  gallantry,  smart  appearance,  and  discipline.  Small- 
wood's  regiment  had  been  recruited  from  the  best  families  in 
Maryland ;  and  Haslet 's  Delawares  were  a  similar  body.  Stir- 
ling had  placed  them  on  rising  ground  where  they  resisted 
Grant 's  attack  for  several  hours  and  held  their  own  even  after 
Howe  had  begun  to  gain  their  rear. 

"  The  Delawares  and  Marylanders,"  said  Haslet,  "  stood  firm  to  the 
last;  and  after  a  variety  of  skirmishing,  the  Delawares  drew  up  on  the 
side  of  a  hill,  and  stood  upwards  of  four  hours  with  a  firm,  determined 
countenance,  in  close  array,  their  colors  flying,  the  enemy's  artillery 
playing  on  them  all  the  while,  not  daring  to  advance  and  attack  them, 
though  six  times  their  number  and  nearly  surrounding  them."  (Onder- 
donk, "Revolutionary  Incidents  of  Suffolk  and  Kings  Counties,"  p.  143.) 

The  British,  as  Lord  Stirling  and  Smallwood  explained, 
were  unwilling  to  attack  because  they  expected  soon  to  take 
the  Delawares  and  Marylanders  by  the  movement  behind  them. 
Part  of  Smallwood's  men  made  a  spirited  attack  upon  Corn- 
wallis,  and  under  cover  of  this  the  Delawares  and  the  rest  of 
Smallwood's  command  started  to  cut  their  way  out.  They 
reached  Brooklyn  Heights  by  severe  fighting,  wading,  and  swim- 
ming across  a  marsh  and  creek,  but  with  heavy  loss  in  killed 
and  prisoners,  and  Lord  Stirling  was  captured. 

Washington,  who  was  watching  these  troops  cut  their  way 

496 


LOSSES  ON  BOTH  SIDES 

out,  is  said  to  have  wrung  his  hands  and  exclaimed,  "Good 
God,  what  brave  fellows  I  must  this  day  lose."  One  of  the 
Maryland  riflemen  has  left  us  a  description  of  his  experience, 
and  he  describes  the  bad  markmanship  of  the  British  soldiers. 

"  The  Major,  Capt.  Ramsay,  and  Lt.  Plunket  were  foremost  and 
within  100  yards  of  the  enemy's  muzzles,  when  they  were  fired  on  by  the 
enemy,  who  were  chiefly  under  cover  of  an  orchard,  save  a  few  that 
showed  themselves  and  pretended  to  give  up;  clubbing  their  firelocks  till 
we  came  within  forty  yards,  when  they  immediately  presented,  and 
blazed  in  our  faces.  They  entirely  over-shot  us,  and  killed  some  men 
away  behind  in  the  rear.  I  had  the  satisfaction  of  dropping  one  the  first 
fire.  I  was  so  near  I  could  not  miss.  I  discharged  my  rifle  seven  times 
that  day."     (Onderdonk,  id.,  p.  148.) 

Washington's  estimate  of  his  loss  was  a  thousand  in  killed, 
wounded  and  prisoners.  But  General  Howe's  report  of  his 
success  was  totally  inconsistent  with  this  estimate,  for  he  said 
he  had  taken  prisoner  over  a  thousand  American  privates 
besides  ninety-one  commissioned  officers,  and  that,  besides 
these,  the  Americans  lost  twenty-two  hundred  in  killed, 
wounded  and  drowned,  making  their  total  loss  over  three 
thousand  against  Washington's  estimate  of  one  thousand.  As 
to  his  own  loss,  Howe  put  it  at  less  than  four  hundred 
killed,  wounded  and  prisoners.  But  the  almost  universal  tes- 
timony of  the  American  officers  supports  Washington's  esti- 
mate, and  some  of  them  put  the  British  loss  in  killed  and 
wounded  higher  than  the  American;  or  as  one  of  them  said: 
"We  killed  more  of  them  than  they  did  of  us;  but  they  took 
the  most  prisoners. ' ' 8 

Howe's  report  of  the  battle,  carried  to  England  by  one  of 
his  staff  officers,  filled  all  London  with  joy.  The  great  Armada 
was  surely  subduing  the  rebellion,  and  the  Court  and  Ministry 
displayed  their  satisfaction  with  the  utmost  ostentation.  Gen- 
eral Howe  was  forthwith  made  a  Knight  Companion  of  the 


"Memoirs  of  the  Long  Island  Historical  Society,  vol.  iii,  p.  202; 
American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  167,  445;  "Life  of  G.  Read," 
p.  328. 

32  497 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

Bath,  and  instructions  were  sent  out  to  Admiral  Howe  to 
perform  at  New  York  the  ceremony  of  investing  his  brother 
with  the  insignia  of  his  new  rank.  At  the  same  time  Lord 
Mansfield,  who  had  made  such  strong  legal  arguments  to 
uphold  the  supremacy  of  Parliament  over  all  British  colonies, 
was  created  an  earl.0 

Our  people  had  a  lucky  escape  back  to  Brooklyn  Heights 
from  what  might  have  been  a  still  more  overwhelming  disaster 
if  the  English  had  been  better  marksmen.  Clinton,  Corn- 
wallis,  and  Vaughan,  all  urged  Howe  to  pursue  the  Americans 
at  once  into  their  intrenchments,  and  the  common  soldiers 
were  with  difficulty  restrained  from  pressing  on.  Howe 
admitted  that  the  intrenchments  might  be  easily  taken,  but 
declined  to  take  them  in  that  way.  He  thanked  his  officers 
for  their  zeal  and  advice,  said  enough  had  been  done  for  one 
day,  and  the  intrenchments  could  be  taken  by  regular  ap- 
proaches with  less  loss.10 

The  battle  was  a  curious  one,  because  its  results  now  largely 
depended  upon  the  direction  of  the  wind.  It  had  apparently 
been  intended  to  use  the  men-of-war  and  send  them  into  the 
East  River  behind  Brooklyn  Heights.  But  the  wind  was  north- 
east, and  after  beating  against  it  they  were  compelled  to 
anchor  when  the  tide  turned;  and  only  one  vessel,  the  " Roe- 
buck, "  exchanged  shots  with  Red  Hook. 

Possibly  Howe  expected  that  in  making  his  approaches  the 
next  day  the  fleet  would  cooperate  with  him,  go  round  into 
East  River,  and  entrap  the  force  at  Brooklyn.  But  the  wind 
continued  from  the  northeast,  with  rain.    Washington  brought 


"Memoirs  of  Long  Island  Historical  Society,  vol.  iii,  p.  199;  Ameri- 
can Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  ii,  p.  1112. 

10 "  Remarks  upon  General  Howe's  Account  of  His  Proceedings  on 
Long  Island,"  London,  1778;  see,  also,  Howe's  "Narrative;"  Stedman, 
"  American  War,"  edition  of  1794,  vol.  i,  p.  196,  London.  Clinton,  in  his 
MS.  notes  to  Stedman,  p.  196,  says  that  Howe  may  have  had  political 
reasons  for  not  attacking  Brooklyn  Heights.  Clinton's  MS.  notes  are  in 
the  Carter-Brown  Library,  Providence,  Rhode  Island,  and  a  copy  of  them 
is  in  the  library  of  Harvard  University. 

498 


THE  RETREAT  TO  NEW  YORK 

reinforcements  over  to  Brooklyn  Heights,  raising  the  force 
there  to  nearly  ten  thousand  men.  He  remained  there  all  of 
the  day  after  the  battle,  evidently  believing  that  as  long  as 
the  wind  blew  northeast  he  was  safe. 

The  next  day,  the  29th,  the  wind  and  rain  continued,  but 
the  British  were  pushing  their  approaches,  and  there  was 
constant  skirmishing.  Washington  was  unwilling  to  trust 
any  longer  to  the  northeast  wind,  because  the  British  trenches 
were  coming  nearer  and  his  troops  had  been  standing  in  the 
pelting  rain  for  nearly  two  days,  without  sleep,  not  daring  to 
lie  down  at  night,  and  with  nothing  to  eat  but  cold  bread  and 
raw  pork.  He  had  himself  been  riding  along  the  lines  to 
encourage  the  men  during  all  that  time  without  leaving  his 
saddle. 

He  accordingly  issued  an  order  during  the  morning  to  col- 
lect every  kind  of  boat  that  could  be  found  along  the  neigh- 
boring shores  for  the  ostensible  purpose  of  carrying  the  sick 
and  wounded  to  New  York  and  bringing  some  fresh  regiments 
from  New  Jersey.  At  eight  o'clock  in  the  evening  the 
embarkation  began  with  much  marching  and  countermarching. 
As  each  regiment  departed  for  the  shore  at  Fulton  Ferry, 
another  would  be  moved  or  extended  to  fill  up  the  gap,  and 
the  fires  were  kept  burning  and  the  outposts  at  their  stations. 

At  first  the  northeast  wind  rendered  the  movements  of  the 
boats  to  the  opposite  shore  very  slow.  But  before  midnight 
the  weather  cleared,  and  the  wind  changed  to  southwest,  so 
that  Glover's  Massachusetts  men  from  Marblehead  and 
Hutchinson's  from  Salem,  most  of  them  seamen,  could  use 
sails  on  the  boats.  But  even  with  this  advantage  there  were 
some  six  regiments  still  in  the  works  when  daylight  appeared, 
and  they  could  hear  the  pick-axes  and  shovels  of  the  British 
in  the  trenches.  Luckily  a  morning  fog  arose,  and  under  cover 
of  it,  these  regiments  slipped  down  to  the  ferry.  The  whole 
army  of  nearly  ten  thousand  with  their  prisoners,  wounded, 
baggage  and  stores  got  safely  across  to  New  York,  and  it  has 
been  counted  one  of  the  most  skilfully  conducted  retreats  of 
history. 

499 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

Word  of  the  movement  was  sent  to  Howe,  possibly  by  Mrs. 
John  Rapelje,  a  loyalist;  and  according  to  Stedman,  Howe 
knew  of  the  movement  in  time  to  prevent  it.  But  his  recon- 
noitering  parties,  which  cautiously  drew  near  the  works, 
found  them  empty  and  silent,  and  when  they  rushed  to  the 
ferry  the  last  of  the  Americans  had  left  the  shore.11 


"Stedman,  "American  War,"  edition  1794.  vol.  i,  pp.  197,  198; 
Parliamentary  Register,  1779,  vol  13,  pp.  55,  315;  Onderdonk,  "Revolu- 
tionary Incidents,"  p.  130;  Memoirs  of  Long  Island  Historical  Society, 
vol.  iii,  pp.  213-224;  W.  B.  Reed,  "Life  of  Joseph  Reed,"  vol.  i,  p.  225; 
Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  p.  313. 

There  are  innumerable  secondary  authorities  on  the  Battle  of  Long 
Island,  which  has  been  much  obscured  by  explanations.  The  original 
reports,  letters,  and  testimony  of  the  officers  and  eye-witnesses  can  be 
found  in  the  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  i,  and  they  have  been 
collected  and  well  edited  in  volume  iii  of  the  Memoirs  of  the  Long 
Island  Historical  Society. 


XLV. 

MORE  PROPOSALS  OF  PEACE 

Military  critics  have  suggested  that  it  might  have  been 
better  for  General  Howe  to  have  made  a  mere  feint  at  Brooklyn 
Heights  on  Long  Island  and  sent  most  of  his  force  up  the 
Hudson  to  land  on  Manhattan  Island  above  the  town  of  New 
York.  He  could  then  have  drawn  his  large  force  across  the 
narrow  island  from  the  Hudson  to  East  River  and  hemmed  in 
Washington  in  the  town  where  he  might  be  forced  to  a  sur- 
render ;  or  if  he  attempted  to  retreat  across  to  Long  Island,  he 
would  again  be  isolated;  and  if  he  attempted  to  retreat  across 
to  New  Jersey,  he  would  have  wide  water  to  cross  and  would 
have  to  run  the  gauntlet  of  the  British  fleet. 

This  criticism  presupposes  a  favorable  wind  for  taking  the 
troops  up  the  Hudson.  It  may  seem  to  be  strengthened  when 
we  find  that  now  after  the  successful  Battle  of  Long  Island, 
Howe  still  had  before  him  the  problem  of  locking  up  Washing- 
ton in  New  York  by  crossing  over  to  the  part  of  Manhattan 
Island  above  the  town.  But  he  was  in  no  hurry  to  make  the 
movement  and  astonished  everyone  by  remaining  quietly  on 
Long  Island  for  over  two  weeks  without  attempting  to  enter 
New  York.  He  seemed  to  the  patriots  a  very  slow  general,  or 
else  he  was  trying  to  be  their  friend.1 

But  this  delay  was  apparently  to  give  time  and  opportunity 
for  more  peace  proposals  by  the  Admiral.  General  Sullivan 
who  had  been  captured  on  Long  Island  was  sent  ashore  on  his 
parole  to  visit  the  congress  in  Philadelphia  and  deliver  a 
message  to  the  effect  that  Admiral  Howe  would  be  glad  to 
have  an  informal  conference  with  them.  In  this  new  attempt 
he  meant  to  waive  his  own  rank  as  well  as  theirs,  and  as  a 
mere  private  gentleman  meet  some  of  them  as  mere  private 


1  Drake,  "Life  of  General  Knox,"  p.  31; 

Jones,  "  New  York  in  the 

Revolution,"  vol.  i,  p.  119. 

501 

AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

gentlemen  to  talk  over  the  subjects  of  controversy.  Sullivan 
reduced  to  writing  and  submitted  to  the  Congress  the  verbal 
message  the  Admiral  had  given  him,  and  it  certainly  had  the 
appearance  of  a  serious  attempt  at  reconciliation. 

"  That  he,  in  conjunction  with  General  Howe,  had  full  powers  to 
compromise  the  dispute  between  Great  Britain  and  America  upon  terms 
advantageous  to  both;  the  obtaining  of  which  delayed  him  nearly  two 
months  in  England,  and  prevented  his  arrival  at  this  place  before  the 
declaration  of  independence  took  place. 

"  That  he  wished  a  compact  might  be  settled  at  this  time  when  no 
decisive  blow  was  struck,  and  neither  party  could  say,  that  they  were 
compelled  to  enter  into  such  agreement: 

"  That  in  case  Congress  were  disposed  to  treat,  many  things  which 
they  had  not  as  yet  asked  might  and  ought  to  be  granted  them;  and 
that  if,  upon  the  conference,  they  found  any  probable  ground  of  accom- 
modation, the  authority  of  Congress  must  be  afterwards  acknowledged, 
otherwise  the  compact  would  not  be  complete."  {American  Archives, 
fifth  series,  vol.  ii,  p.  1329.2) 

If  the  Admiral  really  gave  Sullivan  such  a  message  as  this, 
hinting  at  a  possible  recognition  of  the  authority  of  the  Con- 
gress, one  would  suppose  that  the  Admiral  was  exceeding  his 
instructions.  It  is  possible  to  conceive  of  the  Whig  party  or  a 
Whig  politician  standing  ready  to  recognize  the  authority  of 
the  Congress,  but  it  is  hard  to  believe  that  the  Tory  Ministry  of 
that  time  were  ready  for  such  recognition  unless  they  were 
much  weaker  kneed  than  has  been  usually  supposed. 

In  his  own  account  of  the  affair  which  the  Admiral  sent 
to  the  Ministry,  he  did  not  describe  his  message  by  Sullivan 
as  going  so  far  as  to  say  that  the  authority  of  the  congress 
might  be  recognized.  Sullivan's  anxiety  as  a  prisoner,  or  his 
natural  impetuosity  may  have  led  him  to  see  more  in  the 
Admiral's  words  than  were  intended.  The  Admiral,  however, 
admitted  having  told  him  that  it  was  a  mistake  to  suppose 
that  the  peace  mission  of  himself  and  his  brother  was  confined 
to  granting  pardons;  that  his  majesty's  paternal  desire  was 


1  "Life  of  George  Read,"  p.  174;   Works  of  John  Adams,  vol.  iii, 
p.  73;  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  ii,  p.  105. 

502 


THE  STATEN  ISLAND  MEETING 

to  make  his  American  subjects  happy  and  that  both  the 
Admiral  and  the  General  "  were  willing  to  consult  any 
persons  of  influence,  and  that  reconciliation,  union  and  redress 
of  grievances  might  be  the  happy  consequence. ' ' 3 

In  either  of  its  forms  the  message  was  a  rather  curious  pro- 
ceeding, and  coupled  with  the  previous  similar  attempts  showed 
an  apparently  intense  desire  on  the  part  of  the  Admiral  and 
the  General  to  effect  some  sort  of  compromise,  or  reconciliation 
as  it  was  called. 

The  Congress  were  uneasy  lest  the  news  of  this  willingness 
for  peace  negotiation  might  unsettle  the  timid  and  moderate 
patriots,  so  they  resolved  to  send  a  regularly  appointed  and 
formal  committee  consisting  of  Franklin,  John  Adams  and 
Rutledge  to  learn  from  Admiral  Howe  the  exact  extent  of  his 
powers  and  the  terms  he  had  to  offer.4 

There  was  great  expectation  and  excitement  as  to  the  results 
of  the  meeting.  Some  believed  that  a  full  settlement  would  be 
reached  and  the  patriot  army  disbanded,  while  othere  were  en- 
tirely skeptical  as  to  the  admiral's  professions  and  intentions. 
Adams,  who  has  given  a  most  graphic  account  of  this  meeting, 
said  that  on  the  way  to  it  he  and  his  colleagues  were  filled 
with  great  anxiety  for  their  cause  by  the  patriot  troops  they 
found,  both  officers  and  men,  straggling  and  loitering  in  the 
taverns  of  New  Jersey ;  but  they  were  determined  not  to  be  dis- 
heartened, and  with  easy,  composed  countenances,  on  the  11th 
of  September,  took  their  seats  in  the  admiral's  barge,  which 
carried  them  over  to  Staten  Island.  He  came  down  to  the 
shore  and  received  them  in  the  most  handsome  manner. 

"  We  walked  up  to  the  house  between  lines  of  guards  of  grenadiers, 
looking  fierce  as  ten  Furies,  and  making  all  the  grimaces  and  gestures 
and  motions  of  their  muskets,  with  bayonets  fixed,  which,  I  suppose, 
military  etiquette  requires,  but  which  we  neither  understood  nor 
regarded.    .    .    .    His  lordship  had  prepared  a  large  handsome  room,  by 


8  Parliamentary  Register,  vol.  8,  p.  249. 

*"Life   of   George   Reed,"   pp.    189,    190;    American   Archives,    fifth 
series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  178,  192,  272,  1331,  1332. 

503 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

spreading  a  carpet  of  moss  and  green  sprigs,  from  bushes  and  shrubs  in 
the  neighborhood,  till  he  had  made  it  not  only  wholesome,  but  roman- 
tically elegant;  and  he  entertained  us  with  good  claret,  good  bread,  cold 
ham,  tongues,  and  mutton."     (John  Adams,  Works,  vol.  iii,  p.  77.) 

The  greatest  good  feeling  and  politeness  prevailed.  The 
Admiral  was  profuse  in  his  expression  of  gratitude  to  Massa- 
chusetts for  erecting  a  monument  in  Westminster  Abbey  to  his 
brother.  He  said  that  he  felt  for  America  as  for  a  brother,  and 
if  America  should  fall,  he  should  feel  and  lament  it  like  the  loss 
of  a  brother.  To  which  Franklin  replied,  ' '  My  lord,  we  will  do 
our  utmost  endeavors  to  save  your  lordship  that  mortification. ' ' 

The  committee's  report  of  the  interview  agreed  substan- 
tially with  that  of  the  Admiral  to  his  Government.  The  only 
power  he  had  beyond  that  of  issuing  pardons  under  the  Pro- 
hibitory Act  was  to  receive  any  terms  the  patriots  had  to  offer 
and  transmit  them  to  the  Ministry ;  but  first  of  all  the  patriots 
must  submit  and  return  to  British  allegiance.  That  being 
done  the  Admiral  had  no  doubt  that  certain  acts  of  Parliament 
would  be  revised  and  many  grievances  removed.5 

This  was,  of  course,  merely  beating  the  Devil  round  the 
bush;  and  the  Congress  would  have  nothing  more  to  do  with 
the  negotiation.  But  the  Admiral  would  not  cease  from  his 
efforts  and  in  a  few  days  he  and  his  brother  issued  a  procla- 
mation in  which  they  announced  that  the  Congress  had  "dis- 
avowed every  purpose  of  reconciliation  not  consonant  with  their 
extravagant  and  inadmissable  claim  of  independency;"  but 
that,  nevertheless,  the  Admiral  and  the  General  were  still  desir- 
ous to  restore  peace  and  a  permanent  union  with  the  British 
empire;  and  they  further  declared  that  the  King  was  "most 
graciously  disposed  to  direct  a  revision  of  such  of  his  royal 
instructions  as  may  be  construed  to  lay  an  improper  restraint 
upon  the  freedom  of  legislation  in  any  of  his  colonies  and  to 
concur  in  the  revisal  of  all  acts  by  which  his  subjects  there 
may  think  themselves   aggrieved."     Wherefore,   the   patriots 


5  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  323,  324,  914,  915,  972, 
1342,  1343;  Writings  of  Washington,  Ford  edition,  vol.  iv,  pp.  284,  336. 

504 


SPEECH  OF  LORD  CAVENDISH 

should  abandon  their  precarious  cause  and  accept  the  bless- 
ings of  peace  ' '  upon  the  true  principles  of  the  constitution. ' '  6 

The  Admiral  no  doubt  thought  that  the  patriot  party  had 
been  so  badly  shattered  in  the  recent  defeat  that  the  moderates 
might  compel  the  Congress  to  offer  terms.  Lord  Percy  writing 
home  on  the  2nd  of  September,  had  said  ' '  this  business  is  pretty 
near  over, ' '  and  very  likely  that  was  the  general  opinion  in  the 
British  army.7 

The  proclamation  of  the  Howes  was  published  in  England 
and  the  Whigs  immediately  seized  upon  it  as  valuable  material 
for  action  in  Parliament.  On  the  6th  of  November,  Lord  Cav- 
endish in  a  sarcastic  speech  expressed  his  surprise  and  delight 
that  the  Ministry  had  authorized  their  Admiral  and  Gen- 
eral to  say  to  the  Americans  that  the  King  would  concur  in  the 
revisal  of  all  acts  by  which  the  colonists  were  aggrieved.  He 
felt,  he  said,  "a  dawn  of  joy  break  in  on  his  mind."  He  was 
ready  to  cooperate  with  the  Ministers  in  their  noble  work,  and 
he,  therefore,  moved  "that  this  House  will  resolve  itself  into 
a  committee,  to  consider  of  the  revisal  of  all  acts  of  Parliament, 
by  which  his  Majesty's  subjects  in  America  think  themselves 
aggrieved. ' ' 8 

Lord  North  replying  for  the  Ministry,  declared  that  the 
proclamation  was  entirely  in  accordance  with  instructions 
given  to  the  Howes  and  called  attention  to  the  words  of  their 
commission  which  had  recently  been  published  in  the  Gazette. 
The  Ministry  had  always  been  willing  to  hear  and  redress 
American  grievances,  and  part  of  the  duty  of  the  Howes  as 
peace  commissioners,  was  to  transmit  an  account  of  those 
grievances  "and  to  engage  on  the  part  of  the  legislature  that 
redress  would  be  granted,  whenever  a  good  cause  for  redress 
existed."  But  the  Americans  must  first  give  up  their  notions 
of  sovereignty  and  independence,  acknowledge  Britain's  right 
to  rule  and  then  the  Ministry  would  ' '  adopt  the  most  efficacious 


•  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  565,  1180. 
'"Letters  of  Earl  Percy,"  Bolton,  p.  71. 
8  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  1006,  1007. 

505 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

and  speedy  measures,  not  only  to  remedy  real  grievances,  but 
even  to  bend  to  their  prejudices  in  some  instances. ' ' 

The  motion  of  Lord  Cavendish  was  lost  by  a  vote  of  109 
to  47 ;  and  the  patriots  afterwards  discovered  that  the  sending 
by  the  Congress  of  a  committee  to  meet  Admiral  Howe  had 
been  used  by  the  Ministry  to  show  the  French  government 
that  the  patriots  were  inclined  to  compromise.  In  consequence 
France  had  for  a  time,  withdrawn  her  aid;  for  if  the  Amer- 
icans were  about  to  compromise  or  become  reconciled  to  Eng- 
land, it  was  not  for  the  interest  of  the  French  nation  to  help 
them.  France's  only  reason  for  helping  them  was  to  enable 
them  to  become  absolutely  independent  of  England.  From 
this  the  patriots  learned  the  valuable  lesson  that  their  true 
policy  lay  in  rejecting  absolutely  and  without  negotiation  or 
consideration,  any  compromise  proposals  of  England  which, 
as  John  Adams  said,  were  mere  stratagems  to  divide  and 
weaken  the  patriot  party,  prevent  aid  from  France  and  en- 
courage the  loyalists.9 

The  loyalists,  inferred  from  the  effort  the  Admiral  made, 
especially  in  the  Drummond  mission  that  he  had  full  powers 
not  only  to  pardon,  but  to  arrange  a  compromise,  and  Gallo- 
way regrets  that  he  did  not  use  this  power  to  its  full  extent. 
But  an  examination  of  the  secret  instructions  and  orders  to 
the  Howes,  now  accessible  in  the  Eecord  Office  in  London,  shows 
that  they  had  no  power  beyond  what  they  themselves  and  Lord 
North  described.10 


9  Writings  of  Washington,  Ford  edition,  vol.  v,  p.  239  note. 

10  Galloway,  "  A  Letter  to  the  Right  Honorable  Lord  Viscount 
H — e,"  London,  1780.  I  have  had  a  copy  made  of  the  original  Orders 
and  Instructions  to  the  Howes  in  the  London  Record  Office  and  turned 
it  over  to  the  Historical  Society  of  Pennsylvania  for  preservation. 


XLVI. 

THE  MOTIVES  OF  THE   HOWES 

Neither  the  Admiral  nor  the  General  made  any  more  peace 
proposals.  The  efforts  of  the  Admiral  in  this  direction  had 
been  earnest  and  persistent,  beginning  two  years  before  in 
his  secret  negotiations  with  Franklin  in  London.  He  had 
possibly  tried  to  obtain  from  the  Ministry  larger  powers  for 
peace  and  compromise  than  were  given  him  and  for  that  pur- 
pose had  delayed  his  departure  from  England.  But  the 
Ministry  knew  better  than  to  trust  a  Whig  politician  with  any 
large  authority  of  that  kind ;  and  there  is  a  curious  letter  from 
Wedderburn  in  the  9th  Report  of  the  Historical  Manuscripts 
Commission  which  indicates  quite  clearly  the  embarrassment  of 
the  Ministry  in  being  obliged  to  entrust  to  a  Whig  politician 
the  carrying  out  of  a  Tory  policy.  They  were  suspicious  of 
the  Admiral's  intentions  and  not  willing  to  trust  him  with 
peace  proposals  unless  he  was  closely  bound  by  implicit 
instructions.1 

This  brings  us  to  the  great  controversy  of  the  time  over 
the  motives  of  the  Howes,  a  controversy  which  must  be  con- 
tinually referred  to  during  their  command  in  America  in  the 
next  two  years.  Their  motives  were  very  naturally  suspected. 
They  were  charged  with  delaying  the  war  and  trying  to  com- 
promise with  the  Americans  on  Whig  principles,  when  they 
should  have  been  vigorously  subduing  them  on  the  Tory  prin- 
ciples of  the  Ministry  who  gave  them  their  commands  and 
sent  them  out  to  America. 

The  Howes,  we  must  remember,  were  Whigs  of  the  extreme 
type.  George  Howe,  during  his  lifetime,  had  been  the  family 
member  of  Parliament,  and  had  represented  Nottingham  until 


1  Part  iii,  p.  84 ;  see  also  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  i,  pp. 
272,  273;  see  also  vol.  iii,  p.  1227. 

507 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

he  fell  at  Tieonderoga  in  1758.  As  soon  as  his  mother  heard 
the  news  she  issued  an  address  to  the  electors  asking  them  to 
choose  her  youngest  son,  William,  which  they  promptly  did; 
and  he  seems  to  have  thought  of  himself  as  continuing  the 
existence  and  principles  of  his  brother.  He  became  a  strict 
party  man  voting  with  the  Whigs  against  the  Stamp  Act  and 
all  the  other  Tory  legislation  for  America;  and  now  he  was 
out  in  America  as  the  general  to  carry  out  the  Tory  policy 
against  which  he  had  been  voting  for  ten  years. 

Before  he  came  out  as  general  he  had  said  as  a  politician 
that  he  not  only  thought  it  wrong  to  make  war  on  the  Ameri- 
cans, but  useless  and  impractical.  A  large  section  of  his  party, 
the  Rockingham  Whigs,  and  men  like  the  Duke  of  Richmond 
and  Charles  Fox  were  in  favor  of  allowing  the  colonies  to 
form,  if  they  could,  an  independent  nation,  just  as,  in  the 
year  1901,  a  section  of  the  liberal  party  were  in  favor  of 
allowing  the  Boer  republics  of  South  Africa  to  retain  their 
independence.2 

The  rest  of  the  Whigs,  represented  by  such  men  as  Barre, 
Burke,  and  Lord  Chatham,  would  not  declare  themselves  for 
independence.  They  professed  to  favor  retaining  the  Amer- 
ican communities  as  colonies;  but  they  would  retain  them  by 
conciliation  instead  of  by  force  and  conquest.  Their  position 
was  an  impossible  one,  because  conciliation  without  military 
force  would  necessarily  result  in  independence.  But  they 
professed  to  think  that  if  the  troops  were  withdrawn  from 
America,  and  no  invasion  or  subjugating  attempted,  the 
colonies  would  voluntarily  submit  or  enter  into  some  agreement 
by  which  they  would  remain  in  the  empire. 

It  was  certainly  a  little  peculiar  that  a  Whig  member  of 
Parliament  holding  such  opinions  as  these,  should  be  sent  to 
America  to  carry  out  a  Tory  policy  of  repression  and  subjuga- 
tion. But  the  Ministry,  it  is  said,  were  inclined  to  bestow  im- 
portant employments,  military  and  naval,  on  those  who  were 


3  Lecky,  "  England  in  the  Eighteenth  Century,"  edition  1882,  vol.  iii, 
p.  544. 

508 


HOWE'S  INCONSISTENCY 

in  the  habit  of  opposing  their  measures  in  order  to  secure 
themselves  from  attack  and  carry  their  measures  more  easily. 
Howe  had  told  his  constituents  that  if  the  command  against 
the  colonies  were  offered  to  him  he  would  not  accept  it.  This 
reckless  remark  was  characteristic  of  him,  and  when  he  made 
it  he  must  have  known  that  there  was  every  probability  that 
he  would  be  sent  against  the  Americans  in  some  capacity  if 
not  in  chief  command.3 

It  is  somewhat  surprising  to  a  modern  American  to  find 
that  a  politician  and  a  member  of  Parliament  of  such  long 
service  as  Howe  was  also  at  the  same  time  an  officer  of  the 
British  regular  army.  Under  our  national  Constitution  we 
have  always  avoided  conferring  conflicting  offices  and  duties 
on  the  same  person.  But  this  principle  of  distinct  separation 
of  the  departments  of  government,  which  we  have  carried  so 
far,  was  at  that  time  not  much  regarded  in  England.  Admiral 
Howe  was  also  a  member  of  Parliament  and  so  were  Generals 
Burgoyne,  Cornwallis,  and  Grant.  Such  a  system  may  have 
worked  well  enough  until  the  soldier  or  sailor  was  directed 
to  carry  out  what  as  a  politician  he  had  opposed.4 

After  all  that  Howe  had  said  to  his  constituents  about  the 
righteousness  of  the  American  cause,  and  that  he  would  not 
fight  against  such  people,  there  was  surprise  and  some  indig- 
nation among  the  Whigs  in  England  when  his  appointment 
was  announced,  and  he  sailed  for  Boston.  The  Congress  at 
Philadelphia  declared  that  "America  was  amazed  to  find  the 
name  of  Howe  in  the  catalogue  of  her  enemies.  She  loved 
his  brother." 

"You  should  have  refused  to  go  against  the  Americans," 
said  his  old  supporters  at  Nottingham,  "as  you  said  you 
would."  But  Howe,  not  in  the  least  disconcerted,  replied  that 
his  appointment  came  not  as  an  offer,  but  as  an  order  from 
the  King,  and  he  had  no  choice  but  to  obey.     Significant  re- 


8  Stedman,  "  American  War,"  vol.  i,  p.  319. 

4  In  Burgoyne's  expedition  from  Canada  in  1777  six  of  his  staff 
officers  were  members  of  Parliament. — Writings  of  Washington,  Ford 
edition,  vol.  6,  p.  150. 

509 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

marks  were  made  that  the  war  would  now  after  all  be  con- 
ducted on  Whig  principles  in  spite  of  the  Tory  Ministry.5 

At  first  the  peace  proposals  and  comparatively  gentle 
methods  of  the  Howes  seem  to  have  been  approved  by  the  Min- 
istry, and  were  in  accordance  with  the  Ministry's  instructions. 
But  in  the  end  the  Howes  kept  up  the  gentle  methods  too  long 
and  as  their  careers  in  America  developed,  grave  suspicions 
as  to  their  motives  were  entertained  in  England  and  by 
loyalists  in  America. 

Loyalists  and  Englishmen  found  the  conduct  of  General 
Howe  very  difficult  to  understand  unless  they  assumed  either 
that  he  was  a  man  of  rarest  ignorance  and  incompetence,  or 
that  as  a  Whig  member  of  Parliament,  he  was  so  influenced 
by  partisan  feelings  that  he  was  unwilling  to  conduct  the  war 
in  a  way  which  would  give  the  Tory  party  in  Parliament  any 
advantage.  If  the  Americans  had  showed  a  willingness  to 
come  to  terms  and  enter  into  some  engagement  by  which  they 
would  remain  at  least  nominally  a  part  of  the  empire  with 
privileges  and  liberties  satisfactory  to  themselves,  all  the 
Whig  prophecies  of  Burke,  Barre  and  Chatham  would  have 
been  fulfilled,  and  the  Whig  program  would  have  been  car- 
ried out  to  the  letter. 

To  accomplish  such  a  Whig  success  it  was  strongly  sus- 
pected, that  the  Howe  brothers  refrained  from  subjugation, 
and  would  use  the  vast  military  and  naval  forces  committed 
to  their  care  only  for  the  purpose  of  suggesting  to  the  colonists 
that  sort  of  voluntary  settlement  and  submission  which  was 
the  Whig  ideal  of  colonial  relations  with  the  mother  country. 

Admiral  Howe's  naval  operations  during  the  three  years 
of  his  command  were  certainly  conducted  on  good  Whig  prin- 
ciples, but  were  very  exasperating  to  loyalists  like  Joseph 
Galloway  and  not  calculated  to  extend  British  dominion.  In 
1776  he  had  with  him  fifty-six  war  vessels,  and  in  the  next 


5 "  Address  to  the  People  of  Ireland,"  p.  8 ;  American  Archives, 
fourth  series,  vol.  iv,  p.  311;  Galloway,  "Reply  to  the  Observations  of 
Lieutenant-General  Sir  W.  Howe,"  pp.  112,  138,  London,  1780. 

510 


ADMIRAL  HOWE'S  METHODS 

year  he  had  eighty-one.  He  could  have  placed  them  within 
sight  of  one  another  along  the  coast  from  Boston  to  Charles- 
ton. The  original  plan  had  been  to  station  the  large  vessels 
at  the  mouths  of  the  great  rivers  and  bays,  the  Hudson,  the 
Delaware,  and  the  Chesapeake,  and  the  rest  were  to  cruise  up 
and  down  the  coast  three  deep,  but  not  in  file,  so  as  to  render 
it  more  difficult  to  cross  them.  But  Admiral  Howe  never 
attempted  any  such  complete  blockade;  and  made  only  a 
partial  and  very  weak  blockade  of  Delaware  Bay  and  the 
Chesapeake. 

His  war-ships  in  those  waters  were  easily  evaded.  Ameri- 
can vessels  and  the  privateers  which  preyed  on  English  mer- 
chantmen found  a  safe  entrance  at  Egg  Harbor  on  the  Jersey 
coast,  whence,  by  way  of  the  Mullica  River,  goods  were  hauled 
in  wagons  to  Philadelphia  and  other  points.  His  blockade  of 
the  Chesapeake  was  easily  avoided  in  the  same  way  by  means 
of  the  Machipongo  Inlet,  twenty-five  miles  above  Cape  Charles ; 
and  in  the  Carolina  Sounds  the  Americans  did  as  they  pleased. 
"When  asked  why  he  did  not  commission  loyalist  privateers  to 
destroy  American  merchantmen,  the  admiral  is  said  to  have 
replied,  "Will  you  never  have  done,  oppressing  these  poor 
people?  Will  you  never  give  them  an  opportunity  of  seeing 
their  error  V   He  was  a  most  ardent  believer  in  conciliation.6 

The  Ministry  had  intended  the  olive  branch  to  be  offered 
along  with  the  sword.  But  the  olive  branch  was  to  be  with- 
drawn if  not  immediately  accepted;  and  before  long  Lord 
North,  Lord  George  Germain  and  the  whole  Ministry  declared 


6  Galloway,  "  Letter  to  the  Right  Honorable  Lord  Viscount  Howe," 
London,  1779;  Galloway,  "Detail  and  Conduct  of  the  American  War," 
third  edition,  p.  26,  etc.,  London,  1780;  Stevens,  "  Fac-similes,"  vol.  xi, 
p.  1163;  Eddis,  "Letters  from  America,"  p.  345;  American  Archives, 
fourth  series,  vol.  iv,  p.  1127;  vol.  vi,  p.  685;  fifth  series,  vol.  i,  p.  463; 
vol.  ii,  pp.  318,  1319;  "Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson," 
vol.  ii,  p.  222.  Alexander  Hamilton  is  reported  to  have  said,  "All  that 
the  English  need  have  done  was  to  blockade  our  ports  with  twenty-five 
frigates  and  ten  ships  of  the  line.  But  thank  God  they  did  nothing  of 
the  sort."  Pontgibaud,  "A  French  Volunteer  of  the  War  of  Independ- 
ence," p.  147. 

511 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

that  they  were  extremely  disappointed  in  the  conduct  of  the 
Howes.  Letters  were  written  to  General  Howe  calling  for 
more  severity,  and  extracts  from  these  letters  were  afterwards 
read  by  Charles  Fox  in  Parliament.  But  Howe  in  defending 
himself  denied  that  the  letters  contained  positive  instructions, 
and  his  statement  is  interesting  because  it  shows  how  strongly 
he  was  inclined  to  refrain  from  pressing  the  patriots  with  the 
full  rigor  of  war.7 

"  For,  sir,  although  some  persons  condemn  me  for  having  endeavored 
to  conciliate  his  Majesty's  rebellious  subjects,  by  taking  every  means  to 
prevent  the  destruction  of  the  country,  instead  of  irritating  them  by  a 
contrary  mode  of  proceeding,  yet  am  I,  from  many  reasons,  satisfied  in 
my  own  mind  that  I  acted  in  that  particular  for  the  benefit  of  the  king's 
service.  Ministers  themselves,  I  am  persuaded,  did  at  one  time  entertain 
a  similar  doctrine,  and  from  a  circumstance  not  now  necessary  to  dwell 
upon,  it  is  certain  that  I  should  have  had  little  reason  to  hope  for  support 
from  them,  if  I  had  been  disposed  to  acts  of  great  severity.  Had  it  been 
afterwards  judged  good  policy  to  turn  the  plan  of  the  war  into  an 
indiscriminate  devastation  of  that  country,  and  had  I  been  thought  the 
proper  instrument  for  executing  such  a  plan,  ministers,  I  presume,  would 
have  openly  stood  forth,  and  sent  clear,  explicit  orders.  Ambiguous 
messages,  hints,  whispers  across  the  Atlantic,  to  be  avowed  or  disavowed 
at  pleasure,  would  have  been  paltry  safeguards  for  the  honour  and 
conduct  of  a  commander-in-chief."  ( Cobbett,  "  Parliamentary  History," 
vol.  xx,   pp.   682,   683.) 

If  the  suspicion  which  seems  to  be  in  Howe's  mind  were 
correct,  the  Ministry  wished  to  avoid  the  responsibility  of 
severe  devastating  measures,  because  the  cruelty  of  them  would 
arouse  Whig  eloquence  and  perhaps  increase  the  Whig  party 
to  a  majority.  If,  however,  by  means  of  expressions,  the  mean- 
ing of  which  was  uncertain  and  could  be  avowed  or  disavowed, 
they  could  lead  Howe,  a  Whig  general,  into  measures  of  sever- 
ity, the  blame  for  cruelty,  if  the  measures  failed,  could  be 
shifted  to  a  Whig.  If,  however,  the  severity  succeeded  in 
bringing  about  a  peace  or  compromise,  the  cruelty  would  be  of 
little  moment  or  soon  forgotten. 


7  Parliamentary  Register,  House  of  Commons,  1779,  vol.  13,  pp.  271, 
272,  350,  357,  358,  368;  Cobbett,  Parliamentary  Debates,  vol.  19,  p.  766; 
vol.  20,  p.   844. 

512 


AMBIGUOUS  WHISPERS 

The  instructions  or  messages  which  Fox  read  in  Parlia- 
ment, and  which  Howe  said  were  ambiguous  whispers  across 
the  Atlantic,  seem  to  be  contained  in  two  or  three  letters  writ- 
ten to  Howe  by  Lord  George  Germain,  the  colonial  secretary. 
The  first  one  is  dated  the  3rd  of  March,  1777,  and  was  received 
by  Howe  on  the  8th  of  May.  After  regretting  the  loss  of  Tren- 
ton, enjoining  care  against  similar  accidents,  and  referring  to 
certain  inhuman  treatment  said  to  have  been  inflicted  by  the 
patriots  upon  Captain  Phillips,  the  letter  closes  by  saying : 

"  And  here  I  must  observe  that  if  that  impudent  people,  in  contempt 
of  the  gracious  offers  contained  in  the  late  proclamation,  shall  persist 
in  overt  acts  of  rebellion,  they  will  so  far  aggravate  their  guilt  as  to 
become  altogether  unworthy  of  any  further  instances  of  his  Majesty's 
compassion ;  and  as  they  who  insolently  refuse  to  accept  the  mercy  of 
their  sovereign  cannot,  in  the  eye  of  impartial  reason,  have  the  least 
room  to  expect  clemency  at  the  hand  of  his  subjects,  I  fear  that  you 
and  Lord  Howe  will  find  it  necessary  to  adopt  such  modes  of  carrying 
on  the  war  that  the  rebels  may  be  effectually  distressed,  so  that  through 
a  lively  experience  of  losses  and  sufferings  they  may  be  brought  as  soon 
as  possible  to  a  proper  sense  of  their  duty,  and  in  the  mean  time  may 
be  intimidated  from  oppressing  and  injuring  his  Majesty's  loyal  subjects.', 
— Parliamentary  Register,  House  of  Commons,  1779,  vol.  xi,  p.  394. 

Bancroft  quotes  a  passage  from  a  letter  which  he  says  was 
sent  at  this  time,  but  follows  his  custom  of  giving  no  authority 
for  it. 

"  At  the  expiration  of  the  period  limited  in  your  proclamation,  it 
will  be  incumbent  upon  you  to  use  the  powers  with  which  you  are 
intrusted  in  such  a  manner  that  those  persons  who  shall  have  shown 
themselves  undeserving  of  the  royal  mercy  may  not  escape  that  punish- 
ment which  is  due  to  their  crimes,  and  which  it  will  be  expedient  to 
inflict  for  the  sake  of  example  to  futurity." — Bancroft,  "  History  of  the 
United  States,"  edition  of  1886,  vol.  v,  p.  146. 

In  another  letter,  written  on  the  18th  of  February,  1778,  and 
received  by  Howe  on  the  14th  of  April,  Germain  says  that  the 
King  has  accepted  Howe 's  resignation,  but  he  is  to  remain  until 
his  successor  arrives;  and  the  letter  goes  on  to  describe  the 
serious  attempt  at  peace  the  Ministry  was  making  by  sending 
out  a  strong  commission  for  that  purpose,  and  adds  that  the 
King  has  full  confidence  that  while  Howe  remains  in  command 
33  513 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

he  "will  lay  hold  of  every  opportunity  of  putting  an  end  to  the 
rebellion  and  inducing  a  submission  to  legal  government."  If 
the  rebel  colonists  obstinately  refuse  the  offers  of  the  peace  com- 
mission, "  every  means  will  be  employed  to  augment  the 
force  ...  in  the  prosecution  of  the  war. ' '  At  the  close  of  the 
letter  Howe  and  his  brother,  the  Admiral,  are  directed  to  make 
such  an  attack  upon  the  New  England  coast  as  will  destroy  the 
rebel  privateers  and  incapacitate  the  people  from  fitting  out 
others.  This  expedition  against  New  England  Howe  declined 
to  make,  giving  as  his  reason  that  it  was  too  hazardous,  because 
of  the  fogs,  "flatness  of  the  coast,"  together  with  other  very 
peculiar  excuses.8 

The  contents  of  these  letters  have  been  given  somewhat  at 
length  in  order  that  the  reader  may  judge  for  himself  whether 
they  are  ambiguous.  They  do  not  contain  positive  instruc- 
tions, and  yet  they  show  what  the  Ministry  wished  the  General 
and  the  Admiral  to  do.  They  are  very  like  numerous  other 
directions  and  suggestions  in  the  other  letters  from  Germain 
printed  in  the  Parliamentary  Register.  Howe  was  not  sent 
out  to  America  under  binding  or  positive  military  instruc- 
tions.9 He  was  sent  out,  as  is  usual  in  such  cases,  with  full 
discretionary  power  to  suppress  the  rebellion;  and  at  such  a 
great  distance  the  Ministry  was  obliged  to  assume  that,  as 
a  rule,  he  was  the  best  judge  of  his  surrounding  circumstances. 
As  commander-in-chief  he  could  take  the  responsibility  of  re- 
fusing to  carry  out  a  direction  or  request  of  the  Ministry  if 
he  deemed  it  unwise,  impracticable,  or  too  hazardous,  unless 
he  had  positive  instructions  that  it  was  to  be  carried  out  at 
all  hazards  on  the  responsibility  of  the  Ministry  alone.  He 
knew  all  the  political,  military,  and  other  conditions  of  the 
time,  and  had  assumed  responsibility  for  his  actions. 


8  Parliamentary  Register,  1779,  vol.  xi,  pp.  462,  466.  It  is  necessary 
to  warn  the  reader  that  owing  to  the  peculiar  way  in  which  the  Parlia- 
mentary Register  is  published,  there  are  often  two  volumes  bearing  the 
same  number  and  distinguishable  only  by  their  dates. 

9 "  View  of  the  Evidence  Relative  to  the  Conduct  of  the  War,"  etc., 
p.  112. 

514 


XLVII. 

THE  TAKING  OF  NEW  YORK  AND  THE  BATTLE 
OF  HARLEM  HEIGHTS 

During  the  delay  of  two  weeks  over  the  Admiral's  last 
peace  negotiations  Washington  and  his  officers  had  ample  time 
to  consider  their  best  course  and  even  to  send  on  to  the  Con- 
gress at  Philadelphia  for  its  opinion.  As  Howe  took  no  ad- 
vantage of  his  possession  of  Brooklyn  Heights  to  attack  New 
York,  he  evidently  intended  to  land  on  Manhattan  Island 
above  the  town  and  cut  off  all  retreat  from  it.  Washington's 
force  disheartened  by  defeat  and  weakened  by  companies  of 
militia  deliberately  returning  home,  was  spread  out  from  the 
city  through  the  whole  length  of  Manhattan  Island,  a  distance 
of  fourteen  miles  up  to  King's  Bridge,  ready  to  resist  or  evade 
any  hemming  in  movement  on  the  part  of  Howe. 

Washington  was  at  first  inclined  to  defend  New  York 
at  all  hazards,  because  many  of  the  patriot  party  expected  such 
a  defence  and  he  dreaded  the  dispiriting  effect  on  the  patriot 
cause  of  anything  like  hasty  retreat  or  abandonment  of  an 
important  point.  But  he  was  obliged  to  admit  that  his  army 
was  demoralized  and  unfit  for  such  a  task,  when  whole  com- 
panies and  even  regiments  of  militia  were  deserting  and  going 
home. 

His  officers  and  general  opinion  were  divided.  Some  were* 
for  retaining  New  York  at  all  hazards.  Others,  notably  Gen- 
eral Greene,  were  in  favor  not  only  of  abandoning  New  York, 
but  of  burning  it  to  the  ground.  Two-thirds  of  the  property  in 
it,  they  said,  belonged  to  loyalists.  The  destruction  of  it 
would  deprive  the  British  of  winter  quarters  and  of  a  general 
market  for  supplies;  but  if  they  once  occupied  it  with  their 
army,  it  was  so  naturally  strong  and  defensible  that  the 
Americans  could  never  hope  to  retake  it  until  they  had  a  naval 

515 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

force  equal  to  that  of  Britain.  John  Jay  was  in  favor  not 
only  of  burning  New  York,  but  of  desolating  all  the  country 
below  the  Hudson  Highlands  and  then  retiring  with  the  main 
body  of  the  army  to  those  Highlands  and  West  Point,  which 
should  be  made  impregnable  and  the  river  filled  up  with  stones 
rolled  down  from  the  mountains,  so  that  the  British  could 
never  get  possession  of  this  vital  strategic  position.1 

But  the  Congress  and  a  council  of  war  decided  to  abandon 
New  York  without  burning  it,  and  place  the  army  beyond 
the  scope  of  any  attempt  by  the  British  to  shut  them  up  in 
the  town.  On  the  15th  of  September,  when  Howe  finally 
started  to  take  the  city  most  of  the  baggage  and  stores  of 
Washington's  army  and  all  the  troops  except  about  4.000 
under  Putnam,  had  been  removed  to  Harlem  Heights  at  the 
upper  end  of  Manhattan  Island.2 

The  point  selected  by  Howe  for  entering  New  York  was  on 
the  East  River  near  what  is  now  33d  street,  where  the  pa- 
triots had  a  battery  manned  by  three  Connecticut  regiments 
under  Colonel  Douglas.  On  Sunday  morning,  the  15th  of 
September,  five  British  war-ships,  which  had  come  into  the  East 
River  with  but  little  difficulty,  opened  a  heavy  cannonade  on 
Douglas's  regiments  and  kept  it  up  for  three  hours,  while  at 
about  the  same  time  three  other  British  war-ships  came  up  the 
Hudson  directly  opposite  to  those  in  the  East  River,  and  the 
combined  fire  of  the  two  forces  reached  quite  across  the 
island.  Douglas's  men  were  driven  from  their  position,  and 
the  British  force  easily  landed  under  cover  of  the  cannonade, 
and  occupied  the  high  ground  in  the  neighborhood  of  Thirty- 
fifth  street  and  Fifth  avenue,  then  covered  with  corn  fields. 

Douglas's  brigade  fled  in  confusion  fearing  they  would  be 


1  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  120,  121;  Writings  of 
Washington,  Ford  edition,  vol.  iv,  pp.  393,  403 ;  "  Life  of  Joseph  Reed," 
vol.  i,  p.  213. 

2  Memoirs  of  Long  Island  Historical  Society,  vol.  iii,  pp.  227-230; 
W.  B.  Reed,  "Life  of  Joseph  Reed,"  vol.  i,  pp.  213,  229,  234,  235; 
American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  182,  237,  325,  416,  465,  1330; 
G.  W.  Greene,  "  Life  of  Nathanael  Greene,"  vol.  i,  p.  212. 

516 


HOWE  TAKES  NEW  YORK 

intercepted,  and  the  panic  was  communicated  to  several  bodies 
of  troops  which  came  to  reinforce  them.  Washington  riding 
up  at  this  moment,  tried  to  assist  the  officers  in  stopping  the 
flight.  His  passionate  nature  was  thoroughly  aroused,  and 
various  traditional  accounts  have  come  down  to  us  of  his 
distress  and  rage  at  what  he  considered  a  disgraceful  retreat. 
He  threw  his  hat  on  the  ground,  fired  his  pistols  and  in  his 
efforts  to  renew  the  fight  almost  rushed  into  the  British  lines.3 

On  the  Hudson  River  side  where  the  war-ships  shelled  the 
shore,  General  Mercer  tried  to  hold  his  men  at  their  posts, 
but  in  vain;  and  both  they  and  the  troops  under  Douglas 
retreated  to  Harlem  Heights.  The  four  thousand  men  under 
Putnam  down  close  to  the  city  were  now  in  danger  of  being 
entrapped  and  they  began  to  move  as  best  they  could  towards 
Harlem  Heights.  Putnam  with  his  horse  covered  with  foam 
dashed  about  to  encourage  them  to  the  utmost  exertions;  but 
the  day  was  so  hot  that  some  of  them  were  dropping  dead  at 
the  springs  and  brooks,  where  they  drank.4 

Howe  had  now  crossed  the  East  River,  and  could  have 
easily  cut  off  Putnam's  force  if  he  had  merely  extended  his 
lines  with  a  little  promptness  to  the  westward.  But  as  he 
had  allowed  the  patriot  army  plenty  of  time  to  make  up  their 
minds  to  evacuate  New  York,  so  now  he  made  no  real  attempt 
to  hem  them  in  on  the  narrow  island.  Putnam's  division 
panting  and  fainting  with  the  heat,  passed  by  unmolested 
within  sight  of  Howe's  right  wing,  while  he  and  some  of  his 
officers  were  lunching  with  Mrs.  Robert  Murray  at  that  part 
of  New  York  still  known  as  Murray  Hill.5 

Mrs.  Murray  was  a  patriot  and,  as  the  pretty  story  goes, 
invited  Howe  to  lunch  for  the  purpose  of  delaying  him  and 


"Writings  of  Washington,  Ford  edition,  vol.  4,  p.  407  note;  Jones, 
"  New  York  in  the  Revolution,"  vol.  i,  p.  604. 

*  Memoirs  of  Long  Island  Historical  Society,  vol.  iii,  p.  232;  Gordon, 
"  American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  p.  327 ;  Jones,  "  New  York 
in  the  Revolution,  vol.  i,  p.  607. 

5  Clinton's  MS  notes  to  Stedman's  "  American  War,"  vol.  i,  p.  208, 
in  Carter-Brown  Collection  at  Providence. 

517 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

saving  Putnam's  force;  or,  at  any  rate,  her  offer  of  lunch  and 
entertainment,  as  we  are  solemnly  informed  by  historical 
writers,  is  supposed  to  have  had  that  effect.  But  that  Howe 
and  the  officers  with  him,  and  all  the  other  officers  who  were 
not  at  the  lunch,  were  deceived  in  this  way  seems  almost 
incredible.  A  suspicion  arises  that  there  may  have  been  an 
intention  to  move  easily  and  give  the  patriots  every  chance. 
The  lunch  at  the  patriot  house  and  the  jokes  that  are  said  to 
have  passed  at  the  table  seem  very  much  like  a  part  of  the 
conciliatory  method  thus  far  adopted  by  the  Ministry  or  by 
Howe.  They  appear  to  have  thought  that  under  this  method 
the  movement  for  independence  would  finally  collapse.  But 
under  modern  British  methods  Mrs.  Murray  would  have  been 
captured  and  locked  up  in  a  reconcentrado  camp.6 

This  was  the  beginning  of  the  serious  suspicions  of  Gen- 
eral Howe's  motives;  and  from  this  time  he  seems  to  have 
extended  the  olive  branch  more  than  the  Ministry  intended. 
The  next  day  to  the  great  delight  of  the  numerous  loyalists, 
he  took  formal  possession  of  New  York,  which  the  British 
retained  as  their  headquarters  to  the  end  of  the  war.  A  few 
days  after  they  entered  the  town  it  was  set  on  fire  at  night  in 
several  places,  with  the  intention  as  some  supposed  of  totally 
destroying  it.  But  whether  this  was  the  act  of  mere  in- 
cendiaries, or  of  patriots  who  wished  to  burn  out  the  British 
army,  has  never  been  determined. 

A  high  wind  was  blowing,  the  fire  soon  had  consumed  one- 
fourth  of  the  houses;  and  it  required  the  utmost  exertions  of 
the  troops  to  save  their  future  winter  quarters.  Exciting  tales 
were  told.  Many  of  the  incendiaries  who  were  caught  at  their 
work  were  said  to  have  been  shot  down,  pitched  into  the  flames 
or  hung  up  by  the  heels.     Some  six  hundred,  it  is  said,  were 


'Memoirs  of  Long  Island  Historical  Society,  vol.  iii,  pp.  225-240; 
American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  351,  352,  369,  370,  400.  The 
assertion  that  Mrs.  Murray  saved  the  American  army  may  have  been 
originally  a  joke  or  humorous  remark  of  Colonel  Grayson  which  his- 
torians have  taken  seriously.  Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition 
1788,   vol.   ii,   p.    329. 

518 


fimtmam  It  H„rlx„  r.;n!r,  ./,,  Rf!  t-S*. 

CONTEMPORARY   FRENCH    ENGRAVING   OF  THE   BURNING   OF   NEW   YORK 


SECTIONAL  JEALOUSY 

afterwards  imprisoned  on  suspicion;  and  many  of  these,  ac- 
cording to  patriot  accounts,  were  punished  in  the  most  in- 
human manner.  "They  have  hanged  numbers  by  the  feet," 
says  one  report,  "and  then  cut  their  throats."7 

The  patriot  army  now  collected  at  Harlem  Heights  was 
suffering  from  the  usual  demoralization  of  defeat.  They  were 
in  want  of  supplies,  tents,  blankets,  clothes  and  were  indis- 
criminately robbing  patriot  and  loyalist  houses.  There  was 
an  additional  cause  of  disorganization  in  the  scandal  of  the 
panic  of  the  Connecticut  troops  which  Washington  had  tried 
to  check.  Washington  himself  had  reported  it  to  Congress 
as  "disgraceful  and  dastardly."  There  were  already  jeal- 
ousies between  the  sections  of  the  country,  and  the  New 
Englanders  were  not  softened  in  their  resentments  when 
every  day  they  heard  themselves  called  dastards  and  cowards 
by  the  men  from  New  York,  Pennsylvania  and  Maryland. 
Terms  of  reproach  were  so  freely  used,  that  it  was  said  that 
the  northern  and  southern  troops  would  as  soon  fight  each 
other  as  the  British. 

The  feeling  was  intensified  by  the  extreme  democratic  and 
levelling  principles  of  the  New  Englanders  and  the  aristocratic 
ideas  of  the  officers  from  the  Southern  States.  Among  the 
New  England  soldiery  the  officers  were  all  elected  by  the  pri- 
vates; and,  as  Graydon  noticed,  there  were  very  few  officers 
who  belonged  to  the  upper  classes  of  society.  South  of  New 
England,  the  officers  were  appointed  instead  of  elected,  usually 
prided  themselves  on  their  rank  as  gentlemen,  and  believed 
that  only  such  men  could  successfully  command  armies  and 
secure  the  obedience  of  troops.  Washington  on  one  occasion 
urged  that  only  gentlemen  should  be  appointed  to  military 
office ;  and  the  southerners  now  thought  that  the  conduct  of  the 
Connecticut  troops  showed  the  value  of  such  a  rule  and  that 


7  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  462,  463,  466,  524, 
548,  820;  Evidence  in  Card  Catalogue  Penna.  Historical  Society;  Gor- 
don, "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  p.  330;  Writings  of 
Washington,  Ford  edition,  vol.  iv,  p.  430  notes;  Jones,  "New  York  in 
the  Revolution,"  vol.  i,  p.  611;  Stedman,  "American  War,"  vol.  i,  p.  209. 

519 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

nothing  but  disaster  would  result  from  New  England  levelling 
applied  to  military  organization.8 

The  results  of  this  unfortunate  quarrel  clung  to  the  patriot 
army  for  many  years.  It  might,  one  would  suppose,  have 
been  checked  by  the  gallant  conduct  of  some  Connecticut 
troops  the  very  next  day.  For  on  the  morning  of  the  16th, 
Washington  ordered  the  Connecticut  Rangers,  under  Colonel 
Knowlton,  to  reconnoitre  from  Harlem  Heights  southward 
and  discover  any  new  movements  of  the  British.  These 
rangers  were  a  picked  body  of  men,  volunteers  from  New 
England  regiments,  and  Knowlton  was  the  officer  who  had 
fought  at  the  rail  fence  at  Bunker  Hill.9 

With  his  one  hundred  and  twenty  rangers  he  pushed  south- 
ward until  he  found  the  British  light  infantry  at  what  is  now 
the  northern  end  of  Central  Park.  He  resisted  them  behind 
a  stone  wall  until  they  outflanked  him  and  as  he  retreated 
he  was  followed  by  fresh  reinforcements  with  their  bugles 
playing  a  fox  hunting  tune.  They  ventured  too  far,  however; 
for  patriot  troops  attacked  them  in  front  while  Knowlton 's 
men  assailed  their  flanks.  They  fled  from  their  fox  hunt,  with 
considerable  loss,  but  the  gallant  Knowlton  was  killed. 

Receiving  still  more  reinforcements  the  British  came  on 
again,  and  the  patriots  sallied  out  from  Harlem  Heights 
until  there  was  an  appearance  of  a  general  engagement.  The 
patriot  officers  thought  it  a  good  opportunity  to  reanimate 
their  men  who  were  quite  dispirited  by  the  disasters  of  the 
last  few  weeks,  and  they  succeeded  in  again  driving  the 
British  back  to  their  lines.  It  was  most  inspiring  for  the 
patriots. 


8  Memoirs  of  Long  Island  Historical  Society,  vol.  iii,  pp.  240-243; 
W.  B.  Reed,  "  Life  of  Joseph  Reed,"  vol.  i,  p.  239 ;  Gordon,  "  American 
Revolution,"  edition  1788,  pp.  324,  331,  332;  "Life  of  George  Read," 
pp.  192,  193;  G.  W.  Greene,  "Life  of  Nathanael  Greene,"  vol.  i,  p.  209; 
American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  ii,  p.  1101;  vol.  iii,  pp.  1032,  1498. 
Gordon  represents  the  northern  side  in  this  controversy  and  Graydon  in 
his  memoirs  takes  the  southern  side. 

0  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  ii,  p.  465. 

520 


NATHAN  HALE 

''They  find,"  said  Knox,  "that  if  they  stick  to  these  mighty 
men  they  will  run  as  fast  as  other  people. ' ' 10 

It  was  a  few  days  after  this  engagement  that  one  of  those 
apparently  unimportant  incidents  occurred  which  sometimes 
fix  themselves  forever  in  the  public  mind.  Anxious  for  in- 
formation as  to  the  intentions  of  the  enemy,  Washington  had 
sent  spies  into  their  camps,  and  among  those  who  had  volun- 
teered their  services  was  a  handsome  young  officer  from  Con- 
necticut, Captain  Nathan  Hale  of  Knowlton's  Rangers.  He 
was  caught  at  his  work,  confessed  and  was  promptly  hung, 
saying  upon  the  gallows  that  he  was  sorry  he  had  only  one  life 
to  give  for  his  country.  His  case  differed  in  nothing  from 
that  of  numerous  spies  who  were  hung  on  one  side  or  the  other 
during  the  war,  and  were  as  devoted  and  heroic  as  he.  But 
his  youth  and  beauty,  his  rank  above  that  of  an  ordinary  spy, 
and  his  last  words  brought  him  an  universal  sympathy  and 
greatly  excited  public  feeling.  The  British  were  denounced 
in  unmeasured  terms  for  this  new  atrocity  of  the  invader ;  and 
for  the  rest  of  the  war,  and  even  long  afterwards,  as  much  feel- 
ing could  be  aroused  by  the  mention  of  the  death  of  Hale  as 
by  the  mention  of  the  burning  of  Norfolk  or  of  Portland. 

On  the  night  of  the  same  day  on  which  Hale  was  hung, 
the  patriots  tried  to  off-set  their  disasters  by  achieving  a  minor 
success  like  that  of  Harlem  Heights.  Colonel  Jackson,  with 
three  hundred  men  in  four  or  five  flat  boats,  attacked  the 
British  fort  on  Montressor's  Island  in  Hell  Gate  in  the  East 
River.  The  first  boat  landed  and  drove  back  the  guard,  but 
the  other  boats  drew  off  and  shamefully  deserted  their  com- 
rades, who  were  obliged  to  escape  as  best  they  could  with  the 
loss  of  Major  Henly  killed  and  Colonel  Jackson  and  about 
twenty  others  wounded.11 


10 W.  B.  Reed,  "Life  of  General  Reed,"  vol.  i,  p.  237;  American 
Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  500,  548 ;  Drake,  "  Life  of  General 
Knox,"  p.  32. 

n  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  523,  524;  Gordon, 
"  American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  p.  336,  and  title  "  Montres- 
sor"  in  index;  Heath,  Memoirs,  p.  56. 

521 


XLVIII. 

WHITE  PLAINS  AND  FORT  WASHINGTON 

Continuing  his  plan  of  allowing  long  delays,  apparently 
for  the  purpose  of  bringing  about  a  compromise,  General 
Howe  left  Washington  undisturbed  at  Harlem  Heights  for 
nearly  a  month.  During  that  time  he  wrote  the  Ministry 
a  very  peculiar  letter  in  which  he  said  that  the  fur- 
ther progress  of  his  army  seemed  "  rather  precarious, ' '  and 
that  he  could  do  nothing  more  without  great  reinforcements. 
"I  have  not  the  smallest  prospect, "  he  said,  "of  finishing  the 
contest  this  campaign  until  the  Rebels  see  preparations  in  the 
spring  that  may  preclude  all  thoughts  of  further  resistance. ' ' * 

In  other  words,  in  spite  of  the  great  army  and  fleet  that 
had  been  sent  him,  he  writes  that  all  hope  of  subduing  the 
patriots  must  be  put  off  for  another  year,  and  even  then, 
apparently,  they  are  not  to  be  attacked  or  conquered,  but 
are  "to  see  preparations  that  may  preclude  all  thoughts  of 
further  resistance."  He  was  always  harping  on  this  idea  of 
compelling  a  voluntary  submission  by  a  great  display  of  force. 

With  Washington  it  was  now  a  question  of  holding  the 
place  he  was  in,  and  defending  it  at  all  hazards,  or  of  aban- 
doning it  to  avoid  being  locked  up  in  it.  Harlem  Heights 
was  a  naturally  strong  position  and  the  patriots  had  fortified  it 
by  redoubts  and  entrenchments  on  the  high  ground.  But  the 
map  shows  that  Howe,  by  occupying  the  narrow  strip  of 
country  to  the  north  of  it,  between  the  sound  and  the  Hudson, 
could  shut  it  in  and  prevent  all  retreat  except  possibly  across 
the  Hudson  to  New  Jersey,  and  that  might  be  prevented  by 
the  fleet. 

This  was  so  obviously  Howe's  best  move  that  he  was  ex- 


1  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  518,  519. 

522 


THE  ESCAPE  TO  WHITE  PLAINS 

pected  to  start  on  it  any  day.  The  New  York  patriot  leaders 
feared  that  Washington  would  obstinately  remain  and  allow 
himself  to  be  entrapped.  They  wrote  letters  to  one  of  his  staff 
officers,  Colonel  Tilghman,  and  openly  expressed  the  hope  that 
General  Mifflin  or  General  Charles  Lee,  whose  reputation  since 
the  battle  at  Charleston  had  grown  prodigiously,  would  soon 
arrive,  reveal  to  Washington  the  true  situation  and  give  him 
some  sound  advice.  Tilghman  replied  that  Washington  was 
ready  for  any  movement  of  the  British ;  and  it  is  possible  there 
were  some  who  favored  remaining  at  Harlem  Heights  where,  if 
the  British  attacked,  they  would  be  slaughtered  as  they  were  at 
Bunker  Hill. 

General  Lee  soon  arrived,  was  given  command  of  an  out- 
lying force,  and  it  appears  to  have  been  a  commonly  accepted 
opinion  at  the  time  of  the  Revolution  that  Washington,  sup- 
ported by  some  of  his  chief  officers,  would  have  remained  in 
the  trap  had  it  not  been  for  Lee,  who  urged  them  to  go  out 
to  White  Plains  from  which  it  was  easier  to  retreat.2 

Washington,  however,  was  always  so  exhaustively  pains- 
faking  in  canvassing  every  aspect  of  a  situation,  that  it  is 
difficult  to  suppose  that  he  did  not  understand  this  one  as 
well  as  Lee,  or  the  anxious  patriots  of  New  York.  He  was 
probably  reserving  his  retreat  for  the  last  moment,  and  wished 
to  keep  up  a  bold  front  as  long  as  possible.  Howe  gave  him 
every  possible  notice  and  warning  of  the  entrapping  move- 
ment, and  it  was  scarcely  possible  for  Washington  to  have 
been  caught  in  it,  even  with  his  very  undisciplined  and  dis- 
organized army. 

The  patriot  army  was  in  such  a  state  that  it  was  a  marvel 
that  it  held  together  at  all.  People  expected  that  Howe  would 
scatter  it  to  the  winds;  and  no  enemy  could  have  ridiculed 


2  Gordon,  Lafayette,  Reed  and  Stedman  describe  this  service  of  Lee  as 
a  fact,  of  which  they  appear  to  have  had  no  doubt.  Lafayette,  Memoirs, 
vol.  i,  p.  49.  Stedman,  "American  War,"  edition  1794,  vol.  i,  p.  211; 
W.  B.  Reed,  "Life  of  Joseph  Reed,"  vol.  i,  pp.  251,  255;  Gordon,  "Amer- 
ican Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  pp.  337,  338. 

523 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

its  condition  more  than  it  was  ridiculed  by  its  own  officers, 
Washington  and  General  Reed. 

"  A  spirit  of  desertion,  cowardice,  plunder,  and  shrinking  from  duty 
when  attended  with  fatigue  or  danger,  prevailed  but  too  generally 
through  the  whole  army.  And  why  should  I  disguise  any  part  of  the 
truth,  by  concealing  that  it  was  more  conspicuous  in  one  part  of  the 
army  than  another.  The  orderly  books  and  concurrent  testimony  of 
impartial  and  sensible  officers,  even  among  themselves  will  prove  it." 
(W.  B.  Reed,  "Life  of  Joseph  Reed,"  vol.  i,  p.  240.) 

The  indiscriminate  plundering  by  the  patriot  troops  had 
reached  such  a  pass  that  Washington  declared  that  it  would 
ruin  both  the  army  and  the  country.  "I  am  wearied  to 
death,"  he  wrote,  "with  the  retrograde  motion  of  things,  and 
I  solemnly  protest  that  a  pecuniary  reward  of  twenty  thousand 
pounds  would  not  induce  me  to  undergo  what  I  do."  Reed 
was  so  disgusted  that  he  offered  to  resign,  declaring  it  impos- 
sible to  introduce  discipline  in  a  mob  so  disorganized  and  so 
insane  with  levelling  and  democratic  ideas  that  they  would 
endure  orders  from  no  one  except  as  mere  suggestions  to  be 
obeyed  or  not  at  their  pleasure. 

"  It  is  impossible  for  any  one  to  have  an  idea  of  the  complete 
equality  which  exists  between  the  officers  and  men  who  compose  the 
greater  part  of  our  troops.  You  may  form  some  notion  of  it  when  I 
tell  you  that  yesterday  morning  a  captain  of  horse,  who  attends  the 
General,  from  Connecticut,  was  seen  shaving  one  of  his  men  on  the 
parade  near  the  house."  ( W.  B.  Reed,  "  Life  of  Joseph  Reed,"  vol.  i, 
p.  243.) 

Great  events  and  great  nations  may,  however,  grow  out 
of  what  seems  very  inadequate  material,  and  such  is  the  eternal 
lesson  of  history;  easy  to  see  in  the  retrospect;  but  very 
difficult  to  foresee. 

Washington  went  through  all  the  forms  of  disposing  these 
disorganized  forces  in  the  best  and  most  soldier-like  manner 
for  meeting  Howe.  While  the  main  army  at  Harlem  Heights 
watched  and  waited  for  Howe's  entrapping  movement  another 
patriot  force  of  Pennsylvania  and  Delaware  militia  called 
the  "flying  camp"  was  placed  in  New  Jersey,  opposite  Staten 

524 


THROG'S  NECK 

Island  to  resist  any  side  movement  of  the  British  towards 
Philadelphia.3 

At  last,  however,  on  the  12th  of  October,  General  Howe 
embarked  the  greater  part  of  his  force  on  boats,  and  passing 
through  the  East  River  landed  on  Throckmorton's  or  Throg's 
neck,  a  point  of  land  which  became  an  island  at  high  tide  and 
lay  to  the  north  and  east  of  Washington's  position  at  Harlem 
Heights.  Meanwhile,  Lord  Percy  moved  up  from  the  city 
by  land  and  made  a  feint  attack  on  the  few  troops  remaining 
at  the  Heights.  This  movement  by  Howe  was  apparently 
the  entrapping  movement  which  had  been  so  long  expected. 
But  if  he  had  really  intended  it  to  be  successful  he  would 
have  pushed  on  immediately  after  landing  at  Throg's  Neck, 
so  as  to  cut  off  Washington's  retreat.  Instead  of  that  he 
waited  at  Throg's  Neck  for  five  days  which  gave  Washington 
abundant  time  to  call  a  council  of  war  of  his  officers  and  under 
their  decision  move  deliberately  and  leisurely  out  of  the  trap.4 

On  the  18th  of  October  Howe  moved  from  Throg's  Neck,  but 
proceeded  eastward  as  if  he  wished  to  give  the  Americans  still 
greater  opportunity  to  escape  into  the  open  country.  Wash- 
ington kept  moving  out  while  small  bodies  of  his  force,  with 
a  goodly  number  of  riflemen  kept  up  constant  skirmishing 
and  minor  actions  with  the  outskirts  of  the  British  army. 
As  he  moved  in  this  way  his  march  was  by  his  left  flank 
so  as  to  keep  a  front  towards  the  enemy.  But  he  had  few 
horses,  and  the  baggage  and  artillery  had  to  be  dragged  by 
hand.  The  men  would  drag  part  of  it  forward  and  then  go 
back  and  drag  the  rest.  He  entrenched  his  men  on  every  hill 
as  soon  as  he  reached  it;  and  thus  his  movement  was  a  line 
of  detached  and  entrenched  camps  which  it  was  hoped  could 


8 "Life  of  George  Read,"  pp.  192-195,  198,  200-202,  204,  205,  208, 
211,  217,  219. 

4  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  1117,  1118;  Memoirs  of 
Long  Island  Historical  Society,  vol.  iii,  pp.  265,  266;  Heath  Memoirs,  pp. 
59,  62,  64.  Throgmorton's  Neck  was  so  named  from  its  first  settler,  and 
the  name  was  shortened  to  Throg  and  sometimes  to  Frog.  (Jones,  "New 
York  in  the  Revolution,"  vol.  i,  p.  620.) 

525 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

be  taken  by  the  superior  numbers  of  the  British  only  with 
heavy  loss. 

When  he  arrived  near  White  Plains  on  the  28th  of  October, 
the  British  were  close  at  hand,  and  the  advance  of  the  patriots 
in  following  out  the  plan  of  occupying  high  ground  was  in  pos- 
session of  Chatterton  Hill,  on  which  they  had  begun  intrench- 
ments  and  which  was  separated  from  the  rest  of  Washington's 
army  by  the  Bronx  River.  Seeing  that  the  patriots  on  this 
hill  were  isolated  by  the  river,  General  Howe  attacked  them 
with  a  force  of  about  four  thousand  men,  mostly  Hessians. 
General  McDougal  who  commanded  the  patriots  on  the  hill  had 
only  sixteen  hundred,  and  of  these  four  regiments  deserted 
him.  But  with  the  six  hundred  that  remained,  he  defended 
the  hill  for  an  hour  against  a  combined  attack  of  British  and 
Hessians  supported  by  artillery.  The  advantage  the  Ameri- 
cans had  in  being  intrenched  on  a  hill  was  overcome  in  this 
instance  by  the  effective  fire  of  the  British  artillery.5 

"  Their  light  parties  soon  came  on,  and  we  fired  upon  them  from 
the  walls  and  fences,  broke  and  scattered  them  at  once;  but  they  would 
run  from  our  front  and  get  round  upon  our  wings  to  flank  us;  and  as 
soon  as  our  fire  discovered  where  we  were,  the  enemy's  artillery  would 
at  once  begin  to  play  upon  us  in  a  most  furious  manner.  We  kept  the 
walls  till  the  enemy  were  just  ready  to  surround  us  and  then  we  would 
retreat  from  one  wall  and  hill  to  another  and  maintain  our  ground 
there  in  the  same  manner  till  numbers  were  just  ready  to  surround 
us.  Once  the  Hessian  Grenadiers  came  up  in  front  of  Colonel  Douglas's 
regiment,  and  we  fired  a  general  volley  upon  them  at  about  twenty  rods 
distance,  and  scattered  them  like  leaves  in  a  whirlwind;  and  they  ran  off 
so  far,  that  some  of  the  regiments  ran  out  to  the  ground  where  they  were 
when  we  fired  upon  them,  and  brought  off  their  arms  and  accoutrements, 
and  rum,  that  the  men  who  fell  had  with  them,  which  we  had  time  to 
drink  round  with  before  they  came  on  again.  They  formed  at  a  distance, 
and  waited  till  their  artillery  and  main  body  came  on,  when  they  ad- 


6  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  991,  1025,  1168,  1188, 
1202,  1203,  1205,  1240,  1270;  vol.  iii,  pp.  472,  543,  547,  576,  922,  925; 
Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  pp.  339-342;  Jones, 
"  New  York  in  the  Revolution,"  vol.  i,  p.  601 ;  Stedman,  "  American 
War,"  vol.  i,  pp.  210-215;  W.  B.  Reed,  "Life  of  Joseph  Reed,"  vol.  i, 
pp.  246,  247;  Memoirs  of  Long  Island  Historical  Society,  vol.  iii,  chap.  7. 

526 


MAP  SHOWING   MOVEMENTS  TO  WHITE  PLAINS 


INACTIVITY  OF  HOWE 

vanced  in  solid  columns  upon  us,  and  were  gathering  all  round  us  ten  to 
our  one.  .  .  .  Our  loss  on  the  whole  may  be  seventy  or  eighty,  killed  and 
wounded.  It  is  said  by  all  the  deserters  and  captives,  who  agreed  in 
their  stories,  that  the  enemy  had  about  three  hundred  killed  and 
wounded.  The  scene  was  grand  and  solemn;  all  the  adjacent  hills 
smoked  as  though  on  fire,  and  bellowed  and  trembled  with  a  perpetual 
cannonade,  and  fire  of  field-pieces,  howitzers,  and  mortars."  (American 
Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  iii,  p.  473;  see  also  p.  054.) 

The  taking  of  this  mere  outpost  on  Chatterton  Hill  satis- 
fied Howe,  and  he  would  go  no  farther.  He  made  no  attempt 
on  the  weaker  parts  of  Washington's  line,  although,  after 
taking  Chatterton  Hill,  he  received  reinforcements  and  in  the 
opinion  of  most  military  men  had  a  chance  to  inflict  irrepar- 
able damage.  He  remained  inactive  for  the  next  three  days, 
the  two  armies  confronting  each  other  without  fighting.  During 
the  night  of  the  third  day  the  Americans  retired,  falling  back 
to  almost  unassailable  heights  at  North  Castle,  where  Wash- 
ington took  every  possible  precaution  to  protect  his  flanks, 
and  Howe,  after  waiting  five  days  longer,  quietly  returned  by 
land  to  New  York.6 

His  extraordinary  slowness  and  laxity  again  aroused  sus- 
picions both  in  America  and  England  that  he  had  no  serious 
intentions  of  crushing  the  rebellion  by  force ;  but  was  working 
out  some  ulterior  political  purpose.  This  feeling  was  strength- 
ened when  his  defence  of  himself  was  published.  He  admitted 
in  his  "Narrative"  that  after  taking  Chatterton  Hill  he  had 
intended  a  further  assault  on  the  American  lines,  but,  "for 
political  reasons"  refused  to  explain  why  that  assault  was  not 
made. 

"  An  assault  upon  the  enemy's  right  which  was  opposed  to  the 
Hessian  troops,  was  intended.  The  committee  must  give  me  credit  when 
I  assure  them  that  I  have  political  reasons,  and  no  other  for  declining  to 
explain  why  that  assault  was  not  made."  ( "  The  Narrative  of  Lieuten- 
ant-General  Sir  William  Howe,"  London,  1780,  p.  6.) 

In  further  defence  of  himself  he  said: 


6 Gordon,    "American    Revolution,"    edition    1788,    vol.    ii,    p.    343; 
Writings  of  Washington,  Ford  edition,  vol.  5,  pp.  3,  4,  7. 

527 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

"  By  forcing  the  lines  we  should,  undoubtedly,  have  gained  a  more 
brilliant  advantage,  some  baggage,  and  some  prisoners;  but  we  had  no 
reason  to  suppose  that  the  rebel  army  could  have  been  destroyed." 

People,  however,  could  not  understand  why  he  had  not 
wanted  to  press  the  enemy  hard,  inflict  as  much  damage  as  pos- 
sible, come  as  near  as  he  could  to  destroying  them,  and  end  the 
war  as  quickly  as  possible.  But  he  declared  himself  as  having 
been  entirely  content  with  doing  enough  to  force  them  to 
retreat ;  and  said  he  did  not  care  to  risk  any  more  of  his  men. 

In  the  inquiry  into  his  conduct  before  Parliament,  his  confi- 
dential officer,  General  Cornwallis,  was  asked  to  give  the  reasons 
why  more  was  not  done,  and  he  replied : 

"  From  political  motives  it  is  impossible  for  either  the  General  or 
myself  to  explain  these  reasons."  ( Parliamentay  Register,  House  of 
Commons,  1779,  vol.  13,  p.  3.) 

These  mysterious  "political  reasons"  it  was  further  ex- 
plained did  not  refer  to  politics  in  England,  but  to  politics 
in  America;  and  when  all  this  came  out  in  print  it  is  not 
surprising  that  a  conviction  stronger  than  ever  grew  up  in 
the  public  mind,  that  there  was  some  very  strange  purpose 
in  Howe's  peculiar  military  manoeuvres  during  the  three  years 
of  his  command.  People  very  naturally  inferred  that  he 
was  trying  to  bring  about  a  compromise  by  lack  of  severity, 
or  that  he  was  determined  to  stop  just  short  of  crushing  the 
rebellion  and  prove  the  Whig  position  that  the  rebellion  was 
unconquerable.7 

But  the  patriot  party  gave  not  the  slightest  sign  of  a  wish 
to  compromise.  Washington  assumed  that  Howe's  next  move 
would  be  either  up  the  Hudson  to  seize  the  important  strategic 
position  at  West  Point  and  the  Hudson  Highlands,  or  across 


7 "  Observations  on  the  Conduct  of  Sir  William  Howe  at  the  White 
Plains,"  London,  1779;  "A  View  of  the  Evidence  Relative  to  the  Conduct 
of  the  War  under  Sir  W.  Howe;"  Galloway,  "Letters  to  a  Nobleman 
on  the  Conduct  of  the  War "  and  "  A  Reply  to  the  Observations  of 
Lieutenant-General  Sir  W.  Howe ;  "  W.  B.  Reed,  "  Life  of  Joseph  Reed," 
vol.  i,  pp.  244-247 ;  Jones,  "  New  York  in  the  Revolution,"  vol.  i,  p.  639. 

528 


WEAKNESS  OF  THE  PATRIOTS 

New  Jersey  to  Philadelphia;  and  during  the  next  two  weeks, 
after  the  battle  of  White  Plains,  the  patriot  army  was 
stationed  so  as  to  give  as  much  resistance  as  possible  to  either 
of  these  movements.  Lee,  with  seven  thousand  men,  soon 
reduced  by  desertion  to  four  thousand,  remained  not  far  from 
White  Plains  with  instructions  to  retire  towards  the  Hudson 
Highlands  and  fortify  himself  against  any  move  by  Howe 
in  that  direction.  Heath  was  sent  to  strengthen  the  High- 
lands themselves;  while  Washington  with  a  force  of  about 
four  thousand  retired  across  the  Hudson  to  New  Jersey  in 
the  hope  of  checking  any  movement  that  might  be  made 
against  Philadelphia.8 

But  the  patriot  force  was  melting  away;  there  were  hardly 
men  enough  left  to  offer  resistance.  News  arrived  of  the  defeat 
of  Arnold's  fleet  on  Lake  Champlain  with  the  prospect  that 
Ticonderoga  might  be  taken,  and  then  Carleton  could  march 
down  the  Hudson  Valley  to  join  Howe's  victorious  army. 
Washington 's  aid,  Tench  Tilghman,  wrote  at  this  time  that 
there  was  more  to  be  dreaded  from  Carleton  and  his  army  than 
from  Howe.9 

But  Tilghman  and  the  other  officers  assumed  a  bold  and 
hopeful  front  and  the  disposition  of  the  patriot  forces  left 
both  Lee's  and  Washington's  troops  in  such  positions  that 
they  could  finally  unite  against  Howe,  whichever  course  he 
took.  If  he  went  up  the  Hudson  Washington  could  recross  it 
and  join  Lee,  in  an  attempt  to  protect  the  vital  point  at 
the  Highlands.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  Howe  advanced  across 
New  Jersey  towards  Philadelphia,  Lee  could  cross  the  Hud- 
son and  join  Washington  in  an  attempt  to  protect 
Philadelphia. 

If  the  line  of  the  Hudson  River  to  Lake  Champlain  was 
the  controlling  strategic  position  of  the  country,  as  every  one, 
including  Howe  himself,  admitted  it  to  be,  it  is  a  little  re- 


*  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  ii,  p.  1094;  vol.  iii,  pp.  555,  557, 
5C0,  620,  630,  639,  657;  Writings  of  Washington,  Ford  edition,  vol.  v, 
pp.  4,  8,  24. 

9  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  ii,  p.  1205. 
34  529 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

markable  that  he  did  not  now  take  the  opportunity  to  seize 
it  from  a  defeated  and  beaten  army.  He  had  the  largest 
force  commanded  by  a  British  general  during  the  war;  and 
at  no  time  during  the  war,  were  the  Americans  so  little  able 
to  protect  "West  Point  and  the  Highlands.  One  would  sup- 
pose that  a  British  general  of  any  energy  and  serious  inten- 
tions would  have  at  once  occupied  the  Highlands  and  secured 
a  thoroughly  protected  line  of  navigation  down  to  New  York. 
But  Howe,  as  we  shall  see,  would  never  do  anything  to  secure 
the  line  of  the  Hudson,  nor  would  he  assist  any  other  British 
officer  in  securing  it. 

Two  weeks  after  the  battle  of  White  Plains  he  devoted 
himself  to  taking  Fort  Washington  situated  at  the  line  of 
defence  Washington  had  occupied  at  Harlem  Heights.  This 
fort  was  on  the  bank  of  the  Hudson  and  a  heavy  chain  had 
been  stretched  across  to  Fort  Lee  on  the  Jersey  shore.  Old 
vessels  loaded  with  stone  had  been  fastened  to  the  chain  and 
sunk  so  that  they  hung  just  below  the  surface  of  the  water; 
and  it  was  supposed  that  British  war-vessels  would  be  stopped 
by  this  obstruction  and  subjected  to  a  heavy  fire  from  the 
two  forts.10 

It  was  an  ingenious  but  futile  plan,  for  the  war-ships 
passed  the  obstructions  without  difficulty.  Fort  "Washington 
itself  was  utterly  useless  and  should  have  been  abandoned 
by  the  patriots  when  they  abandoned  Harlem  Heights.  Gen- 
eral Greene,  however,  was  strongly  in  favor  of  holding  it.  He 
thought  it  would  be  an  annoyance  to  the  enemy.  It  was  now 
isolated  in  the  midst  of  the  British;  but  its  garrison,  he 
thought,  might  at  the  last  moment  escape  across  the  Hudson 
to  New  Jersey.     Other  officers  were  also  of  this  opinion,  and 


10  Memoirs  of  Long  Island  Historical  Society,  vol.  iii,  p.  264.  Several 
attempts  were  made  to  obstruct  the  Hudson  and  also  the  harbor  of  Ports- 
mouth, New  Hampshire,  by  means  of  a  chain  supported  by  rafts;  but 
except  at  West  Point  the  immense  weight  of  water  and  the  rapidity  of 
the  current  usually  parted  the  chain.  (American  Archives,  fifth  series, 
vol.  iii,  pp.  752,  316,  782,  783,  1031,  1043,  1140;  Writings  of  Washington, 
Ford  edition,  vol.  v,  p.  359  note.) 

530 


FORT  WASHINGTON 

Washington  and  a  council  of  war  finally  consented  that  it 
should  be  retained. 

Washington  afterwards  bitterly  regretted  the  retention  of 
the  fort,  and  at  this  distance  of  time,  the  attempt  to  hold  it 
seems  like  a  most  useless  sacrifice  of  the  3000  patriots  who  were 
killed  or  taken  prisoner.  But  in  the  minds  of  Washington 
and  his  officers  there  was  the  old  feeling  that  Congress  and 
the  patriot  party  might  be  dispirited  if  there  was  too  sudden 
and  complete  an  abandonment  of  every  position  before  Howe's 
advancing  force.  The  patriot  army  was  growing  smaller  from 
desertions  and  disasters;  and  it  might  become  panic-stricken 
and  disappear  entirely,  never  again  to  be  recruited,  if  its 
officers  and  leaders  showed  that  they  had  no  hope.11 

Fort  Washington  as  Graydon  describes  it,  was  scarcely 
a  fort  at  all;  but  merely  an  open  earthwork  without  a  ditch 
or  outside  obstruction  of  any  consequence,  and  with  high 
ground  in  its  rear.  It  had  no  barracks,  casemates,  fuel,  or 
water.  The  troops  that  were  supposed  to  be  holding  it  found 
that  they  could  protect  themselves  better  by  remaining  out- 
side of  it ;  and  the  New  Englanders,  Graydon  complains,  were 
quite  willing  to  see  the  southern  troops,  some  three  thou- 
sand Pennsylvanians  and  Marylanders,  sacrificed  in  the 
attempt. 

There  was  desultory  fighting  round  them  for  many  days, 
and  Graydon 's  descriptions  are  interesting.  There  was  the 
patriot  lad  of  eighteen  who  killed  a  regular  and  brought  in 
his  shining,  beautiful  arms,  such  a  contrast  to  the  brown  and 
battered  American  weapons;  and  those  shining  arms  were 
with  much  ceremony  formally  presented  to  the  boy  at  evening 
parade.  There  was  the  sergeant  who  killed  a  British  officer, 
stripped  him  of  his  uniform,  and  wore  it  like  a  glittering  pea- 
cock in  the  patriot  camp.  Graydon  describes  the  British  sol- 
diers as  absurdly  bad  marksmen.  They  threw  up  their  guns 
with  a  jerking  motion  and  pulled  the  trigger  the  instant  the 


"Memoirs  of  Long  Island  Historical  Society,  vol.  iii,  p.  283;  W.  B. 
Reed,  "  Life  of  Joseph  Reed,"  yol.  i,  pp.  249,  263. 


531 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

gun  reached  the  shoulder.  Ten  of  them  fired  at  him  within 
forty  yards  and  missed  him. 

It  was  an  advantage  to  Howe  that  one  of  the  garrison  de- 
serted to  him  and  revealed  all  its  approaches.  He  summoned 
the  fort  to  surrender  on  the  15th  of  November,  in  the  old- 
fashioned  way  of  threatening  them  with  no  quarter  if  they 
refused.  He  gave  them  until  the  next  day  to  accept  his  terms, 
and  it  has  been  supposed  that  he  hoped  they  would  retreat 
across  the  Hudson  during  the  night  and  save  him  the  men 
he  might  lose  in  an  assault.12 

Washington  watched  the  attack  on  the  morning  of  the  16th 
of  November  and  at  first  actually  had  hopes  of  success.  Colonel 
Magaw,  who  commanded  the  fort  formed  most  of  his  men  out- 
side of  it  on  commanding  ground  and  for  a  time  repulsed 
the  British.  He  was  soon,  however,  driven  back,  the  enemy 
got  behind  his  lines,  and  his  men  began  to  take  refuge  in  the 
fort  in  such  a  confused  and  dispirited  state  that  he  seems  to 
have  been  unable  to  get  them  to  man  the  works  and  fight. 
Washington  sent  a  messenger  directing  him  to  hold  out  until 
evening  when  the  garrison  could  be  rescued  in  boats  and 
brought  across  to  New  Jersey.  But  Magaw  had  surrendered, 
and  there  were  about  three  thousand  ragged  prisoners  for  the 
amusement  of  the  British  officers.13 

Graydon,  who  was  one  of  the  prisoners  gives  most  vivid 
descriptions  of  the  scenes.  They  were  threatened  with  the 
butts  of  guns,  reminded  that  they  would  be  hung,  cursed  as 
' '  damned  rebels, ' '  and  mock  orders  were  given  to  kill  prisoners. 
The  patriots  had  any  sort  of  clothes  and  accoutrements  they 
could  get,  and  some  of  their  equipments  had  once  been  the 
property  of  the  British  government.  Graydon  had  a  belt 
with  the  British  army  marks  G.R.  stamped  upon  it;  and  as 
soon  as  this  was  recognized  it  was  wrenched  from  him  with 
violence. 


"Gordon,  "American  Revolution/'  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  p.  348. 

13  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  707,  856,  1071;  Jones, 
"  New  York  in  the  Revolution,"  vol.  i,  p.  626 ;  Drake,  "  Life  of  General 
Knox,"  pp.  33,  34;  Stedman,  "American  War,"  vol.  i,  p.  217. 

532 


TREATMENT  OF  PRISONERS 

The  officers  surrounded  them  in  crowds,  and  were  as  much 
amused  as  they  had  been  in  Canada  at  the  inferior  social 
condition  of  the  patriot  captains  and  lieutenants.  As  the 
names  were  written  down  there  were  shouts  of  laughter  at 
each  tattered  farmer  who  announced  that  he  was  a  captain, 
or  "keppun, "  as  one  of  them  pronounced  it.  Young  officers, 
insolent  young  puppies,  anxious  to  show  that  they  were  sol- 
diers, were  continually  coming  up  to  curse  the  captives  in 
affected  Billingsgate,  and  to  parade  them  over  and  over  again 
under  the  pretence  of  looking  for  deserters. 

"  On  the  road,  as  we  approached  the  city,  we  were  beset  by  a  parcel 
of  soldiers'  trulls  and  others,  who  came  out  to  meet  us.  It  was  obvious, 
that  in  the  calculation  of  this  assemblage  of  female  loyalty,  the  war 
was  at  an  end;  and  that  the  whole  of  the  rebel  army,  Washington  and 
all,  were  safe  in  durance.  Which  is  Washington?  Which  is  Washington? 
proceeded  from  half  a  dozen  mouths  at  once;  and  the  guard  was  obliged 
to  exert  itself  to  keep  them  off."  (Graydon,  Memoirs,  edition  1846,  p. 
222.) 

The  prisoners  were  afterwards  treated  with  great  severity, 
crowded  into  stables,  and  churches,  almost  starved  to  death, 
and  the  raw  pork  and  maggoty  biscuit  that  they  were  allowed 
was  thrown  into  them  to  be  scrambled  for  as  if  they  were 
animals.  They  were  obliged  to  sleep  and  die  in  the  utmost 
filth ;  and  the  descriptions  read  like  those  of  Andersonville  and 
Libby  during  the  Civil  War.  Deaths  were  numerous  every 
day,  and  many  of  those  who  were  exchanged  were  in  such  a 
frail  state  of  health  from  barbarous  usage,  that  they  died  on 
the  road  before  reaching  home.14 

The  loss  of  nearly  three  thousand  troops  with  all  their 
equipment  at  Fort  Washington,  was  a  terrible  disaster  and 
dispirited  the  patriot  party  more  than  anything  that  had 
happened.  Both  Washington  and  Magaw,  were  bitterly  cen- 
sured. The  New  England  troops  could,  however,  draw  some 
comfort  from  it.     They  had  been  reviled  by  the  Southerners 


"American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  1233,  1234,  1429,  1430; 
Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  pp.  428-430,  459. 

533 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

for  cowardice  ever  since  the  retreat  of  the  Connecticut  men 
when  Howe  took  New  York.  They  now  declared  that  they 
were  very  glad  that  it  was  Southern  troops  that  had  sur- 
rendered Fort  Washington  and  they  were  not  slow  to  abuse 
Magaw  and  his  men  for  surrendering  too  soon. 

Washington's  reputation  even  among  his  own  friends,  sank 
to  the  lowest  point  it  reached  during  his  life.  He  had  hesi- 
tated and  vacillated,  they  said,  until  the  fatal  blow  was 
struck.  He  felt  the  misfortune  keenly,  and  tried  to  put  the 
best  face  on  it.15 


15  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  762,  763,  766,  889,  1498 ; 
Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  p.  350;  Writings 
of  Washington,  Ford  edition,  vol.  8,  pp.  23,  24. 


XLIX. 

THE  RETREAT  ACROSS  NEW  JERSEY  AND  THE 
CAPTURE  OF  LEE 

Fort  Lee,  on  the  Jersey  shore  opposite  Fort  Washington, 
was  Howe's  next  object;  and  on  the  night  after  taking  Fort 
Washington,  a  strong  force  under  Cornwallis,  crossed  the 
Hudson  and  the  next  morning  dragged  their  cannon  up  the 
high  bluffs.  The  patriots  abandoned  the  fort  precipitately; 
and  in  his  report  to  the  Ministry,  Howe  declared  that  Corn- 
wallis was  within  an  ace  of  capturing  some  two  thousand 
prisoners.  As  it  was,  they  suffered  another  huge  loss  of  sup- 
plies and  artillery,  and  were  obliged  to  retreat  so  suddenly, 
that  they  left  their  tents  standing  and  the  kettles  on  the  fire. 

When  Washington  crossed  the  Hudson  to  New  Jersey,  he 
had  expected  to  be  reinforced  by  5000  troops  from  that 
region.  But  he  did  not  obtain  half  that  number  and  lost 
hope  of  checking  the  advance  of  the  British  to  Philadelphia. 
It  was  a  terrible  clearing  out  and  dispersion  of  the  supporters 
of  independence,  and  would  have  been  far  worse  if  Howe  had 
been  more  in  earnest.1 

The  British  force  which  crossed  to  take  Fort  Lee,  intended 
to  enclose  the  patriot  troops  in  the  narrow  neck  of  land  which 
lies  between  the  Hudson  and  the  Hackensack  Rivers;  but 
Washington  escaped  in  time  across  the  Hackensack.  He  was 
now  in  another  narrow  neck  between  the  Hackensack  and  the 
Passaic,  and  the  land  was  so  level  that  there  was  no  oppor- 
tunity for  the  usual  patriot  tactics  of  resistance.  Hills  were 
always  the  great  resource  of  our  troops  against  the  superior 
numbers  of  their  enemy.  By  entrenching  on  a  hill  and  re- 
treating just  before  they  were  outflanked,  they  could  usually 
inflict  greater  loss  on  the  British  than  they  suffered  themselves. 


American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  iii,  p.  1275. 

535 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

Washington,  accordingly  left  this  strongly  loyalist  country, 
crossed  the  Passaic,  and  passed  down  towards  Newark.  If 
Howe  had  sent  a  force  from  New  York  by  way  of  Amboy  to 
reach  the  neighborhood  of  Newark  before  Washington  arrived, 
the  patriot  army  might  have  been  cut  off,  and,  in  any  event, 
would  have  been  in  a  serious  predicament.  The  loyalists  were 
surprised  that  Howe  did  not  take  this  obvious  advantage,  and 
Cornwallis  was  soundly  abused  for  not  pursuing  closely  after 
Washington,  who  lay  in  Newark  nearly  a  week  before  Corn- 
wallis moved  upon  him.  Washington  fell  back  to  New  Bruns- 
wick, and  having  followed  him  to  that  town,  Cornwallis  dis- 
continued the  pursuit,  leaving  Washington  to  retreat  at  his 
ease  to  Princeton.2 

From  Princeton,  Washington  on  the  2nd  of  December  took 
the  main  body  of  his  army  to  Trenton  on  the  Delaware,  hav- 
ing left  some  twelve  hundred  men  at  Princeton  to  watch  the 
British  and  report  if  they  again  began  the  pursuit.  The 
British  were  so  slow  in  coming  that  Washington  after  send- 
ing his  heavy  baggage  over  the  Delaware  had  some  thoughts 
of  facing  about  and  moving  towards  Princeton.  The  extra- 
ordinary slowness  of  the  pursuit,  attracted  universal  attention ; 
and  a  Hessian  officer  entered  in  his  diary  that  Cornwallis  had 
been  instructed  to  follow  until  the  patriots  should  make  a 
stand,  and  then  not  to  molest  them.3 

The  actual  fact  was,  that  Howe  had  ordered  Cornwallis 
to  go  no  further  than  New  Brunswick;  but  why  this  great 
precaution  was  taken  has  never  been  explained.  Inasmuch 
as  Howe  had  not  sent  an  overwhelming  force  to  seize  the  Hud- 


2  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  765,  789,  790,  925; 
Gordon,  "  American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  p.  354 ;  Jones, 
"New  York  in  the  Revolution,"  vol.  i,  p.  131;  Writings  of  Washington, 
Ford  edition,  vol.  v,  pp.  41-46. 

3  Pennsylvania  Magazine  of  History,  vol.  xxii,  p.  149 ;  "  A  View  of 
the  Evidence  Relative  to  the  Conduct  of  the  War,"  etc.,  p.  98.  Galloway, 
of  course,  has  much  to  say  on  this  subject.  See,  also,  Paine's  "  Crisis," 
no.  5;  Stryker,  "Battles  of  Trenton  and  Princeton,"  pp.  16,  327;  Ameri- 
can Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  1026-1028,  1037. 

536 


MAP  OF  WASHINGTON'S  RETREAT  ACROSS  NEW  JERSEY 


©F  THE 

_  U  N  I  V  £  R  S  i 


SLOW  PURSUIT 

son  Highlands  and  control  the  water  highway  up  to  Lake 
Champlain  and  Canada,  it  might  be  supposed  that  he  would 
make  a  rapid  pursuit  of  Washington's  small  straggling  force 
of  about  thirty-five  hundred  men  and  capture  or  scatter  it. 
But  instead  of  that,  he  was  sitting  down  comfortably  in 
New  York  and  had  prohibited  Cornwallis  and  his  five 
thousand  troops  from  pursuing  any  farther  than  New 
Brunswick. 

"Within  three  or  four  days,  however,  accompanied  by  rein- 
forcements, Howe  joined  Cornwallis  at  New  Brunswick, 
apparently  in  order  to  make  sure  of  careful  work.  He  marched 
his  whole  pursuing  force  with  the  utmost  dliberation  to  Prince- 
ton where  he  rested  seventeen  hours,  and  then  on  the  8th  of 
December  took  seven  hours  to  march  twelve  miles  to  Trenton, 
where  Washington  crossed  the  river  at  midnight  just  ahead  of 
him,  having  first  secured  all  the  boats  along  the  shores  for  a 
distance  of  seventy  miles. 

There  never  was  such  an  instance  of  studied  and  masterly 
slowness  by  a  disciplined  regular  force  of  some  six  thousand  men 
pursuing  a  defeated,  disorganized  band  of  only  thirty-three 
hundred,  which  was  all  Washington  had  when  he  crossed  the 
river;  and  of  these,  less  than  three  thousand  were  effectives. 
All  that  saved  America  at  this  time,  said  Washington,  was 
1  'the  infatuation  of  the  enemy."  "Nothing  was  more  easy 
to  them,  with  a  little  enterprise  and  energy,  than  to  dissipate 
the  remaining  force  which  still  kept  alive  our  expir- 
ing opposition. ' ' 4 

Philadelphia  could  now  easily  have  been  taken  by  the  over- 
whelming numbers  of  the  British.  Washington  fully  expected 
that  this  would  be  the  next  event.  The  patriots  were  building 
some  frigates  there,  which  could  have  been  destroyed  in  a 
few  hours.  But  Howe  would  not  go  into  Pennsylvania.  He 
said  he  had  no  boats  with  which  to  cross  the  Delaware;  and 
after  looking  along  the  shores  for  boats,  he  gave  up  the  at- 
tempt, although  the  lumber  to  make  flat  boats  and  rafts  was 


4  Writings  of  Washington,  Ford  edition,  vol.  8,  pp.  394,  503. 

537 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

lying  in  piles  before  his  eyes  in  Trenton,  and  he  could  have 
also  brought  boats  from  New  Brunswick.5 

Washington  felt  sure  that  Howe  would  cross  the  river;  he 
would  surely  build  boats,  or  bring  them  from  New  York;  he 
must  beyond  all  question,  intend  to  take  Philadelphia;  and 
the  patriot  forces  were  accordingly,  spread  along  the  Penn- 
sylvania shore  to  watch  for  any  movement  to  effect  a  crossing. 
But  the  precautions  were  hardly  necessary,  for,  although 
British  scouting  parties  were  seen  along  the  shore  as  if  looking 
for  a  good  place  to  cross,  yet  nothing  in  the  way  of  crossing 
was  done.  Howe  was  entirely  content  with  the  conquest  of 
New  Jersey  and  Washington  soon  became  convinced  that 
Philadelphia  had  nothing  to  fear  for  the  present.  But  he  still 
took  for  granted  that  Howe  would  act  the  part  of  a  vigorous 
general,  and  begin  operations  again  as  soon  as  possible.  He 
had  still  much  to  learn  about  Howe.6 

The  situation  expressed  in  figures  is  the  most  extraor- 
dinary one  ever  recorded — a  victorious  army  of  thirty-four 
thousand  declining  to  end  an  independence  movement,  repre- 
sented by  only  thirty-three  hundred  wandering  half-clothed 
guerillas.  The  patriot  Congress  had  fled  from  Philadelphia  to 
Baltimore ;  it  was  a  migrating  Congress,  meeting  at  Lancaster, 
York  or  any  place  that  was  safe,  for  many  a  day  afterwards; 
and  its  papers  and  printing  press  were  carried  about  in  a 
wagon.  Thousands  of  people  in  New  Jersey  and  New  York 
were  coming  in  to  take  the  British  oath  of  allegiance  and 
receive  their  certificates  of  protection  under  the  "Prohibitory 
Act."     Joseph  Galloway  and  the  Allen  family  of  Pennsyl- 


6Stryker,  "Battles  of  Trenton  and  Princeton,"  pp.  16,  18,  20,  27,  37; 
Jones,  "  History  of  New  York  in  the  Revolution,"  vol.  i,  p.  128;  Stedman, 
"American  War,"  edition  1794,  vol.  i,  pp.  220,  223;  American  Archives, 
fifth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  1053,  1081,  1094,  1095,  1107,  1108,  1119,  1137, 
1138,  1148,  1166,  1275,  1316,  1317;  Gordon,  "American  Revolution," 
edition  of  1788,  vol.  ii,  p.  390;  Wilkinson,  Memoirs,  vol.  i,  pp.  114-121. 

6  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  1201,  1215,  1216,  1217, 
1231,  1232,  1233,  1242,  1245,  1246,  1258,  1310,  1340;  Writings  of  Wash- 
ington, Ford  edition,  vol.  v,  pp.  72-84,  89,  100. 

538 


THOUSANDS  SUBMIT 

vania,  now  abandoned  the  patriot  cause  altogether  and  came 
over  to  New  Jersey  to  make  their  submission  to  General  Howe.7 

The  general  received  these  loyalists  as  subjects  of  the  Crown 
and  gave  them  a  written  certificate  to  that  effect.  A  proclama- 
tion was  issued  on  the  30th  of  November  ordering  all  rebels 
in  arms  and  all  rebel  political  bodies  to  disband;  and  a  cer- 
tificate of  pardon  and  protection  was  promised  to  all  who,  within 
sixty  days,  should  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  king. 

Thousands  availed  themselves  of  these  certificates;  and  no 
doubt  the  Howes  had  confidence  that  in  time,  with  a  continua- 
tion of  their  moderate  and  forbearing  use  of  the  army  and 
navy,  this  system  would  grow  into  some  sort  of  a  general  com- 
promise. Many  of  those  who  were  submitting  themselves  were 
patriots  who  had  been  in  favor  of  the  independence  movement 
if  it  should  succeed;  but  they  could  now  see  no  advantage  in 
prolonging  such  a  struggle  and  sacrificing  life  and  property 
to  the  patriotic  sentiment  that  it  was  better  to  die  than  to 
live  political  slaves.  The  defection  of  such  people  from  the 
patriot  party  was  ruining  it.  Elkanah  Watson  describes  an 
evening  he  spent  in  Boston  with  many  devoted  patriots  at  the 
house  of  Major  Thomas,  who  had  just  returned  from  the  retreat 
through  New  Jersey.8 

"  We  looked  upon  the  contest  as  near  its  close,  and  considered 
ourselves  a  vanquished  people.  The  young  men  present  determined  to 
emigrate  and  seek  some  spot  where  liberty  dwelt,  and  where  the  arm 
of  British  tyranny  could  not  reach  us."  (Memoirs  of  Elkanah  Watson, 
p.  24.) 

It  really  looked  as  if  the  peculiar  method  of  the  Howes  was 
succeeding;  that  there  would  be  a  voluntary  submission  ac- 
complished by  a  "Whig  general ;  that  the  colonies  would  accept 


T  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  1377,  1434;  Gordon, 
"American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  p.  357;  Parliamentary  Reg- 
ister, vol.  8,  p.  252.  See  also  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp. 
1074,  1075,  1159,  1164;  vol.  iii,  pp.  927,  1123,  1408. 

8  See  also  "  Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.  ii,  pp. 
105,  124,  125,  147;  "Life  of  George  Reed,"  p.  224;  American  Archives, 
fifth  series,  vol.  iii,  p.  1275. 

539 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

the  supremacy  of  Parliament;  and  that  the  American  idea 
of  self-government  and  independence  for  naturally  separated 
peoples  would  become  a  mere  anacronism. 

All  that  winter  the  prominent  loyalist  refugees  in  London 
were  filled  with  these  hopes.  They  had  been  living  for  several 
years  on  pensions  from  the  British  Government,  visiting  coun- 
try seats,  indulging  in  walking  or  coaching  tours,  which  was 
all  well  enough  in  its  way.  But  for  many  of  them  it  was  an 
exile  from  property,  home,  old  friends  and  old  associations; 
and  now  they  heard  that  they  could  soon  return  to  America 
with  order  and  good  government  reestablished.  They  prepared 
for  departure.  "They  began,"  said  one  of  them,  "to  count 
the  months  of  their  punishment.  A  New  York  gentleman  told 
me  if  I  did  not  mean  to  be  hurried,  it  was  time  to  pack  up."  9 

It  was  the  universal  opinion  of  the  time,  that  if  there 
had  been  one  vigorous  pursuit  by  Howe,  one  following  up  of 
any  one  of  his  advantages;  any  of  the  usual  methods  of  war, 
these  loyalists  would  have  realized  their  expectations,  would 
have  returned  to  their  old  homes  and  estates  with  perhaps 
additional  rewards  from  the  confiscated  estates  of  rebels. 
Many  of  the  conservative  patriots  were  said  to  be  now  ready 
for  any  sort  of  compromise;  and  the  submission  of  several 
provinces  was  daily  expected.10 

The  extreme  patriots,  however,  though  comparatively  few 
in  numbers,  nerved  themselves  to  fight  to  the  last.  The  Con- 
gress neither  disbanded  nor  offered  a  compromise.  Dr.  Rush 
afterwards  said,  that  all  that  saved  them  from  disbanding  was 
the  Declaration  of  Independence.  They  were  ashamed  to 
abandon  it.11  It  gave  them  a  rallying  point  and  a  tangible 
ideal.  The  vast  unexplored  continent  was  behind  them;  and 
Washington  prepared  to  cross  the  Alleghanies. 


•"  Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.  ii,  pp.  147,  153, 
172,  173. 

10  Pennsylvania  Magazine  of  History,  vol.  27,  p.  145 ;  Jones,  "  New- 
York  in  the  Revolution,"  vol.  i,  pp.  134,  135;  Eddis,  "Letters  from 
America,"  p.  341. 

11  Pennsylvania  Magazine  of  History,  id.  274-41. 

540 


CONFIDENCE  IN  LEE 

"  We  must  then  retire  to  Augusta  County  in  Virginia.  Numbers 
will  repair  to  us  for  safety,  and  we  will  try  a  predatory  war.  If  over- 
powered, we  must  cross  the  Alleghany  Mountains."  ( Irving,  "  Wash- 
ington," vol.  ii,  chap,  xii.) 

Thus  the  romantic  retirement  of  the  patriots  to  live  among 
the  Indians  and  the  buffalo,  which  Burke  had  so  eloquently 
described,  very  nearly  came  to  pass.  It  would  have  been  a 
migration  away  from  British  rule  very  much  like  the  grand 
trek  of  the  Boers  of  South  Africa  in  the  next  century;  and 
some  fierce  and  free  republics  might  have  grown  up  in  the 
Mississippi  Valley. 

Washington  was  in  the  position  of  a  badly  beaten  general; 
and  as  always  happens,  under  such  circumstances,  everything 
he  had  done  seemed  to  be  a  fatal  mistake;  and  some  other 
general,  Lee  for  example,  could  have  done  a  great  deal  better. 
Washington's  habit  of  consulting  others  so  industriously,  and 
reserving  his  final  decision  until  the  last  moment,  was  de- 
nounced as  his  hopeless  weakness  and  indecision  which  had 
caused  the  whole  train  of  disasters.  His  laborious  consulta- 
tions with  others  over  every  minute  detail,  brought  him,  it 
was  said,  under  the  influence  of  incompetent  minds.  His 
intimate  friend,  General  Reed,  lost  all  confidence  in  him;  and 
wrote  to  Lee  imploring  that  general  to  unite  the  scattered  army, 
reorganize  it,  and  supply  that  judgment,  experience  and  de- 
cision of  character  which  were,  he  said,  so  notoriously  lacking 
in  Washington. 

"  Oh,  General,  an  indecisive  mind  is  one  of  the  greatest  misfortunes 
that  can  befall  an  army,  how  often  have  I  lamented  it  this  campaign. 
.  .  .  you  have  decision,  a  quality  often  wanted  in  minds  otherwise 
valuable,  and  I  ascribe  to  this  our  escape  from  York  Island,  from  King's 
bridge,  and  the  Plains,  and  have  no  doubt  had  you  been  here  the  garrison 
of  Mount  Washington  would  now  have  composed  part  of  this  army.  .  .  . 
Every  gentleman  of  the  family,  the  officers  and  soldiers  generally,  have 
confidence  in  you — the  enemy  constantly  inquire  where  you  are,  and  seem 
to  be  less  confident  when  you  are  present."  ( W.  B.  Reed,  "  Life  of  Joseph 
Reed,"  vol.  i,  p.  255.) 

This  unquestioning  confidence  in  Lee  was  now  at  its  height. 
He  was  much  elated  by  it  and  intimated  in  no  doubtful  terms 

541 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

that  he  was  quite  ready  to  take  the  supreme  command  in  place 
of  the  officer  from  Virginia,  whose  indecision  of  mind  was, 
he  said,  "a  much  greater  disqualification  than  stupidity  or 
even  want  of  personal  courage;  accident  may  put  a  decisive 
blunder  in  the  right,  but  eternal  defeat  and  miscarriage  must 
attend  the  man  of  the  best  parts  if  cursed  with  indecision."  12 

Plausible  phrases  like  these  are  to  be  found  in  most  of 
Lee's  writings,  which  can  be  read  in  the  archives  side  by  side 
with  the  sanity  and  equipoise  of  the  letters  of  Washington. 
When  Washington  had  been  driven  across  New  Jersey  he  had 
written  to  Lee  to  join  him  with  such  forces  as  he  had  left. 
But  Lee  delayed,  thinking  he  had  an  opportunity  to  cut  off 
an  exposed  division  of  the  British.  After  he  crossed  into  New 
Jersey  he  still  delayed,  possibly  in  the  hope  that  he  could  fall 
upon  the  rear  of  the  British  who  were  pursuing  Washington, 
cut  their  communications  and  distinguish  himself.  Finally  on 
the  13th  of  December,  he  negligently  passed  the  night  at 
White's  Tavern,  near  Baskingridge,  several  miles  outside  of 
his  own  lines. 

Colonel  Harcourt,  commanding  a  British  scouting  party  in 
that  neighborhood,  was  told  by  a  loyalist  of  the  exposed 
position  of  the  "American  Palladium,"  and  the  next  morning 
he  surrounded  the  tavern.  It  was  a  curious  coincidence,  that 
Harcourt 's  party  was  composed  of  a  company  of  light 
dragoons  which  Lee  had  himself  commanded  in  1762  in  Spain 
at  the  taking  of  Villa  Velha. 

Harcourt  ordered  Cornet  Banistre  Tarleton,  afterwards 
famous  in  the  south,  to  begin  the  attack  on  the  tavern;  and 
according  to  some  accounts  Lee  begged  for  his  life  and  claimed 
the  benefit  of  the  proclamation  of  pardon  under  the  Prohibitory 
Act.  But  it  seems  best  to  follow  the  account  by  Wilkinson,  who 
was  an  eye  witness,  and  said  that  Lee  behaved  with  great 
coolness  and  asked  what  had  become  of  his  guard.  Wilkinson 
went  to  the  other  end  of  the  house  where  he  had  last  seen 
them,  but  they  were  flying  in  every  direction  pursued  by  the 


12  W.  B.  Reed,  "  Life  of  Joseph  Reed,"  vol.  i,  pp.  257-262. 

542 


CAPTURE  OF  LEE 

dragoons.  Believing  it  a  mere  marauding  party  Wilkinson 
placed  himself  against  the  wall  with  a  pistol  in  each  hand.  But 
all  the  British  wanted  was  Lee.  They  demanded  his  surrender 
and  when  he  gave  himself  up  they  mounted  him  on  Wilkinson 's 
horse  which  stood  ready  at  the  door  and  hurried  him  off  bare- 
headed and  in  his  slippers.13 

Both  Washington  and  Congress  made  every  effort  to  secure 
the  exchange  of  Lee,  and  the  Congress  sent  him  a  sum  of 
money  for  his  necessities,  while  in  captivity.  The  British, 
however,  were  at  first  inclined  to  treat  him  as  a  deserter  to 
be  sent  to  England  to  be  hung  or  shot.  But  at  the  time  he 
joined  the  American  army,  he  had  resigned  his  half  pay  in 
the  British  service,  and  this  saved  him  from  a  trial  under 
the  military  law  as  a  deserter. 

Severe  retaliation  was  threatened  by  the  patriots  if  Lee 
was  in  any  way  ill-treated.  For  this  reason,  Howe  would  not 
send  him  to  England  for  fear  retaliation  might  be  inflicted 
on  the  Hessian  officers  who  had  been  taken  prisoners  and 
cause  mutiny  and  discontent  among  his  foreign  troops.  Lee 
was,  therefore,  extremely  well  treated ;  lived  luxuriously  in  the 
rooms  of  the  New  York  assembly;  had  the  full  liberty  of  the 
city  and  its  limits;  horses  were  furnished  him;  he  was  allowed 
to  have  his  dogs  and  invite  friends  to  dinner;  and  was  finally 
exchanged  in  May,  1778. 

Some  months  after  he  became  a  prisoner  he  is  said  to  have 
announced  to  General  Howe  that  he  did  not  approve  of  the 
Declaration  of  Independence,  but  favored  a  compromise  and 
believed  that  some  compromise  could  be  effected.  As  this  was 
exactly  in  the  line  of  Howe's  policy,  Lee  was  given  leave  to 
communicate  with  the  Congress  and  wrote  that  body  a  letter, 


13  Wilkinson,  Memoirs,  vol.  i,  pp.  105,  108 ;  "  Diary  and  Letters  of 
Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.  ii,  p.  136;  Stryker,  "The  Battles  of  Trenton 
and  Princeton,"  pp.  55-59;  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp. 
1041,  1121,  1122,  1153,  1202,  1203,  1204,  1239,  1262,  1265,  1365,  1377; 
Jones,  "  New  York  in  the  Revolution,"  vol.  i,  p.  672 ;  Fonblanque,  "  Life 
of  Burgoyne,"  p.  50  note;  New  York  Historical  Society,  collections  1874, 
vol.  iv,  pp.  387-391. 

543 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

on  the  9th  of  February,  1777,  asking  for  the  appointment  of  a 
committee  to  communicate  with  him  on  matters  of  great  impor- 
tance to  himself  and  to  the  country.  Washington,  Robert  Mor- 
ris and  some  others  were  in  favor  of  sending  this  committee. 
But  after  much  discussion  and  hesitation,  the  Congress  refused. 
There  had  already  been  too  much  negotiation,  and  the  previous 
communications  with  the  Howes  had  injured  our  cause  in 
France  by  making  it  appear  that  we  were  willing  to  accept  a 
compromise  instead  of  absolute  independence. 

A  year  afterwards  in  January,  1778,  Elias  Boudinot,  had 
a  private  conversation  with  Lee,  then  still  a  prisoner  in  New 
York,  and  Lee  told  him  that  his  object  in  asking  for  the 
committee  from  Congress  had  been  to  disclose  to  them  the 
plan  of  the  British  campaign  for  the  following  summer,  which 
he  had  accidentally  discovered. 

We  now  know  that  about  the  time  Lee's  request  for  the 
committee  failed,  he  had  prepared  a  written  plan  professing 
to  show  that  the  best  way  for  the  British  to  conquer  America 
would  be  by  occupying  positions  at  Alexandria  and  Annapolis 
on  Chesapeake  Bay.  His  having  prepared  such  a  plan  was  not 
generally  known  until  nearly  a  century  after  the  Revolution, 
when  the  plan  in  his  handwriting  was  discovered  among  the 
papers  of  Howe's  private  secretary.  The  plan  from  a  mili- 
tary point  of  view  was  not  a  good  one;  and  what  were  Lee's 
purposes  in  this  plan  and  in  telling  Boudinot  that  he  would 
have  disclosed  the  British  plan  of  campaign  would  be  difficult 
to  fathom.14 


14  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  1369,  1374,  1428,  1607 ; 
Writings  of  Washington,  Ford  edition,  vol.  v,  p.  168  note;  431  note, 
vol.  vi,  p.  299  note,  463,  491;  Fonblanque,  "Life  of  Burgoyne,"  p.  161 
note;  Appleton's  Cyclopaedia  of  National  Biography,  title  "Lee;"  New 
York  Historical  Society  Collections,  1874  vol.  iv,  pp.  404,  416-424; 
Boudinot's  Journal,  p.  74,  1894 ;  J.  J.  Boudinot,  "  Life  of  Boudinot," 
vol.  i,  p.  140. 


L. 

ARNOLD  DEFEATED   ON  LAKE  CHAMPLAIN 

When  the  patriot  army  was  driven  out  of  Canada  in  the 
end  of  June  of  this  year  1776,  it  will  be  remembered,  that 
Burgoyne  stopped  the  pursuit  of  it  at  Isle  aux  Noix.  But 
the  island  was  so  damp  and  unhealthy  that  another  retreat 
was  made  to  Crown  Point.  Soon  Schuyler  and  Gates,  who 
were  now  in  command,  began  another  retreat  to  Ticonderoga 
which  brought  indignant  protests  from  Washington,  and  many 
of  the  field  officers  under  Schuyler  and  Gates  signed  a  written 
protest.  This  continual  retreating,  they  said,  when  no  enemy 
pursued  was  too  humiliating,  was  abandoning  too  much,  and 
sacrificing  at  once  the  naval  supremacy  of  the  lake,  which 
could  be  better  maintained  with  Crown  Point  as  a  base. 
But  Schuyler  and  Gates  were  unmoved  in  their  opinion, 
defended  with  vigorous  arguments  the  reasonableness  of 
the  move,  and,  being  on  the  ground,  claimed  the  right  to  use 
their  own  discretion.  They  began  building  a  navy  which 
was  put  under  the  command  of  Arnold.  They  made  most 
strenuous  efforts  to  restore  the  health  of  their  men  and  gather 
recruits;  and  they  fortified  the  high  ground  on  both  sides  of 
the  narrow  stretch  of  water  at  Ticonderoga.1 

The  summer  of  1776  passed  away  while  Arnold  on  one 
side  and  Carleton  on  the  other  were  preparing  armed  gondolas, 
barges,  sloops  and  schooners  to  fight  for  the  supremacy  of 
the  lake.  Arnold,  meantime,  had  displayed  the  weak  side  of 
his  nature  in  two  violent  quarrels,  one  with  Colonel  Hazen 
and  the  other  with  Colonel  Brown.2 

General  Schuyler,  also  at  this  time  became  indignant  at 


1  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  vi,  pp.  1071,  1074,  1101,  1107, 
1108,  1200-1203. 

2 Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  pp.  379,  380; 
American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  iii,  p.  1158. 
35  545 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

the  attacks  on  his  character,  fomented  by  the  New  Englanders, 
as  well  as  by  neglect  and  slights,  which  he  thought  he  had 
received  from  Congress.  He  resolved  to  resign  and  publish  a 
vindication  revealing  all  the  details  of  insubordination,  con- 
fusion and  mismanagement  of  inferior  officers  in  the  northern 
army.  It  may,  perhaps,  be  said  that  constantly  sick  with  ague, 
and  worn  out  with  anxiety  and  work  he  was  irritable,  and  over 
sensitive;  and  yet,  in  spite  of  this  consideration,  it  cannot  be 
denied  that  there  was  much  ground  for  the  indignation  he  felt. 

He  was  finally  persuaded  by  Washington,  and  other  leaders, 
and  also  by  the  Congress,  not  to  resign,  and  above  all  not  to 
publish  a  vindication  which  would  dispirit  the  patriot  cause 
by  revealing  the  shocking  conditions  of  disease  and  insubor- 
dination in  the  northern  army.  Congress,  and  also  the  Con- 
necticut assembly,  gave  him  a  vote  of  confidence  and  im- 
portant persons  combined  to  soothe  and  pacify  him.  But  the 
hatred  of  the  New  Englanders  pursued  him  for  the  rest  of 
his  life.  He  despised  the  New  England  officers,  because  they 
were  not  from  the  upper  ranks  of  life.  He  refused  to  ask 
any  of  them  to  dine  or  drink  with  him,  and  on  almost  every 
occasion  he  treated  them  with  studied  rudeness  and  contempt. 
The  New  Englanders  were  proud  of  their  levelling  and  demo- 
cratic principles,  and  they  deeply  resented  Schuyler's  in- 
solence. Whole  generations  of  them,  long  after  the  Revolution, 
were  brought  up  to  believe  all  manner  of  evil  of  the  Albany 
aristocrat,  and  the  prejudice  against  him  was  so  strong  and 
deep  rooted,  that  Daniel  Webster  confessed  that  with  him 
it  was  almost  ineradicable.3 

Gates  had  instructed  Arnold  to  run  no  wanton  risk  and 
not  to  cruise  too  far  down  Lake  Champlain.  On  the  16th 
of  September,  Arnold  learned  from  one  of  his  spies  that 
Carleton  would  soon  be  greatly  superior  to  him  in  ships, 
men  and  guns.  Not  believing  this  information,  or  as  some 
have   supposed  not  wanting  to   believe   it,   Arnold   sent   the 


3  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  440,  709,  846,  1206,  1384; 
Lossing,  "  Life  of  Schuyler;  "  G.  W.  Greene,  "Life  of  Nathanael  Greene," 
toI.  i,  pp.  435,  436. 

546 


BATTLE  OF  VALCOUR  BAY 

spy  in  irons  to  General  Gates  and  accepted  a  different  and 
more  agreeable  story  from  two  other  spies  who  proved  to  be 
impostors.4 

On  the  7th  of  October,  Arnold  had  pressed  far  down  the 
Lake  below  Crown  Point,  and  was  wondering  why  the  enemy 
did  not  come.  He  had  three  schooners,  a  sloop,  eight  gondolas, 
and  four  galleys,  with  guns  and  swivels  manned  by  about 
eighty  men.  Carleton's  force  was  a  ship,  two  schooners,  a 
radeau,  a  gondola,  20  gunboats,  and  some  long  boats  manned 
by  700  sailors  with  a  very  large  number  of  heavy  guns,  24 
pounders,  9  pounders,  and  6  pounders,  handled  by  a  detach- 
ment from  the  royal  artillery. 

To  meet  this  overwhelming  odds,  Arnold  anchored  his  little 
fleet  between  an  island  and  the  main  land  in  Valcour  Bay. 
On  the  11th  of  October,  having  been  warned  of  the  approach 
of  the  British  fleet  under  a  press  of  sail  before  the  northwest 
wind,  he  got  his  vessels  under  way  and  stood  out  to  meet 
them.  But  on  discovering  their  superior  force  he  returned  to 
his  position  between  the  island  and  the  main  land,  and  there 
the  enemy  attacked  him  late  in  the  morning,  having  run  a 
little  by  him  and  then  beat  up  against  the  wind  to  his  position. 

Arnold  was  advised  by  General  Waterbury  to  make  sail 
and  fight  them  on  a  retreat  in  the  main  lake;  but  he  insisted 
on  fighting  where  he  was  at  anchor.  This  gave  the  British 
the  advantage  of  surrounding  him  with  their  small  boats  and 
of  putting  Indians  in  the  woods  on  shore  to  annoy  him  with 
the  fire  of  small  arms.  But  the  fire  from  these  Indians  had 
little  or  no  effect;  and  if  we  admit  that  it  was  proper  for 
Arnold  to  stop  and  fight  such  a  superior  force,  instead  of 
retreating  and  reserving  his  fleet  to  fight  near  Ticonderoga, 
we  must  also  acknowledge  that  his  position,  in  the  opinion  of 
military  men,  was  well  chosen.  His  flanks  were  protected,  his 
force  condensed,  and  his  fire  concentrated. 

The  two  fleets  fought  each  other  all  the  afternoon,  with 


4  Wilkinson,  Memoirs,  vol.  i,  pp.  81,  87;   American  Archives,  fifth 
series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  885,  999,  1080,  1186. 

547 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

serious  loss  in  ships  and  men  for  the  Americans,  who,  never- 
theless, held  their  own  with  wonderful  courage  against  the 
enormous  odds  of  the  British.  If  it  be  true  that  Arnold  had 
purposely  risked  this  unequal  contest,  and  the  loss  of  his  men 
and  ships,  merely  to  gain  personal  distinction  for  himself,  he 
accomplished  his  purpose. 

An  American  schooner  and  a  gondola  were  destroyed,  and 
the  rest  badly  shattered;  while  the  British  lost  three  gondolas, 
two  sunk  and  one  blown  up  with  sixty  men.  Arnold  fought 
with  such  conspicuous  heroism  as  to  attract  the  admiration 
and  surprise  of  the  British.  Being  in  great  want  of  gunners, 
he  was  obliged  to  point  with  his  own  eyes  and  hands  most 
of  the  guns  on  the  Congress. 

At  night  fall  the  British  ships  ceased  firing  and  fell  back 
over  600  yards  to  the  southward.  The  Americans  having  used 
nearly  all  their  ammunition,  Arnold  decided  to  escape  during 
the  darkness  directly  through  the  British  fleet,  and  he  accom- 
plished this  by  one  of  those  devices  at  which  our  people  were 
always  so  skilful,  and  the  British  always  so  slow  to  detect. 

"  The  Trumbull  galley  commanded  by  a  Colonel  Wigglesworth  of  the 
Massachusetts  militia,  led  the  retreat  with  barely  sail  enough  set  to  give 
her  steerage  way,  and  a  lanthorn  under  her  stern,  so  masked  as  not  to  be 
seen  except  by  those  directly  in  her  wake,  and  the  rest  of  the  squadron 
followed  in  succession  equipped  in  the  same  manner  with  lanthorns,  at 
intervals  of  two  or  three  hundred  yards;  General  Waterbury  of  Con- 
necticut, and  General  Arnold,  in  the  Congress  and  Washington  gallies, 
bringing  up  the  rear.  The  night  was  profoundly  dark,  and  the  atmos- 
phere was  charged  with  a  heavy  fog;  strict  silence  and  stillness  was 
enjoined,  and  we  passed  the  enemy's  line,  without  seeing  one  of  his 
vessels  or  being  ourselves  perceived."  (Wilkinson,  Memoirs,  vol.  i, 
p.  90.) 

The  next  day  the  British  pursued  with  Arnold  fifteen  miles 
ahead.  But  the  wind  soon  sprang  up  from  the  southwest 
and  blew  a  light  gale  against  which  Arnold's  vessels  in  their 
crippled  condition  could  not  beat  and  several  of  the  smaller 
ones  were  run  ashore  and  abandoned.  The  next  morning 
the  pursuit  continued  with  the  wind  from  the  northwest. 
The  British  drew  near  enough  to  renew  the  fight,  and  captured 

548 


ARNOLD'S  FAILINGS 

General  Waterbury  and  his  ship.  Arnold  soon  afterwards 
found  the  remains  of  his  fleet  in  a  sinking  condition.  He  ran 
them  ashore,  set  them  afire  with  colors  flying,  while  his  men 
posted  themselves  on  the  bank  and  protected  the  colors  from 
the  enemy  until  all  were  consumed.5 

Arnold's  craving  for  distinction  was  always  passionate  and 
overwhelming.  He  had  conducted  the  expedition  through  the 
Maine  wilderness  to  Quebec  brilliantly  and  heroically;  but 
with  no  valuable  result;  and  some  have  gone  so  far  as  to  say 
that  he  had  now  sacrificed  his  fleet  in  a  rash  defence,  in 
which  victory  was  impossible,  and  no  end  could  be  gained, 
but  the  enhancement  of  his  reputation  for  courage. 

During  the  last  year  he  had  become  very  abusive,  incon- 
siderate and  quarrelsome  with  his  fellow  officers;  and  under 
the  plea  of  military  necessity,  he  was  believed  to  have  enriched 
himself  by  seizing  and  selling  for  his  own  advantage,  the  goods 
of  merchants  in  Montreal. 

The  American  fleet  of  Lake  Champlain  was  now  wiped 
out  of  existence.  Arnold  and  the  remains  of  his  crews  escaped 
overland  to  Ticonderoga.  It  was  expected  that  Carleton 
would  attack  Ticonderoga  and  attempt  to  press  southward  to 
Albany  and  the  Hudson  River  Valley  to  join  General  Howe, 
who  had  taken  New  York  and  inflicted  severe  defeat  on  "Wash- 
ington's army.  Schuyler,  Gates  and  Arnold  redoubled  their 
exertions  to  defend  Ticonderoga;  and  if  Carleton  should  suc- 
ceed in  taking  it  they  hoped  to  check  his  march  to  Albany. 

More  than  two  weeks  passed  without  any  sign  of  an  enemy ; 
for  the  wind  was  against  them.  But  on  the  morning  of  the 
28th  of  October  they  appeared  in  sight  and  landed  regulars, 


5  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  933,  982,  1028,  1038, 
1079,  1116,  1117,  1040,  1069,  1143,  1224;  "Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas 
Hutchinson,"  vol.  ii,  p.  116;  Gordon,  "American  Revolution,"  edition 
1788,  vol.  ii,  p.  583;  Wilkinson,  Memoirs,  vol.  i,  pp.  88,  93,  47,  49,  58, 
70,  75 ;  Cooper,  "  History  of  the  Navy  of  the  United  States ;  "  "  American 
Historical  Record,"  vol.  iii,  p.  438 ;  Sparks,  "  Correspondence  of  Ameri- 
can Revolution,"  vol.  i,  appendix;  "American  Historical  Record,"  vol. 
iii,  pp.  438,  501. 

549 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

Indians,  and  Canadian  troops  on  the  west  side  of  the  lake 
as  if  intending  to  attack  at  that  point.  All  day  their  boats 
were  moving  and  reconnoitering  from  one  side  of  the  lake  to 
the  other;  but  in  the  evening  they  all  reembarked  and  sailed 
away  northward  to  Crown  Point.  A  few  days  afterwards  the 
American  scouts  who  followed  them,  reported  that  the  whole 
British  force  had  returned  to  Canada  and  the  beautiful  water 
highway  of  Lake  Champlain  was  once  more  a  silent  wilderness. 

Carleton  seems  to  have  decided  that  an  assault  on  Ticon- 
deroga  would  be  a  useless  waste  of  life.  A  long  siege  during 
the  winter  was,  he  thought,  equally  impractical.  He  would 
have  to  open  trenches  in  ground  that  in  a  few  days  might  be 
frozen,  and  at  the  same  time  keep  open  his  long  line  of  com- 
munications, back  to  Canada.  He  was  much  criticised  in 
England,  and  by  his  own  officers ;  for  the  general  belief  was  that 
he  could  have  taken  Ticonderoga  and  pressed  on  southward  to 
Albany  where  he  might  have  been  met  by  Howe  with  his 
victorious  army,  coming  up  from  New  York.  This  with  the 
recent  disasters  to  the  patriots  in  New  York  and  New  Jersey 
would  be  so  overwhelming  a  triumph  of  the  British  arms  that 
the  war,  it  was  said,  would  have  been  ended. 

But  Carleton  may  have  been  wiser  than  they  supposed. 
Subsequent  events  showed  that  Howe  was  not  to  be  relied  upon 
for  any  movement  of  that  sort;  and  Carleton  was  hardly  pre- 
pared for  pressing  down  to  Albany  and  keeping  open  his  com- 
munications with  Canada.  It  seems  probable,  however,  from 
what  happened  the  following  year,  that  he  could  have  taken 
Ticonderoga  much  more  easily  than  he  supposed.  Its'  garrison 
under  Gates  consisted,  it  is  true,  of  9000  effective  men ;  but  a 
neighboring  height,  called  Sugar  Hill,  commanded  all  the  forti- 
fications, and  if  Carleton  had  taken  this  hill  the  garrison  would 
have  been  at  his  mercy.6 


8  American  Archives,  fourth  series,  vol.  vi,  p.  1263;  fifth  series,  vol. 
ii,  pp.  885,  999,  1080,  1186,  1125,  1131,  1132,  1138,  1142,  1144,  1170, 
1172,  1192,  1205,  1257,  1287,  1297,  1299,  1314,  1315;  vol.  iii,  pp.  501,  511, 
526,  605,  607,  621,  641;  Fonblanque,  "Life  of  Burgoyne,"  pp.  218,  220, 
224,  225;  Wilkinson,  Memoirs,  vol.  i,  pp.  90-94. 

550 


CARLETON  AND  HOWE 

The  gossip  of  London  described  Carleton  as  a  man  of 
strong  resentment.  He  disliked  Germain  and  was  supposed  to 
have  been  deeply  mortified  that  Howe,  his  junior  in  rank,  had 
been  given  the  important  command  in  America,  while  he  had 
been  confined  to  Canada.  He  was,  therefore,  resolved,  it  was 
said,  to  do  no  more  than  keep  Canada  clear  of  the  Americans, 
and  he  would  make  no  expedition  down  the  Hudson  Valley  to 
assist  his  rival  and  increase  that  rival's  reputation.7 

Howe,  on  the  other  hand,  was  said  to  be  equally  jealous 
of  Carleton,  and  would  make  no  expedition  up  the  Hudson  to 
join  an  expedition  from  Canada,  for  fear  that  Carleton  would 
reap  the  benefit  of  it.  He  wished,  it  is  supposed,  to  avoid 
bringing  Carleton  down  into  the  rebellious  colonies,  where 
he  would  assert  his  superior  rank  and  claim  the  chief  command. 

Carleton  had  saved  one  province  for  the  British  empire, 
and  he  was  the  only  one  of  the  British  officers  in  the  Revo- 
lution who  accomplished  what  he  was  sent  out  to  do.  He  has 
been  described  as  possessed  of  greater  and  more  masterful 
qualities  than  any  general  that  the  British  had  in  America  dur- 
ing the  war.  Bourinot  gives  him  high  praise  as  the  saviour  of 
Canada,  and  compares  him  with  Frontenac  as  a  soldier  and  with 
Lord  Elgin  as  a  statesman.8  Indeed,  he  impresses  one  as 
possessed  of  rather  more  effective  character  and  energy  than 
any  of  the  other  English  officers,  except  perhaps  Clinton,  who 
was  energetic  but  with  the  luck  and  odds  against  him. 


T  "  Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchinson,"  vol.  i,  p.  505 ;  vol.  ii, 
p.  117. 

8  Bourinot,  "  Story  of  Canada,"  p.  281  Heath,  Memoirs,  p.  316. 


LI. 

TRENTON 

In  that  long  campaign  of  the  summer  and  autumn  of  1776 
the  patriots  had  been  defeated  at  every  point.  They  had  been 
driven  out  of  Canada,  deprived  of  the  naval  supremacy  of  Lake 
Champlain,  defeated  at  the  battle  of  Long  Island,  New  York 
taken,  Fort  Washington  taken,  Washington's  army  scattered, 
and  the  remnant  of  it  under  his  personal  command  driven 
across  New  Jersey;  and  yet  Howe  stopped  short,  took  no  more 
active  measures,  followed  up  none  of  his  advantages. 

His  successes,  as  he  afterwards  put  it  in  his  Narrative, 
"had  very  nearly  induced  a  general  submission."  He  seemed 
to  be  waiting  for  the  "general  submission"  to  be  voluntarily 
offered  by  the  patriots.  He  apparently  expected  from  them 
some  compromise  plan  which  would  show  that  the  colonies 
could  be  retained  without  subjugation  as  the  Whigs  under 
Burke  and  Chatham  supposed  was  possible. 

But,  as  loyalists  like  Galloway  pointed  out,  this  stopping 
just  short  of  complete  subjugation  and  waiting  for  a  voluntary 
submission  merely  brought  into  the  British  lines  the  timid 
patriots  to  get  certificates  of  protection  for  the  time  being, 
while  it  gave  the  determined  and  courageous  nucleus  of  the 
patriot  party  time  to  recuperate,  collect  a  new  army  and  make 
another  stand  for  independence. 

When  the  Congress  departed  so  hurriedly  from  Philadel- 
phia on  the  12th  of  December,  they  left  Robert  Morris  in 
charge  of  their  affairs  and  General  Putnam  as  military  com- 
mander to  keep  down  the  loyalists  and  make  as  good  a  defence 
as  possible.  The  town  was  a  scene  of  distress  and  confusion, 
the  streets  filled  with  beds,  furniture  and  baggage  and  scarcely 

552 


ROBERT  MORRIS 

anybody  willing  to  remain  but  the  Quakers  and  the  sick  sol- 
diers in  the  hospital.1 

Morris's  willingness  to  become  the  solitary  representative 
of  the  infant  government  of  the  United  States  at  a  time 
when  it  was  abandoned  and  very  near  extinction,  was  his  first 
conspicuous  service  in  the  Revolution.  He  was  a  merchant, 
an  owner  of  ships,  cargoes  and  privateersmen  after  the  man- 
ner of  the  times,  bold  and  confident  in  commercial  speculation 
or  privateering  venture,  a  whole-souled,  humorous,  broad- 
minded  sort  of  man.  Two  other  members  of  the  Congress, 
when  it  fled  to  Baltimore,  had  been  appointed  to  act  with  him 
as  a  committee  of  executive  affairs  in  Philadelphia;  but  they 
went  home  and  left  all  to  him. 

For  the  next  few  months  he  conducted  the  executive  busi- 
ness of  the  patriot  government,  borrowed  money,  gave  direc- 
tions to  the  captains  of  the  continental  war-vessels,  superin- 
tended the  sale  of  prizes  they  brought  in,  bought  ammunition 
and  supplies  for  the  remains  of  Washington's  army,  hastened 
the  work  on  the  new  frigates,  and,  in  short,  kept  the  practical 
work  of  the   government   alive   almost   under   Howe's   nose.2 

It  seemed  as  if  Howe  purposely  refused  to  move  again  until 
Washington  had  a  sufficient  number  of  men  to  meet  him. 
Months  passed  away  before  Washington  was  able  to  collect 
ten  thousand  men,  and  nearly  a  year  after,  in  September, 
1777,  he  had  only  eleven  thousand  with  which  to  fight  the  battle 
of  the  Brandywine.  He  never  again  got  together  as  many  as 
he  had  had  at  New  York. 

Settled  down  in  New  York  for  the  winter  with  Mrs.  Loring 
and  cards  for  his  entertainment,  Howe  made  no  effort  to 
wear  out  the  scattered  patriot  commands  or  to  complete  and 
make   permanent  his   conquest.     He  never   did   anything   in 


1  Oberholtzer,  "  Life  of  Robert  Morris,"  p.  24;  Stryker,  "The  Battles 
of  Trenton  and  Princeton,"  p.  34 ;  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  iii, 
pp.  1198,  1199;  Stedman,  "American  War,"  vol.  2,  p.  230. 

2  Oberholtzer,  "  Life  of  Robert  Morris,"  pp.  24-30.  See,  also,  Ameri- 
can Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  1371,  1373,  and  title  "Robert 
Morris  "  in  index  of  Archives. 

553 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

winter.  The  three  winters  he  spent  in  repressing  the  rebellion 
were  passed  in  great  luxury  in  the  three  principal  cities, 
Boston,  New  York  and  Philadelphia,  waiting  for  a  voluntary  sub- 
mission. His  great  army  of  thirty  thousand  was  larger  than  the 
population  of  New  York,  and  filled  the  houses,  churches,  and 
public  buildings,  crowding  out  alike  both  the  loyalist  and 
the  patriot,  spreading  out  into  the  suburbs  and  cutting  down 
the  woodlands  for  miles  in  every  direction  to  supply  fuel. 

At  the  time  Howe  pursued  Washington  across  New  Jersey 
he  sent  a  force  of  some  six  thousand  troops  under  Clinton, 
to  occupy  Newport,  Ehode  Island,  because  its  easy  access  from 
the  sea  rendered  it  a  convenient  place  of  call  for  British  war- 
vessels.  Clinton,  it  is  said,  would  have  preferred  to  go  to 
Philadelphia,  the  taking  of  which  would  have  been  a  much 
more  serious  loss  to  the  patriots.  He,  of  course,  had  no  diffi- 
culty in  taking  Newport  which  was  defenceless,  and  he 
compelled  Commodore  Hopkins  with  his  small  patriot  fleet  to 
retire  up  Narragansett  Bay  to  Providence,  where  he  remained 
for  some  time  inactive.3 

It  also  seemed  necessary  that  Howe  should  do  something 
to  retain  control  of  New  Jersey,  which  he  had  passed  through 
with  his  army  in  pursuit  of  Washington;  and,  accordingly, 
he  placed  cantonments  of  troops  at  different  points  in  a  line 
from  Staten  Island  to  Trenton.  One  was  at  Amboy,  near 
Staten  Island,  one  at  New  Brunswick,  another  at  Princeton, 
and  two  cantonments  of  fifteen  hundred  Hessians  each  at 
Trenton  and  Bordentown  on  the  Delaware.  The  cantonments 
at  Trenton  and  Bordentown  were  six  miles  apart.  Trenton 
was  twelve  miles  from  the  force  at  Princeton,  and  New  Bruns- 
wick eighteen  miles  from  Princeton. 

The  forces  at  Trenton  and  Bordentown  were  small  and 


s  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  1112,  1114,  1115,  1130, 
1131,  1142,  1145,  1146,  1162,  1176,  1222,  1315,  1316,  1389,  1390,  1423; 
G.  W.  Greene,  "Life  of  Nathanael  Greene,"  vol.  i,  p.  300;  Jones,  "New 
York  in  the  Revolution,"  vol.  i,  p.  639 ;  Gordon,  "  American  Revolution," 
edition,  1788,  vol.  ii,  p.  359;  Stedman,  "American  War"  vol.  i,  p.  221. 

554 


MAP    SHOWING    THE    POSITION    OF  THK    BRITISH   ARMY   IN   NEW  YORK    IN    DECEM- 
BER,  1776,    WITH  ITS  CANTONMENTS  FOR  HOLDING  NEW  JERSEY 


OUTPOSTS  IN  NEW  JERSEY 

the  placing  of  them  in  such  an  exposed  position  was  a  fatal 
error  which  has  been  universally  condemned  by  all  persons  of 
military  knowledge.4  Considering  the  enormous  army  Howe 
had  in  New  York,  he  might  easily  have  made  his  outposts 
larger  and  arranged  them  within  supporting  distance.  Indeed 
that  a  general  of  so  much  ability  as  Howe  should  make  such 
a  great  blunder  has  always  seemed  to  every  one  who  has 
studied  the  subject  most  extraordinary  and  inexplicable. 
Cornwallis,  who  is  said  to  have  advised  the  placing  of  these 
outposts,  said  that  they  were  large  enough  and  that  no  mis- 
fortune would  have  happened  to  the  one  at  Trenton  if  Colonel 
Rail,  who  commanded  the  Hessians  there,  had  fortified  and 
protected  his  post  in  accordance  with  the  orders  that  had  been 
given  to  him.  As  it  was,  however,  these  two  isolated  posts, 
Trenton  and  Bordentown,  so  far  from  support,  were  tempting 
objects  of  attack.  Washington  saw  his  opportunity  to  make 
a  turning  point  in  the  war  and  prepared  to  destroy  them. 

Trenton  was  then  a  small  village  of  only  about  one  hun- 
dred houses.  Colonel  Rail,  its  Hessian  commander,  had  dis- 
tinguished himself  by  gallant  conduct  at  White  Plains  and 
at  the  taking  of  Fort  Washington;  but  at  Trenton,  he  appears 
to  have  spent  his  time  in  gay  confidence  of  security,  talked 
lightly  of  going  to  Philadelphia  when  the  river  was  frozen 
and  had  visions  of  capturing  Washington  in  some  of  the  raid- 
ing parties  of  patriots  that  constantly  hung  round  his  pickets 
and  outposts.  When  his  officers  complained  that  his  men 
needed  warmer  clothing,  he  laughed  at  them.  He  would  soon, 
he  said,  run  barefoot  over  the  ice  and  take  the  city  of  Phila- 
delphia; and  if  his  officers  did  not  care  to  share  his  honors 
they  might  retire  from  the  post.  He  placed  no  fortifications 
round  the  town  and  allowed  his  men  to  plunder  and  disaffect 
the  inhabitants.  The  fifteen  hundred  Hessians  lower  down 
the  Delaware  at  Bordentown,  were  under  Count  Donop,  and 


4  Clinton  said  that  Howe  admitted  that  they  were  too  far  away. 
Clinton's  MS.  notes  to  Stedman's  "American  War,"  vol.  i,  p.  224,  in 
Carter-Brown  Collection;  Stryker,  id.,  pp.  224,  225;  American  Archives, 
fifth  series,  vol.  iii,  p.  1317. 

555 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

seem  to  have  been  intended  to  cover  the  neighboring  town 
of  Burlington.5 

Washington  collected  the  remains  of  Lee's  forces,  which, 
together  with  his  own  and  some  sent  down  from  Lake  Cham- 
plain,  gave  him  six  thousand  effectives,  which  represented  all 
there  was  left  of  fighting  enthusiasm  in  the  patriot  population. 
There  was  still  something  to  fight  for  before  retreating  to  the 
western  wilderness.  The  Congress  had  not  disbanded,  and  Eob- 
ert  Morris  was  carrying  on  an  executive  government  at  Phila- 
delphia which  Howe  had  fortunately  abstained  from  attack- 
ing. But  everything  hung  on  a  thread,  and  Washington  was 
urged  to  make  some  capital  stroke  and  make  it  quickly,  "or" 
as  Reed  said,  "give  up  the  cause." 

So  many  were  taking  advantage  of  the  offer  of  pardon,  that 
in  a  little  time  the  American  army  would  be  dissolved;  and 
Reed  thought  that  a  great  number  of  the  militia  officers  would 
soon  take  the  benefit  of  that  offer  of  pardon  and  go  over  to 
the  British.6 

There  was  also  another  reason  for  attacking  the  post  at 
Trenton.  Although  Howe  had  not  attacked  Philadelphia,  it 
was,  nevertheless,  inconceivable  that  he  would  not  soon  go 
there,  especially  if  the  upper  part  of  the  river  froze  over;  and 
Washington  had  what  he  believed  to  be  secret,  and  sure  in- 
formation that  the  British  would  cross  the  Delaware  as  soon 
as  the  ice  was  strong.7  If,  therefore,  the  patriots  should  make 
a  successful  attack  upon  Trenton,  it  would  presumably  delay 


"Parliamentary  Register,  vol.  13,  pp.  4,  95;  Stedman,  "American 
War,"  vol.  i,  p.  224 ;  Stryker,  "  Battles  of  Trenton  and  Princeton,"  pp.  99, 
105;  "Observations  on  the  Conduct  of  Sir  William  Howe  at  the  White 
Plains,"  p.  19,  London,  1779.  See,  also,  Pennsylvania  Magazine  of  His- 
tory, vol.  xxii,  p.  402. 

6  The  rolls  gave  Washington's  numbers  as  10,804;  but  as  so  often 
happened,  nearly  half  of  these  were  sick  or  absent.  (Stryker,  "Battles 
of  Trenton  and  Princeton,"  p.  85;  Wilkinson,  Memoirs,  vol.  i,  p.  124;  W. 
B.  Reed,  "Life  of  Joseph  Reed,"  vol.  i,  pp.  270,  272.)  A  New  Jersey 
militia  colonel  had  already,  it  seems,  accepted  one  of  these  pardons. 
(Stryker,  "Battles  of  Trenton  and  Princeton,"  p.  78.) 

7  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  iii,  p.  1420. 

556 


A  CAPITAL  STROKE  PLANNED 

any  British  movement  to  Philadelphia,  save  the  patriot 
frigates  there,  and  the  headquarters  for  raising  money  and 
supplies  which  Robert  Morris  was  conducting. 

These  preparations  of  the  patriots  to  rehabilitate  them- 
selves, show  what  a  fatal  mistake  Howe  had  made  in  not  fol- 
lowing up  his  opportunities.  He  had  left  the  patriots  just 
enough  to  rebuild  upon,  and  so  long  as  he  had  left  them  this 
chance  the  resolute  nucleus  of  the  party  would  never  come  to 
that  voluntary  submission  which  he  appeared  to  be  expecting. 

The  Congress  finding  itself  safe  at  Baltimore  immediately 
set  about  the  work  of  rehabilitation  without  the  slightest 
thought  of  submission.  They  adopted  a  resolution  increasing 
Washington's  authority,  giving  him  power  to  raise  recruits 
and  appoint  and  dismiss  officers  in  his  own  way;  to  take  prop- 
erty whenever  and  wherever  he  wanted  it,  allowing  a  reason- 
able price;  and  to  arrest  and  confine  loyalists  and  those  who 
would  not  take  the  continental  money.  These  dictatorial  pow- 
ers were  given  him  for  a  period  of  six  months,  and  full  con- 
fidence was  expressed  that  he  would  not  misuse  them.8 

But  he  did  not  receive  these  powers  until  the  end  of  De- 
cember, and,  meantime,  it  was  only  by  the  greatest  persuasion 
that  he  kept  together  his  small  force  of  six  thousand  men. 
That  peculiar  character,  General  Gates,  had  gone  to  the  Con- 
gress at  Baltimore  to  persuade  them  that  Washington  was 
making  a  mistake,  that  while  he  was  watching  the  enemy  at 
Trenton  they  would  cross  the  river  lower  down  and  reach  Phila- 
delphia, and  that  Washington  should  retire  south  of  the  Sus- 
quehanna and  there  form  a  new  army.9 

Artists  and  sculptors  have  represented  Washington's  troops 
as  dressed  in  handsome  uniforms.  But  those  who  saw  them 
agree  in  describing  them  as  dressed  in  ragged  summer  clothes, 
with  their  shoes  so  worn  that  the  frozen  roads  cut  their  bare 
feet.     Their  camps  along  the  Delaware  were  filled  with  loyal- 


8  This  resolution  was  adopted  December  27,  before  the  Congress  had 
heard  of  the  battle  of  Trenton  on  the  25th.  (Stryker,  id.,  pp.  243,  244; 
American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  iii,  p.  1613. 

9  Wilkinson,  Memoirs,  vol.  i,  p.  127. 

557 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

ists  and  spies,  for  the  most  of  the  people  in  that  region  were 
lukewarm  or  hostile,  had  given  up  the  war  as  hopeless,  and 
thought  that  the  best  plan  was  to  make  some  sort  of  peace  with 
Howe. 

Washington  was  well  informed  of  the  condition  and  num- 
bers of  the  Hessian  troops  at  Trenton  and  Bordentown,  largely, 
it  is  said,  through  the  fidelity  of  a  half  idiot  youth  who  acted 
as  a  spy.  He  was  so  deficient  that  the  enemy  allowed  him  to 
wander  about  everywhere;  but  he  had  sufficient  intelligence 
to  return  to  Washington  with  very  accurate  reports  of  what 
he  saw.  He  was  afterwards  suspected  by  the  British,  and 
confined  in  prison  where  he  starved  to  death.10 

Having  finally  made  up  his  mind  what  to  do  Washington 
divided  his  force  into  three  divisions,  which  were  to  cross  the 
Delaware  through  the  floating  ice  at  about  the  same  time.  One 
under  Cadwalader  with  eighteen  hundred  men  was  to  go 
against  Donop  at  Bordentown;  another  with  about  eleven 
hundred,  under  Ewing,  was  to  cross  almost  in  front  of  Tren- 
ton and  station  itself  on  the  other  side  of  Assunpink 
Creek  directly  south  of  the  village  to  cut  off  escape  and  pre- 
vent any  reinforcements  from  Donop ;  and  the  third,  of  about 
twenty-five  hundred  of  the  best  troops  under  Washington 
himself,  was  to  cross  considerably  above  Trenton  and  come 
down  to  make  the  main  attack  upon  the  village.  If  Cadwalader 
was  successful  at  Bordentown  and  Ewing  and  Washington 
successful  at  Trenton,  all  the  divisions  would  unite  and  push 
on  against  Princeton  and  New  Brunswick.11 

For  some  time  small  squads  of  patriots  had  been  in  the 
habit  of  crossing  the  river  almost  every  day  and  skirmishing 
with  the  Hessians  guards  and  outposts.  Whether  this  was 
intended  as  a  preparation  for  the  main  attack,  so  that  when 
the  Hessians  should  see  its  advance  guard,  they  would  think 
it  only  another  skirmishing  party,  is  not  clear;  but  it  was 
well  calculated  to  have  that  effect. 


10  Gordon,  "  American  Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  p.  391. 

11  Stryker,  id.,  pp.  81,  82,  113,  344-347. 

558 


PLAN  OF  ATTACK 

Galloway  said  that  there  was  a  division  arranged  to  draw 
off  Donop 's  attention  and  prevent  him  going  up  to  the  relief 
of  Trenton.  For  this  purpose  an  irregular  band  of  some 
four  hundred,  many  of  them  boys,  were  sent  up  from  Phila- 
delphia along  the  Jersey  side  of  the  Delaware  towards  Bor- 
dentown  with  orders  not  to  fight,  but  to  encourage  Donop  to 
pursue  them  down  the  river  and  as  far  away  from  Trenton  as 
possible.  This  part  of  the  plan  is  said  to  have  succeeded ;  and 
Donop  pursued  this  party  until  most  of  his  men  were  twelve 
miles  from  Bordentown  and  eighteen  miles  from  Trenton.  But 
Gordon  says,  and  apparently  with  truth,  that  this  diversion 
was  accidental,  and  of  no  particular  effect,  for  Donop  had 
returned  to  Bordentown  before  Trenton  was  attacked.12 

Washington  felt  the  greatest  uneasiness  at  hazarding  an 
attack  on  which  so  much  depended.  If  he  failed,  if  he  was 
beaten  back  what  would  become  of  the  patriot  cause?  At 
the  last  moment  he  found  that  his  effective  troops  were  far 
fewer  than  he  had  any  conception  of;  and  yet  he  felt  that  he 
must  go  on.  " Necessity ,' '  he  said,  "dire  necessity,  will,  nay 
must  justify  my  attack.' '  He  wrote  to  Reed  to  arrange  minor 
attacks  on  as  many  of  their  posts  as  possible,  for  the  "more 
we  can  attack  at  the  same  instant,  the  more  confusion  we  shall 
spread,  and  greater  good  will  result  from  it. ' ' 13 

The  two  divisions  under  Cadwalader  and  Ewing  met  with 
serious  difficulties  in  crossing  the  Delaware.  To  cross  through 
the  ice  was  cold  and  difficult,  but  not  dangerous  work.  If  the 
ice  was  floating  loosely  the  passage  could  be  made,  but  if  the 
pieces  were  closely  packed  together  by  the  tide,  boats  could  not 
be  forced  through  them. 

Where  Washington  himself  crossed,  above  the  influence  of 
the  tide,  the  ice  appears  to  have  been  floating  loosely.  It  was 
Christmas  night,  cold,  and  at  eleven  o'clock  a  northeast  snow- 


a  Galloway,  "  Letters  to  a  Nobleman  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War," 
p.  159;  W.  B.  Reed,  "Life  of  Joseph  Reed/'  vol.  i,  p.  273;  Stryker,  "The 
Battles  of  Trenton  and  Princeton,"  pp.  74,  200;  Gordon,  "American 
Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  p.  393. 

18  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  iii,  p.  1376,  1377,  1400. 

559 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

storm  began,  which  became  sleet  before  morning.  It  was  se- 
vere exposure  for  patriots  with  ragged  summer  clothes  and 
worn-out  shoes.  They  labored  hard  with  boats  and  artillery, 
most  efficiently  assisted  by  Glover's  Marblehead  sailors,  and 
encouraged  by  some  of  the  best  officers  that  the  Revolution 
had  thus  far  developed,  Greene,  Sullivan,  Knox,  Lord  Stirling, 
St.  Clair,  and  Stark.  But  with  their  utmost  exertions  far  more 
time  was  spent  in  crossing  than  they  expected.  It  was  three 
in  the  morning  before  Knox  had  all  his  artillery  over,  and 
nearly  four  when  they  took  up  their  line  of  march.  The  timing 
of  the  combined  movements  had  evidently  failed,  and  Washing- 
ton saw  that  he  could  not  reach  the  Hessian  camp  before  dawn, 
and  that  his  chance  of  surprising  them  in  the  darkness  was 
gone.  It  was  a  serious  moment  in  the  American  cause,  while 
he  hesitated  what  to  do.  It  was  a  momentous  decision  when  he 
resolved  to  take  all  chances  and  press  on  to  the  straggling 
village  of  one  hundred  houses,  where  Rail  and  his  fifteen 
hundred  men  had  been  celebrating  Christmas  night. 

It  has  been  supposed  that  Washington  had  resolved  to  stake 
his  life  on  the  issue,  and  not  survive  defeat.  The  patriot 
cause,  he  believed,  was  to  be  rehabilitated  or  extinguished  that 
night.  Circumstances,  however,  favored  him;  for  although 
daylight  was  coming  the  enemy  had  no  entrenchments  and  were 
protected  only  by  pickets  and  sentinels.  Rail  spent  the  whole 
night  with  wine  and  cards.  A  loyalist  sent  him  a  note  warning 
him  of  Washington 's  movements,  but  he  thrust  it  into  his  pocket 
without  reading  it.  He  had  previously  been  warned  by  numer- 
ous loyalists  and  spies  that  the  Americans  were  preparing  for 
some  sort  of  attack;  but  he  would  not  believe  it  and  spoke 
contemptuously  of  his  enemies.14 

Early  in  the  evening  a  roving  band  of  about  fifty  patriots 
who  had  been  scouting  for  three  days  in  New  Jersey,  and 
knew  nothing  of  the  intended  attack  on  Trenton,  moved  up 
near  Rail's  picket  on  the  Pennington  road  and  exchanged  a 
few  shots.    This  is  supposed  to  have  led  the  Hessians  to  believe 


Stryker,  "  Battles  of  Trenton  and  Princeton,"  p.  125. 

560 


ATTACK  ON  TRENTON 

that  no  other  attack  was  intended  and  they  immediately  re- 
laxed their  vigilance. 

It  was  broad  daylight  and  exactly  eight  o'clock  in  the 
morning  when  Washington's  force  reached  the  first  pickets  and 
drove  them  in  on  the  village.  In  spite  of  the  daylight,  the 
Americans  accomplished  a  complete  surprise,  which,  in  addi- 
tion to  their  greater  numbers,  gave  them  an  overwhelming 
advantage.  They  were  in  the  streets  and  Knox  was  using  his 
artillery  before  the  Hessians,  hurrying  from  the  houses,  could 
fully  make  up  their  minds  what  to  do.  The  Hessians,  says 
Knox,  "endeavored  to  form  in  streets  the  heads  of  which  we 
had  previously  the  possession  of  with  cannon  and  howitzers; 
these  in  the  twinkling  of  an  eye  cleared  the  street.  The  backs 
of  the  houses  were  resorted  to  for  shelter.  These  proved  in- 
effectual. The  musketry  soon  dislodged  them. ' '  Some  started 
to  escape  towards  Princeton,  but  Washington,  seeing  the  move- 
ment, sent  a  force  which  cut  them  off.  A  few  escaped  by  the 
way  which  Ewing  was  intended  to  have  obstructed  if  he  had 
succeeded  in  crossing  the  river.  The  rest  carried  on  a  hope- 
less and  confused  fight  in  the  streets,  which  is  supposed  to 
have  lasted  thirty-five  or  forty  minutes,  at  the  end  of  which 
time  Rail  had  been  mortally  wounded,  and  most  of  his  men 
had  surrendered.15 

Poor  Rail,  while  trying  to  rally  his  men,  had  been  struck  in 
the  side  by  two  balls.  He  was  assisted  into  the  Methodist 
church  at  Queen  and  Fourth  Streets,  and  thence  carried  on  one 
of  the  benches  of  the  church  to  his  own  headquarters,  where 
Washington  and  General  Greene  visited  him,  took  his  parole, 
and  through  an  interpreter  exchanged  some  kindly  words 
before  he  died. 

The  completeness  of  the  surprise  and  the  utter  inability  of 
the  Hessians  to  get  together  and  defend  themselves,  is  shown 
by  the  casualties.     The  Hessians  lost  twenty-two  killed  and 


"Stryker,  id.,  pp.  218,  220;  Drake,  "Life  of  General  Knox,"  p.  36; 
Stedman,  "American  War,"  vol.  i,  pp.  230-234;  Wilkinson,  Memoirs, 
vol.  i,  p.  128. 

561 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

eighty-four  wounded,  while  Washington  had  only  two  officers 
and  two  privates  wounded.16 

The  other  two  divisions  which  intended  to  support  Wash- 
ington, seem  to  have  found  the  ice  jammed  by  the  tide,  for 
they  failed  to  cross  that  night.  But  the  next  day  Cadwalader 
crossed  at  Burlington,  to  find  that  Donop  had  retreated.17 

The  Hessian  prisoners  were  sent  to  Philadelphia  to  be 
paraded  in  triumph  for  the  sake  of  animating  the  patriots 
and  depressing  the  loyalists.  It  was  a  curious  scene  as  they 
marched  up  Chestnut  Street  by  Independence  Hall,  patriot 
women  screaming  at  them  and  threatening  to  choke  them,  and 
others  trying  to  give  them  bread.  They  were  warmly  clad 
in  good  uniforms;  but  the  patriots  troops  who  guarded  them 
had  on  summer  clothes  and  some  of  them  were  marching  bare- 
footed on  that  cold  winter's  day.18 

Four  handsome  Hessian  battle  flags  had  been  captured; 
and  one  of  these,  a  beautiful  silken  standard  with  a  lion  ram- 
pant, and  the  motto  Nescit  Pericula,  was  sent  to  Baltimore  to 
the  Congress.  They  needed  all  the  comfort  that  could  be  given 
to  them.  They  had  nearly  gone  out  of  existence;  and  it  is 
curious  to  reflect  that  what  is  now  the  most  powerful  govern- 
ment in  the  world  was  in  January,  1777,  hiding  itself  in  a 
little  room  in  Baltimore  and  taking  a  homely  and  pathetic 
delight  in  decorating  the  wall  with  a  Hessian  battle  flag.19 

It  was  a  wonderful  success  for  the  patriots;  it  continued 
the  war  when  it  had  almost  ceased  and  the  patriot  cause  was 
about  to  expire;  it  reanimated  the  whole  patriot  party;  it  con- 
vinced Europeans  of  the  ability  of  Washington  to  seize  an 
opportunity;  it  was  a  momentous  turning  point  in  the  Revo- 
lution ;  and  a  typical  instance  of  American  promptness,  energy 
and  good  luck. 


18  Stryker,  id.,  pp.  194,  195. 

"Niles,  "Principles  and  Acts  of  the  Revolution,"  edition  1876, 
p.  249;  Stryker,  "  Battles  of  Trenton  and  Princeton,"  p.  218. 

"Stryker,  "Battles  of  Trenton  and  Princeton,"  pp.  213,  214;  Ameri- 
can Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  1429,  1441-1448. 

19  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  1507,  1509,  1510. 

562 


SUCCESS  REANIMATES  THE  PATRIOTS 

It  has  even  been  said  that  the  failure  of  Ewing  to  cross  the 
river  directly  in  front  of  Trenton  was  an  advantage ;  and  some 
have  called  it  a  most  providential  circumstance;  for  if  he  had 
succeeded  in  crossing  during  the  night,  as  was  intended,  he 
might  have  found  it  impossible  to  conceal  his  force  until 
Washington's  delayed  force  arrived  long  after  daylight.  Ewing 
had  no  orders  to  attack,  and  his  eleven  hundred  militia  were 
hardly  competent  to  make  a  successful  attack  on  the  Hessians. 
He  might  have  been  seen  in  crossing,  as  there  was  a  picket  and 
an  outpost  close  to  the  shore ;  and  if  he  had  crossed  unseen  and 
carried  out  his  orders  of  stationing  himself  on  the  other  side 
of  the  creek  on  the  south  of  Trenton,  to  cut  off  the  escape  of 
the  Hessians,  they  would  probably  have  seen  him  and  have 
been  well  prepared  long  before  Washington  arrived  with  the 
main  body.  In  fact,  it  has  been  thought  that  Washington  may 
not  have  intended  that  the  movements  of  Ewing  and  Cad- 
walader  should  be  anything  more  than  mere  feints  on  the  other 
side  of  the  river.20 


^Stryker,  id.,  pp.  231,  233;  "Diary  and  Letters  of  Thomas  Hutchin- 
son," vol.  ii,  pp.  139,  140. 


LII. 

PRINCETON 

Immediately  after  the  affair  at  Trenton,  Washington  re- 
turned to  the  Pennsylvania  side  of  the  river,  with  his  prisoners, 
captured  artillery  and  other  spoil.  But  these  being  secured 
and  finding  no  vigorous  movement  made  from  New  York,  he 
recrossed  and  again  occupied  Trenton.  It  was  a  very  hazardous 
movement,  military  men  have  thought,  to  thus  put  his  little 
force  between  the  barrier  of  the  river  and  the  overwhelming 
force  Howe  might  send  to  avenge  Trenton. 

Cornwallis  with  eight  thousand  men  set  out  from  New  York 
and  Washington  crossed  Assunpink  Creek  immediately  south 
of  Trenton,  and  entrenched  himself  along  a  ridge  on  the  bank 
of  that  stream,  where  he  was  joined  by  Cadwalader's  force 
and  all  the  recruits  that  the  greatest  exertions  of  the  patriots 
could  send  to  him.  He  and  his  officers  were  borrowing  money 
on  their. private  credit  in  order  to  offer  a  bounty  of  ten  dollars 
to  all  the  men  who  would  re-enlist  when  their  term  expired  on 
the  first  of  January.  Robert  Morris  sent  him  $50,000  which 
he  had  raised  on  his  own  credit  from  friends  of  the  cause  in 
Philadelphia.1 

But  even  with  the  assistance,  Washington  was  likely  to 
lose  half  his  force  on  the  first  of  January.  He  made  earnest 
appeals  to  them  to  remain.  General  Knox  addressed  them. 
General  Mifflin  used  all  his  eloquence.  He  was  famous  for 
his  skill  in  addressing  troops  and  encouraging  enlistments ;  and 
he  now  promised  that  if  they  would  remain  six  weeks  longer 
they  would  receive  a  share  of  captured  property,  besides  the 


1  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  iii,  p.  1514;  Stryker,  "Battles 
of  Trenton  and  Princeton,"  p.  256;  Oberholtzer,  "Life  of  Morris,"  p.  32; 
Wilkinson,  Memoirs,  vol.  i,  pp.  133-135. 

564 


CORNWALLIS'  MARCH  OBSTRUCTED 

ten  dollars  bounty.  At  the  close  of  his  stirring  appeal,  four- 
teen hundred  of  the  ragged  bare-footed  veterans  poised  their 
muskets  in  token  of  their  assent. 

Thus  the  patriot  force  was  dragged  over  another  crisis,  and 
counting  old  and  new  troops,  Washington  had  scraped  together 
about  five  thousand  men.  But  they  were  in  a  somewhat  dan- 
gerous position,  which  Washington  seemed  again  determined 
to  fight  out  or  perish  in  the  attempt.  How  was  he  to 
meet  Cornwallis,  who  had  left  New  York  with  eight  thou- 
sand men?  Cornwallis  had  reinforced  the  cantonments  on 
his  way,  and  marched  from  Princeton  on  the  2nd  of  January, 
1777,  with  about  fifty-five  hundred  men  to  retake   Trenton. 

Washington  had  the  day  before,  sent  several  strong  detach- 
ments composed  largely  of  Hand's  riflemen  to  harass  the 
enemy  on  their  march  from  Princeton  and  dispute  every  inch 
of  the  way.  The  weather  had  become  milder,  and  on  the  night 
of  the  1st  of  January,  it  rained  heavily,  so  that  on  the  next 
day  roads  deep  in  mud  assisted  the  riflemen  to  delay  the  British 
march. 

Rendered  cautious  by  the  vigor  of  the  resistance  in  front 
of  them  from  every  clump  of  woods  and  fence  row,  Cornwallis 
consumed  the  whole  day  on  the  march  of  twelve  miles  and 
entered  Trenton  just  before  sunset,  where  the  two  forces  ex- 
changed cannon  shots  across  Assunpink  Creek. 

It  was  impossible  for  Washington  to  retreat  across  the 
Delaware  in  the  presence  of  the  British.  To  retreat  southward 
along  the  Jersey  shore  and  take  the  chances  of  an  opportunity 
to  cross  to  Pennsylvania  was  possible,  but  it  would  be  defeat, 
would  invite  pursuit,  and  possibly  the  breaking  up  of  the  army. 
To  attack  the  superior  disciplined  British  the  next  day  or 
allow  them  to  attack,  would  also  be  defeat.  All  the  success  at 
Trenton  would  be  undone  and  the  patriot  cause  would  sink 
back  into  hopelessness  and  the  old  questions  of  voluntary  sub- 
mission or  retreat  to  the  western  wilderness  would  again  arise. 
Any  form  of  retreat  must  be  avoided ;  and  here  the  delay  of  the 
British,  and  their  late  arrival  in  Trenton  made  an  opportunity. 

Drawn  up  along  the  Assunpink  Creek  with  his  left  on  the 

565 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

Delaware  and  facing  the  British  in  Trenton,  Washington  was 
in  a  position  to  have  his  right  flank  turned  and  be  hemmed 
into  the  triangle  formed  by  the  creek  and  the  Delaware.  The 
British  officers  saw  this  weakness  and  discussed  the  question 
of  proceeding  at  once  to  hem  in  Washington  that  night.  The 
quartermaster-general,  Sir  William  Erskine,  said,  "If  Wash- 
ington is  the  general  I  take  him  to  be  he  will  not  be  found 
there  in  the  morning."  But  the  others  agreed  with  Corn- 
wallis  that  there  was  plenty  of  time,  that  Washington  had 
no  means  of  retreat  and  that  they  could,  without  much  diffi- 
culty, "bag  him"  in  the  morning.  So  sure  of  this  did  Corn- 
wallis  feel,  that  he  sent  no  scouts  round  Washington's  right 
to  give  warning  of  any  attempt  to  retreat.2 

Washington's  headquarters  had  become  untenable  from 
the  fire  of  the  enemy  and  he  called  a  council  of  his  officers  to 
meet  at  the  quarters  of  General  St.  Clair  and  consult  as  to 
what  should  be  done  in  the  serious  predicament  in  which  they 
found  themselves.  Washington  was  inclined  to  hazard  an 
engagement;  but  St.  Clair,  who  had  had  occasion  to  examine 
the  roads  on  the  right  flank  during  the  day  suggested,  it  is 
said,  a  bold  and  brilliant  solution  of  their  difficulties,  which 
was  at  once  accepted  by  Washington  and  the  other  officers 
and  carried  out  with  great  promptness.3 

At  midnight  they  left  their  camp  fires  burning,  and  men 
working  noisily  on  entrenchments,  and  with  the  rest  of  the 
force,  passing  out  through  the  way  Cornwallis  had  left  un- 
guarded,  performed  the  brilliant  manoeuvre  of  marching  to 


2  Cornwallis  was,  of  course,  severely  criticised  in  England  for  this 
piece  of  carelessness.  (Stryker,  id.,  pp.  268,  461,  464;  Clinton's  MS. 
notes  to  Stedman's  ''American  War,"  vol.  i,  p.  236.) 

3  The  credit  of  suggesting  this  successful  movement  was  claimed 
by  St.  Clair,  and  there  is  no  evidence  that  Washington  ever  directly 
denied  it.  (Wilkinson,  Memoirs,  vol.  i,  p.  140;  St.  Clair  Papers,  vol.  i, 
pp.  35,  36 ;  G.  W.  Greene,  "  Life  of  Nathanael  Greene,"  vol.  i,  p.  303 ; 
Stryker,  id.,  p.  273.)  In  his  report  of  the  battle  Washington's  language 
does  not  necessarily  imply  that  he  originated  the  movement.  (Writings 
of  Washington,  Ford  edition,  vol.  v,  p.  148.) 

566 


ST.  CLAIR'S  SUGGESTION 

the  rear  of  that  general  and  striking  his  line  of  communica- 
tions toward  Princeton  and  New  York.  In  boldness  and 
originality  of  conception  it  was  worthy  of  Napoleon. 

The  weather  had  changed  and  grown  cold.  The  mud  which 
had  delayed  the  British  advance  from  Princeton,  was  frozen 
hard.  The  patriots  passed  over  it  rapidly,  marking  it  with 
blood  from  their  naked  feet  and  dragging  some  light  artillery 
with  the  wheels  wrapped  in  old  cloths  to  keep  the  rumbling 
from  being  heard.4 

They  reached  Princeton  about  daybreak  when  three  regi- 
ments of  British  reinforcements  were  starting  out  to  join 
Cornwallis  at  Trenton.  One  of  them  under  Colonel  Mawhood, 
followed  by  part  of  another  regiment,  passed  out  of  Prince- 
ton on  Washington's  left  as  he  entered  by  another  road. 
Mawhood  was  riding  a  brown  pony  with  his  two  favorite 
spaniels  frisking  about  him.  Seeing  the  Americans  entering 
the  village,  he  turned  back  and  attempted  to  seize  a  good  po- 
sition along  a  hedge-row.  A  patriot  brigade  under  Mercer 
reached  it  first  and  fired  at  the  close  range  of  only  about  thirty 
yards.  The  British  then  performed  their  favorite  movement 
of  instantly  charging  before  the  patriots  could  reload,  and  they 
drove  them  back  with  the  bayonet,  killing  Colonel  Haslet  of 
the  famous  Delaware  regiment,  and  mortally  wounding  Mercer, 
who  fought  with  his  sword  and  refused  to  surrender  because 
they  called  him  a  rebel. 

Having  few  bayonets,  Mercer's  men  were  driven  back  to 
the  top  of  a  ridge  where  Washington  rallied  them  in  person, 
within  thirty  yards  of  the  enemy.  Mifflin's  and  Cadwalader's 
troops  and  Hand's  riflemen,  rushed  to  the  rescue  and  there 
was  a  hot  fight  for  some  minutes.  The  British  charged  with 
courage  and  precision;  but  they  were  effective  only  with  the 
bayonet.  Their  marksmanship  was  ridiculous.  They  could 
scarcely,  as  some  one  has  said,  hit  a  barn  when  they  were 
inside  of  it.     Their  artillery  fired   over  the   heads   of  their 


*  Pennsylvania  Magazine  of  History,  vol.  20,  p.  515;  Lee,  Memoirs, 
vol.  i,  p.  273  note. 

567 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

enemy;  while  almost  every  shot  from  the  American  guns  was 
true,  and  the  fire  of  the  riflemen  was  so  deadly,  that  "the 
British  screamed  as  if  so  many  devils  had  got  hold  of  them.', 
Their  charges  were  all  repulsed  with  heavy  loss ;  and  Mawhood 
was  only  too  glad  to  draw  off  his  men,  abandon  his  artillery 
and  continue  his  march  to  join  Cornwallis  at  Trenton,  pur- 
sued for  several  miles  by  the  patriots  who  in  this  "fox  chase " 
as  Washington  called  it  captured  fifty  of  his  men.5 

The  other  regiment  and  a  half  of  British,  which  were  left 
in  Princeton,  fought  for  awhile  in  the  college  buildings,  and 
the  light  battery  commanded  by  young  Alexander  Hamilton, 
sent  some  shots  into  Nassau  Hall  which  retains  the  marks  of 
them  to  this  day.  These  British  also  made  a  stand  outside  of 
Princeton;  but  the  superior  numbers  of  the  Americans  soon 
sent  them  in  full  retreat  to  New  York. 

The  battle,  from  the  modern  point  of  view,  was  a  small 
affair.  The  engagement  with  Mawhood  is  said  to  have  lasted 
hardly  twenty  minutes;  and  the  troops  engaged  in  that  affair 
and  in  the  fighting  in  the  streets  of  Princeton  were  only  about 
four  thousand  or  five  thousand  Americans  against  some  two 
thousand  British.  But  coupled  with  Trenton  as  part  of  a 
sudden  success  in  the  midst  of  overwhelming  defeat,  it  aroused 
great  rejoicing  among  the  patriots,  and  deserves  all  that  has 
been  said  of  it. 

The  artist  Trumbull,  who  served  as  a  patriot  officer  in  the 
Revolution,  regarded  the  moment  when  Washington  saw  how 
he  could  escape  from  before  Cornwallis,  and  attack  Princeton 
as  the  acme  of  his  career;  and  in  the  perhaps  over-idealized 


5  The  American  loss  was  about  forty  killed  and  wounded  and  the 
British  loss  has  been  variously  estimated  at  from  400  to  600  killed, 
wounded,  and  prisoners.  (Stryker,  id.,  p.  292;  Writings  of  Washington, 
Ford  edition,  vol.  v,  pp.  148,  151;  "Life  of  George  Read,"  pp.  328,  250; 
Wilkinson,  Memoirs,  vol.  i,  pp.  141-150.)  See  as  to  the  bayonet  American 
Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  i,  pp.  887,  1065.  The  British  soldiers  aimed  so 
badly  that  they  had  to  shoot  cattle,  it  is  said,  by  platoon  fire.  ("  Corre- 
spondence of  Henry  Laurens,"  p.  25.) 

568 


CORNWALLIS  ALARMED 

but,  in  many  ways,  valuable  portrait  which  Trumbull  painted, 
he  represented  Washington  at  the  supreme  instant  of  the  first 
thought  of  this  manoeuvre.6 

When  Cornwallis  awoke  in  the  morning  and  found  that 
his  enemy  had  eluded  him  and  had  gone  to  the  rear  by  a 
movement  of  such  originality  as  to  be  entirely  outside  of  the 
scope  of  the  British  military  mind,  he  was  greatly  alarmed 
about  his  communications,  the  valuable  stores  and  the  £70,000 
in  the  military  chest  at  Brunswick.  He  started  at  once  with 
his  whole  force  to  save  them,  and  uin  a  most  infernal  sweat," 
as  his  enemies  delighted  to  relate,  and  indulging  in  not  a  little 
profanity,  hastened  to  catch  up  with  the  patriots. 

Less  than  a  month  before  Howe  had  spent  over  two  days 
in  pursuing  Washington  from  New  Brunswick  to  Trenton; 
but  now  Cornwallis,  with  the  fear  of  losing  the  £70,000  before 
his  eyes,  made  the  march  from  Trenton  to  New  Brunswick 
in  exactly  one  day.  He  was  close  on  the  heels  of  Washington, 
who  was  destroying  bridges  and  throwing  every  obstacle  in 
his  way.  General  Lee  was  supposed  to  be  imprisoned  at  New 
Brunswick;  and  if  the  patriots  could  capture  the  money  chest 
and  also  rescue  Lee,  it  would  be  such  a  success  that  Washing- 
ton thought  it  might  put  an  end  to  the  war. 

But  there  was  a  limit  to  human  endurance.  The  ragged 
and  barefooted  patriot  troops  had  been  marching  and  fighting 
for  nearly  forty-eight  hours,  and  were  falling  asleep  in  the  in- 
tense cold  by  the  roadside.  Washington  hesitated.  He  did  not 
wish  to  lose  the  superb  advantage  he  had  already  gained  by 
aiming  at  too  much.  He  called  a  council  of  his  officers,  and 
some  were  inclined  to  take  the  shortest  safe  road  to  the  Dela- 
ware and  cross  back  into  Pennsylvania.  But  an  officer  sug- 
gested turning  northward  into  the  heart  of  New  Jersey,  and 
taking  up  a  very  strong  position  on  high  ground  which  he 


"Stryker,  id.,  p.  263.  Frederick  the  Great  said  that  Washington's 
achievements  in  those  ten  days,  from  the  25th  of  December  to  the  4th 
of  January  were  the  most  brilliant  recorded  in  military  annals  (Stryker, 
id.,  p.  464.). 

569 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

knew  of  at  Morristown,  west  of  New  York,  and  half  way  be- 
tween New  York  and  the  Delaware.7 

Cornwallis  was  intent  only  on  saving  the  money  and  sup- 
plies. If  the  patriots  had  reached  new  Brunswick  ahead  of 
him  and  captured  the  money  chest  he  would  have  been  the 
most  outwitted  and  disgraced  general  in  history.  Having 
reached  New  Brunswick  he  was  content  to  secure  that  place 
and  Amboy.  All  the  rest  of  New  Jersey  was  abandoned,  and 
Putnam  came  from  Philadelphia  with  a  few  patriot  militia 
and  occupied  Princeton  without  molestation  for  the  rest  of  the 
winter  and  spring.  During  the  same  time  Washington  re- 
mained quietly  at  Morristown.  He  had  destroyed  three  British 
outposts,  nearly  captured  a  fourth ;  and  Howe  made  no  attempt 
to  restore  them.  For  the  next  five  months  Washington,  with 
only  about  six  thousand  men,  which  at  times  sank  to  only  three 
thousand,  held  two  widely  separated  posts  in  New  Jersey,  while 
Howe  remained  totally  inactive  with  twenty-eight  thousand 
men  at  New  York,  Amboy  and  New  Brunswick.  So  quiet 
and  secure  was  it  at  Morristown,  that  Mrs.  Washington  and 
other  wives  of  patriot  officers  came  to  the  camp  to  join  their 
husbands.  The  Congress  also  left  Baltimore  and  returned  to 
Philadelphia,  where,  as  sometimes  happens  in  a  revolution, 
there  was  a  scene  of  gaiety,  speculation  and  extravagance 
strangely  inconsistent  with  the  poverty  and  rags  of  the  patriot 
army.8 

That  "these  wonderful  days  in  New  Jersey"  were  a  bitter 
disappointment  to  loyalists  and  Englishmen,  goes  without  say- 
ing. But  there  was  one  person  who  seems  to  have  been 
supremely  indifferent  and  undisturbed  and  that  was  General 
Howe.     Washington  had  now  taken  his  measure  and  under- 


7  It  is  disputed  whether  the  officer  who  made  this  suggestion  was 
Greene,  Knox,  or  St.  Clair.  Stryker,  id.,  p.  300;  Gordon,  "American 
Revolution,"  edition  1788,  vol.  ii,  p.  402;  St.  Clair  Papers,  vol.  i,  p.  42; 
Drake,  "  Life  of  Knox,"  pp.  38,  40. 

8G.  W.  Greene,  "Life  of  Nathanael  Greene,"  vol.  i,  pp.  309,  356; 
Jones,  "New  York  in  the  Revolution,"  voUri,  p.  170;  Stedman,  "Amer- 
ican War,"  vol.  i,  pp.  239-241. 

570 


FRAUD  IN  THE  BRITISH  ARMY 

stood  his  methods.  For  the  rest  of  the  British  general's  year 
and  a  half  in  America,  the  patriot  general,  no  matter  how  low 
his  force  dwindled,  always  remained  encamped  within  a  few 
miles  of  the  vast  host  of  his  Whig  antagonist  undisturbed  and 
unpursued.  There  was  no  need  of  retreating  among  the  In- 
dians and  the  buffalo  of  the  West. 

That  was  a  marvellous  winter  in  New  York  with  a 
gorgeously  caparisoned  army  far  outnumbering  the  population 
of  the  town  in  time  of  peace.  Thousands  of  loyalists  crowded 
into  the  town  as  a  city  of  refuge,  and  their  newspapers  con- 
stantly assured  them  of  the  impossibility  of  American  inde- 
pendence and  the  absurdity  of  American  self-government  by 
mob  rule  and  tar  and  feathers.  They  had  their  concerts,  plays, 
balls  and  charades,  their  coffee  houses  and  their  taverns  with 
a  band  of  music  playing  God  Save  the  King.9 

But  the  poor  loyalists  outside  the  town,  as  a  British  officer 
informs  us,  were  not  so  fortunate. 

"  Several  good  families  whom  their  armies  have  ruined  come  daily 
shivering  for  our  protection,  and  meet  with  such  a  reception,  according  to 
their  stations,  as  can  only  be  obtained  from  clemency  guided  by  order 
and  economy.  Many  of  the  poor  ladies  have  scarce  a  petticoat  to  cover 
them,  being  stripped  of  furniture,  apparel,  and  everything  that  could 
make  a  Yankee  soldier  either  a  shirt  or  a  pair  of  breeches."  ("A  Letter 
from  an  Officer  in  New  York,"  London,  1777,  p.  2.) 

Judge  Jones,  who  spent  that  winter  in  New  York,  has  left 
us  a  graphic  and  indignant  description  of  the  opportunities 
for  money  making  which  were  allowed  in  the  British  army. 
The  commissaries,  quartermasters,  barrack  masters,  engineers, 
and  their  assistants  and  followers,  were  making  prodigious 
fortunes  by  the  most  wholesale  fraud.  The  loyalists  about  New 
York  had  supplied  the  invading  army  with  horses  and  wagons 
in  the  campaign  of  1776,  and  were  cheated  out  of  their  pay- 
ment. In  the  campaign  of  1777  they  again  supplied  the  horses 
and  wagons,  and  were  again  defrauded.     The  quartermaster, 


•Van  Tyne,  "Loyalists  of  the  American  Revolution,"  pp.  251-265. 

571 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

Judge  Jones  says,  netted  for  himself  £150,000  out  of  that 
campaign  and  retired  to  England  a  rich  man.  His  successor 
made  another  fortune.  During  the  seven  years  of  the  war, 
four  quartermasters  in  succession  returned  with  fortunes 
varying  from  £150,000  to  £200,000.  These  were  enormous 
sums  in  those  times,  fully  the  equivalent  of  three  million  dol- 
lars in  our  day.  The  fifth  quartermaster  was  stopped  halfway 
on  his  road  to  a  fortune  by  the  arrival  of  Sir  Guy  Carleton  to 
take  command  in  1782. 

Howe's  favorite  engineer  received  for  merely  levelling 
the  patriot  fortifications  about  New  York  a  fortune,  with 
which  he  retired  and  bought  a  town  house  and  a  country  seat. 
His  successor  was  given  greater  opportunities.  The  barrack- 
masters  seized  private  houses,  public  buildings,  and  churches, 
for  which,  of  course,  they  paid  nothing,  and  rented  them  to  the 
army.  They  cut  down  the  oak  and  hickory  forests  all  round 
New  York  and  for  sixty  miles  along  the  Sound,  selling  two- 
thirds  of  a  cord  to  the  army  at  the  price  of  a  cord,  sixteen  to 
twenty-eight  shillings,  and  selling  the  fraudulently  reserved 
third  to  the  loyalists  at  £4  and  £5  for  two-thirds  of  a  cord. 
Like  the  quartermasters  and  engineers,  they  too  became  nabobs 
of  the  West.  And  then  there  were  commissaries  of  forage, 
commissaries  of  cattle,  and  commissaries  of  artillery,  not  to 
mention  the  commissaries  of  prisoners,  together  with  all  their 
dependents,  male  and  female,  who  enjoyed  a  perfect  carnival 
of  plunder  and  wealth.10 

Meantime,  light  and  hope  for  the  patriots  began  to  appear 
in  France,  although  few  besides  the  secret  committee  of  the 
Congress  knew  of  the  favorable  turn  of  affairs.  That  com- 
mittee had  sent  Silas  Deane  to  France.  The  French  court 
would  not  enter  into  a  war  with  England;  but  they  would 
assist  the  Americans  by  sending  from  Holland  £200,000  worth 
of  arms  and  ammunition  to  St.  Eustatius,  or  other  ports  in  the 


10  Jones,  "New  York  in  the  Revolution,"  vol.  i,  chap,  xvi;  "Thoughts 
on  the  Present  War,"  etc.,  p.  51,  1783;  Stedman,  "American  War,"  vol. 
i,  p.  311,  London,  1794;  Stevens,  "  Fac-similes  of  MSS.,"  vol.  vii,  p.  707. 

572 


HORTALEZ  AND  COMPANY 

West  Indies,  and  from  the  governors  of  these  places  the  Amer- 
icans could  obtain  them  by  asking  for  Monsieur  Hortalez.11 

Hortalez  and  Company  was  the  firm  name  Beaumarchais 
had  assumed;  and  under  this  name  he  carried  on  in  appear- 
ance a  peaceful  mercantile  business  in  Paris.  But  the  money 
was  furnished  him  by  the  French  Government  and  his  cargoes 
went  to  the  Americans.  He  was  a  strange  character,  watch- 
maker, speculator,  adventurer,  the  author  of  "The  Barber  of 
Seville"  and  "The  Marriage  of  Figaro,"  still  a  distinguished 
light  of  French  literature,  and  filled  at  that  time  with  the 
most  devoted  enthusiasm  for  the  patriots  under  Washington. 

But  the  Congress  wanted  more  important  assistance  from 
France  than  supplies  of  arms  and  clothing.  They  wanted  the 
French  King  to  make  a  treaty  of  alliance  with  America  and 
declare  war  against  England.  The  Congress,  accordingly 
voted  on  the  30th  of  December,  just  before  the  battle  of  Prince- 
ton, that  the  European  powers  might  rest  assured  that  the 
Congress  would  maintain  American  independence  and  not  com- 
promise with  Great  Britain,  that  if  France  would  assist  with 
her  army  and  fleet  in  capturing  the  fishing  banks  and  the  islands 
of  New  Foundland  and  Cape  Breton,  those  valuable  fisheries 
should  henceforth  be  held  in  common  by  the  United  States  and 
France  to  the  exclusion  of  all  other  nations,  and  half  the  island 
of  New  Foundland  should  be  ceded  to  France.  All  the  West 
India  islands  that  should  be  taken  from  England  should  also 
belong  to  France.  At  the  same  time  the  Congress  voted  that 
if  Spain  would  declare  war  against  Great  Britain  the  United 
States  wouldrassist  in  securing  for  Spain  the  town  of  Pensacola 
in  Florida,  gpd  would  also,  under  certain  circumstances,  assist 
Spain  in  a  war  against  Portugal.12 

In  September  the  Congress  had  appointed  Franklin  and 
Jefferson  to  go  to  France  as  commissioners  and  join  Silas 
Deane  in  the  work  of  negotiating  with  the  French  Court.    The 


11  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  818-822,  and  title  "  Silas 
Deane  "  in  index  of  Archives. 

12  Journals  of  the  Congress,  Ford  edition,  vol.  vi,  pp.  1054-1058. 

573 


• 


AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 

ill-health  of  Jefferson's  wife  compelled  him  to  decline,  and 
Arthur  Lee,  who  was  already  acting  as  agent  for  the  Congress 
in  Europe,  was  elected  in  his  place.  On  the  26th  of  October, 
1776,  Franklin  left  Philadelphia  and  with  his  two  grandsons 
drove  some  fifteen  miles  down  the  Delaware  to  Marcus  Hook, 
where  the  " Reprisal' '  a  swift  war-ship  of  the  Congress, 
awaited  him.13 

The  "Reprisal"  and  Wicks,  her  captain,  afterwards  became 
famous  in  the  Revolution  for  their  numerous  prizes  and  per- 
sistent good  luck.  Franklin,  too,  was  a  lucky  man  and  with 
him  on  board  the  fleet  "Reprisal"  outsailed  all  the  British 
cruisers,  made  the  voyage  to  Quiberon  Bay  on  the  coast  of 
France  in  thirty-three  days,  and  as  she  entered  the  bay  cap- 
tured two  British  vessels  loaded  with  lumber,  wine,  brandy 
and  flaxseed,  which  when  sold,  together  with  a  small  cargo  of 
indigo  carried  in  the  "Reprisal,"  would  go  to  pay  the  expenses 
of  the  mission  to  France. 

Franklin  already  famous  in  that  country  as  a  man  of 
science  and  a  philosopher,  was  now  arriving  in  the  midst  of 
that  excitable  people  in  the  most  unexpected  and  romantic 
manner ;  fresh  from  the  American  wilderness  and  the  rebellion ; 
and  coming  in  with  two  great  merchantmen  as  prizes,  which 
were  to  pay  his  way  in  the  world  of  European  diplomacy.  It 
was  like  a  scene  from  the  Arabian  Knights,  and  the  French 
received  him  with  an  outburst  of  enthusiasm  which  never 
abated  during  the  nine  years  of  his  residence  among  them.14 


13  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  ii,  pp.  1198,  1212-1216,  1237. 
11  American  Archives,  fifth  series,  vol.  iii,  pp.  1117,  1118,  1197. 


UN? 


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